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Figure 1 F. L. McDougall in Vienna, 1930s.
Source: E. McDougall. 
‘McDougall brings me a new idea every morning.’
— S. M. Bruce
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It is now some 30 years since I joined the Historical Documents Section of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs, to find that my first major task would be to edit 
a volume of letters written throughout the 1920s by Frank Lidgett McDougall 
to Australian Prime Minister Stanley Melbourne Bruce.1 I knew a little of 
Bruce, having read some of his papers concerning his wartime work as High 
Commissioner in London. The name McDougall had cropped up occasionally in 
those papers, attached to cables about wheat, but I knew nothing more of him.
W. J. (Bill) Hudson, Editor of Historical Documents in the Department of 
Foreign Affairs, had begun a series of volumes on early Australian foreign policy 
by publishing R. G. Casey’s letters reporting to Bruce on political events in 
London.2 Having discovered that the Bruce papers included a similar file of 
letters from McDougall on trade and economic matters, he thought they would 
make a valuable complementary volume. He wrote to McDougall’s daughter 
Elisabeth, then working in the British Foreign Office, that ‘the Bruce papers 
now make it clear that much of Bruce’s most interesting and constructive ideas 
in fact were your father’s or were stimulated by him’. Elisabeth welcomed the 
proposal for publication and offered to have what papers she possessed copied 
at Australia House; a set was made for our use and another for the National 
Library of Australia.3
As we worked on the letters, my colleagues and I were awed by the energy 
and devotion McDougall brought to his work, and saddened to think that he 
remained so little known in Australia. In 1984 Bill Hudson suggested I write a 
full biography of McDougall for publication. Work on that progressed slowly in 
my spare time, but biennial conferences of editors of foreign policy documents, 
inaugurated by our British counterparts in 1989, provided brief but essential 
opportunities for research in overseas archives.
Continuing a project over so many years involves difficulties and inefficiencies, 
but there are compensations. As I worked through a mass of collected material, 
notes in familiar handwriting reminded me of the help of past colleagues and 
friends. I particularly want to acknowledge the hard work and enthusiasm 
of those who worked with me on Letters from ‘A Secret Service Agent’: Kate 
Birrell, Rhonda Piggott and Ken Power. The many able scholars who worked 
1 W. J. Hudson and Wendy Way, eds, Letters from ‘A Secret Service Agent’: F. L. McDougall to S. M. Bruce 
1924–1929, [hereinafter LFSSA] Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1986.
2 W. J. Hudson and Jane North, eds, My Dear PM: R. G. Casey’s Letters to S. M. Bruce 1924–1929, Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1980.
3 NLA, MS6890. Letters from Hudson to E. McDougall, 1 August, and reply, 30 August 1979, are now in 
my possession.
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in the Department of Foreign Affairs/Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(DFA/DFAT) Historical Documents Section over the years noted useful material 
as they trawled through the archives, discussed the project and generally 
encouraged me. For this support, I thank Pamela Andre, Frank Bongiorno, 
Damien Browne, Barbara Cooper, Kathleen Dermody, Philip Dorling, Jeffrey 
Grey, John Hoffmann, David Hood, Ashton Robinson and Martin Sharp, former 
DFAT archivists Leith Douglas, Elizabeth Nathan and the late Chris Taylor, 
and diplomatic consultant Jeremy Hearder. I am grateful for the interest and 
assistance of distinguished scholars and public servants associated with the 
DFAT Editorial Advisory Board, particularly Geoffrey Bolton, Peter Edwards 
and Roger Holdich. I owe a considerable debt to David Lee, the present Director 
of DFAT Historical Publications and Information Section, for his interest over 
many years, and in particular for his superb biography of S. M. Bruce,4 which 
has been of great assistance in my most recent work.
After my retirement from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, a chance 
meeting with Pat Jalland led her to suggest a doctorate at The Australian National 
University based on the biography. The suggestion was timely: it had become 
clear to me that the task was too big to be undertaken without the help and 
advice of others. I am most grateful to Pat for persuading me to a course that has 
proved of immeasurable value. The friendship of scholars engaged in various 
studies has been both enjoyable and stimulating and I thank all members of 
the History Program for the enlargement of experience and ideas to which they 
contributed. I am particularly grateful for helpful discussions with Barry Smith 
and Margaret Steven, and for the assistance of Barbara Dawson, Janet Doust, 
Karen Smith, John Thompson, Susan Mary Withycombe and Malcolm Wood. 
Members of my advisory panel, Anthony Low and James Gillespie, provided 
helpful suggestions and encouragement. Barry Higman was most generous 
with his time—both as advisor and as supervisor in 2004; he questioned and 
prodded, impelling me to greater efforts in the scope of the study and in clarity of 
writing and thinking, and gave frequent assistance with books and suggestions 
for further reading. I remain very grateful for his important contribution. My 
supervisor, Tim Rowse, was unfailingly patient, diplomatic, enthusiastic and 
ready with ideas. He helped me maintain excitement about the undertaking; his 
own work and thinking were inspiring, and he spared no effort to ensure that 
my efforts measured up to the standards he set.
Primary historical research relies on the dedication of archivists and librarians 
in many places. My work has been undertaken in locations ranging from the 
grandeur of the Palais des Nations library by Lake Geneva in a glorious autumn, 
to the warehouse then housing the archives of the Commonwealth Scientific and 
Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), its roller doors open to the warmth of 
4 David Lee, Stanley Melbourne Bruce: Australian Internationalist, Continuum, London, 2010.
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the sun on a Canberra winter morning. It was a privilege to work in the archives 
of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), close to the heart of Rome, in 
the building in which McDougall spent the final years of his life. From there one 
can look to the Colosseum in the northern distance; just across the road is the 
site of the Circus Maximus, and a short distance to the south, sheltered by the 
ancient city wall, is the tranquil Protestant Cemetery where McDougall lies, his 
tombstone commemorating one who ‘nobly served his generation’.
On my journey there have been many moments of discovery and the occasional 
piece of luck. In 1984, Kate Birrell and I visited the offices of the Australian 
Dried Fruits Corporation in Melbourne, seeking records of McDougall’s work 
for its predecessor, the Dried Fruits Export Control Board. The staff had been 
clearing out cupboards: ranged along the floor were files going back to their 
earliest days in the 1920s. ‘What should we do with them?’, they asked, and 
happily accepted our suggestion that they contact the Victorian Branch of 
what was then Australian Archives, where the records are now preserved. I 
have thus to thank Kevin Walker and Margaret Terrill of the corporation. I also 
want to record my thanks to former CSIRO archivist Michael Moran, and to his 
successor, Rob Birtles, who guided me through the difficulties of translating 
old Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) file numbers to their 
new identities in the National Archives of Australia. I thank Graeme Powell, 
former Manuscripts Librarian at the National Library of Australia, who was 
responsible for acquiring the McDougall papers for the library. I am grateful 
for the assistance of other librarians in Canberra, Melbourne and Adelaide, 
in Edinburgh and in Washington. I owe even more to the expert assistance of 
staff in national archives in Canberra, London, Ottawa and Washington, in the 
archives of the League of Nations, and of FAO. I have been helped by residents of 
Appleton-le-Moors, North Yorkshire, and of the Renmark district, particularly 
Douglas and Merridy Howie and David Ruston, who have shared memories of 
the McDougall family, and I thank Heather Everingham, Chair of the Renmark 
Branch of the National Trust, for assistance with photographs.
There are few scholars working in the field of ‘McDougall studies’, but I am 
grateful for the assistance and encouragement of those who know and write 
of his work: Michael Roe, Bernard Attard and the late John O’Brien. Sean 
Turnell has been extraordinarily generous in sharing the results of his own 
research and writing; sections of this work depend to a considerable extent on 
that generosity and on Sean’s fine writing about McDougall’s economics. His 
infectious enthusiasm for McDougall’s work has been a constant inspiration.
I can no longer thank in person the two people who really made this study 
possible. Bill Hudson introduced me to McDougall and encouraged me to 
undertake his biography. Bill set a high example in his own biography of R. G. 
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Casey,5 and in his other work. During the years we worked together at DFAT, he 
gave me much practical assistance and wise advice; he remained a mentor and 
friend until his untimely death in 2002.
Elisabeth McDougall died in 2005. She was, I imagine, very much like her 
father in her energy, enthusiasm and determination. She too became a friend. 
In retirement, she devoted herself to the history of her remarkable family, and 
made all relevant findings available to me. When I visited London, she took me 
around Greenwich and Blackheath to many sites connected with her family, and 
provided lunch, which we ate with impressive McDougall family cutlery. We 
had a considerable correspondence, and many long phone calls after she moved 
back to Adelaide in her final years. I am saddened that Elisabeth did not live to 
see my study completed, and grateful for the generous assistance of her nephew, 
Ian McDougall, since her death.
I want to acknowledge the assistance of staff of The Australian National 
University and of ANU E Press for their patience and assistance in the process 
of publication, in particular Duncan Beard, Lorena Kanellopoulos, Karen May, 
Nic Petersen and Liz Walters, and Nausica Pinar for a splendid cover design. 
Finally, I thank my longsuffering family. My daughters and their families 
have borne without complaint my neglect and distraction from their interests 
and have assisted with helpful advice, particularly on computing problems. 
My husband, John, has given me much domestic help and constant 
encouragement; he has scanned pictures, printed documents and listened 
patiently and helpfully to chapter after chapter. This book is dedicated to him 
with gratitude and love.
5 W. J. Hudson, Casey, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1986.
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The creation of an international organisation bringing together the needs of the 
hungry and the interests of farmers seems so logical that it is hard to imagine 
how revolutionary it was in the first half of the twentieth century.
The idea of international organisation was itself new. Late nineteenth and early 
twentieth-century advances in communications had made it feasible. The advent 
of professional scientists and other experts meant it could become a means 
of pooling knowledge and experience. International congresses and societies 
to share expertise in medicine had existed from the mid nineteenth century. 
Efforts to stem epidemic diseases brought further cooperation, but it was only 
after World War I, when the newly created League of Nations Council called 
for an organisation that would fight disease but also strive to prevent it, that 
programs to promote better health on an international scale were envisaged. 
The League of Nations Health Organization (LNHO) undertook work on public 
hygiene. Scientific studies in various countries increasingly showed poor levels 
of nutrition in many social groups; the LNHO published its own authoritative 
report on the problem in 1935. 
Agricultural crises in the late nineteenth century provided a challenge, 
suggesting, for the first time, that international cooperation in agriculture 
might be desirable. The most notable response was the formation in 1905 of the 
International Institute of Agriculture, a body conceived as a world federation 
of farmers collecting and exchanging technological and market information to 
improve their own profitability. But in the crisis of the depression of the 1930s 
much more help was needed.
In 1935 the ‘marriage of health and agriculture’ was first promulgated at the 
League of Nations. The idea turned traditional policy on its head. Farm incomes 
had become an issue of public policy, but accepted remedies were restrictive: 
import quotas, production limits, protective tariffs and pooling schemes to keep 
prices high, thereby putting high-nutritive, ‘protective foods’ out of reach of 
the poor. The marriage of health and agriculture proposed increased production 
of those foods, to lower prices and thereby to increase consumption. The poor 
and hungry would benefit from the first, and farmers from the second. 
This study traces the evolution of that idea in the thinking of a man almost 
forgotten by history. Frank Lidgett McDougall was an English-born fruit farmer 
in the Murray irrigation area of Australia, a self-taught expert on patterns 
of international trade. He became economic adviser to Stanley Melbourne 
Bruce, who was Australian Prime Minister in the 1920s and Australian High 
Commissioner in London in the 1930s and 1940s. McDougall was influenced 
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by the campaign of British scientist John Boyd Orr for government action on 
nutrition. While Bruce and Orr led the ‘nutrition initiative’ in public, it was 
McDougall behind the scenes whose thinking formed its basis. Bruce once said 
‘McDougall brings me a new idea every morning’.1 Some of those ideas became 
the basis for joint action.
The work and ideas of McDougall and of Bruce developed through three phases, 
reflected in the organisation of this study. The first phase covers the 1920s, 
when both believed that the British Empire could hold the key to greater rural 
prosperity in Australia, and that economic problems in Britain could also be 
solved by imperial economic cooperation. They saw the interests of the empire 
and its constituent countries as indivisible; London was the centre of their work 
to that end. Imperial cooperation came into being, to a limited extent, in the 
Ottawa Agreements of 1932. 
By then it had become apparent that some problems were beyond the scope of an 
imperial solution. In the second phase, the League of Nations at Geneva seemed 
to offer a forum for international cooperation. There the ‘nutrition initiative’ 
succeeded beyond expectations. Nutrition was accepted as a proper subject 
for international cooperation, and resulting League publications increased 
public awareness of the problem. Bruce and McDougall went on to extend their 
thinking beyond nutrition, arguing that measures to implement social justice 
and higher standards of living could ease the political tensions of the late 1930s. 
They sought to renew the League as an agency for social reform. 
Finally war turned their focus to Washington and ‘a new deal for the world’. 
In the United States McDougall took a significant part in planning for a 
postwar food and agriculture organisation—eventually to become the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)—while Bruce and Orr 
lobbied in support. All three were to play key roles in the early years of FAO, 
where McDougall’s memory is honoured still in a biennial McDougall Lecture. 
A booklet published by FAO in 1956 was called The McDougall Memoranda: Some 
Documents Relating to the Origins of FAO and the Contribution made by Frank L. 
McDougall.2 The booklet consists of four documents. Three were written in 1935 
for the League of Nations. The first is a memorandum by McDougall called ‘The 
Agricultural and the Health Problems’, which urged placing adequate nutrition 
of populations in the forefront of economic policy. The second, a speech by 
Bruce on Australia’s behalf to the League Assembly, called for ‘the marriage 
of health and agriculture’. The third document is the subsequent Assembly 
resolution establishing nutrition as a subject for international consideration. 
The final document in the booklet is a memorandum written in October 1942 
1 Recorded by Alfred Stirling, On the Fringe of Diplomacy, The Hawthorn Press, Melbourne, 1973, p. 148.
2 Copy of booklet in National Library of Australia [hereinafter NLA], MS6890/5/4.
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by a Washington group including McDougall. It was essentially a revision of an 
earlier paper in which McDougall set out points he and Bruce had discussed. 
The memorandum outlined proposals for an international organisation that 
would ‘make the marriage between health and agriculture a reality’. This study 
aims to show how these documents and the organisation itself came into being.





The working partnership between Frank Lidgett McDougall and Stanley 
Melbourne Bruce in the 1920s aimed to ensure the economic welfare of the 
British Empire. Their partnership also illustrates aspects of the relationship 
between a dominion and the central imperial power, for both men had family 
connections to imperial trade. Both spent most of their careers working for what 
they believed to be Australian interests, yet for much of their lives they were 
based elsewhere.
McDougall grew up in Blackheath, near the River Thames. He could have watched 
ships at the docks nearby unloading cargoes from around the world, including 
grain for the flour mill managed by his father, an expert on imported grains. 
After arriving in Australia at the age of twenty-five to take up an irrigation 
block at Renmark, South Australia, McDougall spent less than a decade in the 
country he adopted as his own. But he had served in the Australian Imperial 
Forces, and was to represent Australia officially for most of his life. In later 
years he would work hard to present an Australian persona—one which other 
Australians sometimes found unconvincing.1 
As a young child, Bruce lived close to Port Phillip Bay. He probably watched 
ships bringing goods from Britain into the port of Melbourne for his family’s 
softgoods importing business.2 Bruce was schooled largely in Australia, then 
spent the formative years of late adolescence and early adulthood in England 
and served in the British forces during World War I. He acquired a ‘quality of 
aloofness from the Australian man in the street’, leaving him ‘a foreigner in his 
own land, a man out of touch with the people he was leading’.3 In fact, like 
many of their time, neither Bruce nor McDougall saw a need to distinguish 
between the interests of Australia and of the Empire as a whole; serving one 
should and would benefit the other.
The terms centre and periphery may be used as shorthand for a metaphor of 
the Empire as a circle with the imperial capital, London, at its centre. From any 
point on the periphery one sees the immediate surroundings most clearly, while 
points on the far side of the circle are hardly visible. From the centre the whole 
periphery is visible, but the central area is clearest. Some change of perspective 
can thus be discerned as Bruce and McDougall move from the periphery to the 
imperial centre. This change is not necessarily an indication of less patriotic 
1 H. C. Coombs, Trial Balance, Macmillan, Melbourne, 1981, pp. 41–2; interview with W. Way, 7 April 1995.
2 Lee, Stanley Melbourne Bruce, p. 1.
3 Ibid., quoting journalist Warren Denning, p. 9.
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goodwill towards Australia. Patriotism for Australians in the early twentieth 
century was not a simple matter of loyalty to an Australian nation. It involved 
complex loyalties within Australia itself and beyond it to the Empire.
Empire, Dominion and Nation
By the early twentieth century the British Empire had become a many-tiered 
institution. Colonies scattered through Africa, the Caribbean, South-East Asia 
and the oceans were controlled by Whitehall. India, by virtue of size and a variety 
of polities, held a unique status, somewhere between colony and dominion; final 
control remained with Whitehall, a matter increasingly subject to controversy. 
Dominions—the white settler societies of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and 
South Africa and, for a time, the Irish Free State, Newfoundland and Rhodesia—
were by convention largely self-governing in domestic matters, which included 
the right to impose tariffs on imports. During the 1920s, dominion rights to 
legislative and executive independence, including external relations, were 
gradually defined—a process driven by ‘radical’ dominions: Canada, with 
trade and security interests increasingly focused in North America; the Irish 
Free State and South Africa, both concerned with ‘equality and separateness’.4 
The 1923 Imperial Conference agreed that separate empire governments could 
conclude treaties with foreign powers. The 1926 Imperial Conference adopted 
the Balfour Report, defining dominions as ‘autonomous communities within the 
British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any 
aspect of domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to 
the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of 
Nations’. Expert recommendations on outstanding legal issues were approved 
by imperial leaders in 1930; dominion legislative independence was solemnised 
in the Statute of Westminster on 11 December 1931.
Australia did not adopt the Statute until 1942, and then only to expedite 
implementation of wartime measures.5 Australian and New Zealand reluctance to 
accept independence was based on defence and on trade; in neither dominion was 
there public pressure for change. Official statements stressed pride in empire and 
its achievements, using the words ‘empire’ rather than ‘British Commonwealth of 
Nations’ and ‘self-governing’ rather than ‘independent’.6 The Crown, common 
history and literature drew ‘cultural and even emotional attachment to the 
material representations and rhetoric of Britishness and imperialism’ even for 
4 W. J. Hudson and M. P. Sharp, Australian Independence: Colony to Reluctant Kingdom, Melbourne 
University Press, Melbourne, 1988, p. 86.
5 Ibid., pp. 130–8. 
6 Ibid., pp. 64, 126–7.
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a prime minister with the Irish heritage of Joseph Lyons.7 On the other hand, a 
prime minister like Robert Gordon Menzies—with deep allegiance to idealised, 
mythologised views of the British Isles and the monarchy—was capable of hard 
bargaining on matters of trade and Australian national interest. Menzies could 
revel in a ‘romanticised’ English countryside, yet privately lampoon pompous 
officials, make cutting observations of royal princes and treat British politicians 
and bureaucrats with ‘courteous equality’.8 For all Australian governments of 
the 1920s and 1930s, cultivation of imperial loyalty, based on allegiance to the 
Crown, and cultural heritage, was a pragmatic necessity for defence. Tough 
negotiation on issues of trade was equally necessary.9 
Australian national sentiment was therefore complex. English-born 
constitutional lawyer W. Harrison Moore wrote: ‘I do not ask myself whether 
I am English or Australian in any sense which excludes one for the other…
to be called on to make a choice…would be deeply painful as a disintegration 
of my own personality.’10 Australian-born historian W. K. Hancock described a 
developing Australian nationalism, but added: ‘A country is a jealous mistress 
and patriotism is commonly an exclusive passion; but it is not impossible for 
Australians, nourished by a glorious literature and haunted by old memories, to 
be in love with two soils.’11
Allegiance was not merely divided between the new world and the old. A new 
federal authority seemed of little relevance to the lives of most Australians, for 
whom State and regional loyalties predominated.12 Apathetic they might be 
about their new Federal Government, but Australians had nevertheless adopted 
the land as their own.13 Native species became national symbols. The ‘Australian 
legend’ portrayed the bush as the real Australia. Distinctive art developed: 
the Heidelberg School ‘shaped the popular Australian view of the land’.14 
McDougall, from youth a lover of German poetry and grand opera, visited the 
studio of Hans Heysen in the Adelaide Hills and was enraptured by Heysen’s 
treatment of the way ‘sunlight streamed through the trunks of the gum trees…
not painted sunlight but the very illuminating thing itself’.15 Australian nature 
formed part of children’s literature and the school curriculum. Yet, like their 
prime ministers, Australians were also formed by the literature and images of 
7 Kosmas Tsokhas, Making a Nation State: Cultural Identity, Economic Nationalism and Sexuality in 
Australian History, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 2001, p. 136.
8 Ibid., pp. 141–50. 
9 See, for example, ibid., pp. 11–12, 19–20.
10 Quoted in Hudson and Sharp, Australian Independence, p. 111.
11 W. K. Hancock, Australia, reprint 1961 edn, Jacaranda Press, Brisbane, 1930, p. 51.
12 J. M. Powell, An Historical Geography of Modern Australia: The Restive Fringe, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1988, p. 20.
13 Thomas R. Dunlap, Nature and the English Diaspora: Environment and History in the United States, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 95.
14 Ibid., pp. 98–102.
15 NLA, MS6890/1/5, letter to Kit, 29 May 1913.
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the British Isles, of ‘things and places [they] had never seen’. Thomas Kenneally 
wrote of being ‘educated to be exiles’.16 To see a world they had learned to love 
at a distance, many left Australian shores. They sailed away with the comfortable 
security of British passports, and rejoiced to smell the eucalyptus as they neared 
those shores on return. 
Thus it was with both Bruce and McDougall, the one Australian-born and 
raised, with close links to the Australian business world, but formed from late 
adolescence in Britain, and having served in the British Army before returning 
to Australian politics; the other born and raised in England, with family links 
to British industry, but whose subsequent career was determined by an early 
adulthood in rural Australia, and service with Australian forces. Their view 
that the interests of the two were indivisible would be proved wrong in the 
testing years of the 1930s depression, and the issue of tariffs was a key part of 
the problem.
Challenging Free Trade
In the 1840s the British Government had adopted a policy of free trade or 
‘economic liberalism’. Advocates of the policy argued that the economy had its 
own rule: the ‘invisible hand’ of the market; governments should not interfere 
with the benign forces of unrestricted trade. Individual good and common good 
were one and the same. This policy benefited an economy leading the world in 
the export of manufactured goods and with a need for cheap imported food. The 
value of the policy seemed to be confirmed by Britain’s early experience. In the 
decades following its adoption, the worth of British exports and imports trebled. 
More than half the world’s ocean-going tonnage was British; public and private 
wealth increased by every measure; living and working conditions improved.17 
From 1860 Britain was the pivot of ‘a new multilateral trading system’ based on 
a pattern of economic specialisation in three broad trading groups.18 Two were 
essentially complementary: industrial, or rapidly industrialising, countries of 
Western Europe and the United States; and agricultural and plantation economies 
of Eastern Europe and the tropics. A third group, including Australia, exported 
primary products, but aspired to industrial development. Britain, with a trade 
surplus derived from a high level of invisible exports, was able to import from 
16 Dunlap, Nature and the English Diaspora, pp. 108, 115–18.
17 David Thomson, England in the Nineteenth Century, Penguin, London, 1950, pp. 138–9, 142.
18 A. G. Kenwood and A. V. Lougheed, The Growth of the International Economy 1820–1980: An Introductory 
Text, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1983, pp. 103–4.
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all three groups and export industrial goods and capital to all of them. In 1913, 
despite decline over some decades, Britain still provided 43 per cent of world 
investment capital.19 
Economic instability in Britain had become apparent, however, in the ‘great 
depression’ from the 1870s to the mid 1890s. Agricultural prices declined as 
supplies of cheap overseas wheat increased.20 Britain’s rate of export growth 
fell; world market share in its traditional industries like heavy machinery and 
textiles drifted to Germany and the United States; emigration increased; and 
capital moved overseas.21 In 1888, when McDougall was four years old, the word 
‘unemployment’ appeared in the Oxford English Dictionary for the first time.22 
The irony was that, in the words of Robert Skidelsky, British export trade could 
be considered ‘largely self-liquidating’. British capital had helped develop 
overseas industries that would eventually become competitors. It had also 
enabled New World countries to develop agriculture and to export foodstuffs 
in return for the sterling they needed to buy British manufactures. Cheap New 
World wheat and meat ‘invasions’ ‘ruined’ British agriculture. British workers 
paid for their cheap food in potential and actual unemployment as foreign 
demand for British manufactures declined.23 
Free trade was therefore questioned. Liberalism and individualism also lost 
ground as a result of economic and social change with the development of 
business combines and cartels, organised labour, political parties and urbanised 
populations. There were opposing solutions to the key problem of creating 
a market for British goods. Socialists wanted measures to increase domestic 
purchasing power. Imperialists, focusing on a need for security in a new and 
uncertain world, turned back to an earlier ‘mercantilist’ doctrine—that foreign 
imports destroy domestic employment. Thus, the aim of mercantilists was self-
sufficiency, based on an imperial trading system protected by tariffs.24 
Around the turn of the century, as the young Bruce was at Cambridge and 
McDougall was contemplating his future in London, Britain debated a ‘tariff 
reform’ campaign, led by Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain. The phrase 
covered a mix of policies, including a protectionist tariff with imperial 
preference—that is, lower import tariffs for goods from the empire. The idea 
appealed to some agricultural and manufacturing sectors. Since foodstuffs 
formed a large proportion of British imports, a significant objection would always 
be that abandoning free trade would raise the cost of food. The Conservative 
19 Ibid., p. 41.
20 W. W. Rostow, The World Economy: History and Prospect, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1978, pp. 164–5.
21 Robert Skidelsky, Oswald Mosley, second edn, Macmillan Papermac, London, 1981, pp. 49–50.
22 Robert Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes: Hopes Betrayed 1883–1920, Macmillan, London, 1983, p. 38.
23 Skidelsky, Oswald Mosley, pp. 51–2.
24 Ibid., pp. 45–53.
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Cabinet divided; Chamberlain and others resigned; and the Government lost 
heavily in a general election on the issue in 1906. Socialists and imperialists 
remained outside a mainstream not yet willing or able to challenge laissez faire.25 
Tariff Policies in the Empire
While the mother country and dependent colonies adhered to the principles 
of free trade, self-governing dominions used tariffs to protect infant industries. 
Dominion tariff policies were driven by mixed motives of imperial sentiment 
and self-interest. Dominions rejected late nineteenth-century suggestions for an 
imperial tariff union, preferring differential tariffs encouraging their own trade 
at the expense of other parts of the empire. Canada introduced protection, with 
some preferential treatment for British goods, from 1879. Australian colonies, 
prevented by 1850s constitutional legislation from imposing differential duties, 
fought for and won that right from Britain in 1873.26 Tariff preference beyond 
the empire was ruled out by a series of most-favoured-nation agreements 
negotiated in the 1860s and binding on British colonies. In 1897 Britain yielded 
to colonial pressure by denouncing treaties with Belgium and Germany. In the 
following decade, while the mother country remained committed to free trade, 
all self-governing dominions initiated some tariff preferences in favour of the 
United Kingdom.27 Ambiguities in relations between dominions and the mother 
country were apparent. It has been argued that adoption of distinct tariff 
policies constituted an affirmation of independence from Britain.28 It has also 
been argued that a key factor in persuading the Australian Federal Parliament 
to institute a British Imperial Tariff at a lower level than the general rate was 
imperial sentiment attaching to Chamberlain’s tariff reform campaign. Domestic 
considerations, however, remained pre-eminent: the interests of Australian 
industry were not to be compromised.29
In Britain, two opposing groups, cutting across party lines, would continue to 
contest economic policy: laissez-faire free-traders and the group described by 
Ian M. Drummond as ‘Imperial Visionaries’. The principal figure in the latter was 
Lord Milner, a former high commissioner in South Africa and later a member of 
Lloyd George’s Cabinet. A loyal following of former junior colleagues, known as 
‘Milner’s kindergarten’, included Geoffrey Dawson, destined to become Editor 
25 Ibid.
26 Emmett Sullivan, ‘Revealing a Preference: Imperial Preference and the Australian Tariff, 1901–1914’, 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 29, no. 1, 2001, p. 37.
27 W. K. Hancock, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs. II: Problems of Economic Policy, Part 1, Oxford 
University Press, London, 1940, pp. 86–8.
28 Francine McKenzie, Redefining the Bonds of Commonwealth, 1939–1948: The Politics of Preference, 
Palgrave, New York, 2002, p. 14.
29 Sullivan, ‘Revealing a Preference’, p. 39.
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of The Times; Philip Kerr, later (as Lord Lothian) Ambassador in Washington; 
Leo Amery, Colonial and Dominions Secretary in the 1920s; and Lionel Curtis. 
The Round Table was established as a forum for the group’s ideas. The visionary 
agenda aimed to raise total empire output by means of emigration and investment, 
and to increase British exports to the empire, thereby reducing unemployment 
and promoting greater prosperity in Britain. A preferential tariff would help 
make empire development more profitable and the empire more attractive to 
capital and migrants. It would strengthen sterling against the dollar and tend to 
replace foreign imports into Britain with empire goods. Tariff preferences would 
secure and raise Britain’s share of trade in manufactures in the overseas empire.30 
In 1914–18 imperial patriotism and imperial self-sufficiency again came together. 
Australia’s Prime Minister, W. M. Hughes, was hailed in London as ‘one of 
the empire’s strong men in her hour of need’, as he campaigned to bring the 
empire’s essential supplies under imperial control, urging that Australians ‘must 
get nothing overseas that we can produce ourselves, and we must in particular 
buy nothing except from Britain and her allies’.31 A combination of wartime 
sentiment and pragmatism thus brought small steps towards the imperial vision 
in Britain. The ‘McKenna Duties’ of 1915 imposed tariffs on luxury goods. 
The Imperial War Conference resolved in 1917 that the empire should be as 
independent as possible in food supplies, raw materials and essential industries. 
It also resolved in favour of British emigration to empire countries and imperial 
tariff preference, linking ‘in a single logical system the policies of migration, 
investment, and tariff preference’.32 Bruce would later call it ‘men, money and 
markets’. The visionary agenda seemed to be in place.
Tariffs were the first aspect of the program to receive attention, but the results 
fell well short of tariff preference. Conservative leader, Bonar Law, and Liberal 
Prime Minister, Lloyd George, both promised to honour the 1917 resolution 
on preference, but would not tax food. The 1919 British Budget included 
preferences equivalent to one-sixth of low revenue duties existing on tea, cocoa, 
coffee, sugar, tobacco and dried fruits. The small sums involved were unlikely to 
make empire goods competitive. This was the situation when McDougall began 
to argue that the future of the Australian dried-fruits industry depended on a 
substantial British tariff preference.
30 Ian M. Drummond, British Economic Policy and the Empire 1919–1939, George Allen & Unwin, London, 
1972, pp. 36–42.
31 L. F. Fitzhardinge, The Little Digger 1914–1952: William Morris Hughes, a Political Biography. Volume II, 
Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1979, p. 60. 





The story of the ‘marriage of food and agriculture’ begins with the arrival of 
twenty-five-year-old Englishman Frank McDougall at Renmark, South Australia, 
in 1909. This chapter decribes a young man born into a devout, inventive and 
successful family, but struggling to find his own purpose in life. He was to find 
that purpose as a fruit-grower in Renmark, an irrigation settlement depending 
on self-help and technical efficiency. McDougall worried about the prospects 
for his rapidly growing industry; he studied market possibilities and concluded 
that the industry’s prosperity depended primarily upon gaining preferential 
tariff treatment in the world’s biggest market for dried fruits: Great Britain. His 
idea was developed in a series of memoranda written in the years immediately 
after World War I. With the support of press and fellow growers, he lobbied 
State governments and the Federal Government, gaining support in spite of a 
daunting political barrier: with a few minor exceptions, the British Government 
was committed to a policy of free trade.
The Making of ‘an incorrigible optimist’
The Murray River meanders for hundreds of kilometres through eastern and 
southern Australia. In the early twentieth century it formed, with its chief 
tributary, the Darling, an inland highway, carrying goods and passengers 
upstream from South Australia through the pastoral inland to settlements in 
Victoria and the far west of New South Wales.
In the spring of 1909 a paddle-steamer tied up at Renmark, on the eastern fringe 
of South Australia. It had churned its way past yellow sandstone cliffs topped 
with desert saltbush and mallee scrub, and skirted mazes of billabong and 
swamp. At times passengers had been asked to jump ashore and gather firewood 
to keep its engines going. It had been a long trip for all, but for none more 
than twenty-five-year-old Frank McDougall. In the past two years he had sailed 
three times from England to the southern hemisphere, spending several weeks 
in the tiny crown colony of St Helena and making two visits to the spectacular 
escarpments around the Umgeni Valley near Pietermaritzburg in Natal, part of 
the self-governing dominion of South Africa.1 Finally he had sailed to Adelaide, 
1 NLA, MS 6890/1/4, letters to family.
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and then travelled by train north to the river port of Morgan and by paddle-
steamer to Renmark. As he stepped ashore at Renmark, he may have thought 
he had reached his destination. He could not have imagined the extraordinary 
journey he was about to begin.
Such extensive travelling suggests that young McDougall’s family was no 
ordinary one. Members of his father’s family managed two successful national 
industries. Their lives were marked by discipline and a commitment to education 
and self-improvement, derived from a heritage of devout Methodism.2 The 
McDougalls applied their devotion equally to work and to social activism, and 
took an inventive, inquiring approach to the world and its workings. Frank’s 
grandfather, Alexander McDougall, had been a schoolmaster in Manchester and 
a keen amateur chemist. Alexander might well be seen as an example of the 
way in which scientific progress occurred in nineteenth-century Britain, where 
pioneering developments in both industrial and agricultural production were 
led by amateurs. Later industrial development was often pioneered in German 
universities, and American governments established colleges and agricultural 
extension services to support a massive development of agriculture, but early 
British innovators were nurtured by the scientific societies.3 The Royal Society, 
from 1660, and similar bodies in Birmingham, Manchester, Edinburgh and 
Liverpool a century later were first founded to cater for wealthy cultured 
enthusiasts. John Dalton, doyen of the Manchester Literary and Philosophical 
Society, represented a new kind of scientist: lower middle class, provincial, 
dissenting—and completely devoted to science. Unlike the earlier amateurs, 
these ‘devotees’ had concerns associated with professional science: research at 
the frontiers of science, publication, ‘keeping up’ with the output of leaders in 
their specialities, and scientific communication.4 Although they were generally 
self-taught, and in many cases unable or unwilling to make a career of science, 
their chief purpose and status lay in its pursuit. They worked not only for 
personal gratification. Like the utilitarians, they believed science to be vital to 
Britain’s progress.5
Alexander McDougall had been drawn from his native Carlisle to Manchester by 
its scientific institutions and organisations and was probably taught by Dalton. 
Alexander based a successful milling industry on his invention of self-raising 
flour. McDougall’s Flour was merged with Hovis in 1957 and absorbed into the 
conglomerate Rank Hovis McDougall in 1962. Since 2007 it has been part of 
2 David Hempton, Methodism: Empire of the Spirit, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 2005, pp. 52–4.
3 Peter Alter, The Reluctant Patron: Science and the State in Britain 1850–1920, trans. Angela Davies, 
Deddington, Oxford, 1987, pp. 22–4. 
4 Robert H. Kargon, Science in Victorian Manchester: Enterprise and Expertise, Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 1977, pp. 11–13.
5 Ibid., pp. 35, 78.
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Premier Foods.6 Alexander made an important contribution to the welfare of 
Manchester, a ‘boom town’ suffering the inevitable pollution of smoky factories 
and rivers described as ‘stinking foul open sewers’. Edward Chadwick’s 
report of 18427 spurred a public health and sanitation movement and a royal 
commission. With professional chemist and crusader for research into air 
pollution Angus Smith, Alexander McDougall experimented on deodorisation of 
sewage. A disinfecting powder, patented by Smith and McDougall in 1854, was 
subsequently sold as ‘McDougall’s powder’. Alexander also marketed a liquid 
of carbolic acid and limewater for use in sewers; later it was used in dissecting 
rooms and for treating sores, dysentery and footrot. Joseph Lister claimed to 
have taken the idea of using carbolic acid for surgical purposes from its use 
disinfecting sewage at Carlisle, where McDougall’s process had been adopted.8 
These inventions formed the basis of McDougall’s chemical company. By 1926, 
Coopers, McDougall & Robertson was the leading British supplier of sheep dip 
and insecticides and a major supplier of disinfectants;9 it was acquired by the 
Wellcome Foundation in 1959.
Privately funded regional colleges were gradually established to meet demands 
from British industry for training. Owens College in Manchester was established 
in 1851 by a bequest from a nonconformist cotton merchant. Alexander’s son, 
Arthur McDougall, won the Dalton Prize for original research at Owens College, 
but abandoned science for business. Owens College was to become Manchester 
University, and Arthur’s son, Sir Robert McDougall, one of its significant 
benefactors.10 But there were no counterparts in Britain for the large American 
foundations nurtured in the Social-Darwinist tradition that wealth should be 
used to benefit society.11
The children of Alexander McDougall, however, were encouraged to teach 
in ragged schools in the slums of Manchester, and as adults they devoted 
their spare time to church and municipal work. Two of them—Frank’s father, 
John, and young Alexander—eventually sold out of the family business to 
concentrate on this work. John McDougall left his position as manager of 
McDougall’s London flour mill in 1888 to represent the district of Poplar on the 
London County Council (LCC), for 25 years. His chief interests were efficiency 
and social welfare, in particular lunatic asylums and drains; he spent three days 
a week visiting inmates in the former, and personally toured the latter. During 
6 A Matter of History: A Century of McDougall’s Self Raising Flour 1864–1964, in NLA, MS6890/5/4; 
company sites on Internet; E. McDougall.
7 Report on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population of Great Britain.
8 Kargon, Science in Victorian Manchester, pp. 108–23; Ellen, Lady McDougall, The McDougall Brothers and 
Sisters: The Children of Alexander McDougall, privately published and printed in Blackheath, UK, 1923.
9 NLA, MS6890/1/9, McDougall to Norman, 3 January 1926.
10 Kargon, Science in Victorian Manchester, p. 179; McDougall, McDougall Brothers and Sisters. 
11 Sidney Fine, Laissez Faire and the General-Welfare State: A Study of Conflict in American Thought 1865–
1901, University of Michigan, Michigan, 1956, pp. 114–15.
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Frank’s childhood, John McDougall was pilloried in Punch and was a focus of 
demonstrations against his campaign to clean up entertainment offered in music 
halls. He was knighted as LCC Chairman in the coronation year of Edward VII. 
Traditions of disciplined devotion to work and social activism persisted in a 
third generation including high achievers and dedicated idealists: industrialists 
and academics, doctors and missionaries.
Frank Lidgett McDougall was born on 16 April 1884, in Blackheath, London, 
the eldest child and only son of John McDougall’s second marriage. Frank’s 
mother, Ellen Lidgett, also had a strong Methodist heritage. Her double first 
cousin, Dr John Scott Lidgett, ‘the grand old man of Methodism’, was co-
founder of the Bermondsey Settlements, leader of the LCC Progressive Party 
from 1918 to 1928, and Editor of Contemporary Review and the Methodist Times. 
Ellen herself was serious and bookish, a writer of devotional works, some based 
on the McDougall and Lidgett families.12
With this powerful array of examples it is hardly surprising that the young 
Frank McDougall believed he should devote his life to a worthy purpose. It is 
equally understandable that he struggled to find his own path. Frank completed 
his schooling to matriculation level at Blackheath Proprietary School in 1901, 
but his father had suffered financial difficulties and there was no money for 
university. There was thought of joining the family chemical business. In 1903 
Frank spent time in Godesburg am Rhein learning German, and late in 1905 he 
was in Darmstadt, preparing to enter the famed University of Technology. He 
learned to enjoy reading German, but found ‘the language does not come very 
quickly’ and ‘everyone speaks too fast’.13 He did not complete any qualification. 
In 1906 he was back in England, tinkering with chemical experiments.14 He 
drifted. Members of his extended family conferred about possible employment. 
He was sent to investigate possibilities of wattle growing on St Helena, and in 
Natal where there were Lidgett relatives. Finally the decision was made to invest 
in a fruit block in South Australia, where there were also family connections. 
His oldest half-sister, Lucy, was married to Charles Napier Birks, of a prominent 
Adelaide retailing family, and the two families had other connections in 
England. The Birks family was active in charitable causes; Lucy later founded 
the Adelaide Babies Aid Society.15
Frank was twenty-five years old when he reached Renmark. Long letters to his 
younger sister Kit, written between 1906 and 1909, have survived. In these one 
12 McDougalI, The McDougall Brothers and Sisters.
13 NLA, MS6890/1/3, letter to Mother, 30 October 1905; letter to Kit, 19 October 1905.
14 Ibid., letters to Kit, 30 September, 10 October and 15 November 1906, 13 May 1907.
15 Information from E. McDougall; Martin Woods, ‘Birks, Rosetta Jane (1856–1911)’, Australian Dictionary 
of Biography [hereinafter ADB], online edn, 2006, <http://www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/AS10040b.
htm> [accessed 22 October 2008].
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sees a young man desperately searching for a purpose. He lectured her thus: 
‘You have the job of choosing something to do, well let it be something really 
worth while’; adding, ‘I feel and you too will feel like the young man who went 
to Jesus to know what must I do to be saved. I think in a few years it will be 
clearer.’16
Extensive reading shaped McDougall’s religious and political thinking: ‘Books 
are everything not quite!!’ he wrote to Kit in 1907. A later letter provided an 
impressive list of recommended reading for her, drawn from his own favourites.17 
Gradually he shed his Methodist heritage, briefly considering ‘High Puritanism’ 
and Anglo-Catholicism, but subsequently abandoning Christianity altogether. 
Much remained of his Christian upbringing: he was known ever after for his 
ability to recite Bible passages and his affection for the Book of Common Prayer 
and the Authorised Version. A colleague wrote of him being ‘always ready to cite 
scripture for his agricultural purposes’, but the obituary writer for The Times 
recalled that ‘there were some who held the view that what he quoted was 
not always to be found in Holy Writ’, adding, ‘he nevertheless could produce 
phrases which sounded as if they could have come from nowhere else’.18 More 
significant Methodist legacies were a dedication to disciplined, unremitting 
work; a preference for empirical, rather than theoretical, understanding of 
problems; and a belief in the perfectibility of man through his own efforts.19
The young McDougall mentioned Immanuel Kant, Henry George and Max 
Nordau amongst those who led him briefly to consider socialism, and to aver 
that ‘the great standing lie is our present social system and our economic 
system’.20 He made no formal commitment to left-wing politics, but as a 
young man of twenty-three saw much in his own world needing change and, 
without any sense of direction, he wanted to help. He thought that ‘the social 
question’ (a euphemism for prostitution) was in truth much wider, perceiving 
evils in domestic service, in ‘Society’ living in idleness on the work of others, 
in obsession with material possessions, and even smoke pollution.21 He had 
difficulty in formulating a social philosophy, partly because of a fundamental 
aversion to compulsion, and partly in reconciling social activism with his 
youthful enjoyment of luxuries: ‘the hard thing is to get a reasonable line of 
junction for a love of Beauty and a dislike of luxury.’ The individualist ‘sees 
that no real progress for the indiv[idual] can be made without the personal 
choice, while the Socialist is accused of the absurd belief that we can bring 
16 NLA, MS6890/1/3, letter to Kit, 18 June 1907. 
17 Ibid., letter of 1 June 1907; NLA, MS6890/1/4, letter of 9 February 1909.
18 Coombs, Trial Balance, pp. 41–2; Gladwyn Jebb, The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 
London, 1972, p. 63; The Times, 17 February 1958; Alfred Stirling, Lord Bruce, the London Years, The Hawthorn 
Press, Melbourne, 1974, p. 65.
19 Hempton, Methodism, pp. 50, 57–8. 
20 NLA, MS6890/1/3, letter to Kit, 1 June 1907.
21 Ibid., letter to Kit, 18 June 1907.
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about a millennium by Act of Parliament’.22 Nevertheless, perhaps with some 
bravado at home, he was happy to declare himself a socialist. He tried to connect 
Christianity and socialism by writing. In one proposed piece he was to imagine 
a Christian socialist parson working in London’s East End, falling asleep and 
dreaming of what England would be like 50 years after socialism had won a 
parliamentary majority. McDougall’s purpose in this project was to crystallise 
his ideas of ‘what we socialists want’.23
The result of all this thinking is contained in the last such letter, written some 
months after reaching South Australia, and summarising his philosophical 
journey. From it, he wrote, he had emerged with three principles. First, he 
was, and hoped to remain, ‘lacking in reverence’, meaning that no belief could 
be acceptable if it failed the test of human logic. Second, he declared himself 
an optimist: ‘What I mean by that is that I believe that a man has the power 
to choose to live his own life in the way that seems to him best…“I am the 
master of my fate; I am the captain of my soul”.’ In a much later version, he 
would write: ‘I am an incorrigible optimist or at least feel that it is well worth 
while to make a great effort to secure an intelligent attitude towards economic 
problems!’24 He called his third principle ‘the ascent of man’. ‘Man is capable 
by his own efforts of rising’—a belief ‘essential to the creed of a socialist as 
I understand the term’.25 In essence these principles were applied to all the 
problems he would encounter over more than 40 years. In very different times 
and amid calamitous events, McDougall would remain an optimist, pragmatic 
and independent—which surely adds up to ‘lacking in reverence’—and ever 
labouring for a better world.
Renmark: Self-Help and Dissemination of 
Knowledge
This, then, was the young man who arrived in Renmark in the spring of 1909. 
He came to a community and to an industry that had been created in response 
to ideas of Social Darwinism, progressivism and imperial efficiency.
In the later nineteenth century, ideas described collectively as ‘Social Darwinism’ 
were influential in the United States, where William Graham Sumner suggested 
that without state interference men are rewarded in proportion to their efforts; 
22 Ibid., letter to Kit, 8 June 1907.
23 NLA, MS6890/1/4, letter to Kit, 23 January 1909. The piece itself does not seem to have survived.
24 National Archives of Australia, Records of the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research [hereinafter 
NAA/CSIR], A9778, M14/32/5, letter to A. C. D. Rivett, 29 February 1932.
25 NLA, MS6890/1/5, letter to Kit, 20 April 1912. 
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only the fittest survive.26 In Britain such ideas combined readily with evidence 
that British industry was falling behind in a competitive world, encouraging 
scientists and organisations like the British Association for the Advancement 
of Science to lobby for government support. When British industry took few 
awards at the Paris Exhibition of 1867, the association successfully called 
for investigation into science teaching and research. The Devonshire Royal 
Commission on Scientific Instruction agreed in 1875 that development of 
research depended largely on the state being willing to ‘assume that large 
portion of the National Duty which individuals do not attempt to perform, or 
cannot satisfactorily accomplish’.27
Social Darwinist thinking also underlay campaigns for ‘national efficiency’ 
triggered in Britain by German and American competition, and reinforced by 
revelations of the poor health of British recruits for the Boer War, weaknesses 
of army organisation and German technical superiority. Journalists warned of 
Britain’s imminent defeat in the ‘battle for commerce in almost every land on 
earth’. The British Science Guild was established in 1907 by J. Norman Lockyer, 
astronomer, Secretary to the Devonshire Royal Commission and founder of the 
journal Nature, which he used as a vehicle for his arguments. The guild held an 
essay competition on ‘the best way of carrying on the struggle for existence and 
securing the survival of the fittest in national affairs’. In 1903 Lockyer called his 
presidential address to the British Association ‘The influence of Brain-power on 
History’, a deliberate allusion to Alfred Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon 
History (1890). Lockyer said ‘we have not learned that it is the duty of a State to 
organise its forces as carefully for peace as for war; that universities and other 
teaching centres are as important as battleships or big battalions; are, in fact, 
essential parts of a modern State’s machinery’.28
Branches of the British Science Guild were established in Australia. Prime 
Minister Alfred Deakin was impressed by the British aim to achieve efficiency 
and by an informal movement called Progressivism in the United States. 
Progressivism embraced a wide range of measures—democratic reform, 
regulation of corporations and monopolies, labour rights, social justice—all 
aimed at mitigating the harsh effects of unregulated large-scale capitalism. 
Many Progressives campaigned for professionalism, rationality and efficiency 
in government. In 1907 Deakin expressed what might be called ‘imperial 
progressivism’:
The task of Empire is the…scientific conquest of its physical…problems. 
[We must] endeavour…to acquire that knowledge in scientific manner, 
26 Fine, Laissez Faire and the General-Welfare State, pp. 79–91.
27 Alter, Reluctant Patron, pp. 100–2, 118.
28 Ibid., pp. 81–2, 92–4, 113, 127–30.
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and by scientific methods, which shall enable us to appreciate…the vast, 
the incalculable natural resources which are present in our possession 
under the Flag—the means of utilising these instruments of material 
power for the benefit of our race.29
The term ‘pragmatic progressivism’ has been used to describe the coincidence of 
a new federal bureaucracy and a new interest in applying science to problems of 
agriculture, health and transport.30  Yet in the 1880s, before federation, Deakin 
as a Victorian State Minister had chaired a royal commission on irrigation and 
led a group investigating irrigation schemes in California.  There he met brothers 
George and W. B. Chaffey, who came to Mildura in 1886 to demonstrate their 
methods. Deakin subsequently introduced the first legislation in Australia to 
promote irrigation systems and providing for state-aided local trusts, thereby 
enabling establishment of irrigation settlements at Mildura and Renmark in the 
late 1880s.31
The family decision that the young McDougall—drifting apparently without 
purpose—should go to Renmark demonstrates an imperial view: it has echoes 
of the long tradition of sending ‘remittance men’ who were an embarrassment 
to their families to the outposts of the empire, and of another tradition of 
investing in primary industries overseas. It also reflected a new phase of empire. 
Irrigation in the newly federated Australian colonies was barely a generation 
old when McDougall reached Renmark in 1909. Irrigation was in the forefront 
of consolidation of settlement, a pattern extending throughout the temperate 
empire, particularly in Canada and Australia, driven by the idea of creating a 
stable ‘yeoman class’ of small farmers, of diversifying production and of taming 
a harsh interior. Immigrants were sought to populate these new areas. New 
production could be exported to the imperial ‘centre’, Great Britain, in return 
for manufactured goods exported to lands on the imperial ‘periphery’. Within 
this pattern lay seeds of conflict between centre and periphery.
Most first-generation settlers at Renmark were genteel middle-class English 
families, with little knowledge of horticulture. They were attracted by 
illustrations of river scenes and by tales of healthy outdoor life and easy profits, 
found in the ‘Red Book’ produced by the Chaffey brothers’ London agent. 
They purchased orchard, town and residential blocks—all on 10-year terms.32 
Through blisteringly hot summers and miserably cold winters, they camped 
29 Quoted in Roy M. MacLeod, ‘Science, Progressivism, and “Practical Idealism”: Reflections on Efficient 
Imperialism and Federal Science in Australia, 1885–1915’, in The ‘Creed of Science’ in Victorian England, ed. 
Roy M. MacLeod, Variorum, Aldershot, UK, c. 2000, p. 7.
30 Ibid., p. 13. 
31 R. Norris, ‘Deakin, Alfred (1856-1919), ADB <http://adb.anu.au/biography/deakin-alfred-5927/
text10099.htm> [accessed 17 January 2013].
32 Prices in the late 1880s are given as £40 per acre for orchard and town blocks, and £200 for residential. G. 
Arch Grosvenor, Red Mud to Green Oasis, Raphael Arts Pty Ltd, Renmark, SA, 1979, p. 18.
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in tents and set about tree clearing, stump removal and channel digging. The 
soil was fertile, irrigation work proceeded with only minor problems, but 
both settlements faced early difficulties: poor-quality or incorrect orchard 
stock, salt seepage from unlined channels, floods in 1890, untimely rains in 
1895, and frosts. After years of waiting, there was fruit to harvest, but there 
remained risks of transporting it fresh to city markets over long distances by the 
uncertain river, which, unhindered by lock or dam, could shrink to a series of 
barely connected waterholes in a dry season and in flood spread miles beyond 
its banks. Improvised drying techniques brought poor results. Refusals to pay 
rates and bank failures bankrupted the Chaffeys; many settlers walked off their 
blocks.33
Figure 2 Renmark 1907: Spreading fruit to dry on the property of E. E. Hutton. 
Source: Photograph by Reiners Studio, image courtesy of Renmark Branch, National Trust.
Those who remained drew on their own resources. A small State Government 
loan kept the Renmark settlement viable, but the foundations for its future 
success lay in self-help, cooperation and dissemination of technical knowledge. 
With no money to keep the irrigation pumps going, settlers cut wood for fuel to 
run them. The locally elected Irrigation Trust, established by State legislation, 
managed irrigation and water rights. A Community Trust Hotel sought to combat 
the sly grog trade that had flourished under the teetotal rule of the Chaffeys; 
33 Ernestine Hill, Water into Gold, Robertson & Mullens, Melbourne, 1946, pp. 89–108; Grosvenor, Red 
Mud to Green Oasis, pp. 14–21.
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the town ‘drank itself into a state of solvency’.34 Fruit-growers organised to 
tackle the problems of transport and prices. The Secretary of the Renmark Fruit 
Packers’ Union was pioneer settler F. W. Cutlack, McDougall’s future father-
in-law. Grower organisations in Renmark and Mildura amalgamated in 1907 to 
form the Australian Dried Fruits Association, controlling purchasing, packing 
and marketing. Distilling and citrus packing cooperatives followed in Renmark. 
Solutions were found for the early problems of cultivation: gypsum would 
break up heavy soils; wells could drain away salt; sultana grapes brought better 
prices than the Gordo Blanco (muscatel); the Greek practice of cincturing Zante 
currants would prevent early fruit loss.
Figure 3 The Murray River 1909: Paddle-steamers moored near stores of 
the Renmark Fruit Packing Union. 
Source: Photograph by Reiners Studio, image courtesy of Renmark Branch, National Trust.
Growers gained their technical information at meetings of the ‘Agricultural 
Bureaux’, an initiative of the SA Department of Agriculture in 1889. Each 
local bureau was run by the growers themselves, gathering in private homes 
or packing sheds to read papers on everything from ‘manuring’ to keeping 
accounts, usually setting out the personal conclusions or research of an 
experienced member. Bureau rules required constant attendance and annual 
34 This is the version given in Hill (Water into Gold, p. 171). Another is that ‘Renmark proceeded, as the 
year unfolded, to drink itself…into a state of beauty and prosperity’. F. M. Cutlack, Renmark: The Early Years, 
Nancy B. Basey, Eltham, Vic., 1988, pp. 26–7.
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turnover of one-third of members, thus helping newer arrivals who were most 
in need.35 By 1909 the population of Renmark numbered some 2000, and most 
aspects of a settler’s livelihood depended on these patterns of cooperation and 
shared technical knowledge. They were to influence profoundly McDougall’s 
future thinking.
With family funds, he purchased blocks totalling some 40 acres (16 ha) in an area 
close to the river known as ‘The Crescent’, where he grew vines and apricots. 
The holdings doubled as he was joined later by two half-brothers and a sister.36 
He was fit and, despite apparent reluctance to accept the family decision, and 
references in letters to a determination to remain only briefly, he enjoyed the 
physical and intellectual challenges. In 1910 he reported with satisfaction that 
he could do three times as much manual work in a day as he had been able 
to achieve on arrival. Later he wrote that he enjoyed pruning most of all his 
tasks: ‘the work is interesting, requiring judgement and it’s full of hope for the 
next season’s crop for which one is pruning.’37 His neighbours were congenial, 
many with interests similar to his own, and he participated in the Agricultural 
Bureau with enthusiasm. In October 1911, with a mere two years’ experience 
as a grower, he joined two prominent members of the Renmark Settlers’ 
Association travelling by river to Mildura to examine the new method of rack 
drying. He wrote a paper setting out designs they had seen, with advantages 
and disadvantages and costs. The paper was printed in the Renmark Pioneer, 
whose Editor, H. S. Taylor, was an influential advocate of causes benefiting 
growers and their organisations.38
The block had prospered sufficiently for McDougall to take a holiday in England 
in the summer of 1914. He married Joyce Cutlack in 1915 shortly after enlisting 
in the Australian Imperial Force (AIF); their son, John, was born in England in 
1918; a daughter, Elisabeth, followed in 1920. McDougall served on the Western 
Front as a lieutenant in the Cycle Corps, then as battalion quartermaster, and 
was promoted to captain. He was transferred to the AIF Education Service just 
days before the Armistice. He attended a school for instructors preparing troops 
for future careers on the land; then, from 18 December until his departure for 
home early in April 1919, he participated in a massive effort to keep troops busy 
and interested while they awaited repatriation. Staff hastily prepared suitable 
textbooks, with McDougall contributing some pamphlets on fruit-growing.39
35 Murray Pioneer [hereinafter MP], 17 December 1920.
36 Registrar-General’s Unregistered Document Service, SA Department of Lands: Certificates of Title; 
Merridy Howie, ‘Personalities Remembered: No. 24, Frank McDougall’, Radio talk on 5CL, 15 November 
1970. I am grateful to Mrs Howie for giving me a copy of her talk.
37 NLA, MS6890/1/5, letters to Kit, 18 November 1913 and 21 August 1910; NLA, MS6890/1/7, letter to 
Kit, 11 June 1921.
38 MP, 3, 17 and 24 November 1911; Malcolm Saunders, ‘Taylor, Harry Samuel (1873–1932)’, ADB, online 
edn, 2006, <http://www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs> [accessed 21 November 2006].
39 Resume of military service supplied by Central Army Records Office, Melbourne, 31 August 1983.
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Figure 4 McDougall pruning vines, c. 1919: ‘full of hope for the next 
season’s crop.’ 
Source: E. McDougall. 
Figure 5 F. L. McDougall, AIF, 1916. 
Source: E. McDougall. 
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Figure 6 Australian Production of Dried Vine Fruits, 1880–1960.
Source: S. Wadham, R. Kent Wilson and J. Wood, Land Utilization in Australia, fourth edn, Melbourne 
University Press, Melbourne, 1964, p. 194.
It was an immature Frank McDougall who had arrived in Renmark in 1909. 
Captain McDougall returned in 1919 as a family man of purpose, with an 
understanding of the importance of education and the problems of his industry. 
As a returned soldier, he received financial benefits, enabling him to repay the 
loans from his family and to plan expansion of his enterprise. Those plans were 
soon to be overtaken, however, by the first of his important ideas: a program to 
put Australian dried fruit on a sound export footing.
Australia’s Dried Fruit Industry
Cultivation in the Murray irrigation areas had increased gradually in the first 
decade of the twentieth century, in 1901 yielding 2050 tons of dried fruits 
(sultanas, currants and lexias—the last popularly called raisins) and 9000 tons 




Figure 7 Dried Fruit Prices on the London Market, 1900–27.
Source: Development and Migration Commission [Australia], Report on the Dried Fruits Industry, 
Melbourne, 1927.
On his return to Renmark in 1919, McDougall found evidence of expansion 
and optimism. New irrigation areas were being planned and block prices were 
rising. His own property had almost doubled in value. Electric light and power 
had reached the area. A nearby orchard boasted a new heated drying house 
with trays carried in and out on a sunken railway. An automatic dip installed 
on another property processed 800 tins of sultanas an hour; at best a man could 
manage 2000 a day.42
McDougall’s optimism was tempered with understanding of the difficulties 
facing his industry. On his holiday home in the European summer of 1914, 
he had taken time to investigate the British market, seeking views in London 
and in northern cities from buyers, brokers and cooperative organisations. He 
had asked for comparison with Californian dried fruit and about government-
controlled marketing of South African fresh fruit. He had learned that Australian 
fruit was supplied spasmodically and thought to be badly graded, over-dried 
and unattractively presented compared with the Californian product. He had 
concluded that Australian growers were ill informed about prices in Britain, 
with little understanding of the needs and views of British buyers.43
During the war, H. S Taylor is reported to have sent free copies of the Murray 
Pioneer to all Riverland volunteers serving overseas.44 These may have kept 
42 NLA, MS6890/1/9, letter to mother, 2 July 1919; MP, 28 February 1919.
43 F. L. McDougall, ‘Notes on the Dried Fruits Industry in Australia’, Murray Pioneer, 23 May 1919.
44 Saunders, ‘Taylor, Harry Samuel’.
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McDougall abreast of developments in Renmark: higher prices, extended 
plantings and the prospects of soldier settlers adding to grower numbers.45 In 
the rest camps in France he organised several ‘Agricultural Bureaux’ at which 
‘good papers’ were followed by ‘keen discussion’.46 He had estimated that 
some 3000 men awaiting repatriation were in the agriculture section of the AIF 
Education Service; he knew at first hand that many returned men were eager to 
take up land under soldier-settler schemes.47 But he also knew that a postwar 
export market could not be assured.
1918–19: ‘Notes on the Dried Fruits Industry 
in Australia’
McDougall was in his late teens in 1903 when Joseph Chamberlain’s tariff 
reform campaign began. With his strong social conscience and eagerness to 
find a place in the world, he must have taken some interest in it then. He had 
occasional home leave in London during the war, and probably had access to 
British newspapers, as well as mail, at other times. He would have known of 
renewed imperial sentiment and debate on the tariff as the date for the Budget 
of 1919 approached. During the last months of the war and its immediate 
aftermath, he wrote a paper about the problem of finding markets for Australia’s 
increasing dried-fruits crop. He later explained to the Renmark Returned 
Soldiers’ Association that he had some ‘difficulty in persuading the adjutant of 
his unit to allow the manuscript to be typed in the orderly room’.48 ‘Notes on the 
Dried Fruits Industry in Australia’ set out his ideas on marketing, considering 
every step of the trade from irrigation block to London retailer. He drew on 
his own experience. The paper was deceptively simple, its language matter-of-
fact and unpretentious, but, like the best of the many papers McDougall was 
destined to write, it was authoritative, logical and persuasive. It was sent from 
England to be read at the Renmark Agricultural Bureau. Bureau President, F. 
H. Basey, thought it important enough to keep for the 1919 Conference of River 
Agricultural Bureaux. The paper was read there by McDougall’s half-brother 
Norman on 16 May.49
45 Marilyn Lake, The Limits of Hope: Soldier Settlement in Victoria 1915–38, Oxford University Press, 
Melbourne, 1987, p. 32.
46 Remarks by Norman McDougall at River Agricultural Bureaux Conference, 16 May 1919, in MP, 23 May 1919.
47 MP, 17 June 1919. Total numbers, across agriculture, mechanics and commercial courses, were estimated at 
perhaps 40 000; Geoffrey Serle, John Monash: A Biography, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1982, p. 409.
48 MP, 11 November 1921.




The conference opened on a pessimistic note. A. J. Perkins, SA Director of 
Agriculture, recalled marketing difficulties of the past and predicted more with 
postwar expansion. He could see little hope for export markets, given high labour 
and production costs, even with mechanisation and cooperative methods; he 
could suggest no alternative crop for irrigation areas except sugar beet. Perkins’ 
speech was followed by McDougall’s paper. It also recalled past problems and 
dismissed some solutions. Export had not been taken seriously earlier and some 
fruits—currants, peaches and lexias—could not compete in world markets. The 
irrigation settlements had been saved in the past by establishment of distilleries 
and there was a view that canning and jam production offered the only hope of 
absorbing expanded postwar production. But then came a call for a ‘radical…
change of viewpoint’:
...overseas markets will become of increasing importance… 
I want the Dried Fruit Producers to establish an industry in the semi-arid 
districts of Australia which will be able to hold its own in the world’s 
markets and therefore to welcome expansion of the industry and to look 
forward to making the Murray Valley a second California… 
I want us to maintain that the Dried Fruits Industry is particularly 
suited to Australia… 
I want the industry to be in such a state that we can cheerfully claim that 
it is the pioneer industry of good working conditions…that it combines 
the healthy conditions of ordinary agricultural life with the reasonable 
hours and opportunities for recreation of the urban industries.
McDougall surveyed the industry’s problems, including the criticisms 
encountered during his own investigations in 1914. He proposed solutions 
under four headings: information, organisation, cooperation and British 
preference. He wanted efficiency and rational organisation. Growers themselves, 
with government support, should investigate and disseminate information on 
marketing conditions. He suggested tighter control by packing houses and 
use of cooperative organisations, well paid and run, to improve production, 
packing, finance and marketing, to eliminate middlemen and to maintain 
consistent quality.
His crucial argument, however, was the need for British tariff preference. As 
matters stood, Australian fruit could not compete with fruit from California, 
which was subsidised by an immense home market, or with Mediterranean fruit 
produced by cheap labour and with low transport costs.50 Indications were that 
50 The daily wage for unskilled labour was the equivalent of 1/6d per day in Greece, 11/6d in Australia. 
Hill, Water into Gold, p. 235.
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Britain was preparing to abandon its historic free-trade policy; it had already 
been chipped away by small revenue tariffs on some commodities, including 
most dried fruits. A British preferential tariff would allow Australian fruit to 
meet competitors on a level footing. He urged growers to establish exactly how 
high that tariff need be for a profitable export trade.
The paper drew considerable discussion and praise. It was read just after the 
British Budget of 1919 had been delivered, but before full details of the new 
British tariff—whether dried fruits were included in tariff duties and, if so, 
to what extent—had reached Australia. H. S. Taylor noted that dried fruits 
had not been mentioned in cabled information about British intentions, and 
asked whether the Australian Dried Fruits Association (ADFA) had brought the 
question before the British authorities. As the Agricultural Bureaux were self-
help, not political, organisations, the conference passed a motion recommending 
ADFA ‘take such steps as are necessary to secure full British preference for 
Australian dried fruits’.51
The Australian Dried Fruits Association 
ADFA owed its existence to W. B. Chaffey’s desire that growers cooperate to 
control marketing. It had grown from separate organisations in Mildura and 
Renmark to a membership including 95 per cent of all fruit-growers, some 
packing companies, agents and merchants. In theory it could control the 
product from grower to retailer. Australia’s prewar consumption of currants 
and sultanas, protected by tariff duties, was almost fully supplied by ADFA, 
and absorbed nearly all the product. Tentative prewar export consignments 
had generally proved unprofitable, and talk of developing markets in the Far 
East and the near north had been little more than that.52 When war opened up 
profitable export markets in Britain, ADFA undertook to supply home needs 
first, but soon found that much higher prices could be gained on the London 
market. Forty per cent of the 1919 crop was exported.53
ADFA’s first response to the problem of finding markets for postwar production 
was to increase home consumption. The 1918 ADFA Conference appointed a 
young Mildura businessman, C. J. De Garis, as its Director of Publicity. De Garis 
spent a lavish budget of £20,000 on a nationwide advertising campaign owing 
much to US inspiration. Richly rewarding competitions were launched on 
billboards and in newspapers throughout Australia. Slogans, recipe books and 
gimmicks followed. The Murray Pioneer reported campaign progress in detail and 
51 MP, 23 May 1919.
52 Hill, Water into Gold, pp. 168–9, 178–81. See also speech by De Garis, MP, 30 May 1919.
53 See Figures 6 and 7 and Table 1.
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carried its advertisements; it was doing well at the time McDougall’s paper was 
read. De Garis addressed the River Bureaux Conference, urging the importance 
of brand names, market research, public education about food values and tactics 
to change buying habits. Admirable as McDougall’s paper was, development 
of the home market offered better prospects than the ‘statesmanlike’ work for 
imperial preference.54
March 1921: ‘A British California on the Murray’
McDougall arrived back in Renmark at the end of May 1919, two weeks after 
his paper was read. For the next two years, he was busy with family, block and 
community work. He served a year as President of the Agricultural Bureau and 
as a member of the Irrigation Trust—effectively the local council. There he had 
experience of responsibilities for management of public money and control of 
works.
H. S. Taylor had bought what was then the Renmark Pioneer in 1905 and 
‘transformed it into a major influence’ in the irrigation areas of the Murray 
Valley. Renamed the Murray Pioneer, Taylor’s paper advocated the cause 
of irrigation, locks for the Murray, closer settlement, organised marketing 
and producer cooperation. Taylor himself led deputations to premiers and 
government ministers.55 With Taylor’s help, McDougall campaigned for State 
Government support for conservation and cultivation of trees along the river to 
meet high demands for timber in the area. They achieved support from the 1921 
State Conference of Agricultural Bureaux and advice from the State Advisor 
on Forests, but little in the long term.56 The campaign did teach McDougall the 
importance of press support and of expert opinion; it also taught him the need 
for persistence.
Publicly he did little for the preference cause; privately he talked with friends 
and rethought his 1919 paper.57 In 1921 he recast it for a broader audience of 
political figures and opinion framers in Australia and in Britain by appealing to 
the burgeoning interest in empire settlement. Its central proposition was now 
that in return for substantial preference on Australian fruit, irrigation land 
should be offered free to British returned soldiers. He described the Murray 
irrigation area, ‘thumped the big drum a little, fell back on statistics and 
finished with a lyrical purple patch over the scheme’s Imperial significance…
54 MP, 30 May 1919.
55 Saunders, ‘Taylor, Harry Samuel’.
56 MP, 24 September and 8 October 1920, and 19 August, 23 September and 21 October 1921.
57 Recollection of T. C. Angove, reported in MP, 10 November 1922.
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How I loathe the terms Empire and Imperial but what else can one use without 
elaborate explanations’.58 He called the new paper ‘A British California on the 
Murray’.
By year’s end McDougall was enthusiastically supporting development proposals, 
maintaining that half a million people could be settled on the Murray; he later 
revised that figure to one million.59 His estimates of potential production were 
sound and often surpassed in reality; the population prediction was of a piece 
with over-optimistic contemporary views represented by ‘Australia Unlimited’.60 
In 1928 a compilation of essays by various experts included estimates of 
population potential ranging from 14 to 200 million.61 Prime Minister, W. M. 
Hughes, and some experts had endorsed a suggestion of 100 million. Australia’s 
population in 1921 was some five and a half millions; a population of one million 
in the Murray lands must have seemed a breathtaking figure. The potential of 
irrigation and other development schemes in Australia was nevertheless widely 
and enthusiastically embraced; the fragility of inland river systems was scarcely 
understood at all.
McDougall’s idea had taken its final shape by 1921, as had his plan of campaign. 
First steps would be based on ADFA and on the press in both Australia and 
Britain.62 By midyear, the Murray Pioneer could claim that preference was 
‘coming on’.63 Another rural newspaper, The Leader, acknowledged that the 
dried-fruits industry was becoming increasingly dependent upon successful 
export. The problem might well be too big for ADFA. By ‘pouring settlers by 
the thousand’ into the industry, government had assumed some obligation 
to those who had already made it a success.64 The Editor of the Mildura Sun 
wanted the fruit industry put on ‘a war footing’ to deal with federal and State 
legislatures. ADFA should buy up his paper and the Murray Pioneer and use 
both to push ‘the greatest Imperial idea that has been heard of yet in Australia: 
the establishment…of a new, self-governing Rhodesia, in the shape of a Sun-
Raysed State’.65 In May, State ministers of agriculture resolved to encourage 
substantial immigration within the empire and to lobby for increased preference 
on primary products, including fruits.66 A speech in the SA House of Assembly 
calling for preference in return for settling British ex-servicemen on the Murray 
58 NLA, MS6890/1/7, letter to Kit, 20 March 1921.
59 Ibid., undated letter to Kit, November–December 1921.
60 See, for example, Hancock, Survey, pp. 133–4; Powell, Historical Geography of Modern Australia, pp. 131–2.
61 P. D. Phillips and G. L. Woods, eds, The Peopling of Australia, MUP/Macmillan, Melbourne, 1928.
62 NLA, MS6890/1/7, letter to Kit, 11 June 1921. 
63 MP, 5 August 1921.
64 Leader article of 19 November, reprinted in MP, 2 December 1921.
65 Dated 12 September, published in MP, 23 September. Taylor, flattered but not tempted, wrote that the 
proposal was nevertheless worthy of serious consideration. 
66 National Archives of Australia [hereinafter NAA], A458, R508/1, part 1. The resolution was forwarded 
by SA Premier, H. N. Barwell, to the Commonwealth Government on 28 June 1921, and supported by letters 
from the Premiers of New South Wales and Tasmania.
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was greeted with cheers. H. S. Taylor had supported imperial preference for 
17 years, ‘but it is only recently that it has been taken hold of by men really 
desirous of bringing the idea to fruition’. Taylor gave McDougall credit for 
originating the linking of preference and imperial soldier settlement.67
‘A substantial British preference’
Besides linking preference to settlement, McDougall’s 1921 version tackled 
a question left unanswered in 1919: how much preference was needed to 
make fruit export viable? The British Budget brought down on 30 April 1919 
included preferences equivalent to one-sixth of low, existing revenue duties 
on tea, cocoa, coffee, sugar, tobacco and dried fruits. Most of the dried fruits 
attracted duty of 10/6d per hundredweight (cwt), which, reduced for empire 
products to 8/9d, meant a preference of 1/9d. Currants attracted a duty of only 
two shillings per cwt, reduced by a four pence imperial preference to 1/8d. The 
small reductions were unlikely to make Australian fruit competitive in normal 
times. Currants exported before the war had sold at a loss for 25–30 shillings per 
cwt; the wartime high of 90 shillings had fallen to 50 shillings by 1921. Lexias 
had not paid, prewar, at 30–40 shillings per cwt; sultanas had barely broken 
even at 45–65 shillings.68 McDougall believed that nothing less than threepence 
preference per pound (that is, 28 shillings per cwt) could give growers a 
comfortable income.69 The Leader later found this suggestion ‘manifestly 
extravagant’.70 It meant the price of foreign fruit in London would rise a further 
28 shillings above prices of at least 50 shillings per cwt for empire fruit; it was 
asking a lot of British consumers and their government. But McDougall had 
argued to his audience of returned soldier ‘blockers’—most of them new to the 
industry—that price was more important than quantity of sales. New markets 
in Asia might be developed, as had been proposed, but these, like London 
markets, would be at risk of dumping from California as other supplies returned 
to normal. Substantial preference was the only sure protection for adequate 
returns for growers. The meeting carried unanimously a resolution urging other 
returned servicemen’s groups on the river to lobby the SA Premier to support 
‘a substantial British preference’. The phrase gained currency: the Renmark 
Agricultural Bureau passed a motion proposed by McDougall, requesting the 
SA Advisory Board of Agriculture to recommend ‘all possible methods’ be used 
to obtain a substantial preference.71
67 MP, 5 August and 21 October 1921.
68 NAA, A458, K500/2, part 1. The figures were submitted by ADFA to the Premiers’ Conference in 1921.
69 Paper delivered by McDougall to Returned Soldiers’ Association in Renmark. MP, 11 November 1921; 
copy in NLA, MS6890/4/2.
70 Article printed in MP, 19 November 1921.
71 MP, 11 and 18 November 1921.
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Daily Mail proprietor, Lord Northcliffe, who, McDougall believed, possessed 
‘greater powers of useful publicity than any man in England’, toured the 
Antipodes in 1921.72 Both the Murray Pioneer and the Mildura Sun urged that 
Northcliffe be invited to the Murray to spark a publicity campaign attracting 
migration and investment to what was potentially ‘a mighty inland State 
stretching from Renmark far beyond Mildura and with a population of at least 
a million men’.73 ADFA representatives asked South Australia’s Premier, H. N. 
Barwell, to seek assurances to Northcliffe from all premiers that Murray lands 
would be supplied to British settlers in return for preference. Northcliffe did not 
visit the Murray, but A. E. Ross, a grower from Waikerie ‘with a fine presence’, 
was chosen to represent ADFA’s arguments to Northcliffe, who promised support 
from the Daily Mail once the scheme was launched in Britain. Barwell assured 
Renmark growers his government was determined to establish markets for the 
produce of ‘the great Murray lands’, and was exploring measures to open up 
promising trade prospects in the East. State ministers of agriculture had agreed 
that everything should be done to achieve substantial tariff preference. His 
own government had contacted the Commonwealth Government and concerted 
action by the States was contemplated. ‘We’ve progressed a fair way’, reflected 
McDougall, and thought his settlement scheme itself might be named ‘A British 
California on the Murray’.74
72 NLA, MS6890/1/7, letter to Kit, 3 October 1921.
73 Grant Hervey, Editor of the Mildura Sun, in MP, 2 September 1921.
74 MP, 16 September and 2 December 1921; NLA, MS6890/1/7, letter to Kit, 3 October 1921.
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2. Working with Bruce
Summary
The Australian Dried Fruits Association took the campaign for tariff preference, 
summed up in a memorandum by McDougall, to the Premiers’ Conference late 
in 1921. The Federal Government was persuaded to raise the issue of increasing 
preference with the British Government, which refused to consider a measure 
increasing the cost of food. A delegation to help clear stocks of Australian 
tinned fruits in London included McDougall, who gained the approval of 
Stanley Melbourne Bruce, a young and very new Federal Treasurer in 1922, 
for his continuing to campaign for tariff preference while in London. By 
the time McDougall reached London, Bruce had replaced W. M. Hughes as 
Prime Minister. McDougall reported regularly to Bruce on the progress of his 
lobbying, and was asked to assist him prepare for the 1923 Imperial Conference. 
He helped write Bruce’s major speech to the Imperial Economic Conference, 
calling for imperial economic cooperation through the provision of ‘men, 
money and markets’. Soon after the conference, British Prime Minister Stanley 
Baldwin sought endorsement of further tariffs at a general election. McDougall 
assisted Bruce in his support for Baldwin’s case and also urged Bruce to ensure 
that Australia’s rural industries were organised for efficient marketing. With 
the election lost and an anti-tariff minority Labour Government in power in 
London, Bruce summoned McDougall to Australia in 1924 to help prepare 
legislation for organisation schemes for industries including dried fruits. It was 
agreed between the two that McDougall should return to London, paid partly 
by the Federal Government for lobbying work and partly by the new Dried 
Fruits Export Control Board, of which he would be the London Secretary. By 
this time Bruce and McDougall had developed a solid working partnership, the 
nature of which is discussed at the end of the chapter.
November 1921: ‘A California within the Empire’
ADFA delegates from four States conferred in the temporary federal capital, 
Melbourne, in October 1921, and resolved to seek federal and State help in 
‘agitating’ for a preferential duty on dried fruits in the United Kingdom. As 
ADFA deliberations concluded, senior ministers from all States were arriving 
for a premiers’ conference. On its first day, Barwell requested consideration of 
an additional agenda item concerning ‘some matter’ from the ADFA Conference. 
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An ADFA deputation wished to see the Prime Minister. H. D. Howie of Renmark 
and a Mr Victorsen of Clare saw Hughes at his home on Tuesday, 1 November, 
the Melbourne Cup Day holiday.1
Barwell’s ‘matter’ was yet another version of the paper that had occupied 
McDougall throughout 1921. A preliminary statement submitted to the 
conference set out the problem: London prices were already falling to half the 
wartime level, and might reach a point where export would not pay. The present 
acreage was expected to increase more than sevenfold, and ADFA’s expensive 
three-year advertising campaign had brought sales in Australia to saturation 
point. With the paper was McDougall’s six-page memorandum prepared for 
Northcliffe, headed ‘A California within the Empire’. It presented the case from 
the British point of view, including likely returns from fruit-growing for a settler 
and opportunities for British investment. Both depended upon a preference rate 
of 3d per pound. The paper suggested, as a quid pro quo, an invitation to British 
returned soldiers to work side-by-side with ‘old comrades in arms’, to enjoy the 
healthy lifestyle and community spirit of an industry already established for 
them. It answered objections to taxing food: even at a high price of one shilling 
per pound, dried fruits would constitute the cheapest form of fruit food. The 
Imperial Exchequer would benefit from customs duties until ‘a great producing 
centre has been built up within the empire which can supply all its needs’.2 
McDougall already understood the advantage of propounding the vision from a 
central point of view.
Hughes promised ADFA delegates full support.3 But next day he told the 
assembled premiers he held ‘no hope whatever’ of a British Government agreeing 
to increase the price of the people’s food. Nor did Barwell. The premiers spent 
much of that day seeking other means to sell more Australian fruit. Stories of 
poor-quality fruit and packing, inadequate advertising and poor comparison 
with Californian fruit were shared round the table. All agreed ‘immediate 
action is imperative’. ‘We cannot attack a more serious problem’, said Victoria’s 
Premier, H. S. W. Lawson.4 Their decisions formed the major part of Hughes’ 
statement at the conclusion of the conference. The Federal Government and 
State Governments would work with producers to ensure a standard product 
through uniform inspection and grading, and would jointly fund commercial 
representatives overseas. Migration and marketing were linked, said Hughes: 
‘successful land settlement involves more than merely placing men upon suitable 
1 Argus, 31 October 1921; MP, 4 November 1921; NAA, A9504/1, 3, 31 October 1921.
2 NAA, A458, K500/2, part 1.
3 MP, 3 March 1922.
4 NAA, A9504/1, 3, 2 November 1921.
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areas…We must find remunerative overseas markets for what they produce.’ 
This was particularly true of the fruit industries, whose very success ‘now 
threatens us with disaster’.5
Although politicians had written off preference, ADFA persisted. Its conference 
had appointed a committee of five to pursue the campaign. McDougall, one of 
the five, explained his vision to his sister. Once the Federal Government was 
brought ‘into line’, it might send a full statement of the case, ‘nicely printed’, to 
England, followed by representatives ‘to push the matter, to lobby in the House, 
and to try and get the necessary backing…The committee all say that I must be 
the one to go to England.’6
ADFA had discussed the idea of sending irrigation pioneer William Chaffey and 
McDougall to England early in 1921, but ADFA funds were low after a poor 
season and the expense of the publicity campaign, so the idea was put aside.7 
Almost a year later the idea remained in doubt. South Australian delegates 
favoured the trip but Chaffey did not. McDougall wondered, without much 
hope, whether the Federal Government could be persuaded to share the cost. 
He was reluctant to go without his family and foresaw jealousies within ADFA.8 
Official travel overseas was a rare and costly privilege, avoided as far as possible 
by making use of Australians already overseas on other business. It could very 
easily create resentment.
A two-day Premiers’ Conference in January 1922 dealt with matters left over 
from the November meeting. Barwell, with support from Victoria’s Lawson, 
fulfilled a promise to his State Assembly to continue pressure on preference. 
Hughes had confirmed with Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill that a 
British Government would not tax the people’s food. Hughes suggested ‘a first 
class business man’ could achieve sufficient market share in Britain without 
preference. Barwell countered that a preference on dried fruits already existed; 
it was simply not high enough. He recalled the proposal to make fruit-growing 
land available for settlement in exchange for preference. Still doubtful, Hughes 
promised to telegraph Churchill again.9
Much of the cable sent on 28 January might well have been drafted by 
McDougall himself. It extolled the ‘almost unlimited’ possibilities of the dried-
fruits industry, the capacity of the British market to absorb the product, its 
economic importance to the Empire and its direct bearing on settlement of 
British ex-soldiers. Australian ministers in conference urged British assistance 
5 Argus, 5 November 1921.
6 NLA, MS6890/1/7, letter, probably to Kit. Page one is missing, but the content suggests it was written 
before the second Premiers’ Conference, probably in November or December 1921.
7 Ibid., letter to Mother, 7 March 1921. 
8 Ibid., undated letter to Kit of November–December.
9 NAA, A9504/1, 3, 17–18 January 1922. 
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to the industry in the form of a preferential tariff of one and a half pence per 
pound on currants and twopence on other fruits.10 The amount was less than 
ADFA wanted, but the British Government baulked at such an increase over 
existing rates. To achieve Australia’s request, the existing duty on foreign 
currants must rise from 2 to 14 shillings per cwt, assuming empire fruit was 
admitted duty-free. Duty on other fruits would almost double to at least 18 
shillings and 8 pence.11 Britain would not accept so great an increase in the 
cost of a food largely consumed by the working classes, nor a possible loss of 
customs revenue if imports of foreign fruits liable to duty were to decrease in 
favour of free-entry empire produce. Despite ‘every sympathy’ with the object 
of the request, it was ‘quite impracticable’.12
The ADFA committee would not give up. The proposals put to London had 
been ‘half-baked’ and bound to fail, claimed the Murray Pioneer. McDougall 
determined to answer the case against preference with more information, better 
presented. He asked the Commonwealth Statistician to help calculate just what 
effect an adequate preference would have on the British Exchequer. Armed with 
a conclusion that revenue would in fact increase by some £1,600,000 per annum, 
McDougall prepared a new, longer statement: ‘The Case for Preference.’13
The Fruit Delegation
In May 1922 McDougall was summoned to Melbourne to address ‘a special 
Ministerial Conference’ of the Murray States, arranged by Lawson to discuss 
preference. The conference requested further negotiations with London. It also 
agreed that the States should prepare ‘an attractive immigration offer as a quid 
pro quo’, and that States and Commonwealth together should fund a delegation 
of ‘practical men’ to put the case before influential people in England. State 
ministers for agriculture endorsed the proposals in Perth later that month.14
A national conference of fruit-growers was called in August 1922 to effect 
measures to improve standards in the industry. It was attended by ministers 
for agriculture, more than 100 growers, and Hughes himself on the final day. 
The conference agenda included establishment of an Australian Advisory Fruit 
Council and State Advisory Boards, a national trademark, and inspection of 
10 NAA, A11804, 1922/232; text reprinted in Argus, 28 January 1922.
11 Figure 7 shows that London wholesale prices in 1919–22 for lexias and currants ranged between £60 and 
£80 per ton (60–80 shillings per cwt). Prices for sultanas had been almost double that at their highest, but fell 
sharply after 1922. McDougall stated in his paper ‘A California on the Murray’ that the highest retail price was 
about one shilling per lb (equivalent to 112 shillings per cwt).
12 NAA, A11804, 1922/382, 24 March 1922.
13 MP, Editorial, 9 June 1922; report of McDougall’s speech to growers, 23 June; a version of ‘The Case for 
Preference’ published 7, 14, 21 and 28 July 1922.
14 MP, 12 May 1922; NAA, A457, Y300/7, McDougall to conference of fruit-growers, 14 August 1922.
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grading and packing, storage and handling. But it was also required to approve 
‘an urgently pressing matter’: the sending of a delegation to Britain in time to 
negotiate effectively for the new season’s deliveries. Arthur Rodgers, Federal 
Minister for Trade and Customs, dismissed suggestions that ‘either the Agent-
General or the High Commissioner are the men for this job…it requires men 
who can go, with the weight of life-long experience and supported by the 
governments, to fight for every branch of the industry’.15
McDougall shared the platform with Rodgers, giving the meeting an account 
of negotiations with governments since the January Premiers’ Conference. 
Fellow South Australian, ADFA delegate A. E. Ross, countered any lingering 
reluctance: the real beneficiaries of the venture would be new ex-service 
growers who, without preference, would ‘make an unholy failure’ at ultimate 
cost to the taxpayer’. The motion in support was carried unanimously.16 The 
delegation, comprising two irrigation growers, McDougall and Chaffey, and C. 
E. D. Meares, General Manager of the Coastal Farmers’ Co-operative of New 
South Wales, left for London on 20 November 1922, their work funded jointly 
by the Commonwealth and the States. Members would be paid a daily living 
and entertainment allowance of five guineas once they reached Britain and two 
guineas per day on board ship.17 McDougall left his block in the hands of his 
half-brother Norman.
The Murray Pioneer credited government support for the delegation to 
McDougall’s ‘able advocacy’ and ‘tireless persistence’. Speakers at a farewell 
dinner described him as ‘a technical expert in the question of preference’, a man 
of ‘bulldog tenacity’ and ‘dogged persistence’. McDougall replied modestly, but 
did claim to have ‘worn holes in about all the ministerial doormats in Melbourne 
and Adelaide’. The task of ‘preparing the British mind for preference’ would be 
an easy one if a Conservative Government were returned in a general election 
set for 15 November, ‘very difficult but not hopeless’ under a Labour/Liberal 
Government: ‘if British Labour men meant half of what they said it should not be 
impossible to convert them to a policy which had for its object the maintenance 
of a decent standard of living.’18
Before the Fruit Delegation left Melbourne, Rodgers handed them formal 
instructions. They were to advance sales of Australian dried, fresh and canned 
fruit. They were to consult with the Australian High Commissioner and State 
Agents-General on a campaign of persuasion and ‘judicious propaganda’ to 
15 MP, 1 September 1922; NAA, A457, Y300/7, report of conference, pp. 72, 77.
16 Ibid., pp. 77–84.
17 NAA, M111, 1925, statement attached to McDougall’s letter to Bruce, 14 December 1925. See also LFSSA, 
45, 14 December 1925, pp. 129–30. 
18 MP, 10 November 1922.
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merchants, brokers and large eating houses, and on means of disposing of stocks 
of canned fruit already built up in London. They were to report fortnightly to 
Rodgers, and the period of the mission was limited to six months.
But then the instructions took a surprising turn. At the fruit-growers’ conference 
Rodgers had explained that the delegation would ‘convince the consuming 
public of Britain, the merchants and the British Government that it was a wise 
thing to give preference to Australian fruit’. In Rodgers’ presence, McDougall 
had spoken at length on lobbying for preference. Now, the written instructions 
forbade it: 
You are, under no circumstances, to approach the Imperial Government, 
British Ministers, or organised bodies on the question of Imperial 
Preference. This matter, the Commonwealth Government can delegate 
to no private individual. You may, of course, say that Australia will 
be represented by a full supply of choice fruits at the British Empire 
Exhibition…you should make no communications to the press either 
privately or otherwise.19
There was no recorded explanation for the reversal. The letter would have 
been drafted by Rodgers’ department, which had taken a conservative position 
in regard to preference throughout the preceding debate.20 It may have been 
bureaucratic inability to deal with an unorthodox proceeding. McDougall’s 
comment suggests something of the sort: ‘Rodgers tried to wind red tape around 
us but I had an eminently satisfactory interview with Bruce as to aims and 
objects.’21
Bruce
Stanley Melbourne Bruce was then Australia’s Federal Treasurer and was shortly 
to become Prime Minister. Bruce was born in Melbourne in 1883, the youngest 
child of John Munro Bruce, partner in the prominent softgoods importing 
firm Paterson, Laing and Bruce (PLB), and his wife, Ann. He was educated 
largely in Melbourne, though the family spent some time in England during 
his childhood. After his father’s death in 1901, he moved with his mother and 
invalid sister to England, studying law at Trinity Hall, Cambridge. Bruce’s 
academic achievements were outweighed by his success in rowing: he was a 
member of the winning crew in 1904 and subsequently coached Cambridge 
crews. He was admitted to the English Bar and developed a practice in company 
19 NAA, A458, 1500/2, part 1, Rodgers to Meares, Chaffey and McDougall, 9 November 1922.
20 NAA, A458, R508/1, various examples.
21 NLA, MS6890/1/8, letter to Norman, 10 November 1922.
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law. PLB was substantially funded by British shareholders; Bruce became its 
London Chairman in 1906, while his brother Ernest managed the Australian 
operation. 
In 1913 Bruce married Ethel Anderson, elegant daughter of a prominent 
Melbourne family. The marriage was a close and devoted one. The couple had no 
children, but took a keen interest in their many nieces and nephews. Bruce was 
commissioned in the British Army and fought in the Gallipoli campaign. He was 
awarded the Military Cross for leading a rescue of 42 isolated comrades and the 
Croix de Guerre avec Palme for support his battalion had given to the French. In 
October 1915 he suffered a severe knee wound and spent 18 months in hospitals 
before returning to Australia in 1917, still on crutches, to take over PLB after 
Ernest enlisted. After Ernest’s death in 1919, he became responsible for both the 
London and the Melbourne offices. He oversaw PLB’s increasing expansion and 
profitability, and also ensured a profit-sharing scheme was extended to junior 
staff.
During the war the Australian Labor Party had split on the issue of conscription. 
Prime Minister W.M. Hughes left the party with almost one-third of its MPs, 
and joined with the pro-conscriptionist Liberals to form the Nationalist Party. In 
1917 the Federal seat of Flinders on the outskirts of Melbourne became vacant 
and Bruce was persuaded to stand for the Nationalists at a by-election. Despite a 
myth that he stumbled unwillingly into politics, it has been argued that he had 
a clear agenda and, using the ‘guise’ of a businessman who disliked politics, he 
was able to criticise the Government and yet accept most of its legislation.22 He 
claimed to stand for ‘efficiency and economy in the conduct of affairs’; he urged 
‘business methods’ in government development of industry and government 
promotion of immigration and irrigation. He was elected to the House of 
Representatives on 11 May 1918, one of very few returned soldiers at that time. 
In 1919 he was sent by the Government to investigate repatriation systems in 
Britain, the United States and Canada. In the general election campaign at the 
end of that year he claimed to stand for maintenance of the British Empire, 
a living wage, a health insurance scheme, soldier settlement, development of 
markets in Asia and tariffs to create new secondary industries. 
In the 1919 general election, the Nationalists won 37 seats and Labor 27; 11 
Country Party members generally supported the Nationalists, without formal 
agreement. In 1921 Bruce was obliged to spend several months in London on 
PLB business. While there, he was appointed senior Australian representative at 
the League of Nations, where he spoke graphically of the horrors of war, saying: 
‘If the League of Nations goes, the hope of mankind goes also.’ As Bruce returned 
22 Heather Radi, ‘Bruce, Stanley Melbourne [Viscount Bruce] (1883–1967)’, ADB, <www.adb.online.anu.
edu.au/biogs/A070460b.htm>
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to Australia in October, Hughes offered him the post of Minister for Trade 
and Customs. Bruce refused, but did accept a subsequent offer of Treasurer. 
Members of the National Union, backers of the Nationalist Party, wanted the 
appointment of a businessman. Bruce resigned from PLB when his appointment 
was announced on 21 December. His only budget, in 1922, proposed reduced 
income and company taxes, reduced tariffs on imports of galvanised iron, wire 
and tractors, and a bounty for local production of these essential products 
for farmers. He established a sinking fund to redeem the domestic war debt 
within 50 years, based on the practice of other developed countries. He claimed 
that his measures were inspired by resolutions of the International Financial 
Conference in 1920. He also paid special attention to war service homes and 
soldier settlement.23
Many members of the National Union were critical of Hughes’ policies as 
extravagant and socialist. The leader of the Country Party, Earle Page, disliked 
him. At the general election in December 1922—the first to use preferential 
voting widely—Nationalist numbers fell to 28 seats. Labor rose to 30, leaving 
the Country Party with 14 seats and holding the balance of power. That party 
decided not to support any government led by Hughes. Bruce, aged thirty-nine, 
became Prime Minister on 9 February 1923. He has been called the ‘architect’ 
of the enduring coalition between Nationalists (later United Australia Party 
and subsequently the Liberal Party of Australia) and the Country Party (later 
the National Party and now The Nationals). His policies appealed to interest 
groups including business and returned servicemen; his speeches, though 
workmanlike, impressed with solid content; one observer described him as 
‘ponderous and measured…at his best when addressing Chambers of Commerce 
or trade meetings’.24 But no doubt his courteous and reserved demeanour, 
enhanced by a commanding stature, contrasted favourably with that of the 
mercurial and sometimes irascible Hughes.
Although he would come to be respected and influential, and to have wide 
access at high levels in British and international politics, Bruce was not naturally 
gregarious. For much of the time he and Ethel lived quietly, enjoying travel, golf, 
theatre and the company of family and close friends. It has been suggested that 
his obduracy and apparent aloofness may have masked ‘a sense of insecurity 
and melancholy’, and even at times depression. His family life had been marked 
by loss: his father committed suicide in 1901, as did his brother Ernest in 1919. 
His sister died in 1908 and his mother four years later.25
23 I. M. Cumpston, Lord Bruce of Melbourne, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1989, pp. 21–2.
24 Lee, Stanley Melbourne Bruce, p. 20.
25 Ibid., p. 14.
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Bruce had been marked out from his schooldays as a leader; in his military 
career and at PLB he demonstrated a natural ability. He valued ‘order, tradition, 
structure and discipline’. His primary loyalties were to nation and empire, the 
interests of which he believed to be inseparable. As a leader, he could look 
beyond political boundaries and personal oddities to make use of talented 
individuals. He had formed a government with Page and worked constructively 
with him despite Page’s ‘habitual incoherence and tendency to giggle’.26 While 
he could inspire loyalty and confidence in his supporters, and respect even more 
widely, his lack of a ‘common touch’ and refusal to bow to opinion created 
enemies. Opponents would characterise him as a conservative Anglophile and 
representative of big business. He ‘saw himself as a modern man’ looking to 
international cooperation to prevent future wars and build a more prosperous 
world. As a businessman depending on international trade himself, he would 
always aim to facilitate and encourage its expansion. As a political leader of a 
country dependent on primary exports, he understood the needs of the rural 
sector and the importance of marketing its products.27 In the later years of his 
prime ministership, his determination to take a hard line with maritime unrest 
strengthened the forces against him.
Lobbying for Preference
As Federal Treasurer, Bruce had visited Renmark with members of the Murray 
Waters Commission, a few months before his meeting with McDougall in 
November 1922, and just after a period of record rains. Despite being bogged 
and spattered with mud en route, Bruce was said to be impressed with the 
construction works in progress, and promised early attention to a telephone 
connection between Mildura and Renmark.28 There is no evidence that he 
met McDougall then, but the experience and a shared vision of the area’s 
potential perhaps gave them common ground. Bruce was persuaded to endorse 
McDougall’s plan of action. Writing just after Bruce’s appointment as Prime 
Minister, McDougall tactfully reminded him of their agreement:
...you were good enough to clearly state your views as to the best 
methods to adopt in England. Very briefly stated your views were that 
the main duty of the Delegation was to prepare the ground for further 
Preference proposals by the Commonwealth Government, and that the 
26 Ibid., pp. 9, 33.
27 Ibid., pp. 29–31.
28 MP, 12 May 1922.
A New Idea Each Morning
46
best method to adopt was by personal interviews with the right people, 
and other quiet unobtrusive methods. My own views entirely concurred 
with your own.29
McDougall thus had two objectives: sales promotion with the Fruit Delegation 
as instructed by Rodgers, and covert lobbying for preference sanctioned by 
Bruce. He welcomed the return of a Conservative Government days before he 
sailed. By the time he reached England, however, Prime Minister Bonar Law had 
repeated his earlier pledge not to tax food. Undaunted by this difficulty, or by 
Rodgers’ instructions, McDougall used every spare moment from a busy round 
of sales promotion and investigation, ‘going very hard…seeing people morning 
noon and night’ about preference. No-one ‘uttered the word impossible, except 
the High Commissioner [former Prime Minister Sir Joseph Cook] who did not 
understand the scheme’, although in the City ‘one and all emphasise the very 
great difficulties that will have to be overcome’.30
This early period in London was effectively an apprenticeship, where McDougall 
applied himself to learn the skills of the lobbyist: putting a persuasive case, 
whether in person or in writing; mastery of his subject matter; and an 
understanding, even empathy, with those he sought to persuade. Talking, 
especially informally, came easily, but he claimed to find writing difficult. It 
was to become integral to his work, in a constant flow of memoranda and in the 
press. He began gradually, drafting replies, refutations and corrections to letters 
and public statements criticising Australian tariff policy, to be published over 
the signature of Australia House officials as he maintained a policy of anonymity. 
He cultivated journalists of like mind, particularly at The Times, and at first was 
content to ‘inspire’ articles. Very soon he was ‘doing much more journalism than 
I ever imagined would fall to my lot…I have no style and mightily little ear or 
eye for bad faults, and a 1500 word article is some joke to me’.31 With experience, 
and later the confidence of a well-received book behind him, he was to become 
a contributor of major articles, often in series of three or more. He spent a great 
deal of time in editorial offices; his articles in The Times were usually part of a 
coordinated campaign, timed to advantage and frequently echoed by editorials.
Within a few weeks, McDougall could report to Bruce sympathetic views from 
importers of dried fruits; a promising contact within the Colonial Office; an 
interview with the President of the Board of Trade; approaches to the Federation 
of British Industries, numbering 200 Members of Parliament amongst its 
29 NLA, MS6890/1/8, copy of McDougall’s letter to Bruce, 8 February 1923, sent to Norman for circulation 
in ADFA.
30 Ibid., letters to Norman, 4 January and 8 February 1923.
31 Ibid., letter to Norman, 29 August 1923.
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membership, and to Lionel Curtis of the Round Table; editorial support from 
the Morning Post and Daily Mail; and favourable views at The Times. British 
commercial treaties with Spain and Greece, however, remained an obstacle.32
Bruce’s elevation to the prime ministership delighted him: ‘I hope…that it 
will be a new bright page on the history of Australia.’ He quickly sent a brief 
letter of congratulation with a longer letter, which included the reminder of 
their agreement quoted above, a report on progress and assurance that as the 
names of the delegates were not associated with preference, Rodgers’ ‘very 
hurriedly given’ instructions were being observed. But he also explained that 
the campaign had been ‘forced open’. Press support of Australia’s preference 
proposals had followed the ‘unexpected’ publication by The Times Trade 
Supplement of McDougall’s report to the most recent ADFA conference. He 
confessed to Norman: ‘I did not exactly write either article but I entertained the 
writers of both to separate dinners!! I hope I shall not sacrifice my figure on the 
altar of preference.’33
The Imperial Conference, 1923
McDougall began his mission hoping to stay longer than the six months allowed 
for the Fruit Delegation. Before leaving Adelaide, he had made tentative 
arrangements for his family to join him in the English spring. An Imperial 
Conference, expected in June, would provide the opportunity for pressure at 
the highest level to seal the preference campaign. He believed there would be 
work to do following up any broad decision, and hoped the task would be his. 
When the conference was delayed until autumn, beyond the six-month limit 
of the delegation, the NSW and Victorian Premiers, both then in London, were 
persuaded to send almost identical cables to the Prime Minister, stating that 
McDougall was doing ‘excellent work’, he should remain for the conference 
and the cost could be covered by financial arrangements made for the Fruit 
Delegation.34 The South Australian Government, lobbied by ADFA, joined in the 
request; South Australian winemaker T. C. Angove saw Bruce; and Meares, by 
then back in Australia, also dealt with the Federal Government. All governments 
and departments involved assented and the High Commission in London was 
formally notified of approval on 8 June. Chaffey departed and McDougall, still 
officially the Fruit Delegation, remained to prepare for the Imperial Conference.
An Australian Prime Minister could expect to return with some reflected glow 
from the glories of empire. But his electorate, and a modest federal budget, 
32 Ibid., letters to Norman, 4, 12 and 24 January 1923.
33 Ibid., letters to Norman, 2 and 8 February; copy of Letter to Bruce, 8 February 1923.
34 NAA, A458, 1500/2, part 1, cables from Fuller and Lawson, 28 April 1923.
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could not accept undue squandering of funds for accompanying officials. 
The party of advisers accompanying Bruce would be small. He might well 
supplement his team with any likely Australian who happened to be in Europe, 
and would make good use of his long and expensive journey by staying on for 
several weeks, publicising and attending to Australia’s interests. All of this had 
occurred to McDougall. He wrote to Meares suggesting he join Bruce’s ship 
in Naples, to help brief him for the conference, but was told that his presence 
would not be required. Then suddenly, early in September, he was delighted to 
be ordered to meet Bruce’s ship at Port Said: ‘This will give me five days with 
Bruce, Wilson, Oakley and Fred and a splendid opportunity to press home the 
points I particularly want to make.’35 Senator R. V. Wilson, Assistant Minister, 
was the only other politician in the party travelling from Australia. Officials 
were the Comptroller-General of Customs, R. McK. Oakley, Solicitor-General, 
Sir Robert Garran, an adviser on defence and another on foreign policy. There 
were also secretaries to Bruce and Wilson and a publicity officer, F. M. [Fred] 
Cutlack, lawyer, journalist and author of a much-publicised volume of the 
official war history, who was also McDougall’s brother-in-law. Four prominent 
businessmen acted as advisers: Herbert Brookes and Claude Reading, both 
members of the Commonwealth Board of Trade; London-based John Sanderson, 
who represented Australia on a committee advising the British Board of Trade; 
and Walter Young, General Manager of Elders and an active promoter of orderly 
marketing, particularly of wool and wheat.
McDougall was never so overawed by the great and powerful as to lose sight 
of their use to his cause. As he prepared papers and arguments aboard the 
Orsova steaming towards Port Said, he sensed the approach of a momentous 
leap for his cause and for his career: ‘I suppose the next six weeks are going 
to be immensely interesting, perhaps decisive as to Preference, Inter Empire 
Trade, Baldwin and Bruce’s governments and perhaps for FLMcD!!’ FLMcD had 
his objectives in order of priority and, while he placed Australian interests—
preference on dried fruits, on canned fruit and on wine—first, Bruce should 
express his policy ‘in harmony with’ British agriculture and British consumers, 
and with broader imperial interests: the proper organisation of empire trade, 
giving empire producers competitive advantage over foreigners and eliminating 
price fluctuations.36 McDougall had prepared the ground with an article in the 
Yorkshire Post, written by ‘an Australian correspondent who has made a special 
study of the problems to be discussed at the Imperial Economic Conference’. It 
argued for reciprocal tariff preferences and access to British markets for Australian 
producers labouring in a sparsely populated continent of enormous potential, 
35 NLA, MS6890/1/8, letter to Norman, 5 September 1923.
36 Ibid., letter to Norman, 26 September 1923.
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one unlikely in the foreseeable future to become a significant manufacturing 
economy. Australia needed men and markets.37 The day before Port Said, he 
confessed to apprehension about the fate of his cause and his future:
Everything is so dependent upon what is forthcoming next month. 
Tomorrow and the few days following will show me whether Bruce will 
be the man for the occasion. The occasion is here, I perhaps have done a 
little mite to prepare and to bring the occasion but Bruce can if he will 
bring it to the climax.38
The Imperial Conference of 1923 was in some ways the first of a new era. No 
longer overshadowed by the Great War and subsequent treaty-making, it was 
in fact two conferences, held concurrently over some six weeks, seeking to 
define how the British Empire would meet the political and economic challenges 
of a difficult postwar world. The Imperial Conference opened on 1 October, 
chaired by the British Prime Minister, and dealt with foreign policy, defence, 
communications and legal issues. The President of the Board of Trade, Sir 
Philip Lloyd-Greame, chaired the Imperial Economic Conference, beginning the 
following day. Its agenda included financial assistance for imperial development, 
technical research and communication, commercial facilities, currency and 
exchange, forestry, livestock and the Imperial Institute. Bruce had worried that 
absence threatened his tenuous hold on office; he tailored parliamentary sittings 
to include a brief but busy session before his departure after which Parliament 
would not sit again until his return. The arrangement meant that Bruce could 
not reach London until a week after the conference opening; its program was 
modified to allow him to speak at the Economic Conference as soon as he arrived. 
He was met on arrival by Lord Milner, inspiration for the ‘imperial visionaries’, 
who became a close associate and encouraged him to promote imperial economic 
cooperation.39
Bruce proved indeed to be the man for the occasion. McDougall had ‘worked 
up’ the opening address with him as they sailed through the Mediterranean. Its 
theme was an imperial vision very much along the lines of McDougall’s Yorkshire 
Post article, summed up in the words ‘Men, Money and Markets’. Its thesis 
was that markets were paramount; without them migration and development 
would at best be slow and limited. About one-quarter of it was devoted to 
figures drawn from McDougall’s increasing interest in proving the value of 
Australia’s tariff preference to British manufactures and of dominion markets 
to British employment. Bruce countered arguments against tariff preference 
on the grounds of harm to British trade relations, surveyed tariff practices of 
37 Ibid., cutting from Yorkshire Post, 7 September 1923, with letter to Norman, 11 September 1923.
38 Ibid., letter to Norman, 26 September 1923.
39 Lee, Stanley Melbourne Bruce, pp. 37–8.
A New Idea Each Morning
50
other colonial powers and recommended his audience study, as McDougall 
undoubtedly had, the report of the US Tariff Commission. He quoted Cobden: ‘I 
doubt the wisdom, I sincerely doubt the prudence, of a great body of industrial 
people to allow themselves to live in dependence on foreign Powers for the 
supply of food and raw material.’ He described the threat from products of 
cheap labour and recalled the 1917 resolution on imperial preference: ‘the last 
expression of the view held by a Conference of this character.’ Australia would 
again subscribe to a similar resolution, but would prefer ‘something practical 
to give effect to what we actually believe in’. He described the potential of the 
Murray irrigation scheme and its increasing production dependent on markets: 
‘if we have no markets we cannot have great migration, we cannot have great 
development in the near future.’ Interestingly Bruce altered McDougall’s order 
of objectives, placing assistance to the British farmer first, before dominion 
producers, with the British consumer last. He surveyed possible methods: tariffs, 
subsidies, import licensing or import control, and recommended an imperial 
royal commission to make recommendations on these alternatives. Finally he 
apologised for the length—26 typed pages—of his speech.40
McDougall sat watching the faces of British ministers as Bruce delivered 
the speech they had written together ‘extraordinarily well’. It was ‘a day of 
some personal triumph’. That afternoon, Lloyd-Greame, who less than a year 
earlier had declared increased preference impossible, announced a reversal of 
government policy, to allow full preference—10/6d per cwt—on all dried fruits 
except currants, about which there would be further discussion, and a new 
duty giving a preference of 5 shillings per cwt on canned fruit.41 The campaign, 
it seemed, had been won.
The General Election of 1923
It was a brief triumph. Bruce learned next day that the decision on tariffs 
had been made by the British Government well before his arrival and that 
the new Conservative Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, long committed to 
tariff reform, intended to take the country to a general election on the issue. 
Baldwin believed a wider tariff policy offered a solution to the ‘gaping wound’ 
of unemployment—his government’s most pressing problem—as well as falling 
exports and dominion demands for secure markets.42 With further depression 
predicted for the approaching winter, Baldwin and his ministers sought means 
to stimulate industries. Suggestions included the visionary program: increasing 
40 NAA, CP103/3, Volume 6, ‘Imperial Conference 1923, Stenographic Notes’, Fourth Meeting, 9 October 
1923, pp. 3–22.
41 NLA, MS6890/1/8, letter to Norman, 11 October 1923.
42 Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, Baldwin: A Biography, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1969, p. 219.
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the 1919 preferences and allocating more funds for empire development.43 
Having agreed in principle to extending preferences on empire sugar and 
dried fruits in March, Baldwin suggested delaying the announcement until the 
Imperial Conference: ‘if it were given in advance the Dominions would accept it 
and ask for something more.’44
Proposals to extend the McKenna and 1919 duties and to impose ‘safeguarding’ 
measures against dumping had been approved by Cabinet in August. Wider 
reform would break the 1922 pledge not to extend tariffs without another 
election. As imperial leaders gathered, the question in government had 
become not whether, but when, that election might be held. Besides aiding 
the economy, tariff reform might also heal a split in the Conservative Party and 
forestall a rumoured declaration of support for tariffs by Lloyd George. Senior 
Conservatives consulted Bruce as to ‘how far we can go at the Conference and 
also what we are to go to the country upon and when’. Cabinet members did 
not support immediate action; even keen tariff reformers like Leo Amery urged 
cautious and slow preparation. Baldwin hesitated, giving a ‘somewhat Delphic’ 
speech to his party conference on 25 October and choosing, on the final day of 
the Imperial Conference, not to deliver a prepared speech explaining a decision 
to go to the polls. Three days later, on 12 November, he sought a dissolution.45
Those who had advised caution were proved right. The party did not reunite; 
its case for tariff reform was unprepared; there was substantial press opposition 
and too little time to educate the electorate. Although the Liberal Party could 
expect to attract free-traders who normally voted Conservative, and to hold 
much of their working-class support for fear of ‘dear bread’, there was little 
else to distinguish Liberal policy from Labour, and Labour reaped the benefit. 
At the general election on 6 December, the Conservative Party lost its majority, 
but remained the largest party in the House of Commons, with 258 seats. Labour 
won its largest number to that date, 191; the Liberals were left with 159.46
Baldwin chose not to resign immediately, forcing the Liberals to decide which 
party to support. They chose Labour, possibly because the Liberal Party was 
more likely to survive a brief alliance with the left, whereas alliance with the 
Conservatives might encourage a move for fusion.47 Thus, a censure motion 
on 21 January 1924 brought a minority Labour Government into power. 
Labour tended to oppose tariffs to keep food cheap, and was now dependent 
43 John Barnes and David Nicholson, eds, The Leo Amery Diaries 1896–1929. Volume I, Hutchinson, 
London, 1980, entry for 10 July 1923, p. 333.
44 David Dilks, Neville Chamberlain: Pioneering and Reform 1869–1929, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1984, p. 339.
45 Barnes and Nicholson, Amery Diaries, Vol. I, p. 348; Dilks, Neville Chamberlain, pp. 341, 344; Middlemas 
and Barnes, Baldwin, p. 23. 
46 T. O. Lloyd, Empire to Welfare State: English History 1906–1985, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986, pp. 127–8.
47 Ibid., p. 129. 
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on free-trade Liberal support. Chancellor of the Exchequer Philip Snowden, 
a determined free-trader, abolished the McKenna duties and reduced revenue 
tariffs on sugar, tea, coffee and cocoa. The preference increases announced at 
the Imperial Conference, which involved no increase in duty, were to be put to 
a free vote in Parliament in June 1924.
McDougall had expected the election campaign to be a full-scale, measured 
debate to which he could apply ‘all the propaganda we can work to disarm 
hostility to our preference’. When the election date was uncertain, he suggested 
he should remain in England long enough to ensure the duties announced at 
the Imperial Conference survived the budget. Bruce agreed that he should stay 
at least until the election, and later extended his approval until the budget, due 
in May 1924.48 In the weeks after the Imperial Conference, Bruce toured the 
country, accompanied much of the time by McDougall, who drafted speeches 
and articles on the tariff question, expounded his own views on the needs of the 
dried-fruits industry, and developed the partnership begun on the Orvietto. The 
announcement of a December election, and its outcome, shifted their focus. The 
preferences announced at the Imperial Conference might now depend on Labour 
support, and McDougall congratulated himself on his foresight in establishing 
early links with Labour. At his first shipboard meeting with Bruce and his 
economic advisers, he had argued that agreement with Conservatives could not 
be permanent without Labour support, and wrote ruefully of the ‘rapid and 
cruel vindication of my prophecy’, adding, ‘but again, it’s interesting’. ‘I am 
now all out on propaganda for Labour. It was a damned wise move on my part 
to get in touch with Labour people before the Conference, as a result I have a leg 
in with them now.’ Rapidly developing as a skilful lobbyist, he was learning to 
tailor his arguments to a solution to the listener’s own concerns.
I have had [J. R.] Clynes [then considered a potential Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, but who became Lord Privy Seal] to lunch during the last 
week and also [F. W.] Pethick Lawrence and G. D. H. Cole. I hope to see 
Sidney Webb, [J. H.] Thomas and other lights, I am stressing to them 
the importance of Labour putting itself right with the nation on Empire 
matters, showing them the wonderful purchasing power of Australia 
and New Zealand for British Goods and the value of our preference.49
He found little sympathy for the imperial vision amongst Labour intellectuals, 
and nothing developed from a tentative approach based on common problems 
of agriculture. He had more success on the issue of labour conditions, stressing 
the importance of supporting products of good working conditions against 
those of sweated labour. He found ‘among Trade Union MPs a clearer realisation 
48 NLA, MA6890/1/9, letters to Norman, 30 October and 1 November 1923.
49 Ibid., letters to Norman, 10 and 24 January 1924.
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of economic fundamentals than among either Liberals or the Labour intelligen[t]
sia’.50 But he did make some headway with the Liberals by focusing on their 
perceived need for an ‘empire policy’.51 Early in 1924, McDougall determined 
‘to bring every argument and every battery to bear upon Parliament. When 
Bruce leaves I must start to see Chambers of Commerce, Trade Union leaders 
and represent the danger of losing the Australian preference on their own lines 
of commodities.’52 Bruce lunched with leading Labour figures on 19 December 
and was ‘convinced that they are most anxious to put themselves right with the 
Empire’, although their election speeches had also convinced him they would 
find ‘preferences hard to swallow’.53
In the event the free vote taken on the preferences announced in 1923 was 
narrowly lost. ‘Just fancy’, wrote McDougall, ‘a Free Trade majority of 80, the 
McKenna duties defeated by 62, and we get within six of our goal. It’s damnable 
but in some respects a triumph and at least argues irresistibly that in the near 
future we shall succeed.’54
Bruce’s ‘secret service agent’
McDougall wrote that Bruce’s biggest failing was of ‘imagination’—a term that 
for McDougall may well have included empathy with his own position. He knew 
from the beginning that he could not expect warmth or personal understanding 
from Bruce, whose ‘main disadvantage’ was a ‘lack of general knowledge and 
experience, powerfully offset by commonsense and a very considerable power 
for close thinking’. Yet, wrote McDougall, ‘one could work for him with 
enthusiasm, because he thinks and is mentally progressive’. On Bruce’s last 
evening in London, he and McDougall talked until 2 am. In that cosy intimacy, 
Bruce answered a question about the nature of the position McDougall was to 
hold while he remained in London: ‘Well McDougall, in your more uplifted 
moments you can call yourself the confidential representative of the Australian 
Prime Minister, when less inflated a secret service agent.’ Amusing and flattering 
as that reply might have been, there was no such designated position in the 
sprawling bureaucracy of Australia House and no comfortable line of direction 
for McDougall once Bruce departed. Bruce’s authority would be carried by 
Senator Wilson, who was remaining to oversee the British Empire Exhibition. 
Wilson was not well disposed to McDougall. Nor did Bruce’s joke hold any 
solution to the problem that had been nagging McDougall and his wife for many 
50 Ibid., letters to Norman, 2 February, 2 and 29 April, 10 and 17 May 1924.
51 LFSSA, 2, pp. 4–5.
52 NLA, MA6890/1/9, letter to Norman, 24 January 1924.
53 NLA, MA6890/1/8, letter to Norman, 20 December 1923.
54 NLA, MA6890/1/9, letter to Norman, 19 June 1924.
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months. Dwindling funds allocated for the Fruit Delegation could not last much 
beyond his fortieth birthday in April. He knew now that ‘active fruit growing’ 
would not ‘be my calling unless as a stop gap…I do want to be in the big things 
and I want to help Australia’.55
The Dried Fruits Export Control Board
Before the Imperial Conference McDougall had organised a committee in London 
to discuss an organisation scheme for the dried-fruits industry. A 27-page 
memorandum recording their views was sent to Bruce, McDougall privately 
claiming responsibility for 65 per cent of the ideas in it. Contributors were Sir 
James Cooper, A. H. Ashbolt, Agent-General for Tasmania, and M. L. Shepherd, 
Official Secretary at the High Commission.56 McDougall had personally urged 
Bruce that organisation was essential: ‘it will be impossible to get very much 
improvement in the manner of marketing our fruit in London until we control 
the fruit itself…until [ADFA] has been re-organised and is able to finance its own 
shipments.’ Bruce had been ‘very much struck’ with the suggestion and asked 
for more detail to be mailed to reach him on the journey home.57 At Sydney’s 
Royal Easter Show, he announced that some tariff revenue would be used to 
assist struggling primary industries with marketing, freight subsidies, export 
bounties and transport—all conditional on efficiency and organisation.58 The 
next day a cable instructed McDougall, through Wilson, to return to Melbourne. 
Despite a second cable two days later, Bruce’s intentions were not clear, but 
McDougall assumed, correctly, that he was to help establish an organisation 
scheme. It was a request he could not refuse, reluctant as he was to leave London 
before the parliamentary vote on preference in June.59
Having left his family in England, McDougall helped prepare short-term 
assistance proposals for the dried-fruits industry and legislation for grower-
funded control boards for dried fruits, canned fruits and dairy products. Progress 
was slow, giving the lonely McDougall leisure to worry about his own future. 
Bruce agreed he might be of greatest use in London and promised a proposal, 
but was slow to make a definite offer.60 There were other options. Before leaving 
England, McDougall had been offered a position with the Conservative Party, 
presumably as part of a short-lived policy secretariat to be organised by Leo 
Amery after the election loss, its purpose to prepare propaganda for preference 
55 Ibid., letters to Norman, 10 and 24 January, 7 February 1924; for Wilson, see letters to Norman, 13 July 
and 4 September 1924.
56 NLA, MS6890/1/8, letter to Norman, 30 July 1923.
57 NLA, MS6890/1/9, letters to Norman, 24 January and 24 April 1924.
58 Sydney Morning Herald, 17 April 1924.
59 LFSSA, 7 and 8, pp. 18–21.
60 NLA, MS6890/1/9, letters to Norman, 19 June and 10 July 1924.
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and ‘safeguarding’.61 A firm offer for a management position in Australia with 
ADFA remained open.62 After a delay of two months, Bruce could only offer 
employment in Melbourne for the rest of the year, for remuneration considerably 
less than that of the Fruit Delegation. He explained that while ‘he recognised 
my value Cabinet did not and that I must impress them. I said that as I had to 
hide my light under a bushel of obscurity how could I?’ McDougall believed 
Wilson, now Minister for Markets, was against him; the ADFA job would not 
do for that reason, and was, in any case, ‘off my track’. ‘What was I? Answer: 
an expert on Empire Trade and an artist at propaganda.’ He would best serve his 
cause by being in London ‘to work for Preference and for Empire Development’. 
Bruce accepted his suggestion therefore that he return to London to work part-
time for the Dried Fruits Export Control Board (DFECB) being established by 
the new legislation. His remuneration would be shared between the grower-
funded board and the Commonwealth Government, on behalf of which he 
would continue to lobby. It would be £650 per year less than he had received 
on the Fruit Delegation and inadequate, McDougall would later argue, in view 
of his lack of tenure, lobbying expenses and in comparison with salaries in 
other dominion marketing agencies in London—a sore point that would persist 
throughout the 1920s. The lack of permanency meant that his family lived in a 
succession of rented houses, often at considerable distance from London, and 
this may well have contributed to the disintegration of his marriage towards the 
end of the decade. ‘What we all want is a home and garden’, he would lament to 
his brother, less than a year after the arrangement began.63
The London Agency of the Dried Fruits Export 
Control Board
The London Agency was responsible for ensuring that fruit was sold profitably, 
having regard to the state of the markets and the quality of the product. Its 
Chairman was London-based businessman Sir James Cooper. The agency 
employed technical staff to appraise fruit consignments and supervise provision 
of physical needs such as storage and fumigation. It liaised with importers, 
supervised traders’ records of sales, promoted the product, and sent a steady 
stream of reporting back to Melbourne. As its part-time secretary from April 
1925, McDougall spent two busy days each week in the agency’s office at 2 Talbot 
Court, Eastcheap, close to the docks, until 1928, when members of the board in 
Melbourne became concerned that he was overstretched. Prompted to action by 
61 NAA, M111, 125, statement enclosed with letter from McDougall to Bruce, 14 December 1925.
62 NLA, MS6890/1/9, letter to Norman, 19 June; NAA, M111, 1924, Bruce to McDougall, 12 May 1924.
63 NLA, MS6890/1/9, letters to Norman, 13 July 1924 and 3 January 1926; LFSSA, 16, 20 and 45, pp. 45–6, 
55–6, 131–2.
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an illness which, unusually, kept him away from work for some weeks, the Board 
Chairman, W. C. F. Thomas, in 1929 proposed a new position for McDougall 
of Deputy Chairman, freeing the board to employ ‘a real secretary’ and still 
provide McDougall with financial support and a status ‘more appropriate to his 
present functions’ and to ‘the higher work which he might yet be called upon 
to perform for the Government’.64 McDougall was to be Chairman of the agency 
from 1936 to 1947. He maintained some financial involvement with the Renmark 
blocks, which continued to be worked by Norman McDougall, but was never to 
visit Australia again after 1924.
Figure 8 The London Agency of the Dried Fruits Export Control Board 
meets British dealers and bakers in Liverpool, date unknown. Sir James 
Cooper is third from left in front row; J. S. Scouler, Agency Secretary, on 
far right. McDougall, then Vice-Chairman of the Agency, is third from left 
in back row; agency member A. E. Gough fourth from left; A. E. Hyland, 
Director of Australian Trade Publicity, is on the far right. 
Source: E. McDougall.
64 National Archives of Australia, Victorian Branch [hereinafter NAAV], B4242, Thomas to Cooper, 8 
February 1928.
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The Partnership
McDougall’s first important idea—to secure an export market for the dried-
fruits industry by more efficient organisation and by persuading the British 
Government to institute substantial tariff preference—thus had a mixed result. 
He almost certainly played a major role in persuading Bruce to establish and 
control the industry on a basis of efficiency. By his work in Melbourne and 
as London secretary, he contributed much to putting the idea into effect. The 
idea was in accord with those of efficiency and ‘practical progressivism’; Bruce’s 
ready acceptance is not surprising. The move seems to have been successful: 
both industry and organisation have survived.65
The tariff preference campaign was, in the event, only marginally successful. 
The Conservative Government returned to office at the end of 1924 removed 
duties on empire dried fruits, giving a preference of 10/6d per cwt on fruits 
other than currants, which were left at 2 shillings. It was below what the 
Federal Government had requested in 1922, and well below what McDougall 
had calculated as necessary. Sales, however, continued to be good, at least until 
1927 when severe frost affected yield. The work of the agency on the periphery 
and publicity from the Empire Marketing Board at the centre helped focus 
public attention on the products of empire, until general tariff protection was 
achieved by the Ottawa Agreements of 1932.
For McDougall, the preference campaign had brought conviction that his place, 
physically, and to an increasing degree intellectually, was not on the periphery, 
but at the empire’s centre. He saw himself still as a servant of Australia, but 
knew he could not flourish in the Australian political arena. To be in ‘the big 
things’, which would help Australia and his own industry, he had to be in 
London and he returned assuming, probably correctly, a personal responsibility 
to the Prime Minister who had accepted an arrangement placing him outside 
the lines of conventional bureaucracy. He could perhaps be seen as a prototype 
of the modern-day political staffer. Certainly Bruce’s good-natured but vague 
designation as ‘personal representative of the Prime Minister…secret service 
agent’ set the pattern for their future cooperation.
During the 1920s McDougall wrote a least one letter to Bruce each week, and 
often more. The letters reported on his activities, but also contained gossip and 
frank comments and suggestions on policy. He presumed a special relationship 
and did not hesitate to approach Bruce with ideas, or indeed with complaints. 
Bruce responded in kind. He wrote infrequently, but took care when he did to 
65 The Australian Dried Fruits Board became a subsidiary of the Australian Horticultural Corporation in 
1987.
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comment on every letter; one reply runs to 37 pages.66 He assured McDougall 
that ‘every one of your letters is read by me’, and he hoped McDougall would 
not be discouraged by the infrequent replies to letters that were ‘of the utmost 
interest and value to me’. He made use of some material McDougall enclosed 
in speeches. After a quick first reading, Bruce saved McDougall’s letters until 
he had time to read them carefully, usually at weekends; he often reread them 
months later. During a two-month tour of outlying States, he ‘read many of 
them while travelling in trains, and one even when travelling in an aeroplane’.67 
His replies reported candidly on the political situation in Australia and his own 
activities and plans, occasionally sending copies of his correspondence with 
others. He happily joined in the gossip and sometimes vented, to the point of 
indiscretion, his dissatisfaction with events and people, at one time complaining 
about the ‘hopeless incompetence’ of the Prime Minister’s Publicity Department, 
at another describing fruitless efforts ‘to get some useful information from the 
Customs Department’.68 At times he asked for more information on particular 
issues; he engaged in discussion and referred to views and aims that he and 
McDougall shared. This extended to broad economic and social philosophy:
I read with considerable interest what you say with regard to the 
continuous harping upon the question of economy as if that was going 
to solve the economic problems the nations are up against. I agree with 
you that it will not: that the world is now so far advanced that we have 
to recognise we must face great expenditures upon social amelioration, 
and the only way to solve our problems is to adopt the same course that 
every modern business has been forced to, and that is of expanding 
our turn-over rather than imagining we can solve our difficulties by 
reducing our expenses.69
Bruce frequently sent the suggested cable or took other action recommended 
by McDougall: ‘I am taking up the question you raise about the position of 
the standard of living in Australia and Great Britain…I will let you have the 
information…when I have received it.’ If he did not agree, he often explained 
why, or at least let McDougall down gently. He commended one memorandum 
McDougall had sent him, urging British cooperation in Australian development, 
as ‘very useful’, but rejected a suggestion that it be sent to British ministers: 
‘on reading it carefully I think the time is hardly ripe for us to let the British 
Government have copies of it.’ On another suggestion, which McDougall had 
pressed more than once, Bruce was more severe:
66 NAA, M111, 30 April 1929. Bruce’s letters are filed chronologically with McDougall’s in this series.
67 Ibid., 21 May and 15 September 1927, 16 January 1928.
68 Ibid., 10 February 1929, 26 September 1927.
69 Ibid., 30 April 1929.
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You will have grasped from my not having taken any further action after 
receiving your letters, that I do not want to deal with this matter at the 
present time. I gave a lot of thought to it when your suggestion came 
through by cable, and I think for the present it would be better for you 
to drop the idea.70
He was generous in his appreciation:
I have made a point of advising [the Minister for Trade and Customs] of 
the different actions you have taken…in the first place to bring home to 
him the value of the services you are rendering…
I read the Debate in the House of Commons with regard to Empire trade, 
and your trail could be seen very distinctly through the whole of the 
discussions.
…your work is extraordinarily interesting and extremely valuable, but 
you have to remember that everything depends upon your maintaining 
your health.
…after I have read [McDougall’s letters] I am certain that my mind 
subconsciously goes on thinking over the points that you have raised, 
and the conclusions that are arrived at are unquestionably very 
considerably influenced by what you write to me.71
Bruce did, however, urge McDougall to keep enclosures to a minimum, because 
‘the time which I have at my disposal for such a purpose is extraordinarily 
limited’.72
In sum, the correspondence shows a solid partnership between men with 
common aims and mutual respect, despite their difference in status. Yet that 
difference was to be maintained over more than 20 years of working together. 
They could share a joke, but McDougall would never presume to address Bruce 
as anything other than ‘Mr Bruce’; Bruce called him ‘McDougall’, not the 
familiar ‘Mac’ used by his friends. The partnership, close and effective as it 
was, did not develop into easy friendship. The gulf between prime minister/
high commissioner and ‘secret service agent’/economic adviser was never to be 
bridged by intimacy.
70 Ibid., 12 December and 7 March 1927, 16 January 1928.
71 Ibid., 30 April and 27 August 1928.
72 Ibid., 21 May 1927.
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Summary
In London McDougall pursued his vision of imperial cooperation through 
the second half of the 1920s. His book, Sheltered Markets, published in 1925, 
argued the case for imperial tariff preference, based on an analysis of patterns 
of trade. Imperial preference would not be introduced until 1932; the returning 
Conservative Government in 1925 acknowledged that public opinion was 
opposed to the idea. An Imperial Economic Committee was established instead, 
to advise on improvements to production and marketing of empire goods, and 
an Empire Marketing Board was to encourage ‘voluntary preference’ by means 
of marketing and scientific research into problems. McDougall was an active 
member of both. He also acted as London liaison for Australia’s Council for 
Industrial and Scientific Research (CSIR) and the Development and Migration 
Commission (DMC). Representation on all these bodies brought him into contact 
with leading scientists, notably nutritionist John Boyd Orr, and A. C. D. (David) 
Rivett, Chief Executive of CSIR.
The new influences led McDougall to devise forms of imperial cooperation in 
science, agriculture and industry. Seeking efficiency, he suggested pastoral 
improvement in Australia should be directed by Orr and based on British 
research; Rivett argued that Australia must develop its own research capabilities. 
Similarly McDougall was influenced by British criticism of rising Australian 
tariff protection to argue for an imperially rationalised approach to industrial 
development: Australia and other dominions concentrating on simpler 
manufactures. Bruce was anxious to moderate Australian tariffs, but his efforts 
to bring about economic reform faced increasing hostility; he lost government 
at the end of 1929.
‘Sheltered Markets’
The idea of writing a book about empire trade occurred to McDougall soon 
after Bruce left London early in 1924. Amery was enthusiastic. The enforced 
idleness of some of McDougall’s time in Melbourne and the return voyage 
to London provided the opportunity. Sheltered Markets: A Study of Empire 
Trade was published on 30 June 1925, a volume of some 150 pages selling 
for 5 shillings a copy. McDougall was promised a foreword by Lord Milner, 
but the mentor of imperial visionaries died in May and Sir Robert Horne, 
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businessman, philosopher and former Conservative minister, took his place.1 
Horne recommended the work as providing ‘the most likely means—if not the 
only means—of redressing the precarious problem in which we stand today’, 
meaning unemployment. McDougall had ‘gone at once to the root of the problem 
in discussing the markets in which British manufactures are most likely to find 
their market’.2
Sheltered Markets argues the case for imperial preference. It is more varied and 
broader in vision than the simple message of the preference campaign waged 
from Renmark three years earlier. McDougall writes as before of the benefits of 
closer settlement, in the Murray Valley in particular. He argues, as always, the 
value of Australia’s tariff preference to the United Kingdom; he preaches the 
importance of organised marketing of empire commodities for both producers 
and purchasers. Preference is needed to compensate for disadvantages that 
empire produce suffers on the British market: the costs of transport over long 
distances and of decent living wages.
These familiar points are argued in the context of a sophisticated analysis of 
patterns of trade and their relative value to the economy. They are argued from 
the perspective of Britain and its empire, not from the perspective of Australia 
alone, still less of one Australian product. McDougall’s thesis is that British trade 
with dominions and colonies is more robust, and of more value to the British 
economy, than trade with foreigners. To support it he explains the importance 
of what have come to be called ‘value adding’ and ‘sustainability’: exports of 
finished manufactures are more profitable than raw materials. Coal, a major 
British export, is a non-renewable resource. Although its export to Europe keeps 
miners in work, it is of limited value when compared with the manufactured 
goods that make up almost the entire export to the empire. Tables demonstrate 
Britain’s balances of trade: unfavourable with the United States and Europe; 
better but declining with Canada; and favourable with other dominions. He 
considers factors thought to influence the buying patterns of Britain’s trading 
partners: prosperity and wealth distribution, British loans, British buying 
patterns and the availability of shipping. Two factors predominate: there is 
‘no doubt as to the very great advantages that national sentiment and tariff 
preference give to British trade.’ He devotes several pages to the advantages of 
the Australian tariff to that trade.3
1 NLA, MS6890/1/9, letter to Norman, 24 January 1924; LFSSA, 2, 15 and 23, 20 February, 2 April and 11 
June 1924, pp. 4, 41, 63.
2 F. L. McDougall, Sheltered Markets: A Study of Empire Trade, John Murray, London, 1925, p. v. 
3 Ibid., pp. 68–74, 89.
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Figure 9 Declining Percentages of British Exports of Manufactures to 
Europe and the Americas.
Source: F. L. McDougall, Sheltered Markets: A Study of Empire Trade, John Murray, London, 1925, p. 46.
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For the first time McDougall tackles free trade head on. It had not been an 
unmitigated benefit even in the nineteenth century. It effectively encouraged 
sweated labour in other countries by disregarding the growth of foreign 
protective tariffs and ignoring improved wages brought about in Britain, 
Australia and New Zealand by trade unionism. It destroyed the colonial sugar 
industry and developed a dangerous reliance upon foreign foodstuffs and 
raw materials. Lancashire had been brought to near starvation by blockades 
preventing cotton leaving the United States during the Civil War—a lesson 
forgotten until 1914–18. In 1925, McDougall writes, consumers face formidable 
competition on all sides: combines and cartels, US farm politics, the Soviet 
Government combine, agricultural cooperatives in Denmark and organised 
marketing in the dominions. The day of laissez faire and cheap food has passed; 
‘unrestricted competition no longer exists’.4
McDougall does not advocate immediate abandonment of free trade, nor does he 
push one simple solution. He examines the difficulties of all major food imports 
and concludes that the solutions are as varied as the Empire itself. Empire 
buying power must be enhanced by soundly based migration, particularly to 
closer settlements; empire industries must become viable with organisation, 
technical aid, London advisory bodies to cooperate in price stabilisation and 
publicity to create a demand for empire goods. Part of the solution might well 
be some tariff preference.
Sheltered Markets deals with difficult and complex material. The fact that it 
reads easily and persuasively is tribute to McDougall’s maturing skills as a 
writer, still more as an educator. As the book moves to a new phase of argument, 
he summarises the previous one, reinforcing his points. He provides tables and 
graphs that are easy to understand. He uses simple metaphor with effect: a 
preferential tariff system is like a weir. Foreign trade must flow over the top 
‘while British goods flow through the preferential sluice gates’ lower down.5
The book was well received. An editorial in The Times Trade and Engineering 
Supplement urged ‘every thoughtful citizen of the empire’ to read it
for it deals in a broad, comprehensive and lucid fashion with the 
essential economic problem that confronts the whole British race…facts 
are marshalled so admirably that even the reader who may open this 
book with strong preconceived opinions of an opposite character will 
find it difficult to dissent from the argument.6
4 Ibid., p. 133.
5 Ibid., pp. 66–7.
6 Times Imperial and Foreign Trade and Engineering Supplement [hereinafter TTES], 4 July 1925.
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Figure 10 McDougall’s Hydraulic Metaphor for Imperial Preference.
Source: F. L. McDougall, Sheltered Markets: A Study of Empire Trade, John Murray, London, 1925, p. 77.
Bruce wrote that it was ‘timely and useful and will accomplish a considerable 
amount of good’. It ‘continues to get a most remarkable press and equally 
remarkably small sales considering the press’, complained its author.7
Conservative Party headquarters took 1000 paperback copies at 2 shillings 
each, and McDougall’s friend Brooks Crompton Wood, MP, sent a copy to each 
member of the House of Commons. By August, 750 copies had been sold to 
the general public. McDougall stood to receive only 7d per copy of the regular 
edition. It would not end his financial worries but it did give him something 
he needed. He had written before publication that ‘if the book causes real 
discussion, I shall feel that it has served its purpose’. It had achieved that, but 
it also ‘let people know that F. L. McD is a person who exists’.8 No longer was 
he an anonymous ‘secret service agent’ of the Australian Prime Minister; he was 
the author of Sheltered Markets.
7 NAA, M111, 1925, Bruce to McDougall, 31 August 1925; NLA, MS6890/1/9, letter to Norman, 18 August 
1925, and copy of Bruce’s letter; MS6890/5/1, copies of many reviews.
8 NLA, MS6890/1/9, letter to Norman, 25 June 1925; LFSSA, 24, 2 July 1925, p. 67.
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The Imperial Vision by Other Means
Substantial imperial preference was ruled out after Stanley Baldwin’s election loss 
on the issue late in 1923. The case for change then had been poorly prepared and 
opposed by a formidable combination of forces: Liberal and Labour politicians, 
some Conservatives, financial and commercial interests, much of industry, the 
union movement, some agricultural interests and the popular press. Baldwin 
commented ruefully: ‘the people of this country cannot be shaken out of their 
fear of high prices.’9
The Conservative Party returned to government under Baldwin’s leadership 
included former Liberal and free-trader Winston Churchill, who was appointed 
Chancellor of the Exchequer. Joseph Chamberlain’s son, Neville, the new 
Minister of Health, was principal author of a restatement of the party’s principles 
and aims, produced during its opposition in 1924, and the basis of its manifesto 
for re-election. It included a statement of the imperial vision, recognising the 
importance of strengthening and developing the empire, fiscal autonomy of the 
dominions and the assistance tariff preference could give them: ‘In this way we 
can provide through our markets the opportunity which they need in order to 
develop their plans of land settlement, and they, in their turn, will absorb our 
surplus population and provide new outlets for our manufactures.’
But while the party undertook to defend British trade against unfair foreign 
competition, ‘proposals for a general tariff will not again be submitted except 
upon clear evidence that on this matter public opinion is disposed to reconsider 
its judgement’.10 Thus, although the small preferences announced in 1923 
were finally confirmed in Churchill’s first budget in 1925, an effective imperial 
preference was shelved for the remainder of the decade.
Joseph Chamberlain had recognised the link between imperial tariff reform 
and Social Darwinism. He had been Deputy President of the Science Guild; 
its purpose was described as ‘making the Empire strong and secure through 
science and the application of scientific method’. World War I demonstrated the 
need for British Government support for science. The Committee of the Privy 
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, created in 1915, was enlarged 
in 1916 as the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research. It was to be a 
‘scientific bureaucracy for the administration of research grants, scholarships 
for research training, and the provision of scientific advice to the government’.11 
In 1923 the Imperial Economic Conference recognised the significance of science 
9 Dilks, Neville Chamberlain: Pioneering and Reform, pp. 358–9.
10 Ibid., p. 381. The statement was published as a pamphlet, entitled ‘Looking Ahead’, and was also printed 
in The Times, 20 June 1924.
11 Alter, Reluctant Patron, pp. 92–4, 97; C. B. Schedvin, Shaping Science and Industry: A History of Australia’s 
Council of Scientific and Industrial Research 1926–49, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1987, p. 25. 
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to economic progress, approving establishment of an advisory body on imperial 
cooperation and a resolution commending cooperation in science: ‘All possible 
steps should be taken to encourage the exchange of scientific and technical 
information between the various parts of the Empire and the co-operation of the 
official and other organisations engaged in research for the solution of problems 
of common interest.’12
In 1925, the Baldwin Government turned to these as safer alternatives to an 
imperial tariff, creating an Imperial Economic Committee, and granting £1 
million to be spent by an Empire Marketing Board. As part of the ‘visionary’ 
scheme to strengthen imperial trade and cooperation, the board was to spend 
much of its £1 million annual grant on research stations throughout the Empire, 
studying problems of science as applied to production and transport of foodstuffs 
and other exports. In Australia the Commonwealth Council of Scientific and 
Industrial Research and the Development and Migration Commission were seen 
as complementary bodies. McDougall made important contributions to all of 
them.
The Imperial Economic Committee
The new Conservative Government undertook immediate establishment of the 
Imperial Economic Committee (IEC). Its terms of reference were
to consider the possibility of improving the method of preparing for 
market and of marketing within the United Kingdom the food products 
of the oversea parts of the Empire with a view to increasing the 
consumption of such products in the United Kingdom in preference to 
imports from foreign countries, and to promote the interests both of 
producers and consumers.13
In deference to Canadian opposition to creating anything resembling an empire 
secretariat, it was to be an ad-hoc body and these terms of reference were to be 
reviewed at the next Imperial Conference.14
The IEC was an advisory body responsible to the several governments of the 
Empire, though it reported to the Board of Trade—giving, in McDougall’s 
view, a misleading impression that it was subsidiary to the board.15 Four 
12 NAA, CP103/3, vol. 6, IEC 1923, Stenographic Notes, Eighteenth Meeting, 1923, p. 24.
13 Reports of the Imperial Economic Committee on Marketing and Preparing for Market of Foodstuffs Produced 
in the Overseas Parts of the Empire. First Report—General, Cmd. 2493, pp. 2, 4.
14 Stephen Constantine, ‘Anglo–Canadian Relations: the Empire Marketing Board and Canadian National 
Autonomy between the Wars’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 21, no. 2, 1993, pp. 360–3.
15 LFSSA, 38, 5 November 1925, pp. 111–12.
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members, including the Chairman, represented the United Kingdom; there 
were two each for the six dominions (at this time including the Irish Free State 
and Newfoundland) and India. Leo Amery, then Colonial Secretary, chose as 
Chairman Sir Halford Mackinder, the geographer who had inspired Amery’s 
own view of the imperial vision. Representatives nominated early in 1925, 
with the exception of those from Canada, were senior and notable: chairmen of 
associated chambers of commerce and of the Co-operative Wholesale Society, 
high commissioners, trade commissioners and the London Manager of the New 
Zealand Producers’ Board. Canadian representatives were ‘humble technicians 
with specialist expertise only in the areas of immediate inquiry’: a livestock 
expert from the Department of Agriculture and a fruit expert on the staff of 
the Canadian High Commission in London. They were instructed not to act on 
matters of high principle without consulting the High Commission, whence 
reference would be made to Ottawa.16 The ‘senior’ Australian representative was 
Sydney businessman Sir Mark Sheldon, a former chairman of the Associated 
Chambers of Commerce and holder of several government appointments. 
According to a newspaper report, F. L. McDougall, ‘well-known orchardist 
on the Murray River’, who had ‘rendered splendid service in conducting a 
campaign in Great Britain on behalf of the Australian fruit industry’ and at 
the 1923 Imperial Conference, was to be the ‘other representative during initial 
portion work of [the] committee’.17
McDougall had hoped for such an appointment. Immediately after the 1923 
Imperial Conference, he had written: ‘if the Imperial Economic Committee 
comes to a head and if Bruce offered me a salaried post as Australia’s official 
representative thereon I think it would be well worth doing.’18 But he was 
disturbed by the apparent short-term nature of his appointment and by the 
distinction in seniority. He suggested to Bruce that Australia would be served 
best by one permanent member stationed in London and a second representative 
chosen for expertise relevant to a particular inquiry who could maintain close, 
‘educational’ contact with Australia.19 This pattern did occur, for a time. 
Sheldon was succeeded after a year by W. H. Clifford, General Manager of the 
North Coast Co-operative Company Limited, New South Wales, and a member 
of the Dairy Produce Control Board. Sir James Cooper attended during 1928. 
Thereafter, McDougall often served as sole Australian representative. He was to 
chair the committee during the 1930s.
The IEC first met on 17 March 1925. Its method of supplying advice was to 
publish voluminous reports on commodities approved by empire governments. 
16 Constantine, ‘Anglo–Canadian Relations’, p. 363.
17 Sydney Morning Herald, 25 February 1925; cable quoted in LFSSA, 11, 26 February 1925, p. 28.
18 NLA, MS6890/1/9, letter to Norman, 20 December 1923.
19 LFSSA, 42, 19 November 1925, 107, 109 and 113, 11 and 25 May and 16 June 1927, 143, 11 January 1928, 
pp. 120, 358, 68, 78–9, 495.
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At first limited to foodstuffs, its terms of reference were amended by the 1926 
Imperial Conference to include raw materials, and its membership augmented 
by representatives of British agriculture and the colonial empire.
The first commodities to be examined were meat and fruit. McDougall was 
appointed to the fruit subcommittee and to its three-man drafting committee. He 
quickly demonstrated determination to see the IEC functioning effectively and 
producing reports reflecting his views: ‘I think that it is essential to cultivate 
the personal acquaintance of the members of the Committee so that we may 
be able to get them privately to see the full importance of this committee and 
thus…obtain general support for comprehensive proposals for assisting Empire 
Trade.’ He began the process by lunching with the Chairman on the first day. 
Mackinder also chaired the Imperial Shipping Committee and was a member of 
the Royal Commission on Food Prices. McDougall and Sheldon worried that his 
commitment to the IEC would be limited.20
No member worked harder than McDougall to ensure the IEC lived up to the 
hopes of empire visionaries. When the 250-page fruit report21 was published, in 
June 1926, he organised wide publicity for its appearance, contacting ‘all the 
Editors that I know personally’, arranging special treatment in The Times and 
Daily Telegraph, and interviews for four Conservative MPs with correspondents 
of provincial newspapers.22 He spent long hours in the tedious tasks of drafting 
and revising this and most subsequent reports. The committee worked by 
hearing witnesses and inviting submissions. This itself was a burden: 63 
memoranda were submitted for an inquiry on tobacco, each averaging about 
four typed foolscap pages, so that ‘one’s weekends are fairly well employed 
in reading them’.23 He viewed the job as an imperial, rather than simply an 
Australian, responsibility, and he served at times on drafting committees for 
commodities of little interest to Australia.
McDougall spent much time compensating for what he considered Mackinder’s 
shortcomings as Chairman, correcting his thinking, smoothing difficult situations 
and undertaking extra work. He told Bruce that ‘in private negotiations I rather 
get forced into the position of representing the oversea representatives to (a) the 
Chairman (b) the Members of the Government’.24
After the appointment of Sir David Chadwick as Secretary in 1927, the problem 
of Mackinder diminished. Chadwick included McDougall in consultations on 
new procedures, which limited the full committee to hearing a few important 
20 Ibid., 14, 19 March 1925, pp. 34–5.
21 Reports of the Imperial Economic Committee on Marketing and Preparing for Market of Foodstuffs Produced 
in the Overseas Parts of the Empire: Third Report—Fruit, Cmd. 2658.
22 LFSSA, 77, 10 June 1926, p. 248.
23 Ibid., 150, 23 February 1928, p. 520.
24 Ibid., 37, 29 October 1925, p. 107. 
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witnesses on each new inquiry, discussing its scope and then handing over 
to a subcommittee. Definition of the scope of an inquiry proved difficult, so 
McDougall joined a three-man committee to review that problem.25 Chadwick 
and Mackinder later asked McDougall to join them on a standing committee ‘to 
get the proper Imperial aspect suitably expressed in each report’:
I was reluctantly forced to agree that, for this particular type of work, 
there was no other overseas representative who could usefully function. 
It is a rather sad comment on the type of man whom the other Dominions 
have appointed…that experience has shown that, when the general 
Dominion point of view needs to be taken into careful consideration, 
they have to turn to me.26
The Empire Marketing Board
The first task of the IEC was to advise on a general matter. Having renounced 
tariffs, Baldwin’s government promised an annual grant of £1 million, calculated 
as the value of preferences that might have been given to empire goods in 
1924, to encourage empire trade by other means.27 The first report of the IEC 
recommended the money be administered by an ‘executive body’ subject to 
the IEC and used to encourage ‘voluntary preference’: persuading the British 
public to purchase empire goods by means including advertising and research 
into problems of production and distribution.28 While British agreement to the 
recommendations was delayed for some months—one major reason being the 
constitutional problem of a body including representatives of other empire 
governments spending British taxpayers’ money—McDougall, virtually alone 
amongst IEC members, lobbied ministers, the Cabinet Secretariat and Members 
of Parliament on its behalf. Bruce cabled London twice at his suggestion. After 
lengthy exchanges of suggestions and reference to a cabinet committee, the 
Empire Marketing Board (EMB) was constituted as an advisory committee to 
the Dominions Secretary, Leo Amery’s title after the creation that year of the 
Dominions Office. The board met for the first time on 20 May 1926.
Before the board’s composition was finally decided, McDougall, already one of 
the busiest members of the IEC, was eager to be a dominion representative of 
the IEC on the board: ‘No one here has a wider knowledge of the point of view 
of the various sections of producers’ opinion in all the Dominions for I have 
25 Ibid., 107, 11 May 1927, pp. 357–8; 150, 23 February 1928, pp. 520–1. 
26 Ibid., 156, 29 March 1928, pp. 544–5.
27 NAA/CSIR, A9778, M14/27/9, undated memorandum by McDougall, ‘The Empire Marketing Board and 
Empire Economic Affairs’, received 5 December 1927, p. 2.
28 Reports of the Imperial Economic Committee on Marketing and Preparing for Market of Foodstuffs Produced 
in the Overseas Parts of the Empire: First Report—General, Cmd. 2493.
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made that question a special study for the last three years.’29 In the event he was 
one of five IEC representatives who joined four British ministers—Leo Amery 
as Chairman; Colonial Secretary William Ormsby-Gore as his deputy; Minister 
of Agriculture Lord Bledisloe; Under-Secretary of State for Scotland Walter 
Elliot—and representatives of the Board of Trade.
The EMB formed two temporary subcommittees to recommend methods of 
tackling research and publicity.
It was very far from being my wish that I should have to have a say on 
both these subjects but in the discussions it had become rather obvious 
that I had perhaps done rather more constructive thinking about 
how the Economic Committee’s recommendations were to be put into 
operation than anybody else present at the meeting and the Board felt 
that in devising methods I could give useful assistance both on publicity 
and research. Personally I should have preferred to be mainly connected 
with the research side but I am rather afraid that the Secretary of State 
and other ministers will particularly want me to serve on the Publicity 
Sub-Committee as they seem to regard me as being particularly expert 
on educational publicity.30 
Ormsby-Gore had agreed to chair the Publicity Committee on condition that 
McDougall was a member.31 Both committees became permanent—‘Research’ 
later being renamed ‘Research Grants’ to reflect more accurately its function as 
a dispenser of funds to approved research projects and institutions. The EMB 
report for 1931–32 lists six main committees; McDougall sat on four or them, 
including Agricultural Economics, which he chaired, and the Film Committee.
The EMB developed into a substantial institution. It was a ‘constitutional 
oddity’: technically an advisory committee, but effectively possessing executive 
authority, with a civil service staff of some 120 at its height.32 Amery prevailed 
over Treasury to ensure that the £1 million annual grant was non-returnable and 
free from close Treasury control, although the battle to preserve it continued 
throughout EMB’s seven-year existence. The board was also unusual in its non-
partisan membership: J. H. Thomas represented Labour from a very early stage, 
and Archibald Sinclair the Liberals. In 1929 the Labour Government continued 
its work with enthusiasm.
McDougall’s closest ally on the board was Walter Elliot, a doctor who had also 
gained a DSc for a study on pig nutrition, undertaken at the Rowett Research 
29 LFSSA, 55, 17 February 1926, p. 162.
30 Ibid., 76, 3 June 1926, p. 246.
31 Ibid., 70, 11 May 1926, p. 225.
32 Stephen Constantine, Buy & Build: The Advertising Posters of the Empire Marketing Board, HMSO, 
London, 1986, p. 3.
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Institute, Aberdeen, headed by his friend John Boyd Orr. In 1935 Elliot would be 
elected a fellow of the Royal Society. He held somewhat independent, ‘centrist’ 
views, and McDougall was impressed by his book Toryism and the Twentieth 
Century (1927), arguing, in the tradition of Progressivism, for ‘a conservatism 
that would make use of applied and social sciences and of government 
intervention’.33 Another ally was Ormsby-Gore, a former Parliamentary Private 
Secretary to Lord Milner at the Colonial Office, with unusually wide knowledge 
and experience of the colonial empire.34 Elliot and Ormsby-Gore were both 
‘visionary’ advocates of ‘science for development’, believing that research, 
particularly in agricultural sciences, and an organised colonial agricultural 
service held the key to developing the resources and potential markets of the 
colonial empire.35 McDougall wrote that he, Elliot and Ormsby-Gore ‘envisage 
the problems of Research and Publicity from the same angles and together I 
feel sure that we shall be able to shape a policy for the Board which will be 
effective’.36
EMB staff were of high calibre. McDougall was impressed by the Secretary 
Amery had chosen. Stephen Tallents had wide experience as a civil servant, in 
wartime food rationing and postwar relief, as Imperial Secretary in Northern 
Ireland and as Secretary of the cabinet committee dealing with the 1926 
General Strike. It has been suggested that, as a result, Tallents was, for his time, 
‘unusually sensitive to the need to assess and massage public opinion’, aware 
that as government functions broadened it would be necessary to use publicity 
as ‘a managerial tool’ and ‘to obtain public consent by persuasion’.37 McDougall 
claimed to have arranged the appointment, as Assistant Secretary, of E. M. H. 
Lloyd, ‘the stabilization expert’, who had worked in the wartime Ministry of 
Food, in the Economic and Financial Section of the League of Nations from 1919 
to 1921, and in the Ministry of Agriculture.38
The EMB was ‘a multi-media event’. It provided public lectures, materials for 
use in schools, books and pamphlets—some serious studies written or inspired 
by McDougall, others more light-hearted such as ‘A Book of Empire Dinners’. 
It spent £364,280 on press advertisements over its seven-year life and indulged 
in occasional publicity stunts, such as hiring aircraft bearing the slogan ‘Buy 
33 Gordon F. Millar, ‘Elliot, Walter Elliot, (1888–1958)’, ODNB, 2004, <http://www.oxforddnb.com.virtual.
anu.edu.au/view/article/33003> [accessed 22 November 2005].
34 K. E. Robinson, ‘Gore, William George Arthur Ormsby, Fourth Baron Harlech (1885–1964)’, ODNB, 2004, 
<http://www.oxforddnb.com.virtual.anu.edu.au/view/article/35330> [accessed 7 May 2007].
35 Joseph M. Hodge, ‘Science, Development and Empire: The Colonial Advisory Council on Agriculture 
and Animal Health, 1929–43’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. XXX, no. 1, 2002, pp. 3–5.
36 LFSSA, 78, 24 June 1926, p. 253. 
37 Constantine, Buy & Build, p. 4.
38 LFSSA, 78, 24 June 1926, p. 253. Lloyd published Stabilisation in 1923 and Experiments in State Control 
in 1924. Frank Trentmann, ‘Lloyd, Edward Mayow Hastings (1889–1968)’, ODNB, 2004, <http://www.
oxforddnb.com.virtual.anu.edu.au/view/articles/34/34566-nav.html> [accessed 20 November 2004].
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British’ and the baking of a seven-foot-high ‘King’s Empire Christmas Pudding’. 
It arranged Empire Shopping Weeks, exhibitions and broadcast talks, and had a 
film library and a small film unit.39
McDougall had not been keen to use the £1 million grant for publicity. He did 
not believe that voluntary preference could achieve the results possible from 
tariff preference.40 But if money had to be spent on publicity, he knew what that 
publicity should be. He constantly used the word ‘educational’ because ‘what 
we had to do was to develop…an Empire consciousness in the people of Great 
Britain and that appeal must be directed to the reason and not to the emotions’. 
He had to begin by educating the Publicity Committee itself, as it became clear 
‘that what was urgently needed as a preliminary to more effective advertising 
was a clear realisation, on the part of members of the Board and of the Publicity 
Committee, of the essential facts about the importance of Empire Trade to Great 
Britain’. He therefore prepared a statement of those facts for them.41
McDougall was an active member of the EMB poster subcommittee. Its most 
distinctive posters were series, mounted on large, multi-section frames, a format 
suiting McDougall’s ‘educational’ principles. The panels could position lists of 
export and import figures between striking illustrations commissioned from 
notable artists.42 McDougall devised a special ‘educational’ series for use in 
British factories. ‘The idea is to demonstrate chiefly to persons engaged in some 
of the most important industries of the United Kingdom the great advantage 
that will accrue to those industries if Empire development is supported by 
Empire purchasing.’ The posters specified how much that firm or factory had 
sold to a particular part of the empire, or that a contract was now in hand, and 
asked: ‘How can you help to secure further contracts from the Empire? Answer: 
By buying, and by getting your wife to buy, the produce that the Empire sends 
to us.’43
Research Grants 
EMB publicity activities drew some criticism as an inappropriate function 
for government, but the research side of its work was widely accepted. The 
39 Constantine, Buy & Build, p. 5; Constantine, ‘Bringing the Empire Alive’, in Imperialism and Popular 
Culture, ed. John M. Mackenzie, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1986, pp. 205–10.
40 LFSSA, 9 and 27, 22 January and 6 August 1925, pp. 23, 75–7.
41 Ibid., 61, 31 March 1926, p. 193; 95, 3 March 1927, pp. 318–19.
42 Copyright restrictions prevented their use in this publication, but illustrations of many posters are 
included in Constantine, Buy & Build. They may also be viewed online at: <http://www.manchestergalleries.
org/the-collections> Works by Charles Pears, including Gibraltar, Aden and Bombay, provide a good example 
of a multi-frame series.
43 LFSSA, 171, 28 June 1928, pp. 599–600; Constantine, ‘Bringing the Empire Alive’, p. 216. The poster 
campaign is discussed in the EMB’s Report for 1928–29, EMB 19, HMSO, July 1929, pp. 24–5.
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EMB Research Grants Committee (RGC), chaired by Walter Elliot, made 
recommendations to the full board for the funding of scientific investigations. It 
can be argued that this was the most important of all McDougall’s activities in 
this period: it was central to his work in many ways both then and in the future. 
As with publicity, McDougall was appointed to a subcommittee to consider 
‘machinery and methods’ of putting IEC recommendations into effect and, as in 
the IEC, he undertook the task of ensuring the RGC fulfilled its proper purpose.44 
He aimed to ensure RGC grants were used effectively in research work of value 
to the Empire and worked hard to keep the EMB and its committees true to his 
vision of their role.
EMB scientific staff investigated applications for grants, but RGC members were 
often actively involved. The committee agreed at its first meeting that advice on 
the existing state of knowledge should be sought before consideration of any 
application, and that all bodies likely to be interested should be notified of any 
inquiry. At that meeting proposals for tropical research centres were referred to 
the Colonial Office and the Development Commission; investigation of transport 
and refrigeration of fruit to the Department of Scientific and Industrial 
Research; and packing of fruit and arsenic sprays to the Ministry of Agriculture 
and the Imperial Bureau of Entomology. A proposed study of vitamins in dried 
fruits was referred to the Medical Research Council; one on tainting of dairy 
produce during transport to the National Institute for Research into Dairying; 
and another on sugaring of raisins to the Royal Society. A year later, a similar 
meeting considered a broader range of proposals including the timber industry 
in Guiana, egg marketing in Scotland, the teaching of economic geography at 
Cambridge, calf-rearing in Palestine and transport of chilled beef.45 All of these 
topics, with the bodies proposing research and those to whom proposals were 
referred, came within McDougall’s ambit. A conscientious member of the RGC 
needed to understand, at least in basic terms, something of the fundamentals 
of many branches of the biological and physical sciences, economics, transport 
and storage, not to mention the geography of the empire itself. It was a mind-
stretching undertaking, but it called for general rather than specialist skills. It is 
difficult to think of any sort of training better than McDougall’s: a combination 
of some basic science, practical experience of production, marketing and 
organisation, travel in two dominions and a tiny colony, an intensive study of 
the trade and produce of the empire, and dedication to cooperative development 
of the empire’s resources.
44 LFSSA, 76, 3 June 1926, pp. 245–6. 
45 National Archives of the United Kingdom [hereinafter UKNA], CO760/21, Minutes of EMB RGC, First 
Meeting, 1 July 1926; Twelfth Meeting, 25 May 1927.
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The EMB published more than 50 papers—mostly the work of experts.46 Many 
publications arose from research grants. The long evening meetings McDougall 
spent drafting and redrafting IEC reports were unnecessary for the EMB, 
although he was the author of one of its publications, The Growing Dependence 
of British Industry upon Empire Markets (1929).47 McDougall’s role on the EMB 
was an executive and creative one, of policy and liaison between and on behalf 
of dominions and the British Government, and with research establishments.
Scientific Liaison
In Australia, the founding of a ‘national research laboratory’ had been announced 
amid the imperial enthusiasms of wartime. The Institute of Science and Industry 
was not actually established until 1921, and then limited by its budget to small-
scale research. Substantial Federal Government support awaited ‘identification 
of the major economic role’ of science. Bruce identified that role as imperial 
scientific cooperation. In creating the Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research (CSIR) in 1926, he made clear its responsibility to concentrate on ‘a 
limited number of major investigations of national importance’. In view of 
balance-of-payments uncertainties and Bruce’s commitment to promoting trade 
within the empire, this meant the problems of the major export industries. It was, 
writes C. B. Schedvin, ‘a by-product of the Indian summer of neo-mercantilism 
and the idea that the British nations should combine economically to yield a 
high level of self sufficiency’.48 Its goals included cooperation with imperial 
arrangements for government-sponsored scientific research.
During his visit to London for the 1926 Imperial Conference, Bruce asked 
McDougall to act as London representative for both CSIR and its twin 
organisation, the Development and Migration Commission (DMC). Established 
primarily to examine settlement schemes proposed by State Governments, 
DMC was also to conduct economic surveys and facilitate establishment of new 
industries. Introducing the Bill for DMC’s establishment, Bruce ‘declared his 
purpose to lift Australia’s population to a level that world opinion would either 
respect or fear, while integrating that process with planned economic expansion 
and thus maintaining living standards’.49
McDougall’s appointment could have seemed an odd one. Whatever reputation 
he had in 1926 rested upon his mastery of empire trade statistics. But Bruce 
46 A list of 52 publications, to May 1932, is in EMB 53, Empire Marketing Board May 1931 to May 1932, 
HMSO, June 1932.
47 EMB 23, HMSO, December 1929.
48 Schedvin, Shaping Science and Industry, pp. 14–18, 25.
49 Michael Roe, Australia, Britain and Migration 1915–1940: A Study of Desperate Hopes, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1995, p. 67.
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understood the place of science in the scheme of imperial development. He knew 
that substantial funds were to be had from the EMB. With the RGC’s sanction, 
McDougall had written offering EMB assistance in the form of 50/50 grants for 
CSIR and coordination to prevent overlapping within the empire.50 Privately 
he had written to Bruce at length about the application of scientific research 
to Australia’s rural problems. Bruce must have understood that McDougall—
already close to many key political figures and civil servants—was well placed to 
extend his contacts in science. The appointment probably had its actual genesis 
in informal discussion during Bruce’s visit. It accorded well with McDougall’s 
new interests and his membership of the RGC.
Liaison with DMC
H. W. Gepp, metallurgical engineer, founding manager of the Electrolytic 
Zinc Company of Australasia, industrial relations pioneer, believer in welfare 
capitalism and propagandist for scientific agriculture, was appointed to head 
DMC and, given the imperial dimension envisaged for his work, accompanied 
Bruce to London for the 1926 Imperial Conference.51 Gepp’s brief was impossibly 
broad, and Gepp himself unrealistically ambitious for the commission. He 
proposed to begin with an economic survey of ‘the whole of the present 
resources of Australia’ to establish, inter alia: the effects of the seasonal nature 
of work in Australia, and of migration, upon unemployment; the commercial 
relationships between industries to be encouraged; and the causes of cyclic 
economic depressions. He aimed to cooperate with every agency upon which 
this work impinged and proposed early investigation into development of 
Tasmanian resources, the goldmining and tobacco industries, rural housing, 
development of fisheries, and production and marketing problems of the dried-
fruits industries. DMC would be ‘the national clearing house for all ideas and 
schemes bearing upon economic development’.52
McDougall took the intense, almost hyperactive Gepp under his wing, 
arranged introductions and inspections with the many institutions in which 
Gepp expressed interest, and generally displayed his enthusiasm and his range 
of contacts. Gepp’s schedule in Britain was as punishing as his vision was 
ambitious. He presided over a committee of the Colonial Office to investigate 
mechanical transport for undeveloped terrain (a type of road train); he visited 
research stations seeking information on shale-oil production, low-temperature 
50 LFSSA, 82, 22 July 1926, pp. 268–9. 
51 Roe, Australia, Britain and Migration, p. 69.
52 NAA, A11583, 16, ‘Imperial Conference 1926, Unbound Individual Papers, (E[E]1 to E[E]52)’; H. W. Gepp, 
‘The Development and Migration Commission, Commonwealth of Australia, its constitution and functions’, 17 
November 1926, Imperial Conference 1926, E(E) 51.
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carbonisation of brown coal, producer gas, a physical and chemical survey of 
Australian coal resources, liquid and pulverised fuels, geophysical prospecting, 
transport of foodstuffs, dehydration of vegetables, canned foodstuffs, fisheries, 
goldmining, grass improvement, forestry and the placing of research students.53
All these lines of inquiry had to be followed up by McDougall. The new 
appointment gave him more formal links with the Australian bureaucracy and 
a regular, albeit officially temporary, position in Australia House. He gained, 
at Bruce’s instruction, a clerical assistant, A. W. Stuart Smith, and a technical 
assistant, Dr A. S. Fitzpatrick, the latter because McDougall doubted his own 
ability to cope with the technical demands of work relating to the physical 
sciences.54 In the first of regular monthly reports, McDougall emphasised 
the care he was taking to ensure that other officers in Australia House were 
consulted and informed. He had begun immediately to establish formal liaison 
with every relevant research board and institute in the United Kingdom, 
including some 30 bodies under the control of agricultural authorities, and 
with government departments. McDougall planned to visit the head of each 
organisation personally.55
Liaison with CSIR
McDougall did not meet the chief figures in CSIR for some time and was 
uncertain about what was expected of him. He wrote to George Julius, Chairman 
of the Council and of its Executive Committee: ‘As I see this job…it is to keep 
your Council in touch with the work done in this country in the application of 
science to primary and secondary industries, in so far as these applications may 
seem to be of interest to Australia.’ He went on to explain the interest of the RGC 
in coordinated research throughout the Empire.56
Julius, gifted engineer, inventor and businessman, and CSIR’s Chief Executive, 
David Rivett, both replied courteously, but warily. Rivett had been persuaded 
to leave the Chair of Chemistry at the University of Melbourne to fill this new 
position. He was an able administrator and distinguished physical chemist who 
believed that empirical work must be supplemented and guided by thorough 
theoretical analysis.57 Like McDougall, he came from nonconformist stock 
with a strong sense of social responsibility. Rivett was personally gracious, 
approachable and patient, but he faced a daunting task. Every area of primary 
53 NAA/CSIR, A8510, 220/39, ‘Reports from F. L. McDougall 1927’, ‘Statement re Development and Research 
Activities of Chairman D&M Commission whilst in London’.
54 Ibid., McDougall to Julius, 26 January 1927.
55 Ibid., Report, 10 February 1927.
56 Ibid., McDougall to Julius, 26 January 1927.
57 Schedvin, Shaping Science and Industry, pp. 32–3.
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industry had pressing problems in urgent need of solution. CSIR was also 
required to assist secondary industry. Unlike Gepp, Rivett and his fellow 
councillors saw a clear need to establish priorities, to avoid spreading resources 
too thinly. In establishing those priorities, handling political pressures, relations 
with other institutions and practical problems of staffing and accommodation, 
Rivett had his hands full. He was reluctant to accept advice or assistance from 
London. Apart from his view that Australia should pay its own way, there was 
concern that such assistance might come with conditions.
For some months McDougall felt that he and his staff were ‘simply improvising, 
without any clear idea as regards your wishes’.58 Rivett was reluctant to accept 
EMB funds—the chief service that McDougall could give. But when Julius 
visited London in mid 1927, he and McDougall established an immediate 
rapport. Julius reported favourably to Rivett and explained Rivett’s funding 
scruples to McDougall. McDougall wrote to reassure Rivett, reminding him 
of Bruce’s pivotal role in establishing the EMB, adding what was effectively a 
short memorandum explaining that any action taken by Britain to aid empire 
development repaid Britain at least as much as the empire gained. Rivett replied 
that while this was ‘very logical’,
I cannot refrain from suggesting that the case for acceptance of British 
money for Australian work would be much clearer if Australia were 
putting into general scientific research an amount of money commensurate 
not only on a population basis with what Britain is finding but also 
commensurate with the magnitude of our local problems. We are hardly 
doing the former and most emphatically not the latter. [Nevertheless] the 
policy of co-operative work with the EMB is settled and I only hope we 
shall not appear at any time to be leaning too heavily upon its funds.59
Thus began an important correspondence and friendship, and McDougall’s role, 
not just as a liaison officer, but as an adviser, was established. Rivett wrote that 
‘you have been the guide, philosopher and friend [to Julius, who] knows quite 
well how impossible his task would have been without you and your staff. I 
wish we were as happy about everything as we are about our liaison work in 
London.’60 He continued to write frankly, sometimes using the correspondence 
as a means of thinking through problems, and as though McDougall were on 
a par with the three-man Executive Council. In a sense he was: in these first 
years of CSIR’s existence, his liaison work became an important lifeline in funds, 
recruitment and contacts, in links to the network of empire. McDougall also used 
Rivett as a sounding-board and a point of distribution in Australia for his own 
58 NAA/CSIR, A9778, M14/27/9, McDougall to Rivett, 4 August 1927.
59 Ibid., McDougall to Rivett, 30 June and 7 July; Rivett to McDougall, 15 August 1927.
60 NAA/CSIR, A10666, [1], Rivett to McDougall, 20 February 1928.
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ideas and memoranda. The wide-ranging nature of the correspondence is shown 
by the fact that after ‘some difficulty’ in sorting the personal from the official 
material in CSIR, McDougall divided his letters into three categories: those 
for Rivett’s private information, often sent to his home address; confidential 
letters which Rivett might share with others if he wished, sometimes including 
memoranda; and official letters to be filed. Rivett seems to have adopted a 
similar practice.61 Rivett’s son believed that their ‘close friendship [was] based 
on mutual admiration’ and a meeting of minds beyond their working concerns, 
particularly as McDougall’s
insights into British politics were sharp and spiced with humour. This 
delighted David who had always corresponded on these lines with 
his own family but seldom received much on the lighter side from his 
scientists. He and McDougall could see an amusing side in even the 
grimmest cuts and setbacks and helped each other to keep frustration 
and genuine grievance in proportion.62
CSIR’s Executive believed that effective working relationships should be 
established with research and other establishments, both in Australia and 
overseas.63 Even before the understanding about his role had been reached, 
McDougall was becoming the eyes and ears of the organisation in London: ‘I 
am writing today to McDougall to ask him if he can start any enquiries going 
amongst the British biologists as to the way in which the [“dingo pest”] question 
can be attacked.’64 He was able to inquire informally from Sir Henry Tizard, head 
of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, about British views on 
the payment of academic scientists seconded to government projects and on the 
tricky problem, involving copyright of results, of CSIR membership of British 
research organisations.65 McDougall’s office took care of the finances and progress 
of young scientists sent to Britain under the studentship scheme. He took this 
fatherly role seriously, giving practical assistance, arranging placements and 
doling out advice. He arranged wider experiences for very promising students.66 
On occasion students failed to measure up to the demands imposed upon them. 
McDougall would counsel, arrange conclusion of the placement and then placate 
the institution, protecting CSIR’s reputation for future students.
McDougall helped recruit scientists. Rivett wanted his research divisions 
headed by world-class figures to enhance the standing and attraction of the 
61 Ibid., McDougall to Rivett, 8 December 1927.
62 Rohan Rivett, David Rivett: Fighter for Australian Science, Melbourne, 1972, pp. 107–8.
63 Schedvin, Shaping Science and Industry, p. 58–9.
64 NAA/CSIR, A9778, M14/27/7, Rivett to Julius, 7 July 1927.
65 NAA/CSIR, A9778, M14/27/9, McDougall to Rivett, 25 August 1927; Rivett to McDougall, 27 September 
1927; McDougall to Rivett, 5 October 1927.
66 LFSSA, 171, 28 June 1928, p. 598; NAA/CSIR, A9778, M14/28/7, McDougall to Rivett, 3 May 1928; 
A10666, [1], McDougall to Rivett, 18 September 1928.
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organisation. With few experienced research scientists in Australia in some 
disciplines important to the work of CSIR, there was a view that the advice 
of leading overseas scientists should be sought. South African veterinarian Sir 
Arnold Theiler visited for six months in 1928 and recommended an ambitious 
program, including a large central laboratory. McDougall helped arrange the 
visit and was subsequently much involved, at Bruce’s personal instruction, 
in unsuccessful efforts to persuade Theiler to head the Division of Animal 
Health—a field considered crucial to CSIR’s success.67 He assisted in recruitment 
of other senior men and a young Francis Ratcliffe, then a junior EMB employee, 
to work on flying foxes.68
The work did not always accord with McDougall’s views on imperial cooperation. 
A request that the EMB contribute half the cost of an ambitious plan for research 
into biological control of various plant and insect pests—devised by the 
brilliant but difficult head of CSIR’s Division of Economic Entomology, Robin J. 
Tillyard—was supported by Federal Cabinet and by a personal cable from Bruce 
to Baldwin. In McDougall’s view, the proposal threatened imperial cooperation 
and coordination by demanding too heavy an expenditure on entomology, for 
which a considerable sum had been committed elsewhere, and it involved a 
disproportionate allocation to Australia. He persuaded Elliot, nevertheless, and 
the grant of £36,000 was one of the largest ever made.69
Both as EMB member and in liaising for CSIR and the DMC, McDougall visited 
research stations throughout Britain and came to know some leading scientists 
well. Chief among them was Elliot’s friend John Boyd Orr, ‘a very remarkable 
man of about 45 years of age’, wrote McDougall after their first meeting, 
impressed both by Orr’s scientific achievements and his war record: serving as 
a medical officer, Orr had been awarded both a Distinguished Service Order and 
a Military Cross.70 After graduating in medicine, Orr had received a Carnegie 
Fellowship to study physiological chemistry, and in 1913 had been appointed 
Director of a new institute of nutrition at Aberdeen. After the war he expanded 
what became the Rowett Institute, studying nutrition of farm animals and of 
human populations.71
McDougall reported constantly to Bruce on his regular visits to the Rowett 
Institute; to the Fruit Research Station at East Malling near Maidstone in Kent, 
67 Schedvin, Shaping Science and Industry, pp. 82–4.
68 NAA/CSIR, A9778, M14/27/9, McDougall to Rivett, 7 September 1927.
69 Schedvin, Shaping Science and Industry, pp. 99–101; LFSSA, 171, 28 June, 174 and 179, 12 and 26 July 1928, 
pp. 599, 608–9, 662; NAA/CSIR, A9778, M14/27/9, Rivett to McDougall, 20 October 1927; A10666, [1], McDougall 
to Rivett, 24 November 1927, 21 June and 5 July 1928; Archives of the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial 
Research Organisation [hereinafter CSIRO], Series 3, AN1/6/7, McDougall to Rivett, 19 and 26 July 1928.
70 LFSSA, 124, 6 September 1927, p. 422.
71 K. L. Baxter, ‘Orr, John Boyd, Baron Boyd Orr, (1880–1971)’, rev., ODNB, 2004–05, <http://www.
oxforddnb.com.virtual.anu.edu.au/view/article/31519> [accessed 22 November 2005].
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where the Director, R. G. Hatton, headed pioneering work on rootstocks; to the 
Rothamstead Experimental Station on Soil Science at Harpenden in Hertforshire, 
directed by Sir John Russell, a pioneer in organising modern agricultural 
research;72 and to the Welsh Plant Breeding Station at Aberystwyth, led by 
Professor R. G. Stapledon, who believed that ‘productive grasslands lay at the 
heart of productive agriculture’. Stapledon’s ‘ecological’ approach influenced 
farmers, scientists and politicians throughout the British Commonwealth.73 
McDougall was much impressed.74 He was also impressed by Stapledon’s young 
assistant, Elspeth Grant, who had grown up in Kenya, studied agriculture at 
Reading and Cornell universities, and was planning to return to the United 
States after some work experience. McDougall persuaded her to apply for a 
position as junior press officer with the EMB, popularising its scientific work.75 
She undertook this task with great success, later married Gervas Huxley, 
Secretary of the EMB Publicity Committee, and, as Elspeth Huxley, achieved 
fame as a novelist. McDougall became a member of her circle of friends, which 
included his relative agricultural scientist A. N. (Jim) Duckham. There was 
frequent correspondence between McDougall and Elspeth for some years after 
she left the EMB and travelled extensively. She, like Rivett, was one of those to 
whom he sent ideas and memoranda for comment throughout the 1930s.
Spurred by the views of both Walter Elliot and McDougall, the RGC adopted 
a role beyond mere dispensation of funds, assuming responsibility for 
coordinating research throughout the empire in the fields related to its role, 
avoiding duplication and publishing results. To harness science effectively to 
the cause of empire development, it was not sufficient simply to supply funds. 
The Imperial Agricultural Bureaux (IAB) were attached to leading institutions to 
disseminate results of research through abstracting services. McDougall played 
a significant role in ensuring the IAB were not tied to any British ministry. He 
represented Australia and was Vice-Chairman on the IAB Executive Council.76
Efficiency in Primary Industries
McDougall had argued since 1919 that rural efficiency would rest on producer 
organisation, fewer middlemen, improved transport and provision of economic 
and market information. Now he sought to achieve that efficiency through 
72 N. W. Pirie, ‘Russell, Sir (Edward) John (1872–1965)’, rev., ODNB, 2004, <http://www.oxforddnb.com.
virtual.anu.edu.au/view/article/35877> [accessed 8 May 2007].
73 Elizabeth Baigent, ‘Stapledon, Sir (Reginald) George (1882–1960)’, ODNB, <http://www.oxforddnb.com.
virtual.anu.edu.au/view/article/36255> [accessed 8 May 2007].
74 LFSSA, 122 and 123, 18 and 25 August 1927, pp. 415–16, 418.
75 Gervas Huxley, Both Hands: An Autobiography, Chatto & Windus, London, 1970, p. 149; C. S. Nichols, 
Elspeth Huxley: A Biography, paperback edn, Harper Collins, London, 2003, pp. 91–5.
76 LFSSA, 195 and 198, 21 November and 6 December 1928, pp. 679–80, 686–8.
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imperial cooperation. In 1927 he established, single-handedly it seems, the 
EMB Committee on Agricultural Economics. He brought together leading 
academics C. S. Orwin and J. A. Venn in what was then a very new field, with 
representatives of the EMB, the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries and the 
National Farmers’ Union.77 McDougall had the group list all subjects ‘that might 
usefully be regarded as falling within the scope of agricultural economics’ and 
then select those that could be ‘dealt with on an Imperial basis’.78 The findings 
included ‘economic geography, marketing, co-operation, transport, fiscal and 
even sociological factors as they touch the agricultural sphere’. He hoped work 
in some of these fields would be undertaken by the EMB in cooperation with 
the universities.79
He also urged revision of a view that an Australian development rate of 2 per 
cent per annum was sufficient. ‘You have in Australia 6 million really virile 
people who, in the year of grace 1928, are armed, or ought to be armed, with 
all the inventions of science to assist them in the more rapid development of 
their country.’ He questioned a suggestion by a committee inquiring into the 
Australian tariff that, unlike manufacturing, agriculture was subject to the 
law of diminishing returns. ‘It seems to me that for many years to come the 
application of brains, capital and energy to Australian agricultural and pastoral 
pursuits will give increasing returns, i.e. returns larger than expenditure, and 
I personally doubt whether under undiscriminating protection the same will 
hold good for secondary industries.’80
The task of pasture improvement provided, in McDougall’s view, the ideal 
opportunity for scientific coordination on an imperial scale. He had learned of 
the potential of grassland improvement using superphosphate and subterranean 
clover from SA grazier W. S. Kelly, whom he had first met as a fellow AIF Education 
Officer in 1919, and Victorian Agent-General in London, George Fairbairn, who 
had run successful small-scale experiments on Victoria’s Mornington Peninsula. 
McDougall believed the method offered a means of converting pastoral lands 
to closer settlement, increasing carrying capacity up to tenfold, and replacing 
wool with stock fattening and dairying in suitable parts of southern Australia.81 
Orr visited Australia in 1928 and was convinced that ‘given a great organized 
drive, it would be possible’ to correct mineral deficiencies and thus, ‘within 
five years, to add at least £10 million to the value of Australia’s exports of 
pastoral products without increasing by one acre the areas at present devoted to 
77 H. A. F. Lindsay, R. R. Enfield and J. B. Guild.
78 LFSSA, 120, 4 August 1927, p. 407.
79 NAA/CSIR, A9778, M14/27/9, McDougall, undated memorandum, ‘The Empire Marketing Board and 
Empire Economic Affairs’, received 5 December 1927.
80 LFSSA, 173, 5 July 1928, p. 604; 168, 19 June 1928, pp. 587–8. McDougall seems to have been placing 
his own interpretation on a subject of debate between academic economists at the time. See William Coleman, 
Selwyn Cornish and Alf Hagger, Giblin’s Platoon, ANU E Press, Canberra, 2006, pp. 63–5.
81 LFSSA, 65, 16 April 1926, pp. 208–11.
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pastoral production’. Orr thought that ‘firstclass teams’ of veterinary scientists 
could be formed in Australia to work on the ‘practical aspects’ of the problem 
since ‘already ascertained scientific knowledge—ascertained in many parts of 
the world including Australia—only requires to be collated…for an immense 
advance in pastoral conditions to occur’.
McDougall suggested a joint arrangement between CSIR and the EMB under 
which Orr might be seconded for a period to get such a program under way: 
‘the matter should be considered to be a great national enterprise…in order to 
bring the whole Empire conception into the picture and indeed in order to get 
the necessary intellectual assistance from men such as Orr.’ If CSIR and the EMB 
assisted State agricultural departments, progress that could normally take 20 
years might be made in five. Orr gave authoritative confirmation of McDougall’s 
own view that ‘armed with weapons forged for us by modern science, we ought 
to be able to make much more rapid progress and that, in the first instance, 
progress should be on our already settled areas’.82
Views on Research
The difference in viewpoints of centre and periphery posed problems for 
cooperation in science. Orr’s idea of a great campaign for pasture improvement, 
enthusiastically supported by McDougall, contradicted the approach of T. 
Brailsford Robertson, CSIR’s Chief of Animal Nutrition. Robertson planned 
fundamental research to determine the exact nature of amino-acid deficiencies 
in leaf proteins of fodder plants upon which Australian sheep depended in 
times of drought, followed by field trials of stock licks and mineral supplements 
added to water. British scientists were critical: it had not yet proved possible to 
extract all protein from fibrous plant material; empirical field trials would yield 
quicker results. Orr even questioned ‘the value of any basic nutrition research 
in Australia. His views were those of the economic agriculturalist…he thought 
that an adequate increase in production could be achieved by the application 
of existing knowledge.’ The differences raised ‘fundamental issues about the 
choice of research projects, about the balance between basic and applied work, 
and about the relationship between the ideals of natural science and often 
conflicting socio-economic reasons’.83
CSIR’s historian, C. B. Schedvin, suggests that neither Robertson nor Orr had 
a satisfactory answer. Robertson’s investigation of a ‘challenging biological 
problem’ was hard to justify on economic grounds. But Orr’s ‘sweeping 
dismissal of the need for fundamental research in agrostology bore the imprint 
82 Ibid., 176, 18 July 1928, pp. 613–16.
83 Schedvin, Shaping Science and Industry, p. 80.
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of scientific imperialism’; it assumed that the Rowett Institute could provide all 
the necessary theoretical knowledge. It was ‘a sharp rebuff’ to Rivett’s views.84 
As Rivett put it to McDougall, economies in the conduct of research might 
result, but at the risk of neglecting the potential of Australian researchers: ‘if 
we make it a practice to send our severer problems elsewhere…we shall run the 
risk of definitely lowering the standard of ability in our own workers.’ He drew 
a parallel with the idea called industrial rationalisation—that dominions should 
not aim to develop higher levels of technology:
...however economically unsound Australia’s present tariff policy may 
be, the main idea underlying it is not lightly to be set aside. We must 
have in our midst industries demanding high skill and a good intellectual 
standard…we will be well advised to let our own people face our own 
problems, however difficult they may be. Otherwise we shall tend to 
lose the strength that comes only from exercise.85
In this case, neither solution prevailed. Despite McDougall’s strenuous efforts, 
Orr was unable to spend extended periods in Australia, and Theiler, the preferred 
alternative, declined. Brailsford Robertson, whose work had continued with 
Rivett’s strong support, died suddenly in January 1930. Subsequent recruitment 
policies were ‘more modest and pragmatic’ and attention was paid to ‘local 
knowledge and experience’.86
Thus ended one grand scheme of imperial science. The entomological scheme, 
for which McDougall had subordinated his own view of imperial priorities to 
Australian demands, also met an inglorious end. It was overly ambitious, poorly 
thought out and spread limited resources over a range of complex problems. 
Despite some useful pioneering research, expectations of more spectacular 
successes, like the eradication of prickly pear by caterpillars of Cactoblastus 
cactorum following its introduction in 1926, were not fulfilled.87
Defending the Tariff
One of McDougall’s greatest assets was, as he told Bruce, that ‘I am, like Elijah, 
“very zealous”’.88 His account of a typical day bears this out: writing until 
lunchtime, lunch ‘almost invariably of a propaganda nature’, more office work 
and then seeing people in the House of Commons until 7 pm. He worked at 
weekends, and would remain in London for much of the holiday month of 
84 Ibid., pp. 79–81.
85 NAA/CSIR, A10666, [1], Rivett to McDougall, 12 April 1929.
86 Schedvin, Shaping Science and Industry, p. 84.
87 Ibid., pp. 100–1.
88 LFSSA, 37, 29 October 1925, p. 107.
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August. Vacations were rare and short.89 The letters to Bruce in the 1920s list 
extraordinary numbers of meetings and other activities. Clearly he possessed 
considerable stamina, as well as determination and the dedicated discipline of 
his heritage. But his zeal may well have been a factor in the disintegration of 
his marriage in the late 1920s. His daughter remembered often seeing her father 
only as a hand reaching from behind the newspaper for his cup at the breakfast 
table.
Although he made considerable use of the press, memoranda remained the chief 
vehicle for McDougall’s ideas. Both Elspeth Huxley and her husband Gervas 
joked about his ‘rather touching belief that every problem could be solved by a 
memorandum’.90 His memoranda could be short briefing notes limited to a page 
or two on a very specific topic: many of these were produced, for example, before 
an Imperial Conference. Others could state a case, be intended as discussion 
papers or even a means of crystallising a new idea, running through several 
drafts to reflect the contributions of those asked to read and comment. This 
process might result in a major memorandum of 20 pages or more, covering a 
new idea from every possible angle, and designed to be circulated to a carefully 
chosen list of recipients by both Bruce and McDougall as a catalyst for further 
discussion and action. McDougall had also amassed an encyclopedic knowledge 
of trading patterns—literally, in fact, as he contributed an entry on empire trade 
to the Encyclopedia Britannica. Most of his knowledge was based on intensive 
and self-directed study of statistics, for which, he told his brother, he had 
developed ‘a mania’.91 In December 1925, he was elected a Fellow of the Royal 
Statistical Society, proposed by Sir Sydney Chapman and Henry Macrosty, both 
of the Board of Trade, but he does not appear to have taken any active part in 
the society.92
McDougall was busier than ever in the late 1920s, serving imperial interests on 
the IEC and the EMB, but also working directly for Australia, and that work 
included promoting Australian policy. He could not admit to any difficulty in 
reconciling the two sets of interests, but there were some ominous signs. In the 
years following publication of Sheltered Markets, he was increasingly obliged 
to defend the Australian tariff in the light of his own published arguments, 
and to answer the protests of aggrieved British manufacturers. The Manchester 
Guardian Commercial pointed out that McDougall’s case in Sheltered Markets 
rested on a complementary trade: Britain supplying goods manufactured from 
raw materials supplied by Australia. The reviewer pointed to ‘the inconsistency 
between the propaganda in favour of Imperial Preference and the actual 
89 NLA, MS6890/1/8, letters to Norman, 2 April 1924, 29 August 1923.
90 Elspeth Huxley to W. Way, 15 April 1986; Gervas Huxley, Both Hands, p. 127.
91 NLA, MS6890/1/9, letters to Norman, 10 September 1925 and 3 January 1926; LFSSA, 138, 14 December 
1927, p. 483.
92 Information from RSS Archivist, Janet Foster, 14 and 20 August, and 10 September 2007.
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tendencies in Imperial trade as revealed by the recent actions of Australia’. 
Imperial trade was ‘every day threatened by the avowed and adopted policy of 
complete Protection pursued since 1920 by Australia’.93
McDougall’s response to such criticism was to demonstrate with figures the 
benefits of Australia’s preferential tariff to British industry, overall. He provided 
for Sir William Larke, Director of the National Federation of Iron and Steel 
Manufacturers, a memorandum showing increasing British iron and steel 
exports to Australia, compared with exports to the rest of the world: ‘I may 
say that he was frankly surprised at the results.’94 In the hostile territory of 
Manchester, a manufacturing city harbouring vigorous opponents of Australia’s 
protection policy, McDougall upbraided ‘the most influential Chamber of 
Commerce’ in Britain for ‘such loose thinking and such loose writing as to make 
the sort of statements, of which they had been guilty’, giving examples and 
correcting errors.95 He defended Australian policy by differentiating between 
established industrial powers and young developing nations. In advance of the 
1927 International Economic Conference, certain to be dominated by free-trade 
views, McDougall provided for The Times Trade and Engineering Supplement, 
anonymously, dominion views on this ‘somewhat dangerous conference’. He 
claimed the ‘rights of nations to safeguard their own living standards’: ‘young 
and virile nations on the brink of great economic developments’ relied on 
protective tariffs and orderly marketing of agricultural produce.96
The 1927 International Economic Conference, called by the Economic 
Organization of the League of Nations, carried resolutions for reducing tariffs. An 
Economic Consultative Committee (ECC) was appointed to supervise execution of 
those resolutions. McDougall was one of 60 ECC members, representing League 
member states, but chosen for individual expertise. The ECC met for about a 
fortnight in 1928 and again in 1929. Aware of his government’s anxiety about 
the possibility of League interference in its tariff policy, McDougall expected ‘it 
may become necessary at some stage…to warn the Committee of the dangers to 
the League of Nations of its interference in the economic affairs of…the younger 
nations of the world, who are developing their industrial status and may resent 
dictation from the older industrialised countries’.97
Thus, he began a self-appointed role as spokesman for developing economies 
outside Europe. Impressed by the value and range of economic statistics collected 
by the League, McDougall wanted to divert League activity from efforts to 
impose commercial policy to ‘provision of full, clear comparable information 
93 NLA, MS6890/5/1, review of Sheltered Markets in Manchester Guardian Commercial.
94 LFSSA, 137, 8 December 1927, p. 477.
95 Ibid., 152, 6 March 1928, pp. 528–9. 
96 Ibid., 90, 26 January 1927, p. 296. The article was published in TTES, 29 January 1927.
97 LFSSA, 163, 9 May 1928, p. 569.
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and statistics’, thereby assisting planning for empire cooperation.98 He attended 
the League Assembly as a substitute delegate for Australia in 1929 and, just as 
he had on the ECC, he lobbied the British delegation to oppose the ‘extreme 
anti-tariff attitude’ of the League.99
Rationalising Imperial Industry
McDougall’s advocacy on behalf of Australian policies would always be 
tempered, nevertheless, by the wider imperial interest. He believed that full 
imperial economic development could be realised only through cooperation 
and coordination. He therefore supported the idea, current in some sections 
of British industry, of complementary trade based on imperially rationalised 
industries. In a memorandum on empire secondary industries, written at the 
request of Sir Horace Hamilton, permanent head of the British Board of Trade, 
and circulated within the board, he wrote that dominions lacked the economies 
of scale to attempt complex industrial development. They should selectively 
develop, and encourage with protection, simpler forms. They might assemble 
and manufacture vehicle parts such as chassis and wheels, while British 
industry supplied engines and gears. A dominion electrical industry might 
produce its own domestic appliances, small motors and lamps.100 McDougall 
favoured industry-specific talks to work out rational arrangements; there 
were moves in the late 1920s to hold such discussions between the British iron 
and steel industry and Australia’s Broken Hill Proprietary Limited (BHP). A 
re-examination of inter-imperial tariffs should determine ‘reasonable limits’ 
of dominion industrial development for a five or ten-year period, after which 
‘tariff mongering’ should be left alone.101
As the need to accommodate and respond to British opinion on tariffs formed 
an important part of his work on behalf of Australia, that opinion influenced 
McDougall’s own thinking. His understanding of Australian views, based as 
it was on comparatively brief and narrow experience, never renewed after 
1924, faded. Although he worked loyally for what he believed to be Australia’s 
interests, he was blunt in private criticisms expressed to Bruce. He argued 
that Australia’s tariff policy threatened the imperial vision: tariffs should be 
used for preference, not as protection for inefficient industries. There would be 
little to criticise in a tariff of 35 per cent, but when it exceeded 50 per cent, ‘a 
howl of indignation’ arose in areas producing woollen textiles. Amery agreed: 
98 Ibid., 155 and 169, 15 March and 21 June 1928, pp. 542–3, 595.
99 Ibid., 255 and 256, 4 and 11 September 1929, pp. 885–8.
100 NLA, MS6890/4/2, undated memorandum, ‘The Distribution of Secondary Industries within the 
Empire’; LFSSA, 145 and 155, 25 January and 15 March 1928, pp. 502, 540.
101 LFSSA, 106, 4 May 1927, p. 354.
A New Idea Each Morning
88
in 1927 hosiery manufacturers had protested against Australian tariff increases 
by boycotting an Empire Shopping Week in Nottingham, and McDougall 
reported Amery’s hope that Australia would consider the effect of its tariff on 
the voluntary preference campaign. He had also urged special consideration 
for British industries suffering severe hardship, as were cotton tweed 
manufacturers whose output was geared to specific needs of Australian rural 
workers.102 McDougall criticised Tariff Board policy ‘encouraging every possible 
secondary industry to start for itself in Australia’. Tariff rates had doubled from 
an average of some 10 per cent in 1918 to 20 per cent by 1927.103 As the increases 
continued, he grew more insistent on efficiency as a precondition for protection, 
in both secondary and primary industries. No industry should be supported 
if it required more than a 25 per cent tariff to be competitive, unless it was 
essential for defence. Australia should concentrate on large-scale production 
in enterprises for which it had a natural advantage, lowering overheads and 
assisting export prospects. Full protection, to the point of import embargo, could 
be given to selected industries, and even to items within industries. Duties upon 
other products should be lowered, with a declaration that tariff changes would 
be kept to a minimum, and the previous ‘empirical, experimental, inclusive 
policy be abandoned for a scientific selective policy based upon the interest of 
Australia as a whole and without consideration to the special interests of groups 
of employers or of trade unions’.104
McDougall warned Bruce ‘how widespread and, therefore, serious, is the distrust 
of Australian economic policy in very large sections of influential opinion in this 
country. It is by no means confined to financial circles but affects the attitude 
of many men who are essentially friendly to us.’ A company chairman had told 
him his board was urging realisation of substantial Australian securities because 
of such doubts. McDougall could demonstrate the benefit of the tariff to Great 
Britain and ‘the immense possibilities of Australian primary production, yet it 
is impossible to inspire very much confidence in the immediate future among 
those who have made any considerable study of recent happenings’.105
The Australian Tariff
McDougall urged Bruce to initiate a study of a possible ‘vicious circle in 
Australia…forcing up both wages and the cost of production’.106 Bruce did 
102 Ibid., 157, 4 April 1928, pp. 550–1; 98, 16 March 1927, pp. 324–5; 30 and 31, 10 and 17 September 
1925, pp. 89–91. 
103 Coleman, Cornish and Hagger, Giblin’s Platoon, p. 66.
104 LFSSA, 53, 1 February 1926; 168, 19 June 1928, pp. 154, 588; 108, 23 May 1927, pp. 361–5.
105 Ibid., 149, 16 February 1928, pp. 517–18.
106 Ibid., 129, 12 October 1927, pp. 440–1.
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establish a tariff inquiry, initially by economists L. F. Giblin, E. C. Dyason and 
Commonwealth Statistician, C. H. Wickens. J. B. Brigden and D. B. Copland 
were coopted soon afterwards and the first draft presented to Bruce early in 
1928. Bruce asked Brigden to rework it; the final version, known as the ‘Brigden 
Report’, was published in mid 1929. Bruce admitted ‘the question bristles with 
difficulty owing to the present policy having been pursued to such a point as 
to render the calling of any halt difficult’.107 McDougall was disappointed that 
the inquiry’s first draft report failed to consider the effect of ‘indiscriminate’ 
high protection in limiting the effectiveness of more promising industries, but 
was pleased to find an argument for more discriminating protection.108 The 
final report has been described as ‘a compromise document’, a ‘comprehensive 
manifesto for moderate protectionism’ and, although it did include a ‘trouncing 
of Imperial Preference’, as ‘an attempt to be all things to all men’. It was welcomed 
by both the protectionist Melbourne Age and its rival, the free-trade Argus.109 
The views of Bruce and McDougall were similar in many respects; McDougall 
often conveys a certainty in his letters that Bruce agrees with his view. While 
both men wanted Australia’s high living standards to be maintained, with 
emphasis on development, especially in primary industry and on a more rational 
tariff, McDougall saw things from the centre in London, where he encountered 
hostility towards Australia’s economic policy, British Treasury scepticism about 
the ‘imperial vision’, and factions in Whitehall. He understood the threat to 
Australian borrowing that those negative British assessments posed and he was 
acutely conscious of the fragility of empire cooperation. Bruce understood those 
worries, too, but his immediate concern as Prime Minister was to hold together 
a coalition government subjected to lobbying from rural, manufacturing and 
importing interests.110 An example of their similar thinking from different 
standpoints is found in a pair of letters, crossing in the mail in 1927. McDougall 
expresses frustration with the increasing Australian tariff, which ‘must retard 
Anglo-Australian cooperation in Australian development [and] gravely hinders 
the campaign of Imperial Economic education on which so much time, energy and 
money is being spent’. Bruce wrote at the same time: ‘the whole question of the 
Tariff, and its effect upon Australia’s progress is now very much occupying my 
mind, and I shall be interested to have any thoughts of yours which you choose 
to send me.’111
107 W. H. Richmond, ‘S. M. Bruce and Australian Economic Policy 1923–29’, Australian Economic History 
Review, Vol. 23, 1983, pp. 249–51; NAA, M111, Bruce to McDougall, 15 September 1927.
108 LFSSA, 168, 19 June 1928, pp. 585–9.
109 Coleman, Cornish and Hagger, Giblin’s Platoon, pp. 68, 71–2.
110 Kosmas Tsokhas, ‘Protection, Imperial Preference and Australian Conservative Politics, 1923–39’, 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 20, no. 1, 1992, pp. 67–70.
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The Brigden Report did not ‘produce a simple formula’ for what Bruce had hoped 
would be ‘the clean up on the Tariff question’. It gave Bruce no more satisfaction 
than the hope that it would lead to ‘a really heavy controversy on the subject’.112 
He worried, like McDougall, that the tariff sheltered inefficiencies, and feared 
it could harm the competitiveness of rural industries. Yet Bruce was unable to 
resolve the inherent difficulties of identifying industries deserving protection 
and of fixing appropriate levels for that protection.
Bruce also agreed with McDougall on the need for efficiencies in rural industry. 
At McDougall’s urging, he had implemented organisation schemes. Although 
bounties were granted, Bruce ‘regarded them merely as necessary palliatives to 
relieve the distress experienced by growers’. He would tell industry deputations 
seeking such assistance: ‘The government will help you if you help yourselves…
there is so much that can be done to improve returns and cut costs but it needs 
you to take action…go away and come up with a scheme.’ It was this view 
that had led Bruce to establish CSIR and DMC: ‘We must…recognize that if we 
want to maintain that [very high] standard of living and those social conditions 
we can do it only by adopting the most modern and efficient methods in the 
conduct of the whole of the industries of our country.’113
The 1929 General Election
Bruce, like McDougall, was a ‘rural optimist’. It has been argued that his 
economic policies must be understood in the context of his ‘unyielding belief 
in rural development as the basis of economic progress’.114 He had identified 
two factors undermining that progress: the tariff and the complex system of 
industrial arbitration, divided between State and Commonwealth jurisdictions. 
Having reached an impasse on the tariff, he determined to use other measures 
to reduce costs of production and the cost of living, in order to shore up the 
economy for a depression he believed to be likely. Thus, costs of shipping and 
industrial disputes had to be curtailed.115 He had alienated the labour movement 
and its supporters in shipping disputes in 1925; he saw union militancy as a 
threat to Australian interests, to the British Empire and to the ‘peaceful, 
prosperous, scientific and rational domestic and international order he wanted’. 
Thereafter he had become ‘a polarising and deeply unpopular figure’, ‘the best-
hated man of his day’. He nevertheless won an ‘emphatic’ electoral victory later 
in that year, as the economy recovered from recession; he had succeeded then 
in ‘positioning his government as the genuine representative of the national 
112 Richmond, ‘S. M. Bruce and Australian Economic Policy’, pp. 250–1.
113 Ibid., pp. 245–6.
114 Ibid., p. 239.
115 Lee, Stanley Melbourne Bruce, pp. 81–8.
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interest’.116 But in 1928, still dogged by industrial unrest, Bruce’s government 
barely scraped back, with a majority insufficient to give it a free hand. Bruce 
himself feared it might be defeated on a censure motion.117
In the early months of 1929, timber workers contested an award reducing 
wages and increasing hours, and Bruce’s government prosecuted the Secretary 
of the Melbourne Trades Hall Council, E. J. Holloway, for inciting workers. 
Coalminers in New South Wales objected to an agreement by Bruce and NSW 
Premier, Thomas Bavin, to reduce the price of exported coal, in an attempt 
to prop up the industry, with owners to receive reduced profits and workers 
less pay. Owners closed some mines, but Bruce refused moves to prosecute a 
coal owner, John Brown, for locking out workers. The decision, though based 
on sound reasoning, demonstrated the flaws in Bruce’s political skills. A 
‘personification of the capitalist bosses’, he had shown, according to a growing 
number of opponents, ‘that he had one law for the rich and another for the 
poor’. He seemed to have compromised his government’s ‘moral legitimacy’. 
The Government narrowly survived a censure motion in the Parliament. Bruce 
thereupon determined to reduce costs by reforming the arbitration system, 
either by taking it over completely as a federal activity or by abandoning it to 
the States.118 In September he introduced a Maritime Industries Bill, establishing 
a new type of tribunal to deal with workers in the sea transport industry, but 
also devolving industrial relations largely to the States. Hughes moved an 
amendment that the Bill not be passed without approval by a general election 
or referendum; the amendment was carried by one vote. Bruce had suffered this 
defeat because of his ‘increasing propensity to antagonize those whose support 
he needed’, writes David Lee, who also suggests that at this period he may have 
been suffering from depression. He need not have resigned, but chose to call 
an election, hoping to bring coalition dissidents into line. The election on 12 
October 1929 resulted in a landslide to the Labor opposition. Bruce lost his own 
seat to E. J. Holloway, the unionist who had been controversially prosecuted by 
his government.119
116 Ibid., pp. 50–1, 57.
117 Ibid., pp. 80–1.
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4. The Vision Ends
Summary
The years of the Great Depression brought anxiety and disillusion for Bruce and 
McDougall. Both faced an uncertain future. McDougall’s position at Australia 
House was threatened by the search for economies and by Labor suspicion of 
his views on tariffs. He was saved—albeit at a considerably lower salary—by 
his work assisting the new Prime Minister, J. H. Scullin, at the 1930 Imperial 
Conference. He supplemented his reduced income by writing some paid articles, 
and a brief period writing on imperial trade for Lord Beaverbrook. He was 
tempted by various proposals for work on imperial cooperation in London, and 
by one for economic research in Australia. None of these materialised, but the 
soul-searching involved in considering them confirmed his determination to 
remain at the centre in London and to work for the interests of the empire as a 
whole. As political pressure for a British general tariff increased, he contributed 
to a ferment of ideas for means to transcend the narrow political process with 
machinery for broad-based consultation drawing upon industry, commerce, 
finance and labour.
Bruce was returned to Parliament at the general election in 1931 in a United 
Australia Party Government headed by Joseph Lyons, who appointed him 
Assistant Minister. He led the Australian delegation at the Ottawa Imperial 
Conference, which established an imperial preferential tariff system in 1932. In 
the months preceding the conference, McDougall had negotiated with British 
officials on tariff treatment of individual commodities, while Bruce oversaw a 
similar process in Canberra. McDougall had also worked on plans to transform 
imperial bodies in London into an organisation promoting imperial economic 
cooperation. Debate continues about the advantages of the Ottawa preferential 
system established after hard bargaining. For McDougall, one unexpected 
outcome, the demise of the Empire Marketing Board, was a heavy blow. It 
marked the end of his vision for cooperative imperialism.
The Scullin Government: ‘A pretty hard fight’
Shocked by Bruce’s election loss, McDougall determined to carry on as usual 
and to report regularly to Scullin.1 Anxiety for himself and for his cause was 
1 NAA/CSIR, A10666, [2], McDougall to Rivett, 22 October 1929.
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clear as he wrote consoling Bruce, urging him to ‘make [Scullin] aware of the 
amazing opportunity which he can take, if he chooses, at the next Imperial or 
Imperial Economic Conference’. Otherwise, there could be ‘no one effectively to 
state the case from an overseas point of view in regard to Empire development’. 
He added: ‘I have…no idea what the attitude of the new Government will be in 
regard to my work. I can only hope, from a personal and from a public point of 
view, that they will be prepared to allow me to continue my work without any 
very substantial change.’2 Bruce replied that he had tried to persuade Scullin, 
but could give no indication that he had succeeded: ‘In any event you have now 
so established yourself in London that opportunities will present themselves for 
you to continue your work for the great cause you have espoused, even if it is in 
a new sphere of activity.’3 It was, perhaps, a warning.
McDougall knew little of the new ministers. His support base in Australia was 
small and he had no sympathetic press. His friends in DMC and CSIR were 
worried. Bruce warned them he feared it would be ‘a pretty hard fight to 
persuade the new Government of the real value of McDougall’s services’.4 DMC 
was doomed. With few tangible results to show for its efforts, support had been 
rare even in the former government. Scullin made plain his view that it was a 
waste of money. In November 1929, he decided to stop most assisted migration 
in view of Australia’s economic difficulties, effectively removing DMC’s raison 
d’être. In February 1930 other DMC functions were moved to a ‘Development 
Branch’ of the Prime Minister’s Department.5
CSIR fared better. Its new minister, Senator J. J. Daly, proved approachable and 
keen to extend its work. But when Rivett and Julius tried to persuade him of 
McDougall’s value, especially as a member of the EMB, ‘the Minister said very 
little, but…there was a slightly antagonistic feeling which was probably due to 
the fact that you held more positions than one and received more than the basic 
wage. You know what I mean.’ Rivett assured McDougall that there had not been 
‘the faintest suggestion’ of any threat, but late in January he was less optimistic: 
many ministers did not seem to appreciate the value of CSIR’s work and the 
financial situation was deteriorating rapidly. There would nevertheless be no 
difficulty in finding McDougall’s annual £500 payment, which represented ‘a 
remarkable bargain from CSIR’s point of view’.6
On 28 February, Daly explained the full extent of the financial crisis to CSIR’s 
Executive. Rivett wrote ‘a thoroughly miserable letter’ to McDougall, thinking 
2 LFSSA, 259, 17 October 1929, p. 894. 
3 Ibid., 260, 17 November 1929, p. 896.
4 NAA/CSIR, A10085, vol. 3, Julius to Rivett, 13 November 1929.
5 Michael Roe, Australia, Britain and Migration, pp. 96, 119–20, 140–5; NAA/CSIR, A9778, M14/29/10, 
Rivett to McDougall, 15 October 1929.
6 NAA/CSIR, A10666, [2], Rivett to McDougall, 18 and 28 November 1929, 29 January 1930.
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through the consequences as he wrote. CSIR must help as best it could. 
Development and building would be put on hold, contributions to overseas 
organisations suspended and imperial activities reduced. The Prime Minister’s 
Department had requested justification of McDougall’s appointment. It would 
be ‘answered in very emphatic fashion’, it was not personal, ‘just an evidence of 
the intense desire of Cabinet to reduce expenditure in every direction’. ‘Drastic 
reductions are the order of the day’, but McDougall must remain: ‘I shall have 
to rely upon you to a tremendous extent.’7
Scullin’s questioning was personal, prompted by a letter from Hume Cook, 
Secretary of the Australian Industries Protection League. Cook referred to a 
press report that an EMB paper by McDougall had been hailed by the Daily 
Express as strongly supporting empire free trade, for which Express proprietor, 
Lord Beaverbrook, was waging a vigorous campaign. At the time McDougall 
had described the review as ‘an embarrassing amount of effusion’.8 Cook’s letter 
recalled his earlier complaint about an apparent attack by McDougall on the 
Australian tariff and the ‘unsatisfactory’ response of the Bruce Government. 
Scullin called for information: ‘what salary is being paid by the Commonwealth 
to Mr McDougall, and what services are rendered by him?’9 A four-page 
departmental report dealt with Cook’s two complaints and McDougall’s 
response to the earlier one. It noted an account in the Sydney Morning Herald 
of McDougall’s statement to the League of Nations Economic Consultative 
Committee that ‘there was a feeling in some quarters that certain aspects of the 
Australian tariff policy hindered the growth of certain secondary industries and, 
further, the incidence of the tariff was a handicap to agriculture’. McDougall had 
explained that he had gone on to say that the Australian Government realised 
these were ‘highly complex’ questions, and the Government had therefore 
decided to establish a Bureau of Economic Research.10 He had mentioned the 
decision, he wrote, in order to ‘indicate the way in which the League of Nations 
could, through the provision of a service of economic information, assist 
countries such as Australia in the assessment of the comparative advantages 
which they enjoy in regard to primary and secondary industries’. The official 
report also listed amounts of remuneration received by McDougall: £1000 from 
the Commonwealth Government for ‘general representation’ and a further £500 
each for liaison on behalf of DMC and CSIR. He received another £500 from the 
7 Ibid., Rivett to McDougall, 3 March 1930; NAA/CSIR, A9778, M14/30/2, Rivett to McDougall, 14 March 1930.
8 Empire Marketing Board, The Growing Dependence of British Industry upon Empire Markets, December 1929, 
HMSO; Report in Melbourne Age, 5 December 1929; NAA, M111, McDougall to Bruce, 11 December 1929.
9 NAA, A981, ECOC 1, Cook to Scullin, 6 December 1929, Scullin to Prime Minister’s Department, 10 
December 1929; NLA, MS6890/3/2, copy of cable requesting McDougall’s explanation, 20 December 1929.
10 A Bill to realise Bruce’s aim to provide an independent body to undertake economic research, along the 
lines of CSIR, was submitted to Parliament in March 1929. It was opposed by Labor, chiefly because it seemed 
to threaten tariff protection. Efforts to find a suitable director for the bureau lapsed when Bruce lost office. See 
Coleman, Cornish and Hagger, Giblin’s Platoon, pp. 73–9.
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DFECB, making a total £2500 per annum.11 McDougall’s further response on 
20 December explained that the EMB publication The Growing Dependence of 
British Industry upon Empire Markets had already been sent to Scullin, and that 
it had no connection with the empire free trade campaign; the Daily Express 
must have found the figures in it useful for their own purposes. McDougall 
pointed out that a recent article of his own, defending the right of younger 
Commonwealth nations to use protection, condemned empire free trade as 
‘politically hazardous’ for Britain.12 A reassuring letter was sent to Cook, but 
McDougall’s value to a high-protectionist Labor government was inevitably 
questioned.
Reorganisation at Australia House
Costs at Australia House in London had increased fivefold, from £24,225 to 
£124,841 per annum, between its establishment in 1913 and 1930. The vague 
terms of the High Commissioner Act (1909), the pressures of war and changes 
in the dominion relationship increased the functions of the High Commission 
and brought uncontrolled growth. By 1926 employee numbers were given as 
256, most without permanent tenure.13 A search for savings focused on trade-
related activities; the High Commissioner, Sir Granville Ryrie, was asked for 
suggestions. He described McDougall as ‘a very efficient officer’ and ‘capable 
economist’ who would be ‘of great assistance to the Prime Minister at the 
Imperial Conference on economic questions’. Either McDougall or A. E. Hyland, 
Director of an Australian Publicity Scheme established in 1926, would fill a 
proposed post of Director of Trade and Publicity admirably, but Ryrie would 
prefer to appoint Hyland. McDougall might be retained on a consultative basis 
for a year to continue his representation on the IEC and EMB.14
Gepp and Rivett responded vigorously to the request to justify McDougall’s 
continuation. His work ‘called for the services of one who had special scientific 
and technical experience and a unique standing with official circles in Great 
Britain’, and ‘we esteem Mr McDougall’s services…very highly indeed, far 
beyond the relatively small sum of £500 which we pay for them’.15 They failed 
to persuade Daly, who advised Scullin that arrangements initiated by Bruce 
should not continue. McDougall’s communication with DMC and CSIR was 
controlled neither by the High Commissioner nor by the responsible minister: 
11 NAA, A981, ECOC 1, Report, 11 December; McDougall’s response, 14 May 1929.
12 Ibid. The article was published in the English Review in October 1929.
13 NAA, A461, H348/1/8, P. E. Coleman, ‘Report Upon the Organization of the High Commissioner’s 
Office, London, and the Activities Associated Therewith’, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 1930, p. 5; 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates [hereinafter CPD], Bruce’s reply to question, 19 August 1926.
14 NAA, A461, G348/1/8, part 2, High Commissioner’s Office to Prime Minister’s Department, 14 March 1930.
15 Ibid., Gepp to Daly, 19 March; Rivett to Prime Minister’s Department, 3 March 1930.
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‘from the point of view of efficient administration I am unable to discern any 
feature which commends it.’ Daly calculated the full cost of McDougall’s office 
as £5000 per annum, and recommended DMC and CSIR liaison work be carried 
out by regular High Commission staff. Parker Moloney, Minister for Markets 
and Transport, had no ‘detailed knowledge’ of McDougall’s work on the EMB, 
but believed it could be done by the officer in charge of trade and commerce at 
Australia House.16
P. E. Coleman, Chairman of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Joint Committee 
of Public Accounts, then attending an International Labour Conference in 
Geneva, was appointed to report upon possible savings at Australia House, and 
recommended economies involving abolition or amalgamation of positions. He 
paid considerable attention to the branch known ‘for want of a better name…
as “Mr McDougall’s”’. McDougall’s total remuneration equalled that of J. R. 
Collins, Financial Adviser to the High Commission and a former head of Treasury. 
Collins was paid in part for liaison work on behalf of the Commonwealth Bank. 
He and McDougall were the highest paid officers at Australia House after 
the High Commissioner, who received £3000 and use of an official residence 
valued at £2000. McDougall had three assistants: a technical assistant, Dr A. 
S. Fitzpatrick; an economic assistant, Miss Pitts; and a clerk, A. Stuart Smith. 
His office also employed two typists. Collins had one clerk. Like some others, 
McDougall’s branch operated with virtual autonomy; its records were not kept 
in the central registry and ‘the control exercised by the High Commissioner over 
Mr McDougall’s activities is purely nominal’. There was general recognition of 
the value of his work and claims that he had been ‘a valuable propagandist in 
the development of Empire trade’ and of Australian affairs, but ‘Mr McDougall, 
in common with other officers, has been working more or less in a “water-tight 
compartment”, and has communicated direct with the Prime Minister. The 
consequence is that it is most difficult to form a just estimate of the value of the 
office filled by him.’17
Coleman recommended the liaison functions and McDougall himself be brought 
more directly under control of the High Commissioner, so that the value of his 
services could be assessed. Stuart Smith and one typist should be transferred to 
general High Commission staff, and Fitzpatrick dispensed with. McDougall need 
no longer be paid by Development Branch and CSIR, reducing his remuneration 
by £1000; the loss of Fitzpatrick would save another £500. Adding insult to the 
substantial financial injury, Coleman recommended McDougall be designated 
‘Economic Officer’. By a process that is unclear, he had for some time by then 
assumed the more prestigious title ‘Economic Adviser’.
16 Ibid., Daly to Scullin, 25 March; Moloney to Scullin, 9 April 1930.
17 Coleman, ‘Report’, pp. 10–11.
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The 1930 Imperial Conference
McDougall wrote regularly to Scullin, hoping to educate the new Prime 
Minister on the case for empire cooperation and tactics for the Imperial 
Conference to be held in November 1930. He provided useful figures and 
arguments, memoranda on many subjects and gossip suggesting trends in British 
Government thinking.18 As the conference approached, he briefed ministers and 
drafted speeches. Scullin’s opening speech showed his influence. Like Bruce 
in 1923, Scullin stressed the importance of markets, but he also appealed for 
rationalisation: ‘the better ordering of our production, both in agriculture and 
in industry and of our trade, has become a matter of vital urgency.’ Australia 
would welcome conferences between industrialists to consider rationalisation, 
and he hoped Australian agriculture would be given some advantage ‘over our 
foreign competitors’.19 He expounded figures showing the importance to Britain 
of the Australian market, in comparison with the markets of Argentina and 
Denmark, and the value of Australian preference, and then declared, ‘if British 
industry will co-operate with us in the development of our industries, we…will 
do everything in our power to help you secure the lion’s share of our import 
trade’.20
McDougall gained personally from the conference: he impressed Scullin and 
other delegates with his range of contacts and hard work; he got to know 
Australian ministers and senior public servants Parker Moloney; E. Abbott, 
Deputy Comptroller-General of Customs; and Australian Trade Commissioner 
in Canada, L. R. Macgregor. Best of all was the opportunity to meet in person 
and cement his friendship with Rivett. Otherwise he was disappointed. The 
conference did not consider preference in detail, nor extension of the IEC 
towards the role of an imperial secretariat. These matters posing problems for 
all empire countries were deferred to a conference in Canada in 1932.
In London Rivett approved minor changes to CSIR’s liaison arrangements, but 
insisted upon McDougall’s value. Only a week earlier McDougall had gained 
RGC recommendation for a grant of £6000 for the Plant Industry Division. 
Furthermore:
I have seen enough here to know that he has obtained a reputation 
in London on Imperial Economic Affairs which causes members of all 
parties, as well as important organisations, to consult him on many 
questions. He is also so highly regarded in Geneva and Rome as to be 
very frequently in request on economic and agricultural questions 
18 See letters in NAA, CP103/12, bundle 19, and CP489/1, 430/AA/2.
19 NAA, CP498/1, 430/AA/9B, Stenographic Record, 1 October 1930, E 1st Meeting (1930), pp. 14–15.
20 Ibid., Stenographic Record, 8 October 1930, E 2nd Meeting (1930), pp. 16–20.
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in the international sphere. This is undoubtedly directly of value to 
Australia, and…has some real significance from the point of view of our 
International prestige. I do hope that whatever it may be necessary to do 
regarding Mr McDougall’s financial position, there will be no reduction 
in his status likely to prejudice his work in these fields.21
This, and his own observation of McDougall’s work at the conference, mollified 
Scullin. In a ‘quite satisfactory’ interview, he thanked McDougall ‘quite prettily’ 
for his assistance and apologised for the offensive wording: the intention had 
been economy, not reduction of status. His Commonwealth salary would 
be reduced, nevertheless, to £1000. It would cover liaison work, other than 
detailed tasks now allocated to Stuart Smith. McDougall agreed with Scullin’s 
understanding ‘that I had not been whole-time employed previously so…that 
arrangement would continue’.22 He possibly thought this a reference to his 
work for the DFECB; he may have agreed because it gave him freedom to write 
paid articles. The arrangement was to cause him problems later in the 1930s, 
when Bruce, as High Commissioner, persuaded the Lyons Government to give 
permanency and superannuation rights to High Commission staff. Legislation to 
amend the High Commissioner Act was passed in 1937. Lyons refused to include 
McDougall, referring to his ‘peculiar position’ and to the ‘fact that for some 
years he has not been regarded as [a] full time officer’. Lyons noted McDougall’s 
‘objection to being regarded as an officer on the High Commissioner’s staff’ and 
the fact that he had been given ‘the right of private practice’.23
A furious Bruce responded in seven pages, protesting at ‘ignorance’ of the 
position or deliberate misrepresentation, reiterating the events of 1930, and 
arguing that any right to private practice ‘has never been exercised and never 
could be exercised’, given the ‘very full whole time job’ McDougall did, 
involving much confidential government information. Bruce added pressure 
by sending copies of his letter to senior members of the Lyons Cabinet who 
knew McDougall’s work at first hand: Earle Page, R. G. Menzies and R. G. Casey. 
Lyons rather weakly protested that McDougall had accepted an honorarium of 
100 guineas from the Australian Wine Board, with approval of both Bruce and 
the Government, and suggested, with more justification, that he had wished 
to be treated as ‘someone apart from the regular staff of the High Commission’. 
He gave in, nevertheless. McDougall was granted security of tenure, furlough 
and superannuation rights, but ‘insuperable difficulties’ prevented his being 
permitted to make lower superannuation payments—a concession given 
to others who had served at Australia House since the early 1920s. He was 
21 NAA/CSIR, A10666, [2], Rivett to Scullin, 24 November 1930.
22 Ibid., McDougall to Rivett, 1 December 1930.
23 NAA, A461, G348/1/7, part 2, Bruce to Lyons, 1 September; Lyons to Bruce, 9 September 1937. Lyons 
claimed that McDougall’s objection to being regarded as full-time had been expressed in a letter to Scullin of 
26 November 1930, which has not been found.
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deemed to have been serving ‘de facto’ from the date of Scullin’s memorandum 
appointing him ‘Economic Officer’ in 1930. McDougall’s first secure and regular 
appointment was gazetted on 9 December 1937; he was fifty-three years old.24
The loss that did occur in 1930 was more than financial. For some years, Joyce 
McDougall’s ‘nerves had been very jangled’; McDougall hoped that a holiday 
on her own in Italy early in 1926 might improve her health. But in 1929 he told 
Bruce that his family had spent some time living in Sicily, in an unsuccessful 
attempt to help Joyce, who had been ‘far from well for the last couple of 
years’.25 He and Joyce subsequently agreed that while she remained in Italy 
their children should be educated in boarding schools near Geneva, where he 
could visit them while on international business. McDougall’s reduced salary 
was paid in a currency devalued as the Australian pound floated against the 
pound sterling and was then effectively pegged to it as Britain left the gold 
standard. He also suffered one of the percentage cuts imposed on public service 
salaries.26 His resources in Swiss and Italian currencies were strained and it was 
agreed that the family would return to Adelaide early in 1932.27 Joyce visited 
London at least once in the prewar period, but her condition became so difficult 
that McDougall felt unable to visit Australia himself. She subsequently moved 
to New South Wales, where she died in 1986. McDougall saw nothing more of 
his children until his daughter, Elisabeth, took a post in the British Foreign 
Office after World War II. He was never to know his five grandchildren, who 
grew up in Australia.28
Beaverbrook
McDougall had begun to write paid, anonymous articles for The Times.29 It 
is likely that he was occasionally paid by other journals. His articles always 
advanced some part of his cause: it was thus a moot point whether he thought 
he was working for Australia or for money in writing them. The issue is clearer 
in the case of work he undertook for Daily Express proprietor and vigorous 
campaigner for free trade, Lord Beaverbrook, whose paper, as noted above, had 
welcomed so embarrassingly McDougall’s EMB publication. Invited to lunch 
24 Ibid., Bruce to Lyons, 13 October; Lyons to Bruce, 22 November; Official Secretary, Australia House, to 
Prime Minister’s Department, 14 December 1937.
25 NLA, MS6890/1/9, letter to Norman, 3 January 1926; LFSSA, 220, 221, 25 March and 17 April 1929, pp. 
772–3.
26 NAA/CSIR, A10666, [2], McDougall to Rivett, 10 February, 12 March and 22 July 1931; Rivett to 
Mulvaney, 26 August 1931; NLA, MS6890/3/5, copy of letter from Pearce to Scullin, 13 November 1931. See 
also Bruce’s 1937 letter to Lyons, cited above.
27 NAA/CSIR, A10666, [2], McDougall to Rivett, 23 September 1931; A10666, [3], McDougall to Rivett, 28 
January 1932; A9778, M14/32/2, Rivett to Richardson, 31 March 1932.
28 Information from McDougall family.
29 NLA, MS6890/2/3, note from Elspeth, 15 January 1931.
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with Beaverbrook, McDougall hoped he had persuaded the press baron that 
Australia must continue some protection.30 He did not mention to Bruce that he 
had agreed to write for Beaverbrook, at a rate of 10 guineas per thousand words. 
Notes from Beaverbrook and his secretary suggest that he wrote a small number of 
factual articles on empire trade, which Beaverbook apparently studied carefully. 
He proposed a new edition of Sheltered Markets, which he found ‘very valuable 
from our standpoint’, though ‘much of it can be eliminated’. Nothing came of 
that idea, but, according to the correspondence, McDougall was paid £114/9/- 
in total. Apart from the supply of occasional facts, McDougall ceased to work 
for Beaverbrook after February 1930, possibly because of the embarrassment in 
Australia. In May, Beaverbrook wrote, ‘I hope you are not afraid of my company 
these days’, and, in praise McDougall might have not welcomed, ‘the help you 
have given me has been of decisive importance in our campaign’.31
Organisation for Empire Cooperation
Empire cooperation was a popular idea in many quarters, and so were proposals 
for organisations to facilitate it. McDougall was tempted by several variations 
of that common theme, all of which proved abortive. He was torn, as he had 
been in 1924, between a wish to continue serving Australia and Bruce and 
the attraction of positions offering security and status. More than that, he was 
most attracted to positions offering intellectual freedom, beyond the confines 
of national policies and specific constituencies. He understood himself well 
enough to reject such boundaries.
In December 1929, he was approached about an unidentified position, ‘which 
would enable me to keep in touch with the things in which I am so tremendously 
interested and would probably be very attractive from a financial point of view’. 
He decided then to remain at Australia House as long as the new government 
retained confidence in him; even part-time, his connection with the imperial 
bodies would enable him to ‘influence Imperial Economic ideas’.32 He was 
tempted early in 1930 by a short-lived offer of a position in the Conservative 
Party’s Research Department. Soon after it was made, by outgoing Director, 
Lord Eustace Percy, Neville Chamberlain took over the organisation and wrote 
that he had decided against creating that position.33
Bruce was in London in 1930, and helped devise a scheme for a similar 
organisation funded by business. Walter Elliot was involved, as was Brendan 
30 NAA, M111, 1929, McDougall to Bruce, 11 December 1929.
31 NLA, MS6890/3/1, Beaverbrook to McDougall, 25 January, 10 and 20 May 1930.
32 NAA/CSIR, A10666, [2], McDougall to Rivett, 23 December 1929.
33 NLA, MS6890/3/2, Chamberlain to McDougall, 29 March 1930.
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Bracken, then a director of Moody’s-Economist Services Limited, and Sir Robert 
Horne. Moody’s was prepared to establish a department to collate information 
and statistics, not for party propaganda, but for ‘serious economic work’, and 
to pay McDougall £5000 per annum as its director. The plan hinged on Horne 
obtaining a guarantee of £10,000 for five years, and it is hardly surprising that it 
evaporated. McDougall tried possible sponsors. His cousin Sir Arthur Duckham, 
then about to become President of the Federation of British Industries, hoped 
politically influential industrialist Dudley Docker might help approach Sir 
Montague Norman, Governor of the Bank of England. McDougall thought 
Norman might be interested as he was said to believe a general tariff would be 
introduced and to be anxious that it not shelter inefficiency. McDougall also 
discussed the idea with Assistant Editor of The Times, R. M. Barrington-Ward.34 
Bruce wrote several times from Australia asking about its progress.35
In Australia Bruce helped Casey, then seeking to enter Australian politics, to 
canvass a somewhat similar scheme: a plan to provide a policy and organisational 
base for conservative politics, including a ‘Bureau of Economic and Political 
Research’. A paper by Sydney businessman T. S. Gordon fleshed out the idea, 
well beyond priming politicians with facts, figures and views of government 
agencies, to that of a clearing house for economic and market information from 
Europe, Asia and other areas of interest to Australia. It could have seemed 
attractive to McDougall. Many possible directors were considered, but Casey 
regarded him as the ‘plum’ in his list; Bruce, en route to London, was asked 
to sound him out on the basis of an annual salary of £1500 for three years.36 
McDougall was doubtful. While ‘it has its attractive aspects…[it] also seems 
from a personal point of view to contain a high element of risk’. He would 
become a party man; he doubted his personal appeal in Australia, especially as 
‘the intellectual level of the genus Politicus Australis is deplorably low’. As in 
1924 his métier lay elsewhere:
I have become a fairly specialised animal. I am highly developed about 
Empire trade, agricultural policy and tariffs. I have also devoted myself 
without stint to Empire economic co-operation here in London. I am 
regarded here as the one overseas person who can be intelligent on these 
subjects, therefore I feel that I can be of much greater service to Australia, 
the Empire and to England here than I could be in the Australian job.37
Once again McDougall was unwilling to be pigeonholed. He saw himself 
working for something bigger than Australia alone but it was not enough to say 
34 National Library of Scotland [hereinafter NLS], Acc. 6721, Walter Elliot Papers, Box 3, Brendan Bracken 
to Elliot, 15 July 1930; McDougall to Elliot, 7 January 1931.
35 NLA, MS6890/3/3, Bruce to McDougall, 15 December 1930, 8 and 22 January, 11 February 1931.
36 NAAV, M1146, [128], cable from Casey to Bruce, 31 October 1931.
37 NAA/CSIR, A10666, [2], McDougall to Rivett, 4 November 1931.
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he was working for the Empire. He had identified three broad sets of interests—
‘Australia, the Empire and England’—and believed it possible to serve all three 
simultaneously. He appreciated how complex the Empire had become, but was 
not yet able to admit that the interests of its several parts could be in conflict.
In 1931, as in 1924, he made the right decision. The research organisation idea 
lapsed—despite the interest of ‘very powerful men’ in industry and commerce—
through ‘indifference’.38 Cost, difficulties of finding the right staff and doubts 
about how much the bureau might be used were all factors.
Broad-Based Economic Consultation
A joint memorandum prepared by leaders of the Federation of British Industries 
(FBI) and the Trades Union Congress (TUC) just before the 1930 Imperial 
Conference urged
the necessity for adequate machinery for economic consultation between 
the various parts of the Commonwealth. Unless such machinery can be 
set up, a proper investigation of the various problems cannot be achieved 
and the Governments of the Empire will not have a sound conception 
of the economic considerations involved or the detailed knowledge 
to guide their policy. At the moment, better machinery exists, in the 
shape of the Economic Organization of the League of Nations, for the 
discussion of economic questions between this country and foreign 
countries than exists for the purpose of considering Commonwealth 
economic problems. 
These words could well have been written by McDougall, and were at least 
inspired by him: he had long worked with the FBI. The joint memorandum 
proposed an ‘investigatory’ British Commonwealth trade conference of 
government, industry, agriculture, commerce, finance, shipping and labour to 
review ‘every question affecting inter-Commonwealth trade’, with a view to 
drawing up an agenda for the next Imperial Conference. Regular conferences, 
together with a Commonwealth economic secretariat, would give the 
Commonwealth adequate machinery for dealing with economic problems of 
vital importance.39
38 W. J. Hudson, Casey, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1986, p. 82. Bill Hudson drew my attention to 
Casey’s correspondence about the idea, in NAAV, M1146, [128].
39 NAA/CSIR, A9778, M14/31/12. The memorandum is part of a much longer, undated and apparently 
incomplete document. It includes a report of a visit by Sir Arthur Duckham and shipbuilder Sir James 
Lithgow to Canada to discuss promoting reciprocal trade, and a report of a Joint Preparatory Committee (for 
the Imperial Conference) representing the FBI, the Association of British Chambers of Commerce and the UK 
Chamber of Shipping.
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In January 1931, McDougall wrote a memorandum arguing that the likely 
British adoption of tariffs demanded nonpartisan, broad-based study of 
problems, provision of data and appropriate safeguards, in order to ensure the 
support of finance, industry, commerce and labour. He suggested formation of 
a small research organisation. In a second version, dated 2 February, McDougall 
suggested a body including representatives from all interested groups to tackle 
issues including tariffs, rationalisation of empire industry, and home and 
empire agricultural policy. Political representation ‘would be best served by the 
inclusion of three independently minded men’. He meant that they should be 
open-minded on the tariff question, and nominated Elliot, Sir Oswald Mosely 
and Liberal Member of Parliament E. D. Simon. Sending the February version 
to Elliot, he wrote: ‘I really feel that the way to tackle this problem is to enlarge 
the scope and importance of the idea [of a consultative group].’40
The idea for a consultative group was discussed with Elliot and others early 
that year. McDougall referred to it as ‘my idea’. He reworked his memorandum 
of January and February more fully in June 1931. McDougall’s approach was 
reminiscent of a declaration the previous December by leading Conservatives, 
including Walter Elliot, that the public lacked confidence in politicians. It also 
called for ‘rigorous economy’, scientific methods of production, ‘a reasonable 
measure of protection’, imperial economic reorganisation and use of Britain’s 
large consumer market as a tradeable asset.41 Beaverbrook had also made ‘a 
consistent attack both on parliament as a talking shop and on the Executive 
as a captive of the interests’; he called for inputs from finance, industry and 
unions.42 McDougall wrote:
The record of the present Government and of the last Conservative 
administration, makes it clear that industry cannot rely upon political 
parties to carry out this work. Political parties are inevitably tied by 
immediate electoral considerations and the political atmosphere is 
especially unsuitable for economic sanity.
The civil service is too wedded to existing economic practice and is 
insufficiently constructive for the initiation of new policy.
The proposal of the F.B.I. that when a party pledged to fiscal change 
takes office, it should be urged to establish a Tariff Board is a recognition 
that reliance cannot be placed either on politicians or on the Civil Service 
40 NLS, Acc. 6721, Box 3.
41 Ibid., reports of the declaration, published on 17 December 1930.
42 Andrew Fenton Cooper, British Agricultural Policy, 1912–36: A Study in Conservative Politics, Manchester 
University Press, Manchester, 1989, pp. 114–15.
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as at present constituted. Such a Tariff Board would, however, be of 
necessity a part of the Government machine and could not be regarded 
as expressing the voice of industry, commerce and finance.
No machinery yet exists whereby industry as a whole, commerce, 
shipping and finance, can jointly consider economic problems in such a 
way as to secure definite action.
He went on to consider the possible aims and structure of his proposed body.43 
Disillusioned with politics and bureaucracy, McDougall had begun to think 
beyond existing structures. The idea of gathering expertise from many quarters 
would remain a feature of his strategies in the future. Pragmatic and flexible, 
he would always aim to achieve the broadest possible composition of networks.
McDougall wondered about continuing to represent Australia on imperial bodies 
while acting as part-time director of this secretariat; he thought the functions 
would work well together. Casey recalled: ‘I had often talked to him about some 
such job…It is a most worthwhile Imperial task [which] might well become 
more important to the Empire generally than the job he is now doing.’ Rivett 
agreed with him.44
By September 1931, however, nothing had developed and McDougall feared 
‘the financial crisis may render further progress difficult’. In December he 
was approached, tentatively, about a part-time position developing an empire 
policy for the FBI—apparently now acting alone—but he doubted it would 
materialise.45 The final blow was probably the sudden death early in 1932 of his 
cousin Arthur Duckham, then FBI President and a driving force in the scheme. 
McDougall remained interested in the possibilities of the idea. Early in 1932, 
at the suggestion of Ormsby-Gore, he wrote to Neville Chamberlain, offering 
himself for membership of a tariff advisory committee, which he expected to be 
responsible for ‘shaping the tariff policy’.46
A Ferment of Ideas
In the 1920s McDougall had cultivated ‘intelligent’, young reform-oriented 
Conservatives like Elliot and Harold Macmillan, who were interested in the 
imperial vision.47 Like McDougall’s, their ideas developed in new directions in 
43 NAA/CSIR, A10666, [2], ‘Proposal for a Consultative Group and Economic Secretariat’, 9 June 1931, sent 
on 10 June to Rivett.
44 Ibid., Casey to Rivett, 28 July; Rivett to McDougall, 30 July 1931.
45 Ibid., McDougall to Rivett, 2 September and 12 November 1931.
46 NLA, MS6890/3/4, 19 February 1932.
47 LFSSA, 53, 10 February 1926, p. 158.
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the ferment of the Depression years. Both were influenced to some extent by 
McDougall’s work, and his ideas reflected some of theirs. All three believed in 
economic planning and sought to broaden inputs into that planning.
Elliot ‘owed a special intellectual debt’ to views discussed by an ‘Imperial Study 
Circle’, which included McDougall. Other colleagues or contacts of McDougall 
in the group included E. M. H. Lloyd, economist Sir Arthur Salter, Conservative 
politician Lord Eustace Percy and Sir Edward Davson, a member of the IEC. The 
group’s thinking ‘reflected…progressive economic opinion on intra-imperial 
trade issues’. Elliot believed the economic crisis was no aberration, but the 
result of ‘technological change and growth of productive capacity leading to 
a permanent state of “glut”’. He had moved beyond imperial solutions to a 
view that the problem ‘could only be solved by governmental organisation and 
management’. He sought ‘a measure of centralisation of control’ to bring ‘the 
activities of separate industries…into harmony with the national interests’. In 
March 1930 he told the Royal Institute of International Affairs: ‘if there is one 
lesson which the twentieth century is teaching us, it is the necessity for long-
range planning.’ He wanted ‘the present economically “ignorant” legislature’ 
replaced or combined with an industrial chamber.48
In his autobiography, Harold Macmillan records influence on his own thinking 
of three anonymous articles published in The Times in January 1932, under the 
general heading ‘A True Tariff Policy’.49 The articles were written by McDougall, 
who was pleased to learn from The Times political reporter that they were ‘being 
quoted and their arguments used in talks taking place in Cabinet committees’. 
Some attributed them to Elliot; McDougall swore him to secrecy.50 Subtitles 
suggest the thrust of their arguments: ‘The Lever of Progress’; ‘The Producer’s 
Angle’; ‘Efficiency as a Condition’. Discussion in the third article about ‘the 
sort of tariff commission which should be set up’ led Macmillan to develop 
the idea of a commission ‘planning the growth of the nation’s economic life’, 
extending it ultimately to a ‘sub-parliament’, representing labour, management, 
producing and consuming industries, to consider, inter alia, imperial trade 
policy and financial and monetary problems. The idea resembled McDougall’s 
suggestions for combining diverse interests in a deliberative body linked to an 
imperial secretariat, although it lacked the dimension of imperial organisation. 
Macmillan continued to apply this planning approach to a range of economic 
issues in the mid 1930s.51
48 Cooper, British Agricultural Policy, pp. 160–4.
49 The Times, 13, 14 and 15 January 1932.
50 NAA, CP103/12, bundle 21/12, McDougall to Bruce, 21 January 1932; NAA/CSIR, A10666, [3], McDougall 
to Rivett, 21 January 1932.
51 Harold Macmillan, Winds of Change: 1914–1939, Macmillan, London, 1966, pp. 355–8.
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Preparing for Ottawa
In the late 1920s, British interest in both tariffs and empire grew. Disillusion 
with trade liberalism was driven by persistent unemployment at about 10 per 
cent, as British industry failed to regain its share of export markets in the face 
of strengthening European competition and a slow shift towards newer sectors 
of industry—electrical goods, chemicals and motorcars—which depended more 
on domestic and imperial markets and had less to fear from a preferential tariff. 
As world cereal prices weakened, agriculture also needed help. Imperial policies 
gained support from the political right and much of Labour. By 1929 most of 
industry supported protection; in 1930 prominent merchant bankers signed a 
pro-protection manifesto, and industry organisations campaigned for working-
class support for a tariff.52 This was the fertile ground in which McDougall 
laboured for what he believed to be the imperial cause.
The onset of depression increased protectionist pressure, but politics remained 
the stumbling block. The Labour Government elected in 1929 depended on 
Liberal support; key economic portfolios were filled by free-traders, including 
intransigent Philip Snowden as Chancellor of the Exchequer. Cabinet was 
divided.53 The National Government formed in August 1931 bowed to economic 
and political pressure, enacting a 10 per cent revenue tariff on a wide range of 
goods. It was expected that a full imperial preference system would be created 
at an Imperial Economic Conference in Ottawa in 1932.
The British Government planned bilateral negotiations with the dominions, 
both at home and in London, as a preliminary to the Ottawa meetings. Bruce, 
who had been returned to Parliament after the fall of the Scullin Government 
late in 1931, was appointed Assistant Minister in the new Lyons Government 
and headed a Cabinet subcommittee in Canberra preparing for the conference; 
McDougall was placed in charge of negotiations in London. Talks beginning in 
February 1932 examined Australian and British requests for tariff concessions 
in detail. McDougall’s method of dealing with each commodity was to submit 
the facts in the form of a memorandum, as a basis for discussion. His questions 
were referred back to the Board of Trade, thence if necessary to the FBI 
and the individual industry. The process was amicable. He thought British 
representatives appreciated the opportunity for such close discussion with one 
dominion, which helped them to ‘clear their own minds and to see the whole 
situation in proper perspective’.54
52 Tim Rooth, British Protectionism and the International Economy: Overseas Commercial Policy in the 1930s, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, pp. 38–48, 70.
53 Ibid., pp. 48–54.
54 NAA, CP103/12, bundle 21/10, McDougall to Gunn, 21 April 1931; bundle 21/13, McDougall to Gunn, 
14 April.
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McDougall was able to argue at a detailed level without losing sight of principles. 
His mastery of minutiae, of details of complex industries and of their places in 
the Australian economy, in the empire and in world trade, can be observed in 
his memoranda; in the records of meetings; in endless detail about chilled and 
frozen beef, pork and bacon, light and fortified wines, barley for malting or for 
stockfeed; in lists of percentages of imports and exports grouped and sorted 
a dozen ways; in explanations of where Britain obtained supplies of this food 
and that raw material, where they might be obtained if duties were imposed, 
where suppliers might sell if not to Britain, and what effect an extra penny a 
pound duty might have for British consumers. His power of persuasion rested 
in considerable measure upon his grasp of this material. He had help with its 
preparation, but his strength lay in his ability to take it as ammunition for 
argument. It was never better demonstrated than in these discussions.55
McDougall did not limit his efforts to officialdom. A Times leading article 
dwelt on the unprecedented opportunity at Ottawa for effective economic 
cooperation. There should not be sacrifices; each empire government should 
aim to encourage empire trade to the greatest extent compatible with its own 
economy. ‘The most promising line of approach is through a broad development 
of the principle of complementary production’, it declared, giving as an example 
one of McDougall’s favourite cases: the Australian electrical industry. Sending a 
copy to Rivett, McDougall explained: ‘I never write Times leaders, what I do is 
go and see the leader writer and discuss with him what he is going to write!!’56
Ottawa
Opening speeches at the Ottawa Conference dwelt on the example of cooperation 
about to be presented to the world. Its real business was hammered out in 
bilateral discussions leading to conclusion of 12 trade agreements, seven of 
them between the United Kingdom and a dominion. In the series of meetings 
between British ministers and their Canadian, Australian and New Zealand 
counterparts—essentially the centrepiece of the conference—high moral 
purpose degenerated to abrasive bargaining. W. K. Hancock reminds us that it 
was a gathering ‘of anxious and suffering nations, desperately intent upon a task 
of economic salvage’. While the participants could be criticised for intellectual 
55 Records of McDougall’s discussions with British officials are in UKNA, BT 92/12, as are the reports of 
Britain’s Senior Trade Commissioner, R. W. Dalton, of his discussions in Australia. McDougall’s reports to 
Canberra are in NAA, CP103/12, various bundles. His memoranda are, as always, scattered through these and 
other sources.
56 ‘The Importance of Ottawa’, The Times, 22 March 1932; NAA/CSIR, A10666, [3], McDougall to Rivett, 
31 March 1932.
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inconsistency and muddled thinking, ‘it would be unjust and profoundly 
misleading not to keep constantly in mind the crisis atmosphere’ in which they 
met to deal with ‘unprecedented economic calamity’.57
The Australian delegation comprised two ministers: Bruce and H. S. Gullett, 
Minister for Trade and Customs. It had ten official advisers,58 six official 
‘consultants’59 and more unofficial advisers and lobbyists. Delegates had one 
hundred and sixty-nine documents to digest. No decision had been made 
beforehand about ‘exactly what they would do, or how’. The British delegation, 
representing a non-party government, had ‘agreed to disagree’ on policy. I. 
M. Drummond points out that no British minister or civil servant had been 
involved in such trade negotiations with any country; they were called upon 
‘to construct seven major trade agreements in thirty-one days’. By the end they 
seem to have been pleased ‘not so much with the agreements’ terms as with the 
documents’ existence’.60
Current economic conditions must have made bargaining more desperate than 
it might have been in kinder times. But the underlying problem was that 
the empire had outgrown the visionary idea of complementary trade. There 
were conflicting interests that no imperial preference scheme could resolve. 
McDougall’s desire to see the Australian canned-fruit industry encouraged 
in schemes for rationalised, complementary production was thwarted in his 
preliminary discussions by British policy to develop horticultural and processing 
industries.61 Canada and New Zealand were in conflict over butter: low wheat 
prices had stimulated Canadian dairy production, which then faced US tariff 
restrictions against cream. Canadian farmers agitated against imports of New 
Zealand butter, which enjoyed comparative advantage.62 Britain was anxious 
not to offend Denmark, an essential supplier of dairy products, or Argentina, a 
major supplier of meat and recipient of British investment.63
Australia’s primary concern to secure the British market for its meat was 
successful, but at a cost. Meat had not been included in Britain’s 10 per cent 
57 Hancock, Survey, pp. 215, 229.
58 E. Abbott and A. C. Moore, Department of Trade and Customs; L. E. Stevens and C. B. Carter, Department 
of Commerce; J. F. Murphy, Prime Minister’s Department (Secretary to Delegation); A. E. V. Richardson, 
CSIR; E. C. Riddle and L. G. Melville, Governor and Economic Adviser, respectively, Commonwealth Bank 
of Australia; L. R. Macgregor, Australian Trade Commissioner in Canada; and McDougall. NAA, A1667/1, 
430/B/18, ‘Report of the Conference’.
59 W. C. Angliss, meat interests; S. McKay, Chambers of Manufactures; R. W. Knox, Chambers of Commerce; 
F. H. Tout, Graziers’ Federal Council; H. W. Osbourne, Dairy Produce Control Board; M. B. Duffy, adviser on 
labour questions. Ibid.
60 Ian M. Drummond, Imperial Economic Policy 1917–1939: Studies in Expansion and Protection, George 
Allen & Unwin, London, 1972, pp. 220–1, 284.
61 NAA, CP103/12, bundle 21/13, McDougall to Bruce, 16 June 1932; UKNA, BT11/92, McDougall to 
Wilson, 18 June, minutes of discussion with McDougall at MAF, 24 June 1932.
62 Hancock, Survey, p. 212.
63 UKNA, BT11/92, Stacy to Carlill, 24 May 1932; Cooper, British Agricultural Policy, p. 153.
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general tariff imposed by the National Government. Chamberlain preferred a 
quota system, believing that the British livestock industry contributed to the 
‘general prosperity’ of the nation; that Argentine exporters could dominate 
the market even with a 10 per cent tariff; and that frozen meat from southern 
dominions could not compete with the chilled Argentine product. Dominions 
‘wanted the foreigners to be pushed out of the U.K. market altogether’, but 
were forced to consider a quota which, after hard bargaining, was extended to 
include restrictions on foreign imports of mutton and lamb. It was a ‘makeshift’ 
and unsatisfactory arrangement, which did not deal with the fundamental 
problem of falling prices.64
By 1932, dairying had become the most successful intensive farming industry 
in Australia; butter ranked third after wool and wheat in overall exports 
and had overtaken wheat in the UK market. A depression-induced surge 
in rural production was particularly marked in dairying. After Ottawa, 
in the unrestricted market of the United Kingdom, the percentage of butter 
imports from Australia doubled that of the late 1920s and prices fell from 109 
shillings in December 1930 to 67 shillings in April 1933. A British Government 
proposal for restricting supplies was supported by both McDougall and 
Bruce, at least as a temporary measure. It was opposed in Australia, where the 
dairy industry wielded considerable political power. Bruce’s arguments for 
voluntary regulation were supported by Lyons, but rejected by State premiers 
and ministers for agriculture. Australian meat and butter imports into Britain 
continued to increase until, under terms agreed at Ottawa, Britain proposed to 
introduce quotas for the second half of 1934. Despite Bruce’s continued urging 
that cooperation was preferable to compulsion, Australian governments, State 
and federal, refused to cooperate—alone among the dominions. Bernard Attard 
comments that Australia expected too much of its relationship with Britain: ‘it 
demanded a guaranteed proportion of the British market far greater than it had 
ever previously supplied or could hope to consistently in the future.’65 Attard 
also concludes from this case that Bruce’s influence ‘over the formulation and 
implementation of commercial policy’ by a government constrained by various 
political and economic conditions was more limited than has been argued by 
others, including John O’Brien, who has suggested that ‘Bruce and McDougall 
had all the semblances of a government in exile’.66
The Ottawa Agreements could not create the cooperative, rationalised system 
McDougall had hoped for. I. M. Drummond has suggested that the agreements 
created ill feeling within and beyond the Empire. The meat quota agreements 
64 Ibid., pp. 152–6.
65 Bernard Attard, ‘The Limits of Influence: The Political Economy of Australian Commercial Policy after the 
Ottawa Conference’, Australian Historical Studies, Vol. 29, no. 111, October 1998, pp. 325–43.
66 John O’Brien, ‘Empire v. National Interests in Australian–British Relations During the 1930s’, Historical 
Studies [Australia], Vol. 22, no. 89, 1987.
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antagonised Argentina and did nothing to protect British producers.67 O’Brien 
argues that Australian success was a hollow victory, leaving Britain determined 
not to let empire considerations outweigh national interests again, and Australia 
unduly complacent, with its prospects of success in subsequent negotiations 
with Britain damaged.68 Hard bargaining characterised imperial trade relations 
in the 1930s. Kosmas Tsokhas suggests Australia did well despite having to 
concede some reduction in its own tariffs: Australian exports benefited from 
a depression-mandated devaluation and Australian exports to Britain returned 
to pre-1929 levels by 1936; British exports to Australia remained at only half 
the earlier level. Australia’s Tariff Board interpreted Ottawa clauses, intended to 
ensure equal competition between British and Australian industry, as requiring 
‘a marginal advantage to the Australian manufacturer’. Australia used the 
‘diversion’ of wool sales from Japan to bargain for expanded meat exports to 
Britain, at very little actual cost to the wool industry.69
Harmonising interests, even of countries owing allegiance to a common heritage 
and crown, proved difficult if not insuperable. Yet Francine McKenzie concludes 
that 
...the importance of imperial preference lies not only in the domain 
of reason, or economic calculus, but also in the realm of emotion and 
political symbolism…imperial preference cannot be fully understood 
without considering its emotional force…Preferential tariffs touched 
upon issues of power, identity and alliance, subjects about which 
bureaucrats, politicians and ordinary citizens had strong, sometimes 
visceral, feelings.70 
Complex attitudes to empire and nation persisted.
There is no doubt, however, that the United States viewed the Ottawa 
Agreements with implacable hostility.71 The incoming Roosevelt Administration 
was viscerally anti-imperial. Anti-imperialism certainly fed on opposition to 
British colonial policies, and in the 1930s was linked to what was described as 
a US free-trade policy. But this was ‘qualified free trade’. Tariffs, traditionally 
used to protect developing American industries and agriculture, were not 
objectionable; discrimination and tariff preference were.72 Imperial preference 
was, in the view of Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, ‘a grievous injury to US 
67 Drummond, Imperial Economic Policy, pp. 264–6.
68 O’Brien, ‘Empire v. National Interests’, pp. 561–86.
69 Tsokhas, Making a Nation State, pp. 106–11.
70 McKenzie, Redefining the Bonds of Commonwealth, pp. 261, 265.
71 Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World: America’s Vision for Human Rights, The Belknap Press 
of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2005, pp. 24–5.
72 W. M. Scammell, The International Economy since 1945, second edn, St Martin’s Press, New York, 1983, 
pp. 11–12.
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commerce’. Hull led a campaign to free up international trade and dismantle 
preference; in 1934 the Administration gained congressional authority to 
negotiate bilateral trade agreements; an agreement in 1938 with Britain brought 
‘a marked benefit to US agriculture’.73 McKenzie identifies ‘intertwined’ motives 
underlying ‘the passion and indignation’ inspired by the imperial tariff in the 
United States. One was to eliminate empires from the international community 
and involved an element of altruism. But Americans also believed ‘that by 
liberalizing the postwar international economy, American values of freer trade, 
unrestricted competition, and democracy would become universal and the US 
would be in a position to dominate the postwar world’.74
Cooperation and the Empire Marketing Board
The idea of a permanent body to coordinate empire economic policy had gained 
a foothold in London, partly as a result of EMB publicity and Beaverbrook’s 
vigorous campaigning, but also as a counter to rising tariffs and economic 
nationalism in Europe and the United States. It was much less welcome in the 
dominions where, in varying degrees, opposition to potential imperial control 
was combined with reluctance to bear the cost of such a body. The economic 
crisis threatened all funding in Britain, and was particularly dangerous for 
the EMB, which was still the object of Treasury suspicion. The 1930 Imperial 
Conference had praised its work, but its friends and staff grew anxious as the 
crisis deepened.
British opinion had favoured broadening control and financing of the EMB 
since 1929. McDougall developed ambitious plans to remodel it as a truly 
imperial body. A committee, including McDougall, formed to consider 
relevant resolutions of the 1930 Imperial Conference, recommended extending 
membership to representatives of the overseas empire and reconstitution as a 
body incorporated under Royal Charter with a fixed annual income.75 In the 
Research Grants Committee, McDougall argued for a policy of making more 
funds available for overseas research, and chaired a review allocation committee 
set up for that purpose.76
Insurance magnate Sir George May headed a committee of accountants, 
businessmen and labour representatives with the task of identifying economies 
in government. The majority report, published on 1 August 1931, recommended 
73 Robert Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes. Volume Three: Fighting for Britain 1937–1946, Macmillan, 
London, 2000, pp. 188–9.
74 McKenzie, Redefining the Bonds of Commonwealth, pp. 34–5.
75 NAA/CSIR, A9778, M14/31/5, Report of Committee, 21 May 1931.
76 NAA/CSIR, A10666, [2], McDougall to Scullin, 10 February 1931.
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reductions worth £96 million, mainly from social services, unemployment 
insurance and government salaries. It also recommended abolition of the EMB. 
The Labour Cabinet split over its implementation, resulting in formation of a 
National Government on 25 August.
An anxious Rivett wrote to McDougall that the dominions should offer ‘as 
a matter of good business…financial support to keep the Board going as an 
Imperial concern charged with the central oversight of the work of stimulating 
intra-Empire trade and of developing, as far as possible, team work in research’. 
McDougall ‘stirred up two or three significant people to write to the press and…
to Neville Chamberlain, Sir Robert Horne and to several industrial leaders’. He 
asked Walter Elliot to request that South African statesman Jan Smuts, then 
about to become President of the British Association for the Advancement of 
Science, should publicly acknowledge the EMB’s importance in centralising 
scientific and economic research. After formation of the National Government, 
he correctly predicted that Cabinet, which included supporters like Chamberlain 
and J. H. Thomas, would maintain the board with a reduced expenditure for 
1932–33. He discussed possible economies with Tallents and was the only 
overseas member of a subcommittee to deal with funding cuts—‘a heavy and 
most invidious task’.77 He persuaded the committee to request a lesser reduction 
and, given the need to reduce foreign imports, for £25 000 to be spent on a ‘great 
national campaign to buy British goods from home and overseas’. The national 
campaign was launched in November. Four million posters displayed the ‘Buy 
British’ slogan from windows of government offices and public transport; letters 
15 ft high faced Trafalgar Square. The press offered free advertisements and the 
Prince of Wales led a series of broadcasts.78
In preparation for Ottawa, McDougall had written memoranda giving detailed 
backgrounds of the various imperial bodies, and proposals to transform them 
into vehicles for imperial cooperation, as discussed in the two preceding years 
and refined in discussion with Tallents and Chadwick. He kept in touch with 
Bruce, who agreed dominions should share in EMB funding, albeit in token 
amounts during the financial crisis.79 One suggestion was that the IEC and 
EMB be integrated, with the IEC being the ‘economic consultative side’ of an 
organisation including a secretariat for an imperial council of ministers meeting 
annually.80 After discussion with Sir Geoffrey Whiskard of the Dominions Office 
and McDougall, Tallents drafted a plan to combine IEC, EMB and IAB into one 
body controlling all imperial economic activities. Besides machinery, he and 
McDougall considered tactics to persuade the more reluctant dominions at 
77 NAA/CSIR, A10666, [2], Rivett to McDougall, 11 August; McDougall to Rivett, 19 and 20 August, 10 and 
23 September 1931.
78 NAA/CSIR, A9778, M14/31/12, McDougall to Mulvaney and to Rivett, 19 November 1931.
79 NAA/CSIR, A10666, [2], McDougall to Rivett, 10 December 1931.
80 NAA, CP103/12, bundle 20, memorandum IEC No. 3, ‘Imperial Economic Consultation II’, 13 January 1932.
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Ottawa.81 McDougall’s final scheme abandoned the idea of a single body. Under 
the supervision and budgetary control of an imperial council, the EMB should 
serve as an umbrella organisation over the Imperial Bureaux.82 He chaired an 
‘animated discussion’ with overseas EMB members on methods of finance; H. 
A. F. Lindsay, Government of India Trade Commissioner, suggested a levy on 
empire imports into Britain, leaving McDougall to draft a proposal.83
The Cabinet Estimates Committee recommended a review of the EMB, a 
‘Colonial Development Fund’ established in 1929 chiefly as a means of relieving 
unemployment, and the Advisory Council for Agricultural Research, to resolve 
overlaps and inefficiencies. It argued that Britain’s adoption of a tariff in 1931 
removed the raison d’être of the EMB. McDougall told Bruce he doubted any 
serious intention to abolish it. In the same letter, he enclosed a cutting from the 
Manchester Guardian, reporting schemes for a new organisation to replace the 
EMB and outlining one that was ‘largely the work of Dominion representatives 
here’ and was ‘believed to have a big backing’. The item resulted, McDougall 
explained, from ‘a certain leakage of the very confidential paper which I gave to 
you when you were in London…I am going to suggest that the paper should be 
circulated at an early date’.84
The Skelton Committee
On the Ottawa Committee on Methods of Economic Co-operation, Canada’s 
Minister for Mines, W. A. Gordon, stated bluntly that if the EMB were to 
continue, it should be a British, rather than an imperial, board. Canada had 
the staff and facilities to solve all its own problems. Bruce proposed, as a 
solution to the resulting impasse, that representatives of all empire governments 
consider the problem of cooperation and report in 1933. Dominions Secretary 
J. H. Thomas undertook to keep imperial machinery functioning until then.85 
McDougall was disappointed but hopeful. After a ‘heart to heart’ talk with 
Canadian Prime Minister, R. B. Bennett, Bruce believed there was a fair prospect 
of Canadian cooperation.86 EMB staff were less sanguine. Elspeth Huxley wrote: 
‘I gather that the staff is fed up to a man…Personally, I feel that a speedier and 
more dignified end would have been cleaner than this year’s reprieve…its real 
purpose in life is over.’87
81 Ibid., ‘Some Notes on Inter-Imperial Economic Machinery’, drafts sent to Bruce on 8 and 23 March.
82 Ibid., ‘The Future of Imperial Machinery for Economic Co-operation and Consultation’, 3 May.
83 NAA, CP498/1, 430/AA/13, memorandum reporting the meeting on 30 May 1932.
84 NAA, CP103/12, bundle 20, McDougall to Bruce, 7 April 1932.
85 NAA/CSIR, A9778, M14/32/5, Richardson to Rivett, 5 September 1932.
86 NAA/CSIR, A10666, [3], McDougall to Rivett, 8 September 1932.
87 NLA, MS6890/2/4, Elspeth to McDougall, 23 August 1932.
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McDougall did his best to ensure the 1933 committee reported favourably. He 
sought a memorandum of support from Rivett and prepared one himself. It shows 
him thinking still much as he had before Ottawa, with perhaps more attention to 
dominion sensibilities concerning status and representation.88 He kept in touch 
with an interdepartmental committee preparing the British case and worked 
with British delegates Sir Horace Wilson and Sir Fabian Ware, heartily approving 
their decision to propose Canada’s O. D. Skelton as chairman.89 Skelton, Deputy 
Minister of the Department of External Affairs, ‘felt strongly about Canadian 
nationalism and shared [former Prime Minister Mackenzie] King’s suspicion of 
and opposition to foreign, and particularly imperial, entanglements’. During 
King’s premiership, Skelton had been, unobtrusively, ‘one of the half-dozen 
most powerful men in the country’. He remained in his position, becoming ‘as 
indispensable to the new Prime Minister as he had been to the old’.90 He had 
constantly opposed both the IEC and the EMB, on grounds of independence 
and national self-respect: ‘Canada does not want to go “on the dole”.’91 When 
the committee met, McDougall worked hard to convince Skelton ‘that I was just 
as keen as he was on maintaining the spirit of nationhood of the dominions’. 
In hearings he did what he could to draw out witnesses with ‘helpful leading 
questions’.92
The Skelton Committee on Economic Co-operation sat in London, often three 
times a week, throughout February and March 1933, hearing evidence from 
imperial bodies and holding intensive discussions. Records of these show 
considerable unanimity. There was broad agreement on the value of empire 
cooperation but also, as McDougall put it at a late stage, nobody wanted ‘an 
Imperial Economic Secretariat’; nor did they want ‘a large common fund which 
could be drawn upon by any government for the support of its own scientific or 
economic services’.93 This admission must have cost him some pain: he certainly 
had wanted the first and something approaching the second, but was forced to 
acknowledge the general mood.
Disagreement came when delegates turned to discuss what they did want. 
McDougall, at one extreme, argued for the value of centralised research and 
information dissemination, drawing on his long experience of working with 
the EMB. His formidable opponent was Colonel G. P. Vanier, Official Secretary at 
the Canadian High Commission. Vanier, a decorated war hero, was to continue a 
88 NAA/CSIR, A10666, [3], McDougall to Rivett, 26 October, 17 and 23 November, 8 December 1932, 2 
February 1933; memorandum, ‘The Empire Committee’, 30 January 1933.
89 Ibid, McDougall to Rivett, 9 February 1933.
90 Lester B. Pearson, Memoirs 1897–1948: Through Diplomacy to Politics, Victor Gollancz, London, 1973, 
pp. 71–2, 76.
91 Constantine, ‘Anglo–Canadian Relations’, pp. 362–5.
92 NAA/CSIR, A10666, [3], McDougall to Rivett, 16 February; A10666, [4], 16 and 22 March 1933.
93 NAC, RG25, External Affairs, vol. 1632, 731, FP(16–23), Meetings of Committee on Economic Consultation 
and Co-operation, Minutes of 5 April 1933, p. 2.
A New Idea Each Morning
116
senior diplomatic career and to be Governor-General of Canada from 1959 until 
his death in 1967. He spoke persuasively of a changing relationship, significantly 
choosing the term ‘Commonwealth’:
The Commonwealth has evolved…and its members have developed 
in natural and cultural resources, in national consciousness and in 
economic integration. The Commonwealth has become decentralised… 
We recognise today that the co-operation we seek to effect must take 
place in Canberra and Cape Town…as well as in London, and that there 
should be instruments or agencies of co-operation not only between 
New Zealand and the United Kingdom but also between New Zealand 
and Canada. The United Kingdom remains, and will long remain, easily 
first, in the range of its scientific and economic achievements, as well as 
in the numbers and quality of its workers in those fields; London will 
remain the most important focussing and contact point, but in their 
varying and modest ways, Dublin, St Johns, Salisbury, Delhi and Ottawa 
have come to occupy a place in the picture.
Vanier described scientific research as ‘an essential phase of national activity…
an indispensable and integral part of a nation’s intellectual life’. Cooperation 
should not be achieved through a ‘permanent central authority’, but through 
periodical conferences and exchanges of workers and research programs. 
Coordination of statistical services and research into economic questions was 
essential, but a permanent central body would not deal competently with the 
changing range of economic issues and varying aspects of problems throughout 
the Commonwealth.
If such an effort were made, it would involve navigating in the perilous 
waters of governmental policy, and probably prove more embarrassing 
than helpful…expert assistance must be available, on the spot, to aid 
each Government in the daily tasks of administration, particularly now 
that the economic position is changing from week to week and from day 
to day.
Once again, Vanier advocated ad hoc cooperation.94
The southern dominions objected that periodical conferences posed practical 
and financial difficulties. McDougall acknowledged that in many fields there 
were local problems, but there were also fundamental problems better tackled 
jointly: the pasture research being undertaken in several empire countries 
needed ‘an intellectual general headquarters in the Commonwealth’; it already 
existed at Aberystwyth.95
94 Ibid., FP(1–15), minutes of 20 March 1933, pp. 20–8.
95 Ibid., minutes of 24 March, pp. 5–8.
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Both Vanier and McDougall spoke at considerable length and with authority for 
their governments: Vanier because Skelton chaired the committee, McDougall 
because by then Bruce was in London as Resident Minister. Most overseas 
representatives were less certain of official opinion and stressed that their 
views were personal. These views ranged between the extremes: South Africa 
generally agreed with the Canadian position; New Zealand, representing ‘one 
of the smaller dominions with perhaps not the same financial resources’, was 
appreciative of the advantages provided by the EMB but took a middle view; 
Newfoundland, ‘hitherto…largely ignorant of the advantages to be derived 
from co-operation’, hoped they could continue.96 Representatives of India, the 
United Kingdom and the colonies were close to McDougall’s position, with some 
reservations.
There were differences of opinion about publicity and market promotion. All 
agreed that EMB work had brought a valuable change in public opinion about 
the empire; India and Southern Rhodesia wanted it to continue; Canada and 
New Zealand thought it should be left, in most cases, to individual countries. 
Both were conscious of their current conflict of interest over butter: publicity 
‘should not tread upon the dangerous ground where there were competing 
products from various parts of the empire’.97
Most delegates wanted some form of imperial organisation to continue. Canada 
opposed ‘a central organisation with large funds, a roving commission and 
growing staffs’, but conceded that one or two functions of the EMB should 
continue on a cooperative basis. New Zealand opposed creation of an ‘Empire 
League of Nations’, but supported ‘some form of imperial economic council’ 
to facilitate liaison between empire governments on proposals for action by 
specialised bodies.98 All agreed that the IEC should continue, as should trade 
surveys and market intelligence. Impressive evidence had been given to the 
committee about EMB work in these fields: it was filling gaps in what was 
offered by the International Institute of Agriculture at Rome, and had obtained 
the first outside information about agricultural production in Russia, and in 
Argentina. E. M. H. Lloyd predicted an empire service could outdo that of the 
United States, which served only the needs of its own growers.99
All agreed on the importance of continuing the Imperial Agricultural Bureaux. 
McDougall’s opinion, confirmed by the written record, was that Orr’s evidence, 
combining ‘a certainty of utterance with a modesty of demeanour’, created 
‘a profound effect on the committee’. Sir Rowland Biffen’s ‘somewhat cynical 
96 Ibid., R. S. Forsyth and W. C. Job, minutes of 20 March 1933, pp. 37–44.
97 Ibid., FP(16–23), Minutes of 27 March, p. 23, R. S. Forsyth.
98 Ibid., Minutes of 29 March, pp. 1–8.
99 Ibid., Volume 3433, File 1-1933-14, Stenographic Notes of Oral Evidence, ‘Evidence of Sir Stephen 
Tallents, Mr Lloyd and Mr Hildred’, 1 March 1933, p. 14, statement by Lloyd. 
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detachment made his advocacy of the Bureaux all the more impressive’.100 
Biffen admitted to scepticism when the idea of a Bureau of Plant Genetics was 
suggested late in 1928:
I pointed out then that there were a couple of journals in existence, and 
that the whole of our literature on what was…a new subject was fairly 
well centralised…but now I am perfectly convinced that nobody can 
get on without this abstracting service, merely because of the enormous 
growth of this highly specialised subject…in the last two years we have 
had to look for papers in no less than 330…journals…the output of 
literature in genetics at present works out at something like thirty pages 
of print a day…the average worker is simply overwhelmed with material 
which he has to consult.101
When McDougall put forward his idea for a levy on exports, Canada objected 
that the income would be ‘unstable’ and fluctuating, with administrative 
difficulties. Moreover, it would not be fair: a Canadian levy would come mainly 
from wheat exports, which could not be helped by any empire body. Only India 
was prepared to support a levy outright.102
Tallents explained a change in the role of the EMB, stemming from the meetings 
of heads of empire scientific bodies at the 1930 Imperial Conference. Until then, 
the function of the RGC had been to assess applications for assistance, but
we came to the conclusion that the right policy of the Board, now that 
it had found its feet, was, with the help of [scientific institutions in 
the empire], and in consultation with them, to work out a programme 
and to some extent take the initiative in consulting them as to what 
they regarded as the major problems…We have really passed from being 
merely a target for applications and giving advice to something more 
active.103
Canada was determined to avoid continuation of such an ‘active’ role by any 
imperial body. None should have any executive role or right to initiate work. 
McDougall proposed, as a compromise solution, a right to recommend services, as 
distinct from policies, on research and economic intelligence.104 The committee’s 
report was signed on 11 April on this basis.
100 NAA/CSIR, A10666, [3], McDougall to Rivett, 9 March 1933.
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McDougall—‘dreadfully disappointed’—continued to hope. The outcome 
provided ‘a basis upon which Empire Governments can, if they will, build up 
again a really satisfactory system of Imperial economic and research services’.105 
The report was signed on the understanding that empire ministers would discuss 
the findings when they attended the World Economic Conference in London 
that summer. They might ‘take a more liberal view of the recommendations 
than it was possible to achieve on the Committee itself’. They did not. Bruce 
pressed for a special meeting on imperial economic problems and the Skelton 
report. Ministers gathered at 10 Downing Street, but Bruce failed to get any 
discussion of the report or of the EMB; they simply agreed to recommend the 
report to their governments. ‘Everyone was determined to get away for their 
summer holidays; everyone was tired and the two-and-a-half hours—of which 
only one was spent on economic subjects—was all the time that Ministers were 
prepared to devote to the economic problems of the British Empire.’ For once, 
McDougall’s optimism failed him: ‘No doubt after one has had a holiday…one 
will shake off the sense of discouragement.’106
The British Government accepted that ‘the [Skelton] report represents the 
maximum on which unanimity was possible’. I. M. Drummond writes: ‘Thus 
finally expired the dream of an imperial economic general staff—killed, and 
rightly, by a fact: that economic policy is political, not just technical.’107 McDougall 
had perhaps failed fully to accept that decisions taken at a Cabinet table must 
take account of what seemed good policy and of what could be afforded, but 
also of what electorates would be willing to bear. It could be a difficult task for 
a single government. It verged on the impossible for representatives of several 
governments each, in 1932–33, with suffering constituencies and conflicting 
needs. McDougall’s determination to maintain his own independence of action 
had freed him from worries about constituencies, budgets and pleasing ministers 
or department heads. The disadvantage was his reluctance to allow for factors 
constraining even the most powerful of men.
The negotiations at Ottawa showed clearly the flaw in the ‘sheltered markets’ 
theory. The ideas of the ‘empire visionaries’ could work only where economies 
were complementary. The economies of the British Empire might once have 
been so, but in the twentieth century they were changing rapidly; so were the 
national aspirations of empire governments. Any semblance of control by an 
imperial secretariat was simply unacceptable. Rivett’s expression of national 
aspiration had a moral twist: ‘That Great Britain should finance research in the 
Dominions was always, to my mind, rather a scandal and we need not regret 
105 NAA/CSIR, A9778, M14/33/3, McDougall to Rivett, 12 April 1933.
106 Ibid., A10666, [4], McDougall to Rivett, 25 May and 3 August 1933.
107 Drummond, Imperial Economic Policy, pp. 227–8.
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the passing of that little bit of charity; rather may one be ashamed that the 
Dominions failed to shoulder the load when their responsibility was pointed 
out to them.’108
Yet the empire governments were faced with the heavy responsibilities of 
extreme economic pressures, and it was clear that efforts to devise empire 
solutions based on research, tariffs, quotas or anything else could not solve 
their chief problem: falling prices of staple commodities on a world scale. By 
1933 McDougall was familiar with international efforts to solve that problem, 
and was ready to look for solutions beyond the empire.
108 NAA/CSIR, A9778, M14/33/9, Rivett to Sir Charles Martin, 10 November 1933.




Voluntary cooperation between independent nation-states to create a broad-
based international organisation only became possible when the ultimate 
consequences of national rivalries had been demonstrated in the slaughter of 
1914–18. All three principals in this study participated in that conflict, which 
must have influenced their thinking. On the Western Front, Orr served with 
distinction as a medical officer in the trenches and took part in military action 
in battles including the Somme and Passchendaele.1 In 1939–45 his only son 
was to die serving in the Royal Air Force. In 1916 McDougall was appointed to 
the AIF Cycle Corps, intended for messenger duties and reconnaissance after 
shelling. The latter proved impracticable in the appalling conditions; after a 
period largely involving traffic control, his war service was spent just behind 
the front lines as a quartermaster. He reached the Western Front just before the 
Battle of the Somme. There, no-one escaped privation, fear or horror. He wrote 
of watching the ‘terrible blind groping’ of German artillery, ‘feeling with his 
shells for our batteries…as I wasn’t on duty at the time when his search came in 
my direction I made tracks for shelter and then away’. ‘I shall be very glad for 
a chance to sleep without my boots and clothes’, he wrote to his mother, and, 
in a less-restrained moment, contrasted the pleasant garden surrounds of their 
headquarters out of the line with the ‘dugouts, shells and the unspeakable smell 
of the partially buried’, adding, ‘where we were was quite hot enough for my 
liking but it wasn’t a patch on the front line’. He did think it necessary to write 
a letter for his wife in the event of his death.2
Bruce later revealed something of the horror he experienced at the Dardanelles. 
In 1921, while in England on PLB business, he was appointed Australian 
delegate to the Second Assembly of the infant League of Nations. There he 
spoke passionately in favour of arms reduction:
I want you to realize what it does mean to the soldier…to see the whole 
of his company, or even the whole of his battalion, wiped out practically 
to a man, for no result except that it is all part of the great strategy of 
war to make men attempt the impossible…If you had seen men mutilated 
and dying without the possibility of being helped, if you had ever heard 
the cry of a wounded man out between the lines with no possibility 
of assistance being given him, and with a likelihood that he may lie 
dying there for days…then I venture to say that you would look on this 
question with a different eye.3
1 John Boyd Orr, As I Recall, Doubleday, New York, 1967, pp. 68–78.
2 NLA, MS6890/1/6, letters to Kit, 26 July and 18 August; to mother, 6, 13 and 17 August 1916.
3 Lee, Stanley Melbourne Bruce, p. 20.
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By the time Bruce attended his next League Assembly, in 1932, he had developed 
reservations about the League’s ability to provide for collective security. As Prime 
Minister, like his predecessor, Hughes, he had not been prepared to ‘surrender 
any part of [Australian] autonomy to an international organisation’, and was 
particularly wary of threats to Australian tariff policy in League attacks on trade 
barriers. But he was firmly in favour of extending its role in social, economic 
and technical areas, where he believed it could be effective. He ‘genuinely set 
value on the League as a forum for discussion between states, as a conciliator, 
as a trend-setter in humanitarian activity and…as an educator of opinion’.4 He 
was to take a very active role in the League throughout the decade and hoped its 
potential for social and economic reform might go some way towards defusing 
international tensions.
In what was ‘almost…an afterthought’, Article 23 of the League Covenant had 
authorised the League to deal with ‘the international aspects of social, economic 
and humanitarian progress’. The League developed a ‘double aspect…on the 
one hand the centre for world-wide co-operation in purposes which all could 
support, on the other a political agency closely bound up with a treaty which 
was far from being universally approved’.5 To meet the requirements of Article 
23, bodies were established within the League to deal with economics and 
finance, communications and transit, health, traffic in drugs, traffic in women, 
child welfare, intellectual cooperation and refugees. In the 1930s the League’s 
social and economic institutions became ‘concerned more and more intimately 
with the ordinary problems of the life of individuals as well as of nations’, 
representing ‘in the aggregate an immense contribution to human welfare and a 
necessary element in the complex life of the modern world’.6
By 1939 more than 60 per cent of the League’s budget was spent on economic 
and humanitarian work.7 The greatest public impact was perhaps made by the 
League’s work on nutrition: it published a highly regarded scientific report on 
nutrition in the early 1930s, and the report of the Mixed Committee on Nutrition, 
resulting from the Bruce–McDougall initiative of 1935, was a bestseller amongst 
League publications. This success demonstrates the strength of the League as 
a clearing house for information and statistics, as a meeting place for experts 
and as a focus of international cooperation and recommendations on aspects 
of public policy. Experts gathered at the League, whether as individuals or as 
representatives of institutions, drew on a variety of professional and occupational 
4 W. J. Hudson, Australia and the League of Nations, Sydney University Press, Sydney, 1980, pp. 5–6.
5 F. P. Walters, ‘The League of Nations’, in The Evolution of International Organizations, ed. Evan Luard, 
Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1966, pp. 28–31.
6 F. P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1952, pp. 175–6. 
Walters gives as examples work on standardising guidance lights for shipping, road signs and medical practice.
7 League of Nations, A.23.1939, Report of the Special Committee of the League of Nations, ‘The Development 
of International Co-Operation in Economic and Social Affairs’, Geneva, 1939, p. 7.
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backgrounds and worldwide links to bureaucracies, political structures 
and academic communities. Citizens of non-member states participated in 
the technical work. The technical organs of the League formed a network of 
connections with administrative departments of member and non-member 
countries in fields such as health and social welfare; ‘the world’s best experts’ 
were prepared to serve on them ‘not only for the sake of the work itself but still 
more in the conviction that thereby they were helping the cause of peace and 
international co-operation’.8 The League Health Organization has been described 
as ‘a co-ordinating body—a sort of executive committee—for a worldwide 
biomedical/public health episteme that recently had acquired confidence in its 
ability to alleviate human suffering by reducing, if not eliminating, disease’. 
It enjoyed ‘a symbiotic relationship’ with the Rockefeller Foundation, which 
funded projects, including a bureau on epidemic diseases in Singapore. US 
expertise contributed to much of this work, the partnership enhancing ‘not 
only [the organisation’s] effectiveness, but also its legitimacy’.9
Important as this humanitarian work was, it was never likely to prevent war. 
In the ‘first “realist” monograph on international relations in the twentieth 
century’, E. H. Carr proposed that international relations are primarily based 
on power—military, economic and political—and hard bargaining between 
conflicting interests.10 He shocked many believers in the classical harmony of 
interests, McDougall among them, though not the more politically aware Bruce.11 
McDougall retained much of what Carr called ‘the optimism of the nineteenth 
century…based on the triple conviction that the pursuit of good was a matter 
of right reasoning, that the spread of knowledge would soon make it possible 
for everyone to reason rightly…and that anyone who reasoned rightly…would 
necessarily act rightly’.12 This was the essential basis of the Bruce–McDougall 
nutrition approach. The League of Nations resolution resulting from their 
initiative sought amelioration for international trade problems without resort to 
international compulsion. The measures it suggested lay almost entirely in the 
realm of national policy: no international body was to set prices, export quotas 
or limits to production. International responsibility was to collate and provide 
information, and to encourage. National bodies would collect information, 
educate to create demand for foods believed to promote health and devise 
creative policies to encourage cheap and adequate supplies of those foods. The 
process would be driven by an educated market.
8 Walters, A History of the League of Nations, p. 176.
9 Martin David Dubin, ‘The League of Nations Health Organisation’, in International Health Organisations and 
Movements 1918–1939, ed. Paul Weindling, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995, pp. 56, 63–4, 72–3.
10 E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, 
second edn, Macmillan, London, 1946; Jonathan Haslam, ‘Carr, Edward Hallett (1892–1982)’, ODNB, 2004, 
<http://www.oxforddnb.com.virtual.anu.edu.au/view/article/30902> [accessed 29 April 2005].
11 Stirling, Lord Bruce, the London Years, p. 140.
12 Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, pp. 24–5. 
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In the short term, the idea failed: ‘it required fundamental changes in economic 
policy, in the role of the state in the economy and in the very structure of 
economic activity in individual countries. None of this…came to pass.’ In the 
longer term, and largely through the education on which McDougall relied, 
change did occur. Bringing public attention to the problem of inadequate 
nutrition
provided a valuable corrective to the confusion of thought which 
tended to turn shibboleths of ‘finance’, ‘economic laws’, and ‘free trade’, 
balanced budgets or gold standards, into ultimate criteria of economic 
policy, and pointed to a saner approach to economic problems.13 
[It was] a ‘damning commentary’ that the nutrition approach sought 
to emphasize living standards. Such an emphasis should have been a 
truism.14
But it was necessary. Madeleine Mayhew has pointed to the policy conflict in 
Britain in the 1930s between nutrition scientists—notably John Boyd Orr—and 
the bureaucracy, centred on the question of the relationship between inadequate 
nutrition and income, a conflict between science and economics.15 Paul 
Weindling describes the nutrition research of the League Health Organization as 
‘the product of scientific experts frustrated with the fundamental irrationality 
of the prevailing social order’. The League’s work on nutrition ‘exemplifies how 
scientists were keen to extend their expertise in support of radical reforms…
British nutritionists could criticise the British government by invoking the new 
standards and perspectives on nutrition endorsed by [the League], but which 
they themselves had formulated’.16
An immediate result of the League resolution on nutrition was the formation 
of national nutrition committees in some 40 countries, including Australia. 
Early surveying of the state of nutrition by the Australian Advisory Council on 
Nutrition was marred by amateurism, ignorance of overseas sampling techniques 
and by a decision to avoid the contentious relationship of income to nutrition. 
Findings were ‘vague and ambiguous’. But the work was continued and steps 
were taken towards national food standards: ‘nutrition was now widely regarded 
as a national responsibility.’17 It seems very likely that the action of League 
13 Sean Turnell, ‘F. L. McDougall: Eminence Grise of Australian Economic Diplomacy’, Australian Economic 
History Review, Vol. 40, no. 1, 2000, pp. 67–8.
14 Ibid. Turnell is paraphrasing a view expressed by A. G. B. Fisher in ‘Economic Appeasement as a Means 
to Political Understanding and Peace’, Survey of International Affairs 1937, Vol. 1, pp. 56–108.
15 Madeleine Mayhew, ‘The 1930s Nutrition Controversy’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 23, no. 3, 1988.
16 Paul Weindling, ‘Social Medicine at the League of Nations Health Organisation and the International Labour 
Organisation Compared’, in Paul Weindling, ed., International Health Organisations and Movements, p. 144.
17 James Gillespie, ‘The “Marriage of Agriculture and Health” in Australia: The Advisory Council on 
Nutrition and Nutrition Policy in the 1930s’, in Migration to Mining: Proceedings of the Biannual Conference 




experts and others who promoted these bodies in many countries accelerated 
a process of education in nutrition that has become integral to public and 
professional thinking about health.
This section deals with the nutrition initiative and with the League’s sponsorship 
of conferences attempting to solve other international problems. One was the 
plight of the international wheat market in the early 1930s, where the only 
acceptable remedy seemed to be limitation of production. Its failure spurred 
McDougall, encouraged by Orr and supported by Bruce, to devise his ‘marriage 
of health and agriculture’. The proposal received overwhelming support in 
Geneva. Following that success, Bruce and McDougall devised plans to extend 
the approach of increasing consumption to a political solution for world tension 
and to a scheme for improving the effectiveness of the League’s social and 
economic activities. The first idea generated little enthusiasm; the second was 
warmly received, but simply ran out of time.
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5. The Wheat Crisis of the 1930s
Summary
By the late 1920s the international wheat trade was in crisis. As production from 
the New World increased, traditional importers in Europe encouraged domestic 
production and placed high tariffs on imports. Prices for European consumers 
rose, export prices fell and growers and governments suffered. McDougall 
had been involved in international discussion of agricultural problems as a 
member of the League of Nations Economic Consultative Committee, and one 
of a group of ‘experts’ chosen to advise the League on agricultural problems. 
He became familiar with statistics produced by the International Institute 
of Agriculture in Rome and developed a broad understanding of worldwide 
agricultural production. He protested against Eurocentric views and saw 
himself as spokesman for the world beyond Europe. He began to argue for a 
more rationalised system of agricultural production and for enabling greater 
consumption of nutritious foods by raising standards of living. Not yet ready 
to abandon imperial cooperation, McDougall wrestled with the difficulty of 
reconciling this international outlook with British aims to protect domestic 
wheat production while avoiding conflict with the dominions. He suggested 
special treatment for British wheat.
As the crisis in exporting countries worsened, the only solutions raised involved 
restriction of production. In 1933 a special conference on wheat was held in 
conjunction with a League-sponsored Monetary and Economic Conference. 
Bruce, then Resident Minister in London, led the Australian delegation, mediating 
between pressure from the conference to institute crop and export restriction 
and reluctant Australian governments. An agreement reached after some days 
of tension established a Wheat Advisory Committee, on which McDougall 
represented Australia. Cooperation with restrictions proved impossible to enforce; 
the wheat crisis was only solved by drought in North America.
The Crisis
Wheat…is a commodity of the greatest economic importance, and yet in 
certain countries…it is a crop that exercises a psychological influence even 
greater than is warranted by its almost unique position in world trade.1
1 F. L. McDougall, ‘The International Wheat Situation’, International Affairs, Vol. 10, no. 4, 1931, p. 524. 
Address given to Royal Institute of International Affairs at Chatham House, 7 May 1931.
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At the time McDougall wrote these words, the value of world wheat production 
as a whole was exceeded only by that of rice. Its value as an internationally 
traded commodity was higher than all commodities except raw cotton. Yet only 
18 per cent of all wheat produced in the world entered international trade.2 
Many countries took extraordinary measures to safeguard domestic production 
of this staple food. By the end of the 1920s domestic prices were rising in those 
countries and the wheat export market was facing a crisis. The British Empire 
produced more than half the world’s export surplus; it was not a problem 
amenable to solution by an imperial tariff policy.
Four wheat exporters—Canada, Argentina, Australia and the United States—
produced some 90 per cent of total world wheat exports in the 1920s. Their 
rapid growth as wheat exporters since the late nineteenth century had followed 
similar patterns; Canada led with exports of wheat and flour worth $10.9 
million in 1901, $33.5 million in 1921 and $495 million in 1929.3 Expansion 
in all four depended on similar political and technical factors: land settlement 
and migration policies favouring agriculture; development of wheat varieties 
suitable for climates more extreme than those of Europe; expansion into lands 
suitable for the use of agricultural machinery; provision of cheap transport by 
railway and steamship; and increased demand from Europe as a result of World 
War I. Wheat-growing constituencies wielded considerable political power, 
except in Argentina, where cattle-owning landlords were dominant and wheat 
was grown mostly by non-national, immigrant, short-term tenant farmers.4 
There were other differences: the United States, with a large home market and 
complex economy, depended less on primary exports; the other three needed 
income from those exports to finance further development and imports. Wheat 
was the chief export of Canada and Argentina, both exporting about two-thirds 
of their crop; the pastoral industry predominated in Australia. Canada and the 
United States, with well-developed storage systems, were not under pressure 
to export all their surplus. In Canada, Federal Government control, established 
during World War I, was replaced in the early 1920s by prairie wheat pools, 
based on cooperative marketing principles and responsible for marketing more 
than half of prairie wheat.5 In the interwar years Canada supplied more than one-
third of world wheat exports and Argentina about one-fifth. US wheat exports 
fluctuated from almost one-quarter in the 1920s to less than one-tenth in the 
dust-bowl years of the mid 1930s; for some of those years the United States was 
a net importer. Australia’s share rose to almost one-fifth in those years—from a 
more normal contribution of just more than one-tenth. See Tables 2 and 3.
2 Ibid., pp. 524–5.
3 William E. Morriss, Chosen Instrument: A History of the Canadian Wheat Board: The McIvor Years, 
Reidmore Books/Canadian Wheat Board, Edmonton, 1987, p. 10.
4 Carl E. Solberg, The Prairies and the Pampas: Agrarian Policy in Canada and Argentina, 1880–1930, 
Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif., 1987, pp. 226, 229.
5 Morriss, Chosen Instrument, p. 14.
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would continue to increase.7 The rise in Soviet exports was short-lived: forced 
collectivisation, terror, repression, near civil war and famine removed Soviet 
wheat from the competition, though not from the fears of outsiders.8
The wheat problem continued to worsen nevertheless. A widespread bumper 
crop in 1928 exceeded world demand by an estimated 100 million bushels. The 
resulting carryover formed the basis of a surplus that would undermine trade 
well into the 1930s.9 Exporters and many importers continued to encourage 
production. The other five European exporters had adopted postwar ‘agrarian 
reform’ policies, breaking up large estates to establish peasant holdings with 
higher costs of production. Their governments sought to maintain a reasonable 
living standard for peasant farmers, leading to proposals for inter-European 
tariff preference.10 One study concluded that ‘farming in Europe…is a tradition, 
a way of life, a civilization, and any attempt to regard it merely from the cash 
aspect must fail’.11 McDougall wrote of the ‘cult of wheat’, in which the peasant 
was recognised as a stable, conservative element of society:
No one can begin to grasp the world wheat situation unless he clearly 
recognises that European countries will do everything to maintain the 
peasant, and that wheat together with other cereals in Eastern Europe 
and sugar beet are the mainstay of the peasant.
The continental European attitude towards the oversea wheatgrowing 
countries is that they are upstarts, whose farmers, aided by the biologist 
and the agricultural engineer, threaten the foundation of society.12
Wheat production was supported, for similar reasons, in European importing 
countries. Tariffs against cheap overseas wheat appeared in the 1890s, their 
purpose to protect local producers from ‘the ruin of the culture of the soil’ and to 
encourage ‘a wise and harmonious balance’ between industry and agriculture.13
In the late 1920s European exporters and importers alike encouraged 
consolidation of acreages with government-assisted finance and debt reduction, 
and technologies to increase yields. French tariffs rose rapidly from the mid 
1920s, supported by milling quotas and price and import controls. By 1929 
France had an exportable surplus. Neither Italy nor Germany reached export 
7 McDougall, ‘The International Wheat Situation’, pp. 525, 531–2.
8 Lizzie Collingham, The Taste of War: World War Two and the Battle for Food, Allen Lane, London, 2011, pp. 220–1.
9 Robert Holland, ‘Imperial Collaboration and Great Depression: Britain, Canada and the World Wheat 
Crisis, 1929–35’, in Theory and Practice in the History of European Expansion Overseas: Essays in Honour of 
Ronald Robinson, eds Andrew Porter and Robert Holland, Frank Cass, London, 1988, p. 110.
10 McDougall, ‘The International Wheat Situation’, pp. 525–7.
11 Royal Institute of International Affairs, quoted in Wilfred Malenbaum, The World Wheat Economy 1885–
1939, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1953, pp. 32–3.
12 McDougall, ‘The International Wheat Situation’, p. 527.
13 Malenbaum, World Wheat Economy, p. 158.
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status, but tariffs in both also rose steeply. Mussolini’s ‘Battle of the Wheat’ began 
in 1925 with research, agricultural extension work and land reclamation as well 
as milling quotas, financial assistance and price and distribution controls. There 
were similar measures in Germany and in other European countries. Inevitably, 
stocks accumulated in North America and world prices fell. As tariffs rose even 
higher, consumers in European countries paid almost double the world price 
and were forced to reduce purchases of more costly foodstuffs. Growers in the 
overseas exporting countries suffered reduced incomes; their purchases of other 
commodities declined.
Figure 11 Tariff Levels on Wheat in France, Germany and Italy.
Source: Reprinted by permission of the publisher from: Wilfred Malenbaum, The World Wheat Economy, 
1885–1939, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., p. 162. Copyright © 1953 by the President and 
Fellows of Harvard College. Copyright © renewed 1981 by Wilfred Malenbaum.
International Consultation
McDougall’s experience of international consultation had begun late in 1928 when 
he was appointed to the Economic Consultative Committee (ECC) established by 
the International Economic Conference called by the League of Nations in 1927. 
At first he saw himself as spokesman for the developing industrial economies of 
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the British dominions, countering the attempts of established European powers 
to use the League of Nations to lower trade barriers. He also sought to have the 
work of both the League and the International Institute of Agriculture serve the 
needs of his imperial vision, in ways less threatening to dominions’ commercial 
policies. The crisis in agricultural prices soon led him to focus on the difficulties 
of ‘overseas’ producers of cereal crops on a large scale and on the problem of low 
wheat prices crippling the international economy as a whole.
Through the ECC, McDougall had encountered concerns about the International 
Institute of Agriculture (IIA), which had been established in 1905 under the 
auspices of the Italian Government to collect agricultural statistics and technical 
and economic information. McDougall found IIA publications unsatisfactory 
and was interested in discussions about relations between the Institute and 
the League, which had produced a more impressive range of statistics. He was 
invited to join a new IIA committee on agricultural economics, and persuaded 
Bruce that the League must concern itself with agriculture and therefore work 
to reform the Institute.14
He was also a member of the ECC’s agriculture subcommittee, which, in 1929, 
recommended setting up a body of agricultural experts to advise the League 
on questions of commercial and economic policy affecting agriculture. The 
recommendation was opposed by Italy; McDougall’s compromise proposal, that 
the advisory body be considered a temporary expedient, was unacceptable 
to agricultural countries like France. In subsequent discussion between the 
Institute and the League, it was agreed to establish a list of experts familiar with 
general problems of the agricultural economy. The experts could be involved 
‘according to the nature of each problem to be studied’ in consultations between 
Geneva and Rome’.15 The list, comprising experts connected either with the 
League or with the IIA, included McDougall.
Thus, in January 1930 he was part of a group summoned by the League to 
consider general agricultural problems, their allocation between the League and 
the Institute and, in particular, the problem of cereals. The group spent much 
time analysing the complicated causes of the agricultural depression, but a draft 
report did not win unanimous approval. McDougall, ever the eager draftsman, 
spent an evening rewriting passages, with the intention of submitting it to the 
group the next day. A misunderstanding led to his redraft being sent to all 
members, who took it as a substitute for the disputed draft. Some were happy 
14 LFSSA, 215, 27 February 1929, pp. 749–51; NAA, M111, Bruce to McDougall, 30 April 1929.
15 NAA, A11583, Imperial Conference 1930, ‘EE(30)’ Series—Memoranda—Papers Nos EE(30)1–EE(30)64, 
Imperial Conference Paper EE(30)6.
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to accept it, others wanted changes, Britain and Czechoslovakia objected.16 
McDougall was doubtless embarrassed and probably learned something of the 
extra difficulties of operating in the international sphere.
His amended draft is worth consideration nevertheless, as it shows important 
new ideas emerging and older ones developing. He approved emphasis in the 
original on a principle enunciated in 1927—‘the interdependence of all branches 
of economic activity’—and he agreed that ‘agricultural prosperity is a first 
condition for industrial development and profitable trade between the nations’. 
The original draft listed problems of ‘immediate urgency’. He accepted the first, 
point (a), that increasing production brought about by the application of science 
to agriculture had the potential to create severe international competition, 
with high prices for consumers but low returns for producers. Point (c) urged 
assistance by further study of agricultural credit, including producers’ and 
consumers’ cooperatives. McDougall added to that list government financial 
assistance, means to regulate price fluctuations, and reductions of labour costs 
through mechanisation.
His treatment of point (b) is significant. The original dealt with the threat to 
traditional markets from ‘the uncontrolled overproduction of…certain countries 
peculiarly adapted to the cultivation of certain crops’—that is, the burgeoning 
cereal exports of the New World. McDougall’s version reads, in part: ‘the 
experts are convinced that steps must be taken to secure a more rational system 
of production throughout the world and also to ensure the spread of the idea of 
orderly marketing into the arena of international trade’ (emphasis added). A 
first step must be ‘a better supply of information…prepared and published by 
an international authority’ and based upon ‘full and reliable’ national statistics 
‘as far as possible…compiled upon a comparable basis’. He listed desirable 
categories of figures beyond those already provided: the trend of demand, 
quantities of stocks held, tendencies in certain countries to substitute some 
products for others; early information on prospective crop yields, statistics of 
animal stocks and information as to average costs of production. The last would 
be challenging, but would enable administrators to ‘form an estimate of the 
comparative advantage enjoyed by their country’ in regard to specific crops. To 
this section McDougall added a point new for him:
...the agricultural experts believe that one most important method of 
improving the position of agriculture throughout the world would be 
through the gradual raising of the standard of living of the peoples 
16 Archives of the League of Nations, Geneva [hereinafter LN], 1928–32, 10D 17138/12676. Note in 
particular, McDougall to Stoppani, 5 February, and reply, 11 February 1930.
A New Idea Each Morning
136
of Asia and Africa. This would lead to a larger demand on the more 
nutritious and palatable foodstuffs and would directly or indirectly 
assist agriculture in all countries.17
This document shows that by early 1930, after a brief apprenticeship 
in international organisations, McDougall had achieved a considerable 
understanding of the scope and complexity of the problems of international 
agriculture. In terms of the development of his thinking, the essentials of his 
most important idea were already there. The ‘marriage of health and agriculture’ 
would depend upon both increasing consumption of ‘more nutritious and 
palatable foods’ and rationalising agriculture.
Later in 1930 the ‘experts’ were asked to supply an account of some 10 or 20 
pages on various aspects of the ‘situation in their respective countries’, with a 
view to possible publication. McDougall protested, asserting the importance 
of a universal perspective, questioning the value of ‘a series of uncorrelated 
statements’ by a panel comprising 17 European representatives and five overseas 
states, without important agricultural producers like the British and Dutch 
colonial areas, China, Brazil, New Zealand and South Africa. It was essential 
to have ‘the fullest information upon agricultural conditions and prospects in 
Russia in view of the increasingly significant and novel part which Russia is 
likely to play in the world situation of the near future’. The committee could be 
open to a charge of giving ‘but superficial consideration to a most fundamental 
problem in economics and of taking an extremely narrow and localised view of 
what is a world international problem’.18
McDougall objected to a statement in a later draft report to the League Council 
that ‘the majority of experts believe that restrictions of sown areas will be 
imposed by hard realities in every country’. He argued that in France, Italy and 
Germany ‘wheat is now sheltered behind extremely formidable tariffs [so that] 
the hard realities of the situation will not have any substantial effect upon the 
individual wheat grower’ who in France would receive twice the price received 
by his counterparts in Canada, Argentina or Australia. He wanted the paragraph 
altered to point out that ‘hard realities’ would cause restriction of production 
in ‘the very countries where the cost of production is lowest’.19 His protests 
apparently brought about a new draft, which, he was told, was ‘in no small 
degree the result of your inspiration’.20
17 Ibid. The printed draft, with McDougall’s handwritten additions and alterations, is dated 8 January 1930.
18 LN, 1928–32, 10D 16685/12676, McDougall to Stoppani, 28 November 1930.
19 Ibid., 10D 26670/2016, McDougall to Secretary, LEC, 13 and 15 March 1931.
20 Ibid., 10D 30344/22556, draft sent to McDougall for comment on 1 August 1931.
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McDougall had been the spokesman for the overseas empire on imperial bodies, 
now he saw himself as, and was becoming in effect, the spokesman at the League 
for the world beyond Europe: 
At present I am really worried over the tendency of the League of 
Nations to concentrate its economic work on purely European problems 
and I think I should be particularly well qualified to see that the 
Second Committee of the Assembly took due note of the growth of this 
undesirable tendency.21
British Agricultural Policy
In Britain, meanwhile, agricultural policy had become a matter for intense political 
discussion by 1929. In opposition, the Conservative Research Department 
under Neville Chamberlain tackled agricultural policy, attempting ‘to shape the 
still rather vague concept of Imperial rationalisation into a definitive planned 
form’. Wheat production at home could be rationalised by subsidies to efficient 
British producers. The import market might be regulated by a quota system, 
which would have the advantages of providing a lever in trade negotiations 
with other countries, of avoiding food taxes and of allowing wheat imports 
from Argentina, thought necessary to avoid retaliatory measures against British 
investments there.22 Chamberlain’s policy was supported by many business and 
empire lobbyists, though not by Beaverbrook, who had transformed his empire 
free trade campaign into one of support for British agriculture and cheap food.23 
In negotiations surrounding the 1930 Imperial Conference, it became clear 
that British millers would support a quota scheme only if they were offered 
protection against imported flour. Agreement to such protection would risk the 
Conservatives being drawn ‘into conflict with importers, consumers and the 
Dominions’.24
The Labour Government settled, uneasily, on support for state trading in grains 
through import boards and bulk purchase.25 Late in 1930 the Conservatives 
supported in principle the Labour Agricultural Marketing Bill for elected 
commodity boards with the power to buy and sell at fixed prices. The 
Conservatives also embarked on a new strategy of gaining industry support 
by offering measures of agricultural protection, including safeguarding against 
unfair competition and long-term contracts, as a quid pro quo for organisation.26 
21 NAA/CSIR, A9778, M14/31/5, McDougall to Rivett, 4 June 1931.
22 Cooper, British Agricultural Policy, pp. 94–9.
23 Ibid., pp. 100–4, 113–24.
24 Ibid., pp. 106–8.
25 Ibid., p. 103.
26 Ibid., pp. 127–39.
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The new National (all-party) Government formed in August 1931 ‘sanctioned a 
relatively high degree of state involvement in agricultural policies’. Government 
was involved in agricultural rationalisation through ‘independent’ boards with 
discretionary powers, marking ‘a turning point in British farming’.27
McDougall had sufficient contacts to keep him informed of these political 
manoeuvres; he may well have contributed to them in private discussion. It is 
not surprising, therefore, that in the early 1930s he extended his earlier ideas on 
rationalisation of imperial industry and science to the complex and controversial 
problem of agriculture, aiming, like Chamberlain, to achieve ‘maximum 
efficiency…having regard to the natural advantages of constituent parts for 
supply of particular commodities’. His memoranda written in advance of the 
imperial conferences of 1930 and 1932 took into account ‘two vital factors in 
British prosperity’: cheap food and raw materials, and a prosperous agriculture 
in both Britain and the wider empire.28 In ‘An Empire Agricultural Policy’, 
McDougall advocated a variety of ‘instruments of rationalisation’: preferential 
tariffs, bulk purchase, import controls, anti-dumping legislation and ‘indirect 
measures’—credit facilities, research, market intelligence, consumer education 
and ‘discouragement of uneconomic agricultural development’. Selection of 
method would be based on the needs of particular industries established in 
studies conducted before implementation. Efficiency should be a condition of 
all assistance. Wheat was an exception, though, and the principle of natural 
advantage should not apply. Although British wheat cost much more to produce 
than Canadian or Australian, it should be supported for ‘reasons of national 
psychology and agricultural employment’, perhaps by a guaranteed price or by 
a compulsory minimum percentage of English wheat for milling. As total empire 
wheat production was three times the British requirement, the solution was not 
a tariff, but it could be ‘inter-imperial marketing co-operation’.29
Agricultural rationalisation along these lines would stimulate rural industries 
overseas, encourage animal industries in Britain and protect against dumping 
of agricultural goods on the British market. Empire farmers would gain greater 
purchasing power, enabling them to buy more British manufactures. McDougall 
expected Britain to use its dominance as a market for primary products to 
bargain for a predominant share of dominions’ industrial imports. He did not 
think that dominions’ industrial development would necessarily reduce their 
demand for British manufactures. He expected any tariff-related increases in 
food costs in Britain to be negligible in comparison with their benefits to British 
industry and employment.30
27 Ibid., pp. 143–5.
28 NLA, MS6890/4/2, ‘An Empire Agricultural Policy’, 3 April 1930, p. 1.
29 Ibid., pp. 10–23.
30 Ibid., pp. 11, 15, 27–9.
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‘An Empire Agricultural Policy’ spelled out a program for the 1930 Imperial 
Conference to initiate. It represented the ‘sheltered markets’ idea in its final 
form, concentrated and rationalised, taking account of all that McDougall 
had learned and experienced since 1925, of politics, world markets, specific 
commodities and of patterns of supply and demand. The memorandum was 
filled with facts and figures. But on the hard questions of conflicting imperial 
interests it offered little.
McDougall wrote ‘Home and Empire Agriculture’ late in 1931 for Sir John 
Gilmour, Minister of Agriculture in the new National Government. Its argument 
was similar to the one he had made in 1930: there was little competition between 
home and empire; policies benefiting one would help the other; and an empire 
agricultural policy should not increase the costs of British manufacturing. Most 
of the memorandum discussed details of the application of a tariff policy to 
particular agricultural commodities. He noted at the end that he had given little 
attention to Indian or colonial agriculture; these could be helped by applied 
research, market intelligence, agricultural education and effective transport.31 A 
second paper written for Gilmour considered means of combating the ‘bogey of 
over-production’ in a time of depressed commodity prices and ‘revolutionary’ 
changes in agricultural production. McDougall predicted increased demand, 
once confidence was restored, for animal products, fruits, vegetables and raw 
materials. He suggested efforts to increase milk consumption, in the interests 
of public health, ‘as has been overwhelmingly demonstrated by the large-scale 
experimental feeding of Scottish school children’. The decline in demand was 
not caused by oversupply, he argued, but by financial maladjustment.32
These memoranda were carefully considered and well received in the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF). Admired for the extent and thoroughness 
of their coverage, they seemed sympathetic to the British point of view. H. L. 
French concluded, ‘if all the representatives from the various Dominions were as 
reasonable as Mr McDougall and equally capable of understanding the problems 
of home as distinct from Dominion agriculture, the task of reaching a satisfactory 
agreement at Ottawa would be greatly reduced’. H. E. Dale acknowledged, 
despite his differences on some points, that the memoranda ‘are…thoroughly 
worth reading…they disclose a very reasonable attitude of mind on the part of 
Mr McDougall’.33 They also show his ideas developing towards the ‘marriage of 
health and agriculture’.
31 UKNA, MAF 40/17, ‘Home and Empire Agriculture’, 14 December, with covering letter to Gilmour, 15 
December 1931.
32 Ibid., ‘Home and Empire Agricultural Policy II’, 19 January 1932.
33 Ibid., Minute, H. L. French, 4 March; H. E. Dale, 6 April 1932.
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Overseas Exporters
Governments in overseas exporting countries were attempting to deal with 
the wheat problem. In Australia there had been three successive poor seasons 
by 1930, as overseas markets slowed and prices fell. Much arable land was in 
fallow, the balance of payments was in deficit, the flow of capital had stopped, 
and interest and debt repayments were at risk. Federal and State governments 
resorted to the traditional remedy for low commodity prices: urging farmers 
to ‘Grow More Wheat’. Farmers responded eagerly, encouraged by a federal 
Bill introduced in April 1930 to guarantee 4 shillings (48 pence) per bushel for 
wheat delivered to railway sidings, and to establish federal and State marketing 
boards and a compulsory wheat pool. Many borrowed to plant more. Wheat 
acreage increased that sowing season by 21 per cent, yielding a record 213.6 
million bushels—an increase of 30 per cent.34
The proposed price guarantee evaporated in political wrangling. State 
Governments in Western and South Australia opposed a provision that States 
share in the liability, the Federal Opposition objected to the implied socialisation 
and the Senate rejected the Wheat Bill. State legislation for compulsory wheat 
pools in Victoria and New South Wales failed to gain the consent of sufficient 
growers. As world wheat prices continued to fall, the Scullin Government 
rejected a suggested flour tax because it would increase the price of bread. 
A Wheat Advance Bill hastily passed in December 1930 guaranteed 2/6d per 
bushel (30 pence) for the 1930 crop, without compulsory pools or State liability. 
The Commonwealth Bank refused to advance the funds, arguing it could not 
be guaranteed against loss. A new Wheat Bill in March 1931—proposing a £3.5 
million bounty on the 1930 crop with another £2.5 million in aid to farmers, 
to be financed by fiduciary notes redeemable by a later loan—was rejected 
by the Senate, as was a Wheat Marketing Bill providing compulsory pooling 
and higher-priced flour. In September 1931, attempts to compensate farmers 
for losses from the ‘Grow More Wheat’ campaign were officially abandoned. 
Farmers received approximately 20 pence per bushel, instead of the 48 they 
had expected on planting. Many (at one estimate, 20 000) were forced off their 
land; country businesses were bankrupted; it was ‘one of the greatest disasters 
in Australian economic history’.35
Australia was not alone. Robert Holland suggests that the wheat problem in 
Canada altered the imperial relationship. Canadian growers had borrowed 
heavily to fund the expansion and mechanisation underlying wartime increases 
in production, encouraged by federal control of prices and marketing through 
34 Edgars Dunsdorfs, The Australian Wheat Growing Industry 1788–1948, Melbourne University Press, 
Melbourne, 1956, pp. 267–9.
35 Ibid., pp. 270–5.
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a Wheat Board. When prices fell in 1920, the board was dismantled and many 
were ruined. The outcome was establishment of producers’ wheat pools in the 
mid 1920s. The concept, writes Holland, was ‘developed in the hothouse world 
of American agrarian radicalism’; operation of the pools in Canada threatened 
‘the fabric of imperial collaboration between Liverpool and Medicine Hat, 
apparently seamless for so long’. The pools aimed to keep prices high by limiting 
supplies. Wheat, written by agricultural economists W. W. Swanson and P. C. 
Armstrong, and published in Toronto in 1930, supported the pools. The authors 
predicted that organisation and storage infrastructure would eventually develop 
in Argentina and Australia, to redress what was perceived as an imbalance of 
power between importers and widely dispersed sellers. Buyers, meanwhile, 
relied on the mounting costs of maintaining wheat surpluses to work in their 
favour. British millers, led by James V. Rank, began to combine and rationalise 
while conducting ‘a bitter publicity drive against “the monopolistic” pools’.36
Canadian wheat pools hedged their advances to growers through bank loans. 
Rapid price decline in 1930 during ‘the great Soviet wheat dump of 1930–
31’ led to fears that banks would demand liquidation of stocks in the open 
market. Prairie premiers, ‘all heading farmer-dominated parties’, guaranteed 
the funds, on the pools’ undertaking to repay any government losses. Prices 
continued to fall; the Provinces sought federal guarantees, first refused by the 
new Bennett Government, but later agreed without parliamentary approval. 
Attempts to reform the pools failed: in August 1931 all three provincial pools 
withdrew from the central selling agency, owing their governments a total of 
$24.3 million. By November 1932, 75 million bushels of wheat were in store 
but federally supported measures to withhold wheat from sale failed to hold 
the price above 50c per bushel; bank loans taken out by the pools in 1929 had 
posited a price of $2. By 1933, the gross value of agricultural production in the 
prairie Provinces had fallen from approximately $1 billion dollars in 1926–27 
to $163 million. The west became an area of net emigration: ‘Pitiful caravans 
of destitute families, carrying the remnants of their belongings, trekked away 
from shattered dreams.’37 In the United States, large unsold stocks were held by 
the Federal Farm Board, an agency of a government facing a record budgetary 
deficit.38
Holland suggests that failure to gain agreement on assistance for wheat at 
the 1930 Imperial Conference, which considered and dismissed the idea of 
an imperial tariff, destroyed the last hope for the pools in Canada, and that, 
‘through prairie spectacles, British capitalists—with the connivance of a Labour 
government—had sought an unholy alliance between Moscow and Buenos Aires 
36 Holland, ‘Imperial Collaboration’, pp. 109–13.
37 Ibid.; Morriss, Chosen Instrument, pp. 34, 38–43.
38 McDougall, ‘The International Wheat Situation’, p. 531.
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to smash the price level on which their community aspirations were based’. A 
complacent British view that ‘the small prairie producer would have to accept 
an East European standard of living to survive’ was shaken in 1931 by fears 
that agricultural nations might default. Default by Australia would threaten 
the strength of the pound. Consideration was therefore given to proposals for a 
wheat quota and to some weakening of attachment to the ‘cheap food’ policy.39 
Millers continued their opposition, but gave reluctant consent to offers of 
tariff preference for wheat and limitation of Russian supplies (both ‘practically 
worthless’) at the Ottawa Conference. Canada’s Prime Minister, R. B. Bennett, 
rejected other British suggestions for a wheat quota, or preference, and resented 
attempts to protect British-milled flour. It became apparent that Britain could 
offer no real help, and the possibility of ‘some great Imperial trade agreement’ 
vanished. A disillusioned Bennett, convinced that ‘the British were unprepared 
to enter into some equitable partnership’, declared that he must seek ‘the 
alternative economic strategy open to Canada—some accommodation with the 
United States. As he made plain to the U.K. delegation…“The Americans could 
not have treated us worse”.’ A small preference was agreed, but ‘was excoriated 
by rural representatives in the Dominion Parliament as a gross irrelevance’. It 
proved ineffective: dominions’ share of British wheat imports actually fell in the 
following year.40
The Imperial Economic Committee, its terms of reference enlarged by the 1930 
Imperial Conference, determined to tackle the question as an imperial problem. 
Its preliminary discussions show that McDougall had given much thought to 
the question: he noted the large amount of information available, but warned 
there could be no intra-imperial solution. The IEC should consider it seriously, 
nevertheless, as ‘there is a most urgent need for the producers themselves 
to have a clear appreciation of the world position’, particularly the alarming 
possibility of the Soviet Union returning to its prewar level of output. He 
suggested encouragement of mixed farming to avoid ‘the extreme economic risk 
incurred in any country by too much reliance on wheat’.41
Soon afterwards McDougall’s article ‘The Dominance of Wheat’, published in The 
Times on 25 February 1931 and ascribed to ‘a correspondent’, demonstrated his 
new worldwide perspective and recognition of a problem of great complexity: 
low prices; European production encouraged by artificially high tariff levels; 
technical and biological advances likely to nullify any restriction of crop acreage; 
subdivision of estates and political conservatism in traditional European 
exporters; a relatively inelastic market and declining consumption in Europe; 
39 Holland, ‘Imperial Collaboration’, pp. 114–15.
40 Ibid., p. 117; Cooper, British Agricultural Policy, pp.148–51.
41 UKNA, DO35/201/5, 8115/19, ‘Summary of discussion on foodstuffs remaining for inquiry under Sub-
Head 1 of the New Terms of Reference’, Meeting of the Imperial Economic Committee, 2 December 1930, 
IEC/109 (12.12.30).
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and Canada’s exportable surplus doubling the total European market. Again he 
suggested that diversification offered solutions such as the Danish conversion of 
cheap dumped cereals into stockfeed for more profitable animal products, and 
the more elastic markets for dairy products, meats, fruit and vegetables, textile 
fibres and oilseeds. As always, study of world production and consumption 
figures was an essential prerequisite to the framing of solutions. With some 
prescience, he predicted problems for international bodies attempting to 
regulate production or to control national policies.
International Solutions
Between 1930 and 1933, twenty international conferences dealt wholly or in 
part with the problem of wheat prices. Some involved regional groupings. 
European growers laid claim to their traditional markets, urging an inter-
European preferential system.42
Forty-seven countries, many with weighty delegations, were represented at the 
International Wheat Conference convened by the IIA in Rome in March 1931. 
Canada sent its London High Commissioner, three other delegates and two expert 
industry advisers. McDougall was on his own, but his energy and familiarity with 
the issue enabled him to make important contributions. Delegates considered 
two solutions raised at earlier European conferences: restriction of production 
and intra-European preferences. A consensus view was that European nations 
could not reduce acreage, but that overseas exporters would be forced to do so 
if wheat prices continued to be unprofitable.43 McDougall described the debate 
thus:
Those who advocated compulsory restrictions were unable to answer 
any one of three very simple questions. First, would the advocate’s own 
country practice restriction? Secondly, if so, how would it be enforced 
in a peasant agriculture? Thirdly, what assurance could be given of 
Russian participation? The mere asking of these questions rendered any 
further discussion impossible.44
His own speech—pointing out that overseas exporters were the chief sufferers 
in the crisis, and proposing concentration on orderly marketing rather than 
restriction—was supported by Canada and aroused considerable interest. 
It led to private meetings, in conjunction with Canada, with representatives 
of Argentina, the USSR and finally with European exporters.45 He reiterated 
42 Malenbaum, World Wheat Economy, pp. 198, 200–1.
43 Ibid., p. 202.
44 McDougall, ‘The International Wheat Situation’, p. 529.
45 NAA, A981, Conference 366, McDougall to Scullin, 31 March 1931.
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Australian objections to international bodies promoting sectional interests, and 
he succeeded, with India’s support, in having the conference recommend leaving 
negotiation of intra-European preference to regular diplomatic channels.46
McDougall thought his greatest achievement at this meeting was persuading 
Russian delegates to cooperate. They apparently made the first approach, then 
McDougall and the Canadians spent several hours in discussion with them over 
two days. McDougall attributed the success to his ‘complete…even a brutal 
frankness’, admitting the British Empire could not solve the problem alone, 
stating that international cooperation was essential and suggesting that the 
USSR must make clear whether it would serve its economic ends by cooperating 
for higher prices or its political ends by selling its own wheat cheaply and 
deepening the depression. The Russians admitted the Soviet Government would 
welcome a plan for raising prices; for the next few years, money would be more 
important than fostering revolution. McDougall hinted that if it were possible 
to blame the USSR for failure of the talks, a boycott already imposed by France 
and Belgium might spread, but he assured them he was convinced of a genuine 
desire for cooperation.47 Russian opposition was crucial in defeating European 
preference and quotas at the conference.48 
While conference resolutions recognised the difficulties of reaching agreement 
on production control and did recommend crop diversification, the more 
important recommendations were to create an international body to determine 
quotas, fix prices or both, and to make arrangements between wheat exporters 
for orderly marketing of unsold stocks. For that purpose, a meeting of exporters 
was convened by Canada in London in May 1931.
McDougall expected that the May conference would be confined to short-term 
solutions for the immediate problems of unsold stocks and the 1931 harvest.49 
Even this goal proved unattainable. Although the United States and the USSR 
both attended, the conference only achieved establishment of a committee 
to develop proposals for a clearing house of market and other information. 
McDougall chaired a committee that favoured establishment of an international 
wheat organisation and recommended orderly marketing by means of a quota. 
But the United States would not support quotas, except on the condition of 
reduced production. It has been suggested that other exporters supported 
quotas only because they were confident of US refusal, and that there were 
inconsistencies and fallacies in their views.50 Although the Canadians believed 
Britain would propose a quota at Ottawa, McDougall thought British opinion 
46 Ibid., CP498/1, 430/AA/3.
47 Ibid.; NAA, A981, Conference 366, ‘Notes on discussions with the Russian Delegation’, 8 April 1931.
48 Malenbaum, World Wheat Economy, pp. 202–3.
49 McDougall, ‘The International Wheat Situation’, p. 531.
50 Malenbaum, World Wheat Economy, pp. 203–4.
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was moving away from quotas because they could not raise prices. Australia 
certainly needed higher prices more than disposal of surplus stock, and the only 
solution lay in international action.51
The standing committee established by the May conference met in July, and, 
at US insistence, confined discussion to establishing a ‘Clearing House of 
Information’ to serve wheat-exporting countries. McDougall admitted that 
these discussions had not made ‘any contribution of substantial importance’ to 
growers’ problems.52 What was to have been the ‘International Wheat Information 
Service’ gained only three potential participants: Hungary, Romania and India.
The Wheat Conference of 1933
A full-scale Monetary and Economic Conference was held under League auspices 
(but not confined to League members) in London in July 1933. Its Preparatory 
Commission recommended ‘special attention’ to ‘the production and export of 
wheat’ and discussion of means to liberalise tariff barriers. Formally requesting 
that wheat be placed on the agenda, Argentina submitted that the world 
wheat surplus had doubled since 1927. Import barriers would not ease until 
prices rose, consumption could not increase while widespread unemployment 
persisted and the policy of accumulating stocks to raise prices had failed. The 
only solutions remaining were production and export controls. Although 
exporters had failed to agree in 1931, the worsening situation since then might 
have changed attitudes.53
The four principal exporters met in Geneva for preliminary discussions in 
May 1933. McDougall was instructed from Canberra that he should ‘not be 
sympathetic’ to the idea of crop limitation in the absence of any ‘offsetting 
advantage not now apparent’. It would, inter alia, force Australia to surrender 
market advantage in Britain and in Asia; prevent expansion and development, 
which were ‘the most economic means of ending unemployment’; threaten 
Australia’s ability to meet external liabilities and to make use of lands already 
developed and thus lose the benefits of overseas borrowings; and it would 
advantage the holders of large North American stocks. But as declaration of ‘a 
very definite attitude’ at the outset could be ‘injudicious’, McDougall should 
await development of other representatives’ views.54
51 NAA, A981, Conference 368, McDougall to Scullin, 28 May 1931.
52 Ibid., Conference 371, McDougall to Scullin, 15 July 1931.
53 Ibid., Conference 117, part 1, copies of letter from Agriculture Minister Antiono de Tomaso to Argentina’s 
delegate Raoul Prebisch, 25 October 1932; submission to the Conference Secretariat on 11 December; letter 
from J. H. Thomas to Bruce, 5 January 1933, requesting Australian views.
54 Ibid., Conference 117, part 2, Lyons to Bruce, 3 May 1933.
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The delegates were inclined to blame European agrarian protection for the 
problem, but agreed that emergency action to raise prices must be taken; one 
method could be voluntary limitation of acreage. Export quotas, disposal of 
surplus stocks and tariff modification were also discussed; a standing committee 
to monitor the situation was recommended; no agreement was reached on the 
desirable extent of limitation.55 Australian State premiers, who were responsible 
for agriculture, roundly rejected any restriction scheme.56 Bruce warned Prime 
Minister Joseph Lyons to keep an open mind: the new US President, Franklin 
D. Roosevelt, was known to support restriction of production and wheat 
producers’ agreement might well encourage US support for other economic 
measures. League officials believed European tariff mitigation depended on 
reciprocal action by overseas exporters to limit outputs.57
The world conference began amid pessimism, which was to prove justified. 
Concurrent with it, but formally outside its scope, the four principal wheat 
exporters met in a series of discussions that came to assume pivotal importance 
for the success of the conference itself. The United States’ Henry Morgenthau, 
then Head of the US Federal Farm Board and a close friend of Roosevelt, chaired 
discussions; Bruce represented Australia; Bennett led the Canadian delegation, 
and was eager for a solution to the wheat problem. It has been suggested that he 
favoured acreage reduction and that the absence of imperial aid forced Canada 
into seeking ‘a slice of the New Deal’s inflationary action’, working, albeit in a 
subordinate position, with the Americans.58
Looming over discussions was the threat of the huge North American surplus 
and the possibility that US wheat might be dumped onto the international 
market. On 15 June, Bruce repeated an earlier request for instructions. Acting 
Prime Minister, J. G. Latham, replied that Australia was reluctant to surrender 
a tactical advantage in bargaining for removal of trade barriers against meat 
and dairy produce; there were practical difficulties in compulsory restriction 
and State governments opposed the idea.59 Latham’s position was supported 
by representations from wheat industry organisations and by a confidential 
cable from Toronto advising that Bennett’s statements in London were simply 
politicking; informed opinion in Canada considered limitation impractical.60
By 21 June the United States had declared itself willing and indeed anxious 
to restrict acreage and limit exports in the coming season. Canada was at 
55 Ibid., copy of Agreed Statement, submitted by McDougall to Bruce, 19 May 1933.
56 Ibid., Economic 21, letters from Premiers of South Australia, Victoria and New South Wales, 24, 26 and 
27 May 1933.
57 Ibid., Conference 117, part 2, Bruce to Lyons, 30 May 1933.
58 Morriss, Chosen Instrument, p. 47; Holland, ‘Imperial Collaboration’, pp. 115–18.
59 NAA, A981, Conference 117, part 2, Bruce to Lyons, 15 June; Latham to Bruce, 16 June.
60 Ibid., Economic 21, Australian Trade Commissioner in Canada to Commonwealth Government, 21 June 
1933.
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first inclined to make any limitation conditional upon relaxation of import 
restrictions and tariffs, and, like Australia, was hampered by the difficulties of 
a divided jurisdiction. Fear of US dumping, Russian exports and a premature 
announcement of Provincial support helped force Canadian agreement.61 
Argentina was prepared to cooperate. Bruce cabled again. Wheat was becoming 
the pivotal point of the monetary conference and was governing the US attitude 
on wider issues. Australia could be in an embarrassing position if cooperation 
was not given soon. Without agreement, the United States might well flood the 
market, particularly Australia’s new markets in the Far East. The alternative of 
export limitation was now being discussed as well.62 Australian refusal might be 
held responsible for destroying any hope of international action to deal with the 
economic crisis as a whole. A record of discussion, dated 22 August, indicates 
that on 16 June Bruce explained that acreage restriction, if opposed by State 
Governments, would be unenforceable in Australia. Morgenthau then pointed 
out that the US Farm Relief Act would permit dumping of the US surplus 
overseas. At meetings on 19 and 21 June, it became clear that the United States 
and Canada were willing to restrict acreage, while the Argentine representative 
‘stated his conviction’ that his country would accede to a general agreement. On 
21 June, Bruce said he would be prepared to make two suggestions to Canberra: 
acreage restriction, which, he repeated, was ‘difficult if not impossible’; and 
limitation of exports. The latter seems to have been a new suggestion introduced 
into the discussion by Bruce.63
Australian policy had to be reversed, and that quickly, by a federal government 
without power to ensure States’ compliance. Latham was in Melbourne, 
Lyons in far north Queensland, ministers, State premiers and industry leaders 
scattered. Cables flew across the country. For a week the London talks hung 
in the balance. Lyons was persuaded not to consult industry organisations 
for lack of time, but he wanted the States to be consulted.64 Premiers were to 
meet in Melbourne on Saturday, 1 July. Bruce cabled details about alternative 
schemes for crop limitation and export restriction and a further warning that 
Australian refusal would prevent negotiations with European importers. If 
there were any possibility of either scheme being introduced by Australia, an 
indication of tentative acceptance should be given immediately.65 Lyons gave 
general agreement by telegram ‘because impossible for us to be responsible for 
61 Documents on Canadian External Relations [hereinafter DCER], Vol. 5, 1931–1935, ed. Alex I. Inglis, 
Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, 1973, Documents 696 and 697. Secretary of State for External 
Affairs [hereinafter SSEA], Ottawa, to High Commissioner, London, 27 May; SSEA to Canadian Minister in 
Washington, 1 June 1933, pp. 564–6.
62 NAA, A981, Conference 117, part 2, Bruce to Lyons, 21 June.
63 Ibid., ‘Discussions on Wheat in London, May–August 1933’.
64 NAA, A981, Economic 21, Lyons to Latham, 23 June.
65 Ibid., Conference 117, part 2, Bruce to Lyons, 24 June.
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breakdown’, leaving details to Latham and other ministers.66 By 27 June, Bruce 
felt compelled to make some statement, but his explanation of the difficulties 
of State and producer cooperation and of Australia’s determination not to 
participate without concessions from European importers was countered by US 
and Canadian insistence that Europeans would not act without agreement by 
the overseas exporters. Bruce cabled again: the only way to prevent Australia 
being blamed for the deadlock was to make a statement accepting in principle 
some form of restriction.67
Ramsay MacDonald, Chairman of the Monetary and Economic Conference, 
cabled Lyons, pointing to the ‘striking unanimity among countries who 
have hitherto held divergent views [and the] unique opportunity for agreed 
and effective action’.68 MacDonald’s cable was put before premiers who had 
already been advised that Australia was ‘practically forced in her own interests 
to collaborate’. The Australian delegate could not ‘continue to stand aloof 
while others work out a plan which might be less favourable to Australia’.69 
Messages had already been sent to Bruce and MacDonald accepting restriction 
in principle.70 In London, on 30 June, the basis of a scheme to reduce wheat 
production by 15 per cent of the average crop for the years 1931–33 was agreed. 
Canada and the United States would restrict acreage; Argentina and Australia 
would accept an export quota. On 1 July, Australian premiers reluctantly agreed 
to limit wheat exports to 142 million bushels from the 1933–34 harvest and to 
113 million (plus any unexpended quota from the previous year) in 1934–35.71 
The decision was thought so sensitive that Latham took the unusual course 
of telegraphing newspaper editors, inviting ‘sympathetic consideration’ of the 
view ‘in the highest quarters’ that agreement was essential to the success of the 
London conference. Leading articles seemed to show the message had served its 
purpose.72
The four exporters’ agreement in principle was followed by informal, but 
intense and difficult discussions throughout July and August between the four 
and other exporters and importers. Danubian countries and the USSR agreed 
to limitation in principle; importers agreed not to encourage production and 
recognised that higher prices should mean lower tariffs. Although Bruce had 
assumed principal representation in these discussions, he relied heavily on 
66 Ibid., Economic 21, Lyons to Latham, 26 June.
67 Ibid., Conference 117, part 2, Bruce to Commonwealth Government, 27 June.
68 Ibid., MacDonald to Lyons, 28 June.
69 Ibid., Economic 21, letter to all State Premiers from Latham, 26 June.
70 Ibid., Conference 117, part 2, Latham to Bruce and MacDonald, 29 June.
71 Ibid., Lyons to Bruce, 1 July.
72 Ibid., Economic 21, personal and confidential telegram, sent to editors through Commonwealth 
Investigation Branch, 2 July; Latham to NSW Premier, B. S. Stevens, who suggested the idea, 7 July 1933.
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McDougall: ‘if anything comes of the wheat proposal it will be very largely 
due to McDougall’, wrote Orr in September. McDougall’s secretary sent apology 
after apology to Rivett for McDougall’s failure to attend to correspondence.73
The Wheat Advisory Committee
Twenty-two nations reached agreement late in August 1933 but there was to be 
no end to the travail. The agreement established a Wheat Advisory Committee, 
representing all principal exporters and importers, to monitor world supply. 
The committee had a delicate and demanding task. Quotas were based on crop 
estimates; exporters eyed each other with suspicion. Vagaries of weather meant 
unpredictability. The committee was hampered by lack of knowledge: crop 
estimates varied even where information was freely available, but there was 
none from the traditional bogey, the USSR. Nor was there information about US 
stocks in private hands, yet these could be released to the market in response to 
any slight price rise. Seasonal differences meant that planting in one hemisphere 
could not be calculated until accurate crop forecasts were available for the other.
McDougall represented Australia. He played a leading and characteristic role: 
asking questions, summarising, steering discussion, suggesting procedures, 
oiling the wheels.74 The work began in an inauspicious atmosphere, with 
Canadian and US claims that Australian crop estimates were exaggerated, and 
Australian fears that subsidised US wheat was about to flood promising new 
markets in the Far East.75 Producer confidence waned as prices continued to 
fall.76
The committee nevertheless assumed ambitions well beyond mere ‘monitoring’. 
McDougall was member of one subcommittee to consider a minimum price 
scheme and of another to investigate ways of increasing consumption.77 A draft 
scheme, largely drawn up by McDougall early in 1934, provided for scales of 
minimum prices, maintenance of domestic prices at levels to discourage low-
priced exports and limits on export subsidies.78 In commending the proposal 
to governments, the committee described the idea as ‘indispensable for the 
restoration of confidence’ necessary for any effective adjustment of supply 
73 NAA/CSIR, A9778, M14/33/9, Orr to Rivett, 4 September; M14/33/3 and M14/33/9, M. Divine to Rivett, 
22 and 29 June, 6 and 20 July, 24 August 1933.
74 NAA, A981, Conference 117, part 3, Minutes of the Committee for 27–28 November 1933.
75 Ibid., Conference 117, part 2. See in particular communications from Commonwealth Government to 
Bruce, 25 September, 11 and 19 October; Bruce to Lyons, 13 October; Bruce to US Ambassador Bingham, 20 
October; US Embassy, London, to Bruce, 17 November; Bruce to Lyons, 23 November 1933.
76 Ibid., Conference 117, part 3, report by Andrew Cairns, minutes, pp. 27–8.
77 DCER, Vol. 5, Document 716, High Commissioner, London, to SSEA, Ottawa, 29 November 1933, pp. 578–9.
78 NAA, A981, Economic 22, McDougall to Lyons, 15 April 1934.
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to demand.79 The scheme as presented was viewed in the British Ministry of 
Agriculture as ‘naïve to the point of absurdity’; the committee in fact seemed 
to be considering ‘export monopolies under Government control’ in each 
exporting country.80 One official quoted a recent report that Australian State 
aid for wheat farmers was effectively ‘keeping in production land incapable of 
producing payable wheat crops even in normal times’, and added that minimum 
prices would do nothing for the problem of oversupply.81 President of the Board 
of Trade, Walter Runciman, and Minister of Agriculture, Walter Elliot, thought 
the proposals unworkable. Reluctant to offend the dominions and hopeful that 
‘Argentina will not play’, they adopted a policy of ‘wait and see’.82
Argentina obliged, by requesting an extra 40 million bushels of quota. There 
were suspicions Argentine wheat was being dumped on world markets 
and that farmers were encouraged to plant more.83 With inadequate storage 
facilities, Argentina believed it was justified, because neither the United States 
nor Canada had reduced sowing to the agreed level. Fearing an unauthorised 
40 million bushels would create chaos, other exporters agreed to meet the 
request. McDougall believed Argentina might be persuaded by pressure from 
other signatories, particularly Britain. In Bruce’s absence, he urged this course 
in Whitehall, and he persuaded Lyons to send a cable stressing the threat of 
disaster, not just to the agreement but also to ‘the whole idea of international 
collaboration’. The Canadian High Commissioner acted similarly. Urged by 
Canberra and Ottawa, the British Government made diplomatic representations 
in Buenos Aires in cooperation with the United States.84 In the background 
McDougall helped ensure US cooperation, which depended upon British action, 
by informing J. V. A. MacMurray, who was responsible for wheat negotiations 
in the absence of US Ambassador Bingham, as soon as British intentions 
were confirmed.85 Acting as spokesman for the United States and Canada, 
McDougall also sought further help from British ministers to prevent collapse 
of the agreement. Further diplomatic moves failed to dissuade Argentina, which 
refused any commitment ‘inconsistent with their placing upon the world’s 
markets their entire stocks of wheat by the end of December 1934’.86
In the event harvests in all except Argentina were well below expected levels, 
reduced by drought in North America and by poor weather and rising wool 
79 Ibid., section of Committee’s report to Governments, 16 April, attached to letter from McDougall to 
Lyons, 18 April 1934.
80 UKNA, MAF 40/144, memorandum by E. M. H. Lloyd, 1 March 1934.
81 Ibid., note by C. Houghton, 2 March 1934, quoting E. T. Crutchley, UK Trade Commissioner in Australia.
82 Ibid., D. Fergusson to J. R. C. Helmore, 4 May; Elliot to D. E. Vandepeer, 5 May; Vandepeer to Helmore, 7 May 1934.
83 NAA, A981, Economic 22, McDougall to Lyons, 9 and 14 April 1934.
84 Ibid., McDougall to Commonwealth Government, 26 April; Commonwealth Government to Dominions 
Secretary, No. 28, 30 April; Dominions Secretary to Australia and Canada, 3 May 1934.
85 Ibid., McDougall to Lyons, 3 May.




6. ‘The Marriage of Health and 
Agriculture’
Summary
The year 1935 marked the pivotal point in McDougall’s thinking. This chapter 
begins with an account of the development of scientific knowledge of human 
nutritional needs in the early twentieth century, particularly in understanding 
the importance of vitamin-rich ‘protective foods’ such as dairy products, 
vegetables and fruit. Surveys following establishment of dietary standards in 
the 1920s showed that substantial proportions of populations, even in advanced 
countries, could not afford a diet adequate for health. Concerned doctors and 
scientists, including John Boyd Orr, sought action but were met with resistance 
from the British Government, which feared the cost. Measures to increase 
milk consumption were taken in Britain, but on grounds of assistance to the 
agricultural economy.
In 1934 McDougall began to make the connection between poor nutrition and 
restrictive agricultural policies such as extreme protection. His suggestion for 
a campaign by scientists for adequate diets was enthusiastically supported 
by Orr, and by Bruce. McDougall completed his seminal memorandum, ‘The 
Agriculture and the Health Problems’, in early January 1935. This memorandum 
analysed the causes of agricultural problems, argued the benefits of improved 
nutrition and called for a reorientation of agricultural policy, meaning that 
industrial countries should concentrate on producing more of the protective 
foods, benefiting both consumers and producers. The ‘nutrition initiative’ was 
taken up by the International Labour Office at Geneva and the League of Nations; 
both passed resolutions calling for further investigation and action. The League 
established a ‘Mixed Committee’ of lay and specialist members, including 
McDougall, to report on nutrition to the 1936 Assembly and produced a four-
volume report on the subject. Although immediate changes in government 
policies were negligible, nutrition became a subject of wider public debate and 
education.
Starvation in the Midst of Plenty
Nineteenth-century understanding of human nutrition was rudimentary. By 
that century’s end, orthodox theory proposed five food groups: protein for 
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growth, fats and carbohydrates for energy, salts for bones, blood and thyroid 
function, and water. Scientific studies were chiefly concerned with food as 
fuel and requirements in terms of quantity. Despite centuries-old experience 
that scurvy could be prevented by citrus fruit, and more recent experiments 
showing cod-liver oil prevented rickets, the connection between components 
of diet and health had scarcely been made.1 In the early twentieth century, 
understanding of the complex nature of foodstuffs developed. Amino acids 
were identified and shown to be present in differing proportions and types in 
various proteins. In 1901, after prolonged research in the Dutch East Indies, it 
was shown that brown rice would protect against beri-beri. Scientists began to 
suspect the presence of mysterious substances helping to prevent some diseases. 
In 1912 Cambridge chemical physiologist F. Gowland Hopkins published his 
conclusion that ‘minimal quantitative factors’ were likely to play a part in 
prevention of scurvy, while Polish chemist Casimir Funk, then at London’s Lister 
Institute, predicted many diseases would prove to be due to absence from diets 
of ‘special substances…which we call vitamines’.2 Vitamin C was identified in 
the following decade, and its effectiveness was proved in the aftermath of World 
War I when Dr Henriette Chick found that babies in food-starved Vienna did 
not develop scurvy when given orange juice.3 In the 1920s, vitamins A and D 
were identified. Pellagra was shown to be linked to diets based largely on maize, 
although the precise deficiency, vitamin B3 (niacin), was not yet understood.
4
Dietary standards incorporating these early discoveries were devised in the 
1920s. With a standard established, it was possible to calculate the cost of an 
adequate diet. Such exercises invariably showed that cost to be beyond the reach 
of the very poor, while other studies continued to demonstrate the benefits 
of improved diets. Nutrition policy clashed with economic and commercial 
policies. Tension developed between measures to raise agricultural prices and 
efforts to improve health.
In 1928 the French Government asked the League of Nations Health 
Organization to include nutrition in its program, and studies were undertaken 
in several countries, including one on the effect of the economic crisis on health. 
Conferences in Rome and Berlin considered both the effects of the crisis and 
the fundamental problem of establishing an adequate diet. In 1932 Dr George 
McGonigle, Medical Officer in Stockton-on-Tees, showed that tenants who 
were moved into improved housing and obliged to pay higher rents reduced 
1 J. C. Drummond and Anne Wilbraham, The Englishman’s Food: A History of Five Centuries of the English 
Diet, Jonathon Cape, London, 1939, pp. 429–30.
2 Ibid., pp. 498–508; Barbara Griggs, The Food Factor: An Account of the Nutrition Revolution, Penguin, 
London, 1986, pp. 36–8.
3 Ibid., pp. 80–4; Drummond and Wilbraham, The Englishman’s Food, pp. 519, 533–4.
4 Griggs, The Food Factor, pp. 41–50.
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their expenditure on food and suffered a higher incidence of tuberculosis.5 In 
1934 the League commissioned its officers Drs E. Burnet and W. R. Aykroyd to 
investigate nutrition policies in Britain, France, the United States, Denmark, 
Sweden, Norway and the USSR. The Burnet–Aykroyd Report of June 1935 
acknowledged the relationship between nutrition and the economy, as well as 
the need to educate both the medical profession and the public on principles of 
good nutrition.6
Edward Mellanby, best known for his work demonstrating vitamin D deficiency 
as the chief cause of rickets, published works on nutrition, chaired international 
conferences and was a member of many other committees in Britain, including 
the Medical Research Council, of which he was Secretary from 1933 to 1949.7 
From 1927 Mellanby had led fruitless efforts to put the new knowledge 
of nutrition into practice. The Ministry of Health delayed appointment of a 
committee for the purpose and then stacked it with holders of opposing views 
to avoid the ministry having to ‘come down on the side of those with a positive 
policy’. After Mrs Annie Weaving starved herself to death in order to feed her 
seven children, the Week-End Review commissioned the ‘Hungry England’ 
inquiry early in 1933. The Health Ministry committee accepted the inquiry’s 
findings but could not agree on action. The Nutrition Committee of the British 
Medical Association (BMA) published its own report in November 1933, which 
estimated higher needs, at a cost of 5/11d for a working man, compared with 
5 shillings for the ‘Hungry England’ estimate. The ministry, subjected to 
widespread press criticism, condemned the BMA report as ‘a Labour Party tract’ 
and a ‘stunt’ by McGonigle. It feared being involved in ‘a far-reaching economic 
issue, which is most important to avoid—an issue which might easily affect 
wages, cost of food, doles etc’. A joint committee of BMA and ministry nutrition 
committees agreed on a compromise sliding scale of minimum needs; the ministry 
committee chairman resigned on the issue and the ministry continued to deny 
any connection between low incomes and mortality.8 The ministry response 
demonstrates the difficulty of persuading governments to tackle the question of 
cost inherent in the problem of nutrition.
Industry promotion could persuade consumers of the nutritive value of particular 
foods, increasing sales and farm incomes. In the United States, the dairy industry 
promoted the nutritional value of milk. Biochemist Elmer McCollum, who had 
identified vitamin A, wrote magazine articles at the request of the industry, 
5 ‘Poverty, Nutrition and the Public Health’, published in Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine. See 
Susan McLaurin, ‘McGonigle, George Cuthbert Mura (1889–1939)’, ODNB, 2004, <http://www.oxforddnb.
com.virtual.anu.edu.au/view/article/60875> [accessed 20 March 2005].
6 LN, ‘Nutrition and Public Health’, Quarterly Bulletin of the Health Organization, Vol. IV, no. 2, June 1935. 
Also published separately as Offprint No. 2 of the Quarterly Bulletin.
7 B. S. Platt, ‘Mellanby, Sir Edward (1884–1955)’, rev. Michael Bevan, ODNB, 2004, <http://www.
oxforddnb.com.virtual.anu.edu.au/view/article/34980> [accessed 22 November 2005].
8 Mayhew, ‘The 1930s Nutrition Controversy’, pp. 447–52.
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promoting the value of milk as ‘the greatest of all protective foods’. McCollum 
joined the US Advisory Committee on Alimentation, established in 1918, and 
contributed popular articles on nutrition to McCall’s Magazine for more than 20 
years. US milk consumption doubled between 1918 and 1928, as did demand for 
lettuces; orange consumption tripled.9
Milk led the way in demonstrating the importance of nutrition and in state-
sponsored schemes for greater consumption in Britain. During the 1920s a 
number of experiments, including EMB-funded work in Scotland, appeared to 
show improved growth rates in children. The intention, according to Orr’s own 
account, was to ‘show the nutritive value of milk and increase the sale of the 
more profitable liquid milk’.10 The results influenced nutrition pioneer Gowland 
Hopkins and George Newman, Chief Medical Officer of both the Ministry of 
Health and the Board of Education. In the 1930s more surveys were supported 
by the Milk Marketing Board and were complemented by animal experiments—
some conducted at the Rowett Institute. ‘The connecting theme in much of 
this milk-feeding experimentation was the influence of John Boyd Orr.’ Orr 
became convinced ‘that an increased consumption of milk was important, 
especially for children’. Peter J. Atkins suggests that the research agenda may 
have been influenced by ‘Orr’s wish to use the results as a political lever. The 
underlying science was at times questionable but the publicity was positive 
and Orr’s political and networking skills are not in doubt.’ By 1933 more than 
one million British children received school milk, either as charitable feeding 
under the Education Acts or from voluntary milk clubs, increasing, from 1927, 
with encouragement from the National Milk Publicity Council. The milk club 
scheme provided a new market for some 9 million gallons per annum. It was 
taken over by the Milk Marketing Board in 1934 and funded by the Ministry of 
Agriculture for £1 million over two years. Half the elementary school population 
participated by 1939.11
The purpose, however, was to meet the economic needs of agriculture, rather 
than the health needs of the population. Milk and dairy products were second 
only to ‘fatstock’ in the gross agricultural product of England and Wales; the 
milk sector alone represented 27 per cent of the total. Some three-quarters of 
members of the National Farmers’ Union were milk producers to some extent; 
with the ‘generally distressed nature of agriculture’ in the 1920s and 1930s, 
farmers shifted towards milk production. Walter Elliot, in opposition in 1929, 
managed passage of a Private Member’s Bill that became the Education (Scotland) 
9 Griggs, The Food Factor, pp. 76–7. See also E. Melanie DuPuis, Nature’s Perfect Food: How Milk Became 
America’s Drink, New York University Press, New York, 2002.
10 Orr, As I Recall, p. 114.
11 Peter J. Atkins, ‘Fattening Children or Fattening Farmers? School Milk in Britain, 1921–1941’, Economic 
History Review, Vol. LVIII, no. 1, 2005. Atkins notes that a 1987 thesis by E. C. Petty questions the reliability 
and methodology of the surveys, which were also controversial at the time.
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Act of 1930, enabling Scottish authorities to provide subsidised or free school 
milk: ‘His main argument was one of efficiency: pupils would get more from 
their education and taxpayers would have a better return for their investment in 
education.’12 As Minister of Agriculture from September 1932, Elliot introduced 
a second Agricultural Marketing Act and oversaw establishment of the Milk 
Marketing Board in September 1933. The Marketing Acts gave boards of 
producers ‘powers of compulsion in the creation of a monopoly’, in accordance 
with Elliot’s view on the necessity for planning, since the ‘fundamental failure’ 
of agrarian capitalism must be countered by ‘restructuring along corporatist 
lines with guidance and support from the State’.13 By then Elliot had moved 
away from the imperial solution, opposing dominion preference and pressing 
for greater self-sufficiency in dairy products. But the Ottawa decisions ‘derailed’ 
that policy. Preference for imports of empire dairy products meant a milk 
surplus, which, without those imports, ‘would have found a profitable outlet in 
manufacturing’. In 1934, therefore, Elliot introduced a Milk Act to ‘compensate 
farmers and manufacturers for the sacrifice of their interests at Ottawa’. As part 
of that legislation, he proposed a ‘Milk in Schools’ scheme, inspired, like his 
1930 Act, by Orr’s experiments. He won Cabinet support, however, ‘with an 
agricultural and economic rather than a nutritional or public health rhetoric’.14
Although the Milk Act subsidy for butter and cheese manufacture was three 
times the budget of school milk, Treasury feared the school measure might 
create a precedent for welfare food and clothing. While social reformers 
lobbied departments of health, agriculture and education in favour of poverty 
alleviation and provision of a basic diet, demanding wider provision of free 
milk (then available only on certification by the local medical officer), the Board 
of Education continued to claim that child malnutrition had been exaggerated. 
The ‘progressive dairy legislation’ of 1934 was possible ‘only because it appealed 
to the self-interest of the farming and milk trade lobbies’. Weight is added to 
this contention by the failure of attempts to have only pasteurised milk supplied 
and to make available more supplies of free or cheaper milk. Such measures were 
‘perceived as threatening the prosperity of dairy farmers and milk traders’.15
The primary aim of the 1933 Agricultural Marketing Act was to establish ‘an 
equilibrium of price levels’. Market-supply provisions of the Act promised ‘to 
effectively control the “glut” of production which was perceived as swamping 
agricultural prices’. There was some backlash against Elliot’s orderly marketing 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. Atkins is here drawing upon Fenton Cooper, British Agricultural Policy 1912–36: A Study in 
Conservative Politics, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1989, Chapter IX: ‘Walter Elliot and the 
Corporatist Challenge’, pp. 160–80.
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
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approach, on the grounds of rising prices for domestic staples.16 Orr records 
his own opposition to the idea of producers’ boards, since they would increase 
the cost of essential foods. As a member of a committee appointed to reorganise 
the Milk Marketing Board when it was threatened with bankruptcy because of 
oversupply of liquid milk, he pleaded, alone and in vain, for a plan to increase 
milk production. Orr was happier with later outcomes: funding to publicise 
the benefits of milk consumption, expansion of the school milk scheme and, in 
wartime, milk supplies distributed on the basis of need.17
In the mid 1930s, Orr worked on broad population surveys of diet and income, 
covering 1152 families divided into six income groups. Results were published 
in his book Food, Health and Income.18 The work was supported by Elliot and 
through him by the Agricultural Marketing Boards.19 When the survey results 
were in final stages of preparation for publication, however, ‘a very senior civil 
servant’ ordered civil servants to cease working on them. Orr and McGonigle 
were threatened with deregistration if they went ahead with a broadcast on the 
survey. McGonigle, still a practising doctor, withdrew; Orr broadcast alone. 
Fearing repercussions for civil servants, including staff at the Rowett Institute, 
Orr determined to publish under his own name, though much of the work 
had been done by others. In 1935, lest publication be somehow prevented, 
he delivered a public lecture, to which his friend, journalist Ritchie Calder, 
invited a large press contingent. ‘Sensational reports’ of the findings followed. 
Harold Macmillan agreed to publish; despite official displeasure, Food, Health 
and Income first appeared in 1936 and went through three editions. Orr recalled:
The Establishment put up the strongest possible resistance to informing 
the public of what the true position was regarding under-nourishment 
among their fellow-citizens…The thought of mothers and children 
suffering malnutrition because they were too poor to afford the more 
expensive health foods was intolerable. At that time these foods were 
so abundant that the government was taking measures to reduce 
production so as to increase retail prices. I had never lost my hatred and 
anger against unnecessary poverty. Now, as a scientist, I had the chance 
of giving expression to that anger.20
16 Cooper, British Agricultural Policy, pp. 167–71, 174–5.
17 Orr, As I Recall, pp. 112–13.
18 John Boyd Orr, Food, Health and Income: A Report on a Survey of Adequacy of Diet in Relation to Income, 
second edn, Macmillan, London, 1937.
19 Orr, As I Recall, p. 115.
20 Ibid., pp. 115–18.
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Countering ‘intolerable pessimism’
For McDougall and Bruce, the failures in 1933 to solve the international 
monetary crisis, and more particularly the wheat crisis, were to prove a profound 
disappointment but, ultimately, a turning point. It took little more than a year 
for McDougall to devise what they could believe to be a way out of the morass.
Writing in The Times, McDougall condemned—in words Bruce had used at the 
Economic Conference, but which could easily have been his own—the ‘doctrine 
of intolerable pessimism’ regarding restriction of production as a method of 
restoring prosperity to a poverty-stricken world.21 Groping for an answer 
to ‘intransigent economic nationalism’, he suggested an expanded imperial 
grouping with tariff protection, based on complementary trade. It could include 
close economic partners like Denmark and Argentina, and politically associated 
units like Egypt and Iraq. Free trade would not do, because it could not take 
account of national aspirations: France must grow wheat, Australia must have 
factories. He acknowledged difficulties in applying an Ottawa-type efficiency 
requirement to agriculture, but maintained that world trade would be strangled 
without some limitation on agricultural development in industrial nations.22 
‘McDougall must be a rather disillusioned man nowadays, but he obviously 
intends to fight to the last’, commented Rivett.23
The summer months of 1934 were spent in tough negotiations under the 
International Wheat Agreement and with the British Government on the Ottawa 
meat quota. McDougall’s partnership with Bruce strengthened and settled into 
the mode of operation they would follow for the next decade: McDougall writing 
memoranda and suggesting courses of action, each then lobbying at appropriate 
levels for agreed purposes. Bruce had ‘further improved in the width of his 
outlook and the sanity of his point of view’. 
He and I are doing our utmost in all sorts of ways to convince the British 
Ministers and other influential persons of the extremely grave danger 
of the undue expansion of British agriculture to the detriment of Great 
Britain’s imports from the dominions. I think we are having some success. 
They were urging appointment of a committee to study the problem of 
agricultural costs being higher in Britain than in the dominions, its report to be 
considered by all empire governments.24 At the same time, McDougall recorded 
21 ‘Aid for British Agriculture’, The Times, 13 March 1934—the second of a series of three, published 
anonymously on consecutive days, under the general title ‘Factory and Farm’; copies sent to Rivett in NAA/
CSIR, A10666, [4].
22 Third article, ‘Planning for Reciprocity’, The Times, 14 March. It was supported by a leading article of 
the same date.
23 NAA/CSIR, A9778, M14/34/3, Rivett to Casey, 24 March 1934.
24 Ibid., M14/34/8, McDougall to Rivett, 19 July 1934.
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disappointment with Walter Elliot’s alignment with British producers’ interests. 
He had urged him to aim to be ‘a good Minister rather than…a superlatively 
good Minister of Agriculture’. He thought Elliot took the point, but ‘I have 
not seen any sign of a change of heart’. Elliot had, nevertheless, been ‘quite 
enthusiastic’ about The Times articles, which McDougall showed him before 
publication since they implied ‘serious criticism’ of his policy.25
Much of 1934 thus constituted a period of uneasy transition for McDougall, 
mopping up after Ottawa and admitting the existence of worldwide problems 
needing a global solution. Although his work on the Wheat Agreement had 
required him to think and act well beyond the British imperial framework, 
his thinking was still limited to a considerable extent by the empire idea. The 
period was also marked by a new personal relationship, possibly begun in Rome, 
where McDougall had attended his first meeting of the governing body of the 
International Institute of Agriculture in April. In May, Elspeth Huxley wrote 
delightedly that the friendship with ‘the Italian Bavarian ski champion…sounds 
excellent’. In August, just before attending the League Assembly, McDougall 
spent two weeks in a French mountain village near Geneva. Elspeth hoped ‘the 
mountain air is toning up the tissues, and the wide views soothing the spirit, 
and the companionship satisfying both the soul and the body’. She was later 
delighted to learn that ‘the walking tour was a success…It sounds fun and you 
deserve a bit of affection…Hurray for the signora!’ She continued to respond 
gleefully from travels in the United States as the relationship with ‘Beattie’ 
progressed.26 The correspondence provides no further information about the 
lady, and the relationship seems to have lasted only a year or two.
McDougall wrote to Elspeth in a depressed mood from Geneva, prompting her 
to reply: ‘you took a very defeatist point of view about the achievements of 
the past five years and evidently the atmosphere of Geneva is damping the 
optimist which is such an essential and characteristic part of your makeup.’27 
But perhaps the ‘satisfaction of soul and body’ proved a catalyst to creative 
thinking. In October, happily reunited with ‘Beattie’ in Rome, McDougall first 
publicly made the connection between nutrition and agricultural policy. At the 
IIA, he welcomed a British speech calling for increased consumption, but added 
that decreasing consumption was a consequence of prices raised by extreme 
protection. At the same time, national conscience in many countries was being 
aroused by new understanding of the importance of diet to human welfare:
...it was to be hoped that the nations would soon realise how much it was 
to their own advantage to enable their people to obtain adequate supplies 
25 Ibid., A10666, [4], McDougall to Rivett, 13 March 1934.
26 NLA, MS6890/2/5, 3 May, 23 August, 22 and 30 September 1934.
27 Ibid., 22 September 1934.
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of such valuable human foods as dairy products, meat and fruit…A 
wide application of the doctrine of autar[k]y means the persistence 
of poverty in the midst of plenty with disastrous consequences to the 
whole world.28
He had suggested in 1932 that decline in demand for foods such as fruit and 
vegetables was not a result of glut, but of ‘financial maladjustment’. Earlier he 
had also suggested encouraging greater consumption of liquid milk, for health 
reasons. The leap in 1934 was to connect poor diets with restrictive agricultural 
policies. Although the connection was made, the only remedies suggested in 
that speech were avoidance of extreme protection and reduction of internal 
costs. The IIA could help by studying factors involved in production costs; 
these costs would include protection.
Figure 12 F. L. McDougall at the Institute of Agriculture, Rome. McDougall 
is seated in the centre of the back row. 
Source: E. McDougall.
Once back in London, McDougall decided that a direct attack on high agrarian 
protection could not succeed in the short term and he moved with speed to devise 
a campaign to tackle the problem in another way: ‘Possibly a fruitful method 
28 NAA/CSIR, A9778, M14/34/12, ‘Summary of Speech made by Mr F. L. McDougall in the general 
discussion which arose on Item 8 of the Agenda’, sent to Rivett, 8 November 1934.
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would be a rally of scientific and medical opinion in favour of a reasonable 
standard of nutrition.’29 Bruce was persuaded. Orr was already ‘giving as much 
publicity as possible to the urgent need for a food policy based on health needs’ 
in speeches, writings and broadcasts.30 On 2 November, McDougall consulted 
him about 
a point of view which, I think, should be pushed forward in every 
possible way, both nationally and internationally. In brief, I think the 
time has come when, in the interest of world recovery and the prosperity 
of the peoples of the British Empire, it is necessary to secure the greatest 
possible notice for modern ideas about nutrition. 
Orr should launch the campaign with ‘a letter of great weight’ to The Times, 
warning of statisticians’ predictions of a stationary population in Britain unless 
infant and child mortality rates were reduced, and stressing the beneficial effect 
on those rates of adequate diet. The objective would be to increase demand, 
first in Britain and then in other countries, for milk and other dairy products, 
fruit and probably meat.31 The suggested diet, and its emphasis on dairy foods 
in particular, reflects the Eurocentric nature of most early research in nutrition. 
I am grateful to Barry Higman for pointing out that promotion in pioneering 
nutrition campaigns of a diet based on European preferences has had significant 
consequences for world food production.
Orr replied eagerly on 6 November. A similar idea had been ‘fermenting in my 
innards…during the last month or two’. Had it not been for his friendship with 
Elliot, he would have taken ‘a running kick’ at the milk-marketing scheme: ‘as 
near national lunacy as makes no difference.’ There was ‘a great expandable 
market for dairy products, fruit and meat’: production was not yet at a level 
equivalent to the amounts needed for the general health of the community. ‘The 
present schemes tend far too much to maintain the status quo on the unproved 
assumption that there is a glut.’ He suggested an imperial scheme encouraging 
consumption of liquid milk ‘until it reached a pint per head per day, which 
would double the output of dairy farming in this country’, yet still allow New 
Zealand and Australia to send butter until ‘every household in the country is 
using butter and has stopped the use of margarine’, which was then cheap, of 
poor quality and thought to lack the nutritional benefits of butter.32
McDougall was already mapping out a broader campaign
29 NAA/CSIR, A9778, M14/34/12, McDougall to Rivett, 8 November 1934.
30 Orr, As I Recall, p. 115.
31 Copy sent to Rivett in NAA/CSIR, A9778, M14/34/12.
32 Ibid.
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to try to get scientific and medical opinion to express views, to which 
wide publicity could be given, and then to try and get the Health 
Section of the League of Nations working and to get the International 
Institute of Agriculture at Rome to obtain and publish comparative 
figures on the consumption per caput of milk, dairy products, fruit and 
meat, in Western Europe, United States, Great Britain, Scandinavia and 
the Dominions.33
He attended a meeting of the Wheat Advisory Committee in Budapest from mid 
November until early December, but had a rough draft of a memorandum by 17 
December. A second draft followed on 9 January 1935, a third on 24 January.34 
Copies were distributed to contacts from the Wheat Advisory Committee: a letter 
to Norman Robertson of the External Affairs Department in Ottawa suggested 
showing it to O. D. Skelton. Another was sent to Mordecai Ezekiel of the US 
Agricultural Adjustment Administration, from whom Elspeth Huxley had 
learned something of malnutrition figures in the United States, with a request 
that it be shown to Agriculture Secretary, Henry Wallace, as a personal, not an 
official Australian, paper.35
‘The Agricultural and the Health Problems’
The final form of the memorandum runs to fourteen and a half double-spaced, 
typed pages.36 It has a strong claim to being the most significant memorandum 
McDougall ever wrote. Yet there are some oddities. The title, with its two 
definite articles, reads awkwardly in English, perhaps less so in the League’s 
other official language, French. Titles of earlier drafts varied, some having no 
articles; the final could be an infelicitous result of re-translation. But there 
seems little doubt that McDougall himself intended the final form. He was a 
meticulous draftsman and editor: League files contain many examples of his 
minor corrections. He was unlikely to have let any version pass without scrutiny. 
When the memorandum was published by FAO in 1956, McDougall, although 
officially retired, still spent time in his office and was involved at least to some 
extent in the publication.37 It must be concluded that the two articles are there 
for emphasis: there are two problems and McDougall is proposing a solution 
for both of them. There is evidence, however, that McDougall was not entirely 
happy with the title. A letter to his mother, dated simply 7 May, but presumably 
33 Ibid., Orr to McDougall, 6 November; McDougall to Rivett, 8 November 1934.
34 NAA/CSIR, A9778/4, M1 N43, related correspondence.
35 NAC, MG30 E163, Vol. 4, File 7(1–4), Mgl–Nar, Wheat Advisory Committee, Wheat Export 1938, both 
letters dated 26 February 1935.
36 NLA, MS6890/4/4 and MS6890/4/6. The version published in more lavish layout by FAO is 17 pages long.
37 Ibid., MS6890/5/4, The McDougall Memoranda, FAO, Rome, 1956.
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written in 1935, describes a discussion between McDougall, Earl De la Warr, 
Parliamentary Secretary at the Ministry of Agriculture, and David Lubbock, 
Orr’s son-in law and assistant on the nutrition campaign, concerning ‘a good 
title or phrase for our campaign’. He wrote: ‘“Agriculture and Health” all right 
for the initiated, “Increased consumption” sounds rather poor. The best phrase 
we could think of was “More Abundant Life”. I don’t wholly like it. Can you 
give me any suggestions?’38
McDougall’s memoranda were working documents and generally pedestrian in 
style. Arresting statements were reserved for speeches. The opening sentence 
of this memorandum is both awkward and dreary: ‘Although the diagnosticians 
of the continuance of the depression vary in the emphasis they place upon the 
causes retarding world recovery, there would be general agreement today that 
the problems facing world agriculture are major factors.’ From then on, happily, 
the memorandum becomes clear and persuasive. It includes some of the best 
exposition to be found in McDougall’s work—for example: ‘It would argue a 
bankruptcy of statesmanship if it should prove impossible to bring together 
a great unsatisfied need for highly nutritious food and the immense potential 
production of modern agriculture.’39
Considering the breadth of its subject matter, the memorandum is remarkably 
brief and simple. In 16 points, it summarises arguments McDougall had been 
making, in some cases for many years. It begins with the causes of agricultural 
problems: science-based increases in production levels, high protectionism 
and increasing US reliance on exports for economic recovery. The placement of 
the agricultural problems first, as in the title, is significant: this is the primary 
anxiety of statesmen everywhere.
Nutrition, however, takes up nine pages—the greater part of the text. McDougall 
makes it clear that ‘the very important question’ of nutrition in Asian countries 
is not dealt with; responsibility for a solution lies in the first place with ‘the 
more advanced countries’ where quantities of food consumed are generally 
adequate, but where substantial sections of populations—perhaps 10 million in 
the United Kingdom—suffer nutritional deficiencies of
first and foremost milk, then fresh fruit and vegetables, dairy products 
including eggs and, for large masses of the poorer sections…meat. These 
commodities are exactly those which are causing the greatest concern 
to the Governments of the more advanced countries, whether normally 
importing or exporting agricultural products.40
38 NLA, MS6890/1/10.
39 The McDougall Memoranda, p. 6. Page numbers here and following refer to the printed version, not an 
earlier typed copy.
40 Ibid., pp. 5–7.
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McDougall’s suggestions for tackling the problem rest largely on education and 
efforts to make the protective foods more affordable for the poor: ‘If a start 
was made in the United Kingdom and the United States of America through 
the mobilisation of scientific and medical opinion and the securing of adequate 
publicity, the results might be expected rapidly to spread to other countries.’ 
An education effort could be assisted by international bodies—the League, the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) and the IIA—providing useful facts and 
figures. He suggests ‘special prominence’ be given at the 1935 League General 
Assembly, to be followed by an international conference on agriculture and 
health, in which ‘the United States might be expected to play an important 
part’.41
He devotes two pages to the benefits of improved nutrition, which include 
better health and improved birthrates. ‘The immense potential demand’ of the 
US population could avoid the possibility of the world’s greatest creditor nation 
expanding her own agricultural exports. Improved nutrition as administration 
policy would mean no exports of meat or dairy products and more grain 
required for stockfeed.42 The advantage of his proposal for industrial countries 
is ‘an opportunity for a reorientation of agricultural policy; they could 
continue to protect efficient production but increased demand would allow 
of a simultaneous increase of import trade with beneficial effects upon their 
industrial export industries’. For agricultural countries, the policy means more 
export opportunities.43
Propaganda alone will not solve the problem; the poor need help to afford 
the right foods; state intervention may be necessary. McDougall suggests that 
President Roosevelt’s championing of ‘the cause of social justice’ has eased the 
way, as has the likely realisation that the alternative is ‘not a swing back to the 
right, but wild schemes of confiscation from the extreme left’. This fear has 
brought conservative leaders in other countries to discussion of ways to secure 
‘a more equitable distribution of wealth’.44
Methods of state intervention are discussed briefly. ‘Social provision’, food as 
relief, is applied as free distribution in some countries, more to relieve pressing 
economic problems than for health. McDougall suggests universal provision 
of nutritious school lunches as a method less likely to lower the morale of 
recipients. Free education is widely accepted, but ‘education given to under-
nourished children is frequently wasted’. The cost would be largely offset by 
savings in medical costs and of subsidies presently made to agriculture.45
41 Ibid., pp. 7–8.
42 Ibid., pp. 8–10.
43 Ibid., p. 17.
44 Ibid., pp. 10–11.
45 Ibid., pp. 12–13.
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Distribution costs are high in urban areas of Britain and the United States, 
but lower in countries where there are retail markets without extra charges 
for delivery, packaging and credit. McDougall wonders about replacing milk 
deliveries with central milk pumps, rather like petrol stations with facilities 
added to sterilise containers. Distribution of essential commodities like milk, 
and preliminary processing like flour milling, might be treated as public utilities 
rather than profit-making enterprises—this from a member of a prominent 
milling family!46 He demonstrates the high profitability of such enterprises in a 
note showing the rise in share prices of four British companies: United Dairy, 
Tate & Lyall, Spillers and Ranks, which have at least doubled since 1928; some 
have trebled or quadrupled.47
Finally the effect of high protection policies is shown: butter prices in Paris are 
more than three times those in Britain. While conceding that agricultural policies 
in Europe have to maintain a high population of peasant farmers, McDougall 
calls for a simultaneous commitment to farmers’ efficiency: ‘An aroused public 
conscience might well insist that the price the farmer must pay for protection 
is reasonably high efficiency and prices must not be unduly restrictive on the 
consumption of the poorer classes.’48
‘Mr McDougall’s action in the Assembly’
In March 1935, McDougall travelled to Geneva and Rome. Orr sent ahead of him 
an introduction to W. R. Aykroyd, joint author of the League Health Committee 
Report. H. R. Cummings of the League organisation in Britain also wrote to 
Aykroyd, foreshadowing both Australian and British action on the issue.49 The 
ground was being carefully prepared. Aykroyd read the memorandum, noting 
that his own report had marshalled evidence for McDougall’s proposition that 
subnormal nutrition was the rule, rather than the exception, in even the best-
fed countries. ‘On purely health grounds [the Health Committee] must be in 
sympathy with Mr Bruce and his colleagues.’ But more than sympathy was 
needed: ‘By taking a definite standpoint as regards diet [health organisations] 
can indirectly influence economic policy.’50
Copies of the memorandum spread. Dr Ludwik Rajchmann, Director of the 
League Health Secretariat, requested a dozen more copies, and found Grace 
46 Ibid., pp. 13–14.
47 This note is not included in FAO’s publication The McDougall Memoranda. A version in NLA (MS6890/4/4) 
does include it; that in NLA (MS6890/4/6) does not.
48 NLA, MS6890/5/4, printed version, pp. 14–16.
49 LN, 1933–46, 8A, 17356/2133, Orr to Aykroyd, 11 March; 1933–46, 8A, 17008/8855, Cummings to 
Aykroyd, 8 March 1935.
50 Ibid., note by Aykroyd, 15 March 1935.
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Abbott, head of the US ILO delegation, most interested.51 A draft ILO resolution 
was in preparation by 9 April; cooperation between both organisations was 
rapid and effective. League officials approved the ILO draft, adding a clause 
affirming cooperation with the League Economic Organization and the IIA. 
Correspondence referred to ‘Mr McDougall’s action in the Assembly’ or 
‘l’initiative McDougall’.52
At the Nineteenth ILO Conference in June, the report of the Director-General 
referred to problems of nutrition; statements were made by Miss Abbott and by 
Australian and New Zealand representatives. Australia’s Sir Frederick Stewart 
moved a resolution calling for continued investigation into the relationship 
between nutrition and productive capacity, and for cooperation, particularly on 
the social aspects of nutrition, with the League and the International Institute 
of Agriculture. It was ‘warmly supported’.53
Australia, with much to gain, supported the move at every level. The Prime 
Minister and his wife visited Europe briefly that summer. In Geneva on 23 June, 
Lyons toured the new League building, then nearing completion, visited the ILO 
and lunched with senior officials. In Rome on 28 June, he had ‘a very nice chat’ 
through an interpreter in an audience with the Pope, but ‘found it difficult to 
discuss anything fully’. With the Cardinal Secretary of State, he discussed ‘the 
matter referred to in a memorandum re agriculture and production—the need 
for greater consumption of good food’.54 The memorandum was presumably 
McDougall’s. Lyons explained to the Cardinal his hope that the Pope might issue 
a pronouncement
drawing attention to the present mad policy of trade barriers [as a 
result of which] large numbers of people were suffering from the 
effects of insufficient and unsuitable food [although] there was actually 
overproduction in the world of all that they required. It was useless for 
any politician to draw attention to this, as he would be said to have an 
axe to grind, but if the Holy Father would speak to the world those in 
power might grapple with the evil.
The Cardinal Secretary requested a memorandum for consideration of the 
question.55 The memorandum was subsequently presented. McDougall was at 
51 LN, 1933–46, 8A, 2133/2133, Rajchmann to McDougall, 11 June 1935.
52 Ibid., 17649/2133.
53 Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers: 1934–35–36–37, Vol. II, no. 216, ‘ILO: Report of Australian 
Delegation to 19th Session 1935’.
54 NAA, A461/10, 748/1/361, part 2, extract of an undated private note from F. J. McKenna of the Prime 
Minister’s Department to Australia’s External Affairs Liaison Officer in London, Keith Officer. Confidential 
copy sent to W. R. Hodgson in Canberra.
55 Australian Joint Copying Project, DO35/853, reel 5334, report from British Legation to the Holy See to Sir 
Samuel Hoare, 29 June 1935. According to this report, Lyons did seek to raise the issue with the Pope, who 
also requested a memorandum.
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first ‘a little horrified’ to learn it had been issued to the press, but later amused 
by the ‘vivid, not to say sentimental’ tone of a leading article on the subject in 
the London Catholic weekly, the Table, and, in general, delighted by ‘the interest 
in the Agriculture and Health movement in this country’. Rivett responded that 
the idea was ‘getting some push from Canberra’ and that the Director-General of 
Health had been instructed to pay close attention to nutrition.56
McDougall would have worked closely with Bruce on his speeches for the League 
Assembly; it was their habit to work even as they travelled on the overnight 
train from Paris to Geneva.57 Inclusion of nutrition on the agenda of the Second 
Committee (Technical Subjects) was co-sponsored by Australia with Argentina, 
Austria, Britain, Canada, Chile, Denmark, France, Italy, New Zealand, Poland 
and Sweden.58
Figure 13 Assembly of the League of Nations, 1934. 
Source: E. McDougall.
On 11 September, Bruce introduced it in Plenary Session, ignoring accepted 
practice that introductory speeches be general in character. He suggested 
56 NAA/CSIR, A10666, 30[4], McDougall to Rivett, 4 and 11 October; Rivett to McDougall, 31 October 1935.
57 Interview, Professor J. G. Starke, April 1988.
58 LN, Official Journal, 1935, Records of 16th Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Third Plenary Meeting, 11 
September, p. 42.
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first that the dominating anxiety of the Abyssinian crisis—then threatening 
the principle of collective action to maintain peace and already referred to 
the League Council—should be avoided lest the problem be exacerbated. 
Instead, in a speech far more compelling than McDougall’s memorandum, he 
recalled that the League’s responsibilities extended to economic, humanitarian 
and social issues, and that the question of nutrition had been placed on the 
agenda of the Second Committee. National health, he said, was the basis of 
the wellbeing of every nation. Sanitation and infectious disease control had 
already been the subjects of government regulation to the incalculable benefit 
of populations. Now science, as shown in the League’s own Burnet–Aykroyd 
Report, provided new means of controlling disease and misery with adequate 
nutrition. The problem was to make the more expensive protective foods widely 
available. Yet ministers of agriculture were wrestling with problems of apparent 
overproduction:
Increased yields are being regretted and abundance is often officially 
deplored. At the same time Ministers of Health and their official and 
medical advisers are realising, more and more, that public health 
demands an increased consumption of many of the very products about 
which the Departments of Agriculture are so unhappy.
Millions of pounds are being spent annually in subsidies, bonuses 
and other forms of assistance to agriculture. Side by side with that 
expenditure millions of pounds are being devoted to combating disease. 
Is it not possible to marry health and agriculture and, by so doing, make 
a great step in the improvement of national health and, at the same time, 
an appreciable contribution to the solution of the agricultural problem.59
Introducing a draft resolution in Second Committee, Bruce argued the suggestion 
was neither idealistic nor impracticable. Economic, political and social sciences 
had lagged behind the physical and other sciences. Even in the United States it 
was admitted that six million children were malnourished. A first objective might 
be elimination of malnutrition in ‘the richest and most developed countries’, 
with improvement for the ‘teeming millions’ in undeveloped countries ‘a long-
range objective’. Action should not wait until the economic situation improved; 
progress must be gradual but should start immediately. He listed some practical 
measures and ‘submitted that action to bring about the greater consumption 
of health-giving foodstuffs would not only be beneficial to public health and 
efficiency but would bring about greater demand, larger production, increased 
and freer trade, and better financial conditions’.60 Bruce would later emphasise 
59 Ibid., Fourth Plenary Meeting, 11 September, pp. 51–3. Bruce’s speech was also published in The 
McDougall Memoranda, pp. 18–24.
60 Ibid., Records of 16th Assembly, Minutes of the Second Committee, 19 September, pp. 15–17.
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that the nutrition case was not based on ‘high moral principles, but purely on 
economics’, quoting ‘an American’ who told Orr that ‘this idea of the marriage 
of food and agriculture is the starting-handle of the whole economic recovery 
of the world’. Bruce added: ‘That point has to be stressed, because it’s drifted 
away from hard economic fact and is now mainly governed by humanitarian 
considerations.’61
Delegates appeared to turn with relief from a problem they seemed unable to 
solve, in Abyssinia, to action they could take. Seventeen delegations joined in, 
spreading the committee debate over three days, ‘to the surprise even of Geneva 
idealists’.62 Britain’s Earl de la Warr spoke of ‘a challenge to statesmanship no 
one could afford to ignore’: while Britain could not retreat from ‘the policy 
of planning the market’ undertaken in recent years, ‘such planning should be 
for the purpose of expansion rather than restriction’.63 Denmark’s Christiani 
endorsed Bruce’s ‘masterly speech’.64 Gautier of France ‘agreed entirely’, spoke 
of the need to improve the purchasing power of the agriculturalist, and urged 
the importance of education, ‘since mankind was confronted with conditions 
of existence which were entirely new and called for education of a new kind. 
Hundreds of millions of persons were living in a constant state of semi-
starvation.’65 Italy’s Fera admitted that his country had adopted measures of 
restriction, but was ‘prepared to co-operate most loyally’ with the governments 
that shared her determination to remove ‘the obstacles standing in the way of 
the natural interchange of goods’.66
Some delegates offered examples of measures already taken in their own countries 
in provision of milk and other foods to children and the needy; all supported 
the need for further inquiry. The Second Committee appointed a drafting 
committee, including McDougall, to prepare the final text of a resolution, which 
it approved on 25 September. On 27 September the Assembly resolved that 
governments should examine the practical means of securing better nutrition 
and requested the Council
(1) To invite the Health Organisation of the League of Nations to continue 
and extend its work on nutrition in relation to public health;
(2) To instruct the technical organisations of the League of Nations, in 
consultation with the International Labour Office and the International 
61 Edwards, Bruce of Melbourne, p. 416.
62 Hudson, Australia and the League of Nations, p. 177.
63 LN, Official Journal, 1935, Minutes of the Second Committee, 19 September, p. 17.
64 Ibid., 20 September, p. 18.
65 Ibid., p. 23.
66 Ibid., 21 September, p. 25.
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Institute of Agriculture, to collect, summarise and publish information 
on the measures taken in all countries for securing improved nutrition 
and,
(3) To appoint a Committee, including agricultural, economic and health 
experts, instructed to submit a general report on the whole question, 
in its health and economic aspects, to the next Assembly, after taking 
into consideration, inter alia, the progress of the work carried out in 
accordance with paragraphs (1) and (2) above.67
The Mixed Committee
Action was rapid. The Health Committee appointed the Technical Commission, 
which met in November and produced a Report on the Physiological Bases of 
Nutrition.68 That same month the League Secretary-General requested member 
governments to submit information on action taken to improve nutrition. The 
League Council, of which Bruce was a member, acted immediately, rather than 
delay action until its next session in January, to establish a ‘Mixed Committee’ 
of specialist and lay members to report to the 1936 Assembly.69 McDougall 
reported encouraging press attention in Britain: there had been supportive 
articles in The Times, the Economist, the Statist, the Spectator and Nature.70 He 
wrote to every expert and interested person he could think of, seeking letters 
to the press worldwide.
Both McDougall and Bruce worked hard to establish the Mixed Committee. 
McDougall suggested to League officials that decisions about membership 
should pay some regard to geographical representation; it should include ‘the 
best available men’ from the United States, the overseas dominions, France, 
Scandinavia, Central Europe, the Mediterranean and South America. There 
should be representatives of the technical committee on nutrition, the ILO 
and a British chairman. Some members should have wide knowledge of world 
agriculture, others should understand commercial policy, yet others should be 
economists.71 By 18 December the membership was largely in place, composed 
as McDougall had suggested, and including McDougall himself.
67 Ibid., Plenary Meetings, 27 September, p. 125. The text of the resolution was published in The McDougall 
Memoranda, pp. 24–5.
68 LN, Series of League of Nations Publications, III. Health 1935 III. 6. A final version was published in June 
1936, as P.1936 II.B.4.
69 Ibid., Official Journal, 89th Session of the Council, 28 November 1935, item 3650.
70 Ibid., 1933–46, 8A, 50/20905/19868, McDougall to Stoppani, 9 November 1935. Articles had been 
published in the Economist on 31 August, 14 and 28 September; the Statist on 5 October; and in Nature on 
19 and 26 October 1935.
71 Ibid., 1933–46, 8A, 50/20095/20095, McDougall to A. Loveday, 10 October 1935.
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Bruce was responsible for finding the British chairman. He sounded out Austen 
Chamberlain. Winston Churchill was interested and would have taken the role, 
had he not been preoccupied with defence problems. He did offer to make ‘a big 
speech on the subject’ at any appropriate occasion. Bruce really wanted Lord 
Astor, but had to wait until 18 January to see him in person. Astor, Chairman 
of the Milk-in-Schools Advisory Committee and former Parliamentary Secretary 
to both the Ministry of Food and the Ministry of Agriculture, readily agreed.72
The Mixed Committee was expected to report quickly. Members with disparate 
backgrounds would have little information beyond their own specialties and 
the purely scientific work of the health experts. Responses to the questionnaire 
to governments could not be expected before the committee began meeting in 
February 1936. Therefore it lay with the few persons who had some concrete 
ideas on the subject, foremost among them McDougall (‘vous figurez au premier 
rang’) and the League Secretariat, to research and direct the committee along 
productive lines. The head of the League’s Economic Relations Section, Paul 
Stoppani, suggested McDougall, ‘qui êtes dans une certaine mesure le créateur 
de cette enterprise’, discuss a plan of action with the Secretariat.73 McDougall 
took with him to Geneva a draft of a preparatory document. Discussion of the 
document on 9 December centred on ways of avoiding minor factual difficulties 
and impolitic references and of giving the document more impact. By 14 
December a shorter and simpler document had been prepared, in line with the 
ideas of the Secretary-General on the question. A further revision was taken to 
London by Godfrey Lloyd of the League Economic Section later in December.74
The League published a four-volume report on nutrition in 1936. Volume II was 
the Report on the Physiological Bases of Nutrition; Volume III, Nutrition in Various 
Countries; and Volume IV, Statistics of Food Production, Consumption and Prices.75 
Volume I was an interim report76 of the Mixed Committee, which had decided 
at its first meeting that ‘it would be quite impossible for it to cover the immense 
field which its terms of reference required’ in time to present a comprehensive 
report that year. In 98 pages it did cover knowledge of nutrition and its relation 
to the health of various groups in populations, a survey by the ILO of workers’ 
health and social and labour legislation, and the relationship between nutrition, 
agriculture and the economics of farming. Its 15 recommendations included: 
continued study of and education on the principles of nutrition; cooperation 
and exchange of information; consideration of means of meeting the nutritional 
72 Ibid., 1933–46, 8A, 50/20905/19868, McDougall to Godfrey Lloyd, 14 December 1935.
73 Ibid., Stoppani to McDougall, 28 November 1935.
74 Ibid., notes of meeting on 9 December; Draft with annotations dated 14 December; letter from Stoppani 
to McDougall, 14 December 1935.
75 Ibid., 1936, II.B. 4–6.
76 The Problem of Nutrition. Volume 1. Interim Report of the Mixed Committee on the Problem of Nutrition, 
Series of League of Nations Publications, E. Economic and Financial, 1936, II.B.3.
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needs of various sections of communities, especially the young and those on 
lower incomes; steps to improve and cheapen marketing and distribution of 
the protective foods; consideration of any need to modify general economic 
and commercial policies, including assistance to reorientation of agricultural 
production; coordination of the work of various nutritional authorities; and 
continuation and improvement of collection of national statistics on supply, 
consumption and adequacy of diets. It is a familiar list. McDougall had done his 
preparatory work well.
A final report of the Mixed Committee was never produced: after 1936 
international events turned minds everywhere to more pressing problems. But 
the Interim Report achieved much: it was a mine of information and became a 
bestseller amongst League publications. It had put nutrition on the international 
agenda; national nutrition committees were established in many countries in 
response to the League initiative. Awareness of the science and importance of 
nutrition helped ensure that mistakes made in 1914–18 were not made in 1939–
45 in countries that were able to avoid them; many British people, in particular, 
were healthier than they had been in peacetime.
The memorandum from which the Interim Report developed was a unique and 
inspired contribution to thinking on international commodity problems. It 
applied consumptionism to a problem of human health that could not be solved 
by any of the traditional policies. On the passing of the Assembly Resolution, 
Bruce, McDougall and de la Warr sent a telegram to Orr: ‘Brother Orr, we have 
this day lighted such a candle, by God’s grace, in Geneva, as we trust shall never 
be put out.’77 The resolution represented a tiny speck of light in a darkening 
international world.
77 This version of their paraphrase of Bishop Hugh Latimer’s advice to Nicholas Ridley at the stake is quoted 
in Hudson, Australia and the League of Nations, p. 177. Other versions of the story vary slightly.
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7. A Vision for the League of Nations
Summary
Following the success of the nutrition initiative, both Bruce and McDougall 
held significant positions within the League of Nations, Bruce as President 
of the Council in 1936 and chairing committees seeking to restructure the 
economic and social activities of the League; McDougall as a member of the 
League Economic Committee. Both men sought to use the idea of raising living 
standards to achieve two intertwining goals: persuading the leaders and peoples 
of the fascist powers to adopt policies of international cooperation, generally 
known as ‘economic appeasement’; and enabling the League to become a more 
effective agency of social reform.
This chapter deals with these complex issues as events unfolded. It begins with 
an account of their new roles, particularly of McDougall’s new contacts with 
economists, and his use of the concept of consumptionism. Accounts follow 
of the threat posed by German autarky and rearmament; the development of 
McDougall’s early ideas to alleviate it; British and US policies on economic 
appeasement; and the writing of the ‘Hall Memorandum’ reflecting wider 
discussion of McDougall’s suggestions. A summary of McDougall’s major 
memorandum ‘Economic Appeasement’ is preceded by discussion of the 
possibility that he coined the term. Although his memorandum received a cool 
response in Whitehall, the Imperial Conference in 1937 supported economic 
appeasement in principle. As war became inevitable, McDougall, Orr and 
Professor Noel Hall sought to persuade financial and industrial interests of the 
need for a broader policy of increasing prosperity and for improving national 
defence and health through increased consumption.
McDougall’s hopes of promoting positive action through the League Economic 
Committee to remove trade barriers and pursue economic appeasement were 
disappointed, but Bruce successfully proposed a series of inquiries into means 
of raising standards of living, mitigation of depressions and agricultural credits. 
A report by Hall on the standards-of-living proposal detailed problems to be 
investigated. Three committees chaired by Bruce resulted in the ‘Bruce Report’, 
stressing links between social and economic problems and proposing a more 
effective structure to deal with them. War prevented implementation of both 
the Hall and the Bruce reports, although recommendations of the latter were 
embodied in the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.
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A Failing League
In 1936 the League of Nations began its move to permanent premises. An 
international design competition had attracted 377 entries and a committee 
of winning architects supervised work on a vast, white Palais des Nations, 
sprawling through Ariana Park on the north-western outskirts of Geneva. The 
long, irregular Secretariat building extended to a wing housing the Council; in 
front of a high Assembly building, the ‘Court of Honour’ portico led to terraces 
facing Lake Geneva and the Alps of Savoy; a domed library beyond was built 
with a $2 million grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. The international 
bureaucracy was provided with hundreds of meeting rooms and offices, a 
restaurant, post office and bank. Elegant formal spaces were fitted in marble 
embellished with brass. The Assembly Room accommodated some 2000 persons, 
including two tiers of onlookers, and was thus more suited to set speeches than 
to serious debate. The galleried Council Chamber—dwarfed by gigantic murals 
celebrating, in stark monochrome, the banishment of war—was criticised as 
‘over large, pretentious, even theatrical’. It conveyed the dignity of the world’s 
highest presiding body at the expense of any understanding of the practical 
needs of productive negotiation. Members sat in a shallow crescent on a small 
stage and ‘nothing less suitable to quick and spontaneous discussion could 
possibly be imagined’.1
Whatever the deficiencies of the building, they were less remarkable than 
the irony of its timing. By 1936 the mortal weakness of the League was clear. 
Despite some small successes, the decade already seemed a sorry tale of inability 
to deal with international crises. Mediation and condemnation failed to prevent 
Japan’s annexation of Manchuria and departure from the League in 1931. The 
Disarmament Conference in 1932 achieved nothing, except Germany’s departure 
from the League. In contravention of Versailles, the Luftwaffe was re-established 
in 1934, the German Navy was enlarged, and conscription introduced in 1935. 
Abyssinia’s appeal against Italy in 1935 served merely to demonstrate lack of 
will and agreement between key members: British-backed economic sanctions 
against Italy were invoked in part, but France foiled the inclusion of vital oil 
sanctions. As argument continued, Germany reoccupied the Rhineland in March 
1936 and Italy annexed Abyssinia in May. In view of this fait accompli, such 
sanctions as had been put in place against Italy were lifted in July.
For Bruce and McDougall, nevertheless, the last years of peace involved a 
desperate attempt to enhance the potential of the League for social, economic 
and even political change. The nutrition initiative was but their first major 
action in what has been called the ‘Renaissance of the Economic and Social 
1 Walters, A History of the League of Nations, p. 699; The Times, ‘New Home for the League’, 17 February 1936.
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Agencies’. In the years 1935 to 1939, work in broader fields had begun, and 
formal conferences and agreements were abandoned in favour of less-rigid, 
problem-solving processes of information sharing, concentrated no longer upon 
actions of governments but on ‘the cares and interests of the individual and 
his family’.2 This process was used, encouraged and often led by Bruce and 
McDougall. After 1935, both men sought to use League resources to apply the 
fundamental idea of the nutrition approach—that of increasing consumption—
to wider problems of standards of living and prevention of war.
Both were positioned to invest their skills in the future of the League. Bruce 
was President of the League Council in 1936. That presidency ‘seemed to mark a 
watershed in his life’. He identified with the economic and social purposes of the 
League and enjoyed the atmosphere of an international association, its demands 
and its contacts.3 Since it had been thought that his high commissionership 
could conclude as early as 1936, Bruce might well have been thinking of his 
success in mobilising the League towards nutrition as pointing the way to a new 
and greater career.
The League Economic Committee
In January 1937 the League Council appointed McDougall to a three-year term 
on the Economic Committee, one of two standing committees of the Economic 
and Financial Organization, reporting to the Second Committee (Technical), 
which in turn reported to the Assembly. Most members of the committees were 
respected economists, appointed as individual experts, not as representatives 
of their governments. The Economic and Financial Committees both worked 
through expert committees and individual specialists to investigate problems of 
economic aspects of international relations; their members spoke with ‘a certain 
freedom, and yet in most cases with intimate knowledge of the views of their 
respective governments’.4
Members of the Economic Committee tended to be officials and had the 
confidence of governments and also of business, which subscribed ‘scores of 
millions of pounds’ to loans authorised by the Financial Committee.5 In 1937, 
the 15 members of the Economic Committee were predominantly European, but 
included O. Morato of Uruguay, Y. Shudo of Japan and Dr Henry F. Grady, former 
diplomat and academic, member of the US Tariff Commission and committed 
free-trader, then working with Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, to lower world 
2 Walters, A History of the League of Nations, pp. 749–50.
3 I. M. Cumpston, Lord Bruce of Melbourne, p. 143.
4 Walters, A History of the League of Nations, pp. 177–8.
5 Ibid. 
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trade barriers. Notable Europeans included H. M. Hirschfeld, a Dutch civil 
servant later, controversially, administrator of finance, food and transport in 
the occupied Netherlands, Belgian sociologist Fernand van Langenhove, and R. 
Ryti, President of the Bank of Finland. A further group of 18 ‘corresponding 
members’ included a sprinkling of diplomats, but also Professor A. Flores 
de Lemus, a distinguished right-wing Spanish economist, Dr M. H. de Kock, 
Deputy Governor of the South African Bank, John Leydon, the Secretary of the 
Irish Department of Industry and Commerce, and Indian politician Ramaswami 
Mudaliar, who would later take significant roles in the UN Economic and Social 
Council and in establishment of the World Health Organization.6 The committee’s 
Chairman was Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, Chief Economic Adviser to the British 
Government.
Membership of the Economic Committee gave McDougall access to the services 
of the Economic Relations Section of the League bureaucracy.7 The appointment 
may have recognised McDougall’s contribution to the work on nutrition as a 
member of the Mixed Committee and as a representative and often alternative 
spokesman for Bruce. It was undoubtedly flattering for a self-taught amateur, 
but there is no evidence of his feeling overwhelmed. He did take advantage 
of its facilities and contacts to undertake wider and more theoretical study of 
economics than he had done previously. He certainly read J. M. Keynes’s General 
Theory, published in February 1936; Consumers, Credit and Unemployment 
(1938) by early Keynesian J. E. Meade, a member of the League staff from 1937;8 
work by D. H. Robertson, then an adviser to the League’s Financial Section;9 and 
by Swedish economist, politician and later Nobel Prize winner Gunnar Myrdal. 
Sean Turnell neatly describes McDougall as ‘an inveterate consumer of ideas’. 
His advocacy in the late 1930s incorporated new insights, like nutrition, old 
favourites such as rationalisation and the fruits of his wider reading and recent 
contacts: Meade’s ‘consumer credits’ to underpin consumption; Robertson’s 
supposition that peace required emphasis on consumer, at the expense of 
capital, goods; and Keynes’s suggestion for income redistribution to increase 
effective demand, and his concept of a ‘spending multiplier’.10
McDougall met both Meade and Robertson while they worked with the 
League and corresponded for a time with pioneering Dutch econometrician 
Jan Tinbergen, who three decades later was to share the first Nobel Prize 
for Economics. From his own correspondence with Meade, Turnell notes 
6 LN, Monthly Summary of the League of Nations.
7 Ibid., 1933–40, 10A, 27571/357, Stoppani to McDougall, 30 January and 3 February 1937.
8 Susan Howson, ‘Meade, James Edward (1907–1995)’, ODNB, 2004, <http://www.oxforddnb.com.virtual.
anu.edu.au/view/article/60333> [accessed 21 November 2004].
9 Gordon Fletcher, ‘Robertson, Sir Dennis Holme (1890–1963)’, ODNB, 2004, <http://www.oxforddnb.com.
virtual.anu.edu.au/view/article/35776> [accessed 21 November 2004].
10 Sean Turnell, ‘Éminence Grise: The Political Economy of F. L. McDougall’, Macquarie Economics Research 
Papers, 13, 1998, p. 16.
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that McDougall’s circle of acquaintance amongst ‘mostly young economists’ 
destined to ‘rise to spectacular heights in later years’ extended well beyond 
the committee; they included Gottfried Haberler, Tjalling Koopmans, Ragnar 
Nurske, J. M. Fleming, J. B. Condliffe, J. J. Polak and Folke Hilgerdt. It was 
perhaps a time when economic theory, as distinct from policy, was more widely 
discussed than usual; a decade, says Turnell, ‘most productive for political 
economy’.11 In the 1920s, McDougall’s thinking had been stimulated by contacts 
with young scientists and by innovators in the worlds of business and politics. 
Now he eagerly soaked up ideas complementary to the nutrition approach from 
the world of the social sciences.
He participated in inquiries initiated by the committee, including one on 
standards of living and another on prevention and mitigation of economic 
depressions. The contacts and challenges provided by this membership led him 
to espouse a more general aim of increasing consumption. In 1938 McDougall 
wrote that ‘since 1935, Mr Bruce and I have jointly been responsible for a 
series of initiatives in the international field, all aimed at demonstrating the 
importance of increased consumption’.12 The comment demonstrates the change 
in emphasis taking place in his writing and thinking. The idea of ‘nutrition’ had 
been subsumed into his broader concept of ‘consumption’.
To a professional economist ‘under-consumption’ means the idea that 
consumption expenditure can be ‘insufficient to absorb the total output of an 
economy at prices consistent with normal profits’.13 McDougall used the words 
‘consumption’ and ‘under-consumption’ frequently, and referred to the work of 
leading economists as he did so, but he used them as a layman, in a more literal 
sense. A 26-page memorandum spelled out at length the importance of adequate, 
varied diet for health, and the effect of purchases of cheap manufactured foods 
rather than fresh foods in reducing farm prices and incomes, so that farmers 
bought fewer manufactured goods and the cycle of depression continued.14 
McDougall added: ‘the ignorance which is no doubt a contributory factor [to 
high rates of illness and mortality in poor districts] may be described as an under-
consumption of education.’ A world depression means ‘the under-consumption 
of some thirty millions of employed and partially employed workers; under-
consumption which is especially severe in respect to food deficiency’.15
Fears of renewed depression persisted through the 1930s and means of 
prevention and mitigation preoccupied economists. The influence of economists 
11 Ibid.
12 CSIR/NAA, A10666, [5], McDougall to Rivett, 23 August 1938.
13 Turnell, ‘F. L. McDougall: Éminence Grise of Australian Economic Diplomacy’, 2000, p. 63.
14 NLA, MS6890/4/5, ‘Economic Depressions and the Standard of Life’, 24 June 1938. Attached is a letter 
with brief comments by Tinbergen.
15 Ibid., pp. 2, 11.
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McDougall knew and read is obvious in his memoranda. One suggested the 
Economic Organization undertake work on ‘increased consumption’: ‘Mr D. H. 
Robertson’s plea for a “re-butterment campaign” has encouraged me to propose 
the inclusion of these considerations in the work of the Delegation.’16 McDougall 
conceded that radical social policies during a depression might damage business 
confidence and prolong depression, but cited Keynes as an authority for his 
argument that stimulation of consumption was as valid a method of increasing 
economic activity as stimulation of investment, quoting in full a statement 
by Keynes sanctioning both.17 He argued in favour of deficit financing in a 
depression to create employment, while acknowledging such policies must be 
‘undertaken in ways that will not prejudice the recovery of the normal level of 
investment’. He supported reducing ‘excessive commodity stocks’ as ‘a valuable 
contribution’. Difficulties in devising methods of ‘social distribution’ would 
decrease with greater awareness of ‘the importance of nutrition in social welfare 
and of the relation of efficient distribution of foodstuffs to agricultural and world 
prosperity’. Keynes had recently noted ‘the part that control of stocks may 
play in smoothing out the trade cycle’.18 Turnell writes that while ‘McDougall 
eschewed linking his ideas with any particular economic theory…[in a 1938 
memorandum,] he ‘self-consciously identified them as being consistent with the 
underconsumptionist tradition’.19
Germany: ‘That powerful and dangerous 
country’
The American loan funds upon which German postwar recovery depended 
vanished in the 1930s depression. The resulting economic chaos paved the 
way for political dominance of the Nazi Party and helped set much of the Nazi 
agenda. High tariff barriers confronting foreign foodstuffs hardened into a 
doctrine of autarky—economic self-sufficiency aiming at as little international 
trade as possible. What could not be produced economically would be produced 
with the assistance of protection—massive protection if necessary. What could 
not be produced at all would be replaced with substitutes or done without. 
With autarky came a controlled economy geared to large-scale rearmament. 
German rearmament heightened the political crisis, and the need to match it in 
the democracies created further economic strain. German autarky threatened 
the British Empire’s triangular pattern of trade by reducing sales to Germany 
16 FAO, RG3.1, Series D3, ‘Trade Depressions and the Standard of Living’, 14 June 1938. I am grateful to 
Sean Turnell for generously making his notes of this FAO series available to me.
17 Turnell notes on his copy that the quotation was taken from J. M. Keynes, The General Theory of 
Employment, Interest and Money, Macmillan, London, 1936, p. 325.
18 FAO, RG3.1, Series D3, ‘Note on Consumption Policies in relation to the Trade Cycle’, 25 August 1938.
19 Turnell, ‘F. L. McDougall’, 2000, p. 63.
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of goods from many parts of the empire: industrial raw materials, wheat, wool, 
sugar and other colonial products. This real or potential loss of markets added 
to anxiety in London: British export sales to the empire depended upon the 
empire’s ability to pay. Recovery from depression was fragile; by 1937 there 
was evidence of a further slump. In Britain and its empire, the need to bring 
Germany back into the international fold seemed as pressing on economic 
grounds as it was politically.
McDougall’s determination to tackle the problem of Germany began early in 
1936. In January he read Inside Europe, a widely popular book by US journalist 
John Gunther. So, presumably, did the Bruces: amongst books donated by Bruce 
to the National Library of Australia is a copy of it bearing the handwritten 
inscription ‘Ethel Bruce’.20 Gunther examined the personal history and sources 
of power of political leaders and institutions in most countries of Europe. In 
1936, before ‘warts-and-all exposés’ had become commonplace, the book was 
unusual both in style and in content. It demolished a comforting theory that 
Germany lacked the resources to make war. It also dealt briefly with problems 
of the German economy.21 Germany should be allowed to become ‘strong but not 
too strong’ and manifest injustices of Versailles should be redressed. Germany, 
a ‘have-not’ nation—that is, lacking colonies, as former German colonies had 
been allocated to ‘victor’ nations under the Versailles Treaty—should be 
allowed to regain self-respect. Yet Gunther also warned that German rearmament 
was being funded by borrowing from sources overseas, including the Bank of 
England.22 Perhaps what most alarmed McDougall and other readers was the 
book’s destruction of the mystique of national leaders. Suddenly the destinies 
of ordinary men and women lay in the hands of fallible mortals who, more often 
than not, were fatally flawed or psychologically damaged. Gunther’s book may 
be one more reason 1936 seems to mark the beginning of general apprehension 
of impending war.
In 1935 some 12 million Britons had demonstrated against war in the ‘Peace 
Ballot’. McDougall was influenced by this awakened ‘moral sense’ and by public 
disillusion with the League. His optimism, his belief in the efficacy of reason and 
persuasion, would not permit him simply to wring his hands. Recommending 
Gunther’s book to Rivett, he urged ‘we should give very serious thought to 
the European situation…[which] is full of danger and I believe it has got to be 
looked at not only from the foreign policy point of view but also from a wide 
economic standpoint’. He listed three options facing the British Empire in both 
defence and trade. ‘Splendid isolation’ was dangerous, because it invited attack; 
cooperation with France to use the League as an instrument of collective security 
20 John Gunther, Inside Europe, H. Hamilton, London, 1936.
21 Ibid., pp. 98–102.
22 Ibid., p. 111.
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would be ineffective while the League was crippled by resentment of the Treaty 
of Versailles, of which the League Covenant formed part, and by the disabilities 
of ‘have-not’ nations. Alliance with the United States seemed the ideal, but was 
ruled out by US isolationism. McDougall therefore proposed a fourth option: to 
persuade Germany to ‘abandon the aggressive spirit’ by offering her a general 
treaty of cooperation. In return for largely unrestricted trade with the British 
Empire, and subject to safeguards including adherence by all parties to ILO 
conventions, Germany would return to the League, undertaking to cooperate 
with the British Empire to secure progressive disarmament, abandonment of 
military aviation, international control of civil aviation and economic equality 
for her racial minorities.23
In the first half of 1936, while hope remained that League sanctions against Italy 
might succeed, McDougall wrote a series of papers linking economic policy with 
the political situation. A 26-page memorandum, written in February, expanded 
on the German treaty idea and an ‘open-door’ trade policy for colonies, meaning 
that colonial powers would not claim preferential advantages, thereby allowing 
all nations to trade with colonies on equal terms.24 The overriding aim was to 
avert war:
Fear of war and the necessities of defence reinforce the tendencies 
towards economic nationalism.
These fears and difficulties lead to a dread of over-production at a 
time when under-consumption is the most real factor…It is suggested 
that the world’s economic difficulties can best be lightened through 
improvement in political relations and through attempts to bring about 
increased consumption.
The long continuance of stark poverty in what is potentially an 
exceedingly rich world must lead either, to revolutionary outbreaks 
or to what is more probable, embarrassed Governments attempting to 
escape from their internal difficulties through external adventures.25
There were economic advantages of a treaty and of liberalised trade generally, 
both to the ‘have-not’ nations and to the rest of the world. McDougall now 
dismissed the imperial solution as a temporary expedient. The Ottawa 
Agreements had ‘helped the Empire out of the worst of the depression’ and 
remained of some benefit, but imperial economic cooperation should not go 
so far as to make the Empire a closed economic system, with resulting dangers 
23 NAA/CSIR, A10666, [5], McDougall to Rivett, 23 January 1936.
24 Ibid., ‘The British Empire, World Peace and Prosperity’, 7 February 1936.
25 Ibid., p. 5.
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of ‘war and…reduced prosperity’. The agreements had nevertheless provided 
‘material for concessions to other countries and a bargaining power which 
would have been absent had Great Britain retained her free trade policy’.26
McDougall acknowledged the persuasive case of the ‘have-not’ powers for 
treaty revision and the ‘moral isolation’ of Britain and France. Although 
German demands for access to colonies might be satisfied with nothing less, 
he did not advocate restitution. Instead, Britain might regain moral leadership 
by offering, at an international forum on the economic relations of colonies, a 
complete ‘open door’ overseen by the League of Nations. He noted that such 
a policy was already observed in the Belgian Congo and Dutch East Indies. It 
would be necessary to consider whether Britain should do so without similar 
action by France and Portugal. The British Empire should push the League to 
deal with issues of social justice, such as nutrition and ILO conventions. German 
and Italian aspirations were unlikely to be satisfied by this limited offer, but 
it would remove their ‘legitimate grievances’, deprive them of the sympathy 
of neutral countries—that of the United States in particular—and satisfy the 
moral sense of the British people.27
The League’s lack of universality could be eased by the adherence of either 
the United States or of Germany and, in view of US isolationism, McDougall 
turned to Germany, ‘that powerful and dangerous country’. The existence there 
of some moderate leaders and an apparent desire for good relations with Britain 
offered hope for success of ‘a great gesture’ in the form of a general treaty of 
cooperation. A treaty could end Germany’s feeling of ‘economic encirclement 
and give her immense scope for the beneficial employment of her vigour, in the 
general improvement of her standards of living’.28 It could also be a means of 
restoring Europe as a market for agricultural exporters and Britain.29
Policies likely to reactivate the economic life of Europe, though involving 
some sacrifice of ‘present advantages’, could benefit Australia.30 A small loss 
in colonial trade resulting from an open-door policy would be offset by better 
access to European markets; abandoning protection should give colonial people 
cheaper goods and so stimulate trade generally.31 Nations should explore the 
possibility of rationalised primary and secondary industries on a world scale, 
perhaps between industrial countries like Britain, Germany, Czechoslovakia 
and Belgium, and between the dominions, India and ‘foreign agricultural 
countries’.32
26 Ibid., pp. 14–15.
27 Ibid., pp. 15–20.
28 Ibid., pp. 21–3, 25–6.
29 NAA/CSIR, A10666, [5], ‘Notes on Economic Adjustments and Political Tensions’, 4 April 1936, pp. 3–4.
30 Ibid., ‘Australia and Europe’, 1 April 1936, p. 11.
31 Ibid., ‘Economic Appeasement’, 21 December 1936, pp. 23–4.
32 NAA/CSIR, A9778/4, M1 N43, ‘Note on Australian Economic Policy’, 30 April 1936, pp. 3–4.
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Rivett, like many thinking men of goodwill in 1936, saw no ‘sound ethical 
ground’ for refusing Germany her former colonies, but doubted she would be 
satisfied merely with better opportunities for trade.33 McDougall replied that 
opinion was ‘moving rather fast’ on the question of transferring mandated 
territories to former colonial powers, a possibility he would not rule out.34 
Writing from Kenya, shortly after the failure of sanctions against Italy, Elspeth 
Huxley identified the problem with the treaty idea more bluntly. Other ‘have-
not powers’ might well prefer to emulate Mussolini and ‘take what they want if 
they can, instead of being given less than they want as a favour’. She doubted 
Germany would be satisfied with anything less than outright ownership, but 
also whether Germany would in fact press the colonial question: ‘She knows 
very well they have a negligible value.’35
These views, and many of McDougall’s suggestions, reflected widespread debate. 
The distinctive feature of his solution was his linking of political settlement with 
expansion of consumption. Underlying this argument was a completion of the 
shift in frame of reference that had begun with his engagement with the wheat 
problem. In the 1920s he had been attempting to resolve trade problems within 
the British Empire, with careful attention to its various producer interests; now 
he was tackling the threats of communism and fascism to international security, 
with his political antennae attuned to the unmet needs of consumers.
Much of McDougall’s approach was in accord with significant bodies of 
opinion in London and Washington that had argued since 1919 that lasting 
peace required measures allowing German economic recovery.36 Terms such as 
‘treaty revision’ and ‘general settlement’ (that is, of problems remaining after 
Versailles) were used for suggestions to provide German access to colonial trade 
and raw materials. Supporters of such policies extended beyond those vilified in 
1937 as ‘appeasers’ in the ‘Cliveden Set’, led by Viscount Waldorf Astor and his 
wife, Nancy.37 Advocates in Whitehall of a softer line with Germany included 
the chief of the newly formed Economic Relations Section of the Western 
Department in the Foreign Office, F. T. A. Ashton-Gwatkin, and, from late 1935, 
his deputy, Gladwyn Jebb, just returned from a posting in Rome.38 Before the 
1932 Ottawa Conference, Ashton-Gwatkin had predicted that a high protective 
33 Ibid., Rivett to McDougall, 19 February 1936.
34 NAA/CSIR, A10666, [5], McDougall to Rivett, 9 April 1936.
35 NLA, MS6890/2/6, Elspeth Huxley to McDougall, 13 May 1936.
36 Most notably by J. M. Keynes in The Economic Consequences of the Peace, and by Observer Editor, J. L. 
Garvin, in The Economic Foundations of Peace, both published in 1919.
37 For an account of the smear by a former Times journalist, Claud Cockburn, and an assessment of the 
views on Germany of the Astors and their associates, see Derek Wilson, The Astors 1763–1992, Landscape with 
Millionaires, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1993, Chapter 10.
38 Keith Hamilton, ‘Gwatkin, Frank Trelawny Arthur Ashton- (1889–1976)’, ODNB, 2004, <http://www.
oxforddnb.com.virtual.anu.edu.au/view/article/64923> [accessed February 2005]; Alan Campbell, ‘Jebb, 
(Hubert Miles) Gladwyn, first Baron Gladwyn (1900–1996)’, ODNB, 2004, <http://www.oxforddnb.com.
virtual.anu.edu.au/view/article/63251> [accessed 11 February 2005].
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tariff and empire preference could diminish British influence over European 
affairs and create economic antagonism. He favoured economic aid to Germany 
since ‘a weak hysterical individual, heavily armed, is a danger to himself and 
others’. Jebb described Nazism as a ‘cancer’ that would yield to ‘the radioactive 
treatment of increased world trade’. But a Foreign Office proposal to offer 
colonial concessions to Germany in return for limiting armaments, abandoning 
European expansion and rejoining the League was opposed by the Board of 
Trade.39 In 1936, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden initiated a two-pronged 
policy of rapid rearmament coupled with the possibility of returning colonies, 
if ‘permanent settlement’ could be achieved.40
Until mid 1939, politicians and officials continued to explore possibilities for 
economic cooperation with Germany. Neville Chamberlain, as Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, supported an approach late in 1936, when he feared the effect of 
continued rearmament on Britain’s adverse balance of payments. Common to all 
British schemes of ‘economic appeasement’, in addition to the primary aim of 
reducing tension, was that of encouraging Germany to import from commodity 
producers who spent their income on British exports, an aim supported by the 
City and by the FBI.41 Cabinet authorised further discussions in April 1937, 
offering colonial restitution and economic aid in return for Germany’s ‘good 
behaviour’ in Central Europe; many believed that ‘only colonies stood in the way 
of settlement’. Evidence more recently available suggests Germany’s colonial 
claim was intended to lure Britain into discussions in which Germany would be 
conceded a right to European expansion. Lacking this knowledge, Chamberlain, 
early in 1938, proposed facilitating German access to raw materials through 
management of an area in Central Africa by a consortium of European powers, 
including Germany, in return for arms limitation and territorial guarantees to 
Austria and Czechoslovakia. Rejection of that offer changed British policy to 
one of gradual modification of the German economy through ‘the liberalizing 
influence of increased foreign trade’, to pave the way for political settlement.42 
A final attempt at negotiation with a German official, presumed to be an agent 
of Göring, was sanctioned by Chamberlain in July 1939, in a context of falling 
British reserves. ‘The trade recession dominated his thought on the German 
problem.’43
US policy was influenced by economic considerations, but even more by 
a desire to avoid entanglement in a European conflict. Many influential 
39 William Norton Medlicott, Britain and Germany: The Search for Agreement, 1930–1937, Creighton Lecture 
in History 1968, University of London, London, 1969. See, in particular, footnote to p. 5, and pp. 20–1.
40 Andrew J. Crozier, Appeasement and Germany’s Last Bid for Colonies, Macmillan, London, 1988, pp. 131, 133.
41 C. A. MacDonald, ‘Economic Appeasement and the German “Moderates” 1937–1939. An Introductory 
Essay’, Past and Present, Vol. 56, 1972, pp. 105–6.
42 Ibid., pp. 107–14.
43 Ibid., pp. 127–30.
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Americans, including President Franklin D. Roosevelt, saw sense and justice 
in reassessing Versailles and, like the British, they hoped to use this as a 
bargaining tool, though Roosevelt relied on ‘universalist emphasis on codes 
of conduct rather than Britain’s bilateral and spheres-of-influence approach to 
diplomacy’.44 Early in 1936, Norman H. Davis, ‘roving ambassador and friend to 
Roosevelt and Hull’, suggested Germany be given ‘a special economic position 
in South-Eastern Europe, in return for signing an arms limitation agreement 
and rejoining the League’—a view echoed from Berlin by Ambassador William 
C. Bullitt in November 1936. Pursuing Hull’s freer trade agenda, American 
diplomats generally believed in the political benefits of reduced trade barriers 
and increased access to markets and resources, seeing economic appeasement 
‘both as a diplomatic tactic and a legitimate, publicly acceptable end’.45
Roosevelt suggested a non-political conference on economic and social problems 
in 1936; neither Britain nor Germany was interested. An American proposal 
late in 1937 for a world conference to establish universal codes governing 
international relations, including access to raw materials, was abandoned 
following events early in 1938: Japan’s resumption of fighting in China; Hitler’s 
replacement of moderate Neurath with Ribbentrop and recognition of Japan 
in Manchukuo; Eden’s resignation; and the Anschluss. In 1939 Roosevelt again 
appealed for non-aggression pledges in return for parallel economic and political 
appeasement conferences.46
McDougall’s eagerness for international conferences and treaties and for use 
of the League accords more with the American approach than that of the 
British Foreign Office, where, it has been argued, there were doubts about the 
effectiveness of the League and resentment of its control from Downing Street 
rather than Whitehall.47 The potential threat to imperial trade arrangements in 
McDougall’s approach would also have worried Whitehall.
At a time when Bruce’s mind was turning more and more to the possibilities of 
international action, McDougall’s proposals were appealing and matched his 
own concerns: he became an enthusiastic supporter. Alfred Stirling recalls a 
long evening in Geneva in May 1936 when McDougall ‘poured out to me for 
many hours the anxieties which the High Commissioner and he shared about 
the preservation of world peace’. McDougall’s ‘main theme was the need to re-
44 Arnold A. Offner, ‘Appeasement Revisited: The United States, Great Britain, and Germany, 1933–1940’, 
The Journal of American History, Vol. 64, no. 2, 1977, p. 392.
45 Ibid., p. 378.
46 Ibid., pp. 379–82.
47 Alan Sharp, ‘Adapting to a New World? Britain’s Foreign Office in the 1920s’, Contemporary British 
History, Vol. 18, no. 3, 2004.
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activate trade in Europe, and how Australia must produce more foodstuffs and 
help in the feeding of the hungry of the world. This was vital if war was to be 
averted.’48
Bruce made his views plain in a meeting of British and visiting Australian 
ministers that same month. Jebb was sent by the junior Foreign Minister, Lord 
Stanhope, to ask Bruce to amplify his views. With McDougall present, Bruce 
argued that it was no use attempting to prevent war without trying to eliminate 
the economic causes ‘which inevitably lead to it’. Any declarations made at 
Geneva or elsewhere about reorganising collective security or reform of the 
Covenant must be accompanied by a declaration of economic policy. Bruce was 
less sure about what might actually be achieved, but for ‘propaganda value in 
the world as a whole’ there should be a unilateral declaration of intent to abolish 
imperial preference in the colonial empire and a broadening of the system of 
awarding contracts. Bruce admitted that without some modification of imperial 
tariff policy, these measures would do little to expand German exports but 
insisted that the only hope of preventing Germany’s present ‘drive to the East’ 
from becoming ‘actual military aggression’ lay in the British Empire taking more 
German goods. He favoured Professor Noel Hall’s suggestion to permit entry of 
more semifinished manufactures from Germany, to revive the triangular trade 
between Europe, the dominions and Britain.49 Bruce’s views must have alarmed 
officials anxious to preserve Britain’s imperial trading arrangements.
Group discussion of an idea over dinner was a favourite McDougall tactic. 
Almost certainly Bruce approved establishment of such a group early in 1936 
to consider ‘economic appeasement’. It included Gladwyn Jebb and Australian-
born diplomat R. W. A. (Rex) Leeper, known for his views opposing appeasement, 
as observers from the Foreign Office.50 Other participants represented the 
empire, industry and ideas; most had worked with McDougall before. Assistant 
Editor, R. M. Barrington-Ward, was almost solely responsible for The Times’ 
treatment of Anglo–German relations: ‘the keystone of his view [on Europe] 
was the perniciousness of the Treaty of Versailles.’51 Noel Hall, Professor of 
Political Economy at University College London and Director of the National 
Institute of Economic and Social Research, was described by McDougall as ‘an 
old friend of mine’.52 ‘Mike’ Lester Pearson was then a Canadian diplomat in 
London; R. Enfield of the Ministry of Agriculture had been a contact since the 
mid 1920s; company director and banker Sir George Schuster was an expert on 
48 Stirling, Lord Bruce: The London Years, p. 30.
49 UKNA, FO371/19933, 125552, C4757/99/18, Memo of conversation by Jebb, addressed to Stanhope, 10 
June 1936. This appears to be a draft, not all of which was submitted: the part dealing with Hall’s suggestion 
has been crossed through. I am grateful to Sean Turnell for copies of material from this file.
50 Derek Drinkwater, ‘Leeper, Sir Reginald Wildig Allen (1888–1968)’, ODNB, 2004, <http://www.
oxforddnb.com.virtual.anu.edu.au/view/article/55366> [accessed 28 January 2005].
51 Franklin Reid Gannon, The British Press and Germany 1936–1939, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971, pp. 63–4.
52 NAA/CSIR, A9778, M14/37/7, McDougall to Rivett, 13 July 1937.
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colonial development. On one occasion, they were joined by Oxford Professor of 
International Relations and founder of the Institute of International Affairs, Sir 
Alfred Zimmern, who had identified three causes of war including, significantly, 
the economic issue of the ‘haves and have-nots’.53 Jebb minuted that both he and 
Leeper felt the group’s approach merited ‘the most sympathetic consideration’ 
by government experts. Leeper added: ‘we cannot take political initiative in 
the shape of further commitments. All the more need therefore for economic 
initiative.’54
The group’s paper, ‘An International Policy for the British Empire’, was drafted 
by Professor Hall and generally referred to as ‘the Hall Memorandum’.55 It called 
for cooperative leadership of world economic policy from the British Empire, 
now recovered from depression and in an economic position envied by the 
‘have-nots’, who blamed ‘the Ottawa Factor’ for contributing to their economic 
difficulties. An increase in world trade might help ‘purchase’ a general European 
settlement, extending even to an agreement on arms limitation. The paper 
discounted the value of loans, or return of colonies to Germany, prescribing 
instead a series of coordinated measures based on increased consumption and 
including a conditional open-door policy to trade in the colonial empire. Its chief 
focus was the means to increase the empire’s triangular trade with industrial 
Europe, to give ‘more elbow room’ for dominion producers to trade outside the 
Empire and to revive British industry, shipping and financial services. Its chief 
practical suggestion was a revision of the British tariff, but only where it offered 
prospects of an increase in the triangular trade. Tariff preference by Britain for 
semi-manufactured goods from Europe, such as car parts and steel sheets, would 
benefit alike British and European industry, dominion buyers and raw material 
producers.
Copies of the paper were circulated discreetly. One was sent privately by 
Barrington-Ward to Tom Jones, Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet and an 
economist by training. It was ‘undoubtedly important’, Ward wrote to Jones, 
‘to start talking the economics of peace as soon as possible’.56 The group hoped 
it might lead to ‘more vigorous action’ by Britain at Geneva at the time of the 
Tripartite Declaration, an undertaking by Britain, France and the United States 
to avoid further devaluation of currencies, signed on 25 September 1936. Jebb 
showed it to S. D. Waley of Treasury and a Mr Brown of the Board of Trade. 
Neither was encouraging, although Waley admitted to interest in the idea of 
importing more German goods.57 Opposition by Walter Runciman, President 
53 D. J. Markwell, ‘Zimmern, Sir Alfred Eckhard (1879–1957)’, ODNB, 2004, <http://www.oxforddnb.com.
virtual.anu.edu.au/view/article/37088> [accessed 26 October 2004].
54 UKNA, FO371/19933, 125552, C4757/99/18, minute by Jebb, ‘Origin of the Hall Memorandum’, 25 June 
1936; handwritten comment by Leeper, 26 June 1936.
55 The National Library of Wales, Dr Thomas Jones C. H. Papers, E1, Items 9 and 10, copy dated July 1936.
56 Ibid., Barrington-Ward’s covering letter, 16 July 1936.
57 Jebb, ‘Origin of the Hall Memorandum’.
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of the Board of Trade, and Chancellor of the Exchequer, Neville Chamberlain, 
to any modification of British economic policy ruled that out, and the Hall 
memorandum had no further perceptible effect.58
‘Economic Appeasement’
The Hall group’s discussions must have clarified McDougall’s own thinking. By 
December 1936 he had completed a major revision of his February memorandum, 
now called ‘Economic Appeasement’ and 27 pages long. It is possible that 
McDougall himself coined the term. Jebb writes of ‘what McDougall had called 
the policy of “Economic Appeasement”’, noting: ‘Incidentally I think [early 
1937] was about the first time that the famous word “appeasement” gained any 
currency and it certainly did not then connote a policy of giving the Nazis 
everything they wanted; merely a possible means of achieving a “peaceful 
solution”.’59 Elspeth Huxley recalled McDougall ‘discoursing on the need for 
“appeasement” and that was the first time I heard the word used in the sense 
that later became so discreditable’. She added: ‘it was not then a dirty word 
and seemed a reasonable approach, since it was the harshness of the Treaty of 
Versailles that really gave Hitler his chance to come to power.’60
The phrase ‘economic appeasement’ first appears in The Times index in mid 1937; 
McDougall’s closeness to editorial figures at The Times could have promoted its 
use. The term is used in subheadings in the Economic Section of the 1937 Survey 
of International Affairs, which states: ‘the Australian Delegation to the League 
of Nations had been especially active in propagating the idea of “economic 
appeasement”, and though its meaning was not always clearly defined, the 
phrase became almost a commonplace in the economic and political discussions 
of that year.’61 Bruce had used it in a speech in Second Committee on 6 October 
1936, but in doing so he was commending words of the British delegate who 
expressed Britain’s desire to ‘use every method which presents itself to further 
the economic appeasement of the world’.62 The noun ‘appeasement’ was used 
without the qualifier ‘economic’ earlier in this context. Turnell points out that 
in 1936 ‘one did not speak of the appeasement of Nazi Germany, but of Europe 
58 UKNA, FO371/21215, 125552, W373/5/50, Minute by Jebb, 9 January 1937. I thank Sean Turnell for 
copies from these and related files.
59 Gladwyn Jebb, The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1972, p. 65.
60 Letter to W. Way, 15 April 1986.
61 Alan J. B. Fisher, ‘World Economic Affairs’, in Survey of International Affairs 1937, ed. Arnold J. Toynbee, 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1938, p. 65.
62 LN, Official Journal, 1936, Second Committee (Technical), Minutes: W. S. Morrison, Financial Secretary to 
UK Treasury, 5 October, p. 43; Bruce, 6 October, p. 60.
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and the world’.63 That is, ‘appeasement’ did not mean buying off a potential 
aggressor, but the easing of tension and anxiety. Stressing the importance of 
economic cooperation as a solution to political problems, Bruce demonstrated 
its typical use in September 1936, quoting Assembly President, Paul van 
Zeeland, on ‘the feeling of appeasement and relief which would spread through 
the world if the nations again knew comfort and prosperity’. Bruce went on 
to make a subtle shift in his own use of the word, expressing a conviction that 
‘solution of the economic problems that confront us can best be secured [by] 
the maintenance of world peace, the appeasement of the social unrest and the 
removal of dangers that threaten all countries’.64
‘We prefer butter’
McDougall’s earlier memoranda had focused on bringing Germany back into the 
international fold. In the memorandum of December 1936, the German treaty 
proposal was gone, although the open door to colonial trade remained. The main 
thrust was now improving standards of living to promote a revival of world 
trade, soothing the political situation and convincing European governments 
and peoples that ‘the great democracies have both the will and the power to 
bring about great improvements in the welfare of their own people and of those 
of other nations which are prepared to co-operate with them’. Britain, France 
and the United States had all referred, in declarations on signing the Tripartite 
Declaration, to the need to raise standards of living. McDougall wanted those 
three countries to go further. People everywhere were realising that ‘poverty 
is not inevitable but due to faults in the productive and distributive system’. 
McDougall was encouraged in this view by the recent election of reform-
oriented governments in the United States and France, which seemed to show 
increasing pressure for government action to improve the lot of the poor. He 
therefore called for a ‘direct attack upon low standards of living conducted 
both on the national and [the] international plane’. ‘Dynamic economic and 
social policies’ would show democratic countries were better able to achieve 
comfort and wellbeing for their peoples than the fascist or communist states, 
and would expand the volume of international trade. Most European states 
should then rally to the democratic countries and peoples of fascist states would 
be presented with ‘an attractive alternative to preparations for war’.65
The general idea could be colloquially expressed as follows:—Certain 
dictatorial people have declared their preference for guns rather than 
63 Sean Turnell, ‘Butter for Guns: F. L. McDougall, Nutrition and Economic Appeasement’, Macquarie 
Economics Research Papers, no. 14/95, 1995, p. 3.
64 NAA, M104/1, 4, typescript of speech to 17th Assembly, 29 September 1936.
65 NAA/CSIR, A10666, [5], ‘Economic Appeasement’, 21 December 1936, pp. 1–2.
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butter. This unfortunately compels the democracies in their turn to 
secure a sufficiency of guns. But we prefer butter, and we propose to 
collaborate with all nations who will join with us in securing more 
butter.66
ILO-based international measures and national policies could achieve increased 
purchasing power, improved social services and working conditions, and 
reduction of costs through efficiencies in food production and distribution.67 
McDougall paid particular attention to the contribution of improved nutrition 
to economic appeasement, using familiar arguments about its potential to 
affect consumption and trade, and a new addition: the relevance to defence 
preparations of a policy to ‘encourage a maximum diversity of agricultural 
production’.68 A section of the memorandum was devoted to reduction of trade 
barriers, including suggestions that the United States accept more imports and 
that the United Kingdom accept more goods from Europe. McDougall admitted 
that this seemed to be a reversal of protection policies advocated in 1931 by 
many (including, of course, McDougall himself), but European markets were 
essential for the development on which the import levels of the overseas 
empire depended. He again urged restructuring of tariff policies to encourage 
rationalised industrial production. He called for British and dominion 
governments to take ‘parallel action’ with Cordell Hull’s attempts to liberalise 
trade by bilateral treaties and a colonial open-door policy, possibly subject to 
an ILO convention, and perhaps dependent upon reductions in European tariff 
barriers.69 In summary, he was proposing that democratic nations resolve to 
‘revitalize the world’s trade’, be prepared ‘to share their economic advantages’ 
in return for political cooperation and ‘hold up to the world the ideal of human 
progress and culture as the alternative to dreams of national aggrandisement 
achieved through force or the threat of force’.70
66 Ibid., p. 3.
67 Ibid., pp. 5–11.
68 Ibid., pp. 12–16.
69 Ibid., pp. 16–26.
70 Ibid., p. 26.
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‘Any economic proposal emanating from 
Australia wants watching’
Bruce made a few minor suggestions, but in the next few weeks used all of 
his considerable status and contacts to place ‘private’ copies of McDougall’s 
December 1936 memorandum with carefully chosen recipients. He presented it 
to J. L. A. Avenol, Secretary-General of the League of Nations, as an approach to 
the political problems of Europe ‘from a somewhat different angle from the usual 
proposals for a frontal attack upon the high tariffs and other restrictions’.71 Other 
recipients in London included Anthony Eden, Leith-Ross, Treasury’s personal 
adviser to the Prime Minister, Sir Horace Wilson, former prime minister Ramsay 
MacDonald and Sir Montagu Norman. A copy later reached Runciman. Copies 
were sent to the British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Nevile Henderson, and to 
the Prime Ministers of Belgium and the Netherlands. At the League of Nations, 
besides Avenol, copies went to Alexander Loveday, to Paul Stoppani and to H. 
B. Butler, Director-General of the ILO.72 A copy sent to US Ambassador Robert 
Bingham could thence have reached Cordell Hull, causing Eden to write, on a 
note to that effect, ‘Is not this unusual?’73
Figure 14 F. L. McDougall with J. L. A. Avenol, Secretary-General of the 
League of Nations. 
Source: E. McDougall. 
71 NAA, M104, 5/2, Bruce to Avenol, 1 March 1937.
72 Ibid.
73 UKNA, FO371/21215, 125552, W6363, minute by Jebb, 17 March 1937.
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Foreign Office officials commented at length upon ‘Economic Appeasement’. 
Gladwyn Jebb, strongly supported by Ashton-Gwatkin, minuted that, in 
common with Leith-Ross, the Economic Section believed it contained some 
good suggestions including negotiation on the basis of standards of living; 
association of the ILO with any possible action; the tariff revision proposals 
from the Hall memorandum; countering the claims of ‘have-not’ nations with 
an open-door trade policy; reconsideration of imperial preference; and the use 
of League machinery to further ‘economic appeasement’. The paragraphs on 
nutrition, however, were ‘anathema to certain Government Departments here’, 
and Leith-Ross was sceptical of their utility. Jebb suggested that the proposals 
be recommended to the Board of Trade as offering ‘a distinct—perhaps the 
only—hope of avoiding or moderating further political complications in 
Europe’. They might be discussed unofficially at a meeting between Leith-Ross 
and Dr Hjalmar Schacht, the moderate German Minister of Economics replaced 
by Göring in 1936 but still in Cabinet as President of the Reichsbank, as an 
attempt to divert Germany’s colonial demands and as a means of gaining time by 
‘economic appeasement’. ‘It may well be that this is impossible; I do not rate the 
chances very high; but it is my considered belief that unless we do something 
very soon we shall wake up one Sunday morning to find ourselves with no time 
left to gain.’74
In the ensuing debate within the Foreign Office, officials tended to judge 
McDougall’s memorandum in two contexts: the debate on policy towards 
Germany; and the sour legacy of Australian trade diplomacy since Ottawa, in 
which McDougall had played a significant role. William Strang, head of the 
Central Department responsible for policy on Germany, was critical of both 
style and content of the memorandum, which was ‘not well arranged…much 
too long…[and] contains a number of questionable statements’. Insuperable 
difficulties were likely to prevent a complex three-power economic agreement; 
if it were achieved, the example of improved living standards would be slow 
to take effect. The problem should not be oversimplified: ‘As between politics 
and economics it is not easy to say which is hen and which is egg.’ The Nazis 
had not attained power through economic forces alone, nor would economic 
action alone ‘exorcise the Nazi devil’. Higher standards of living would have 
uncertain appeal in a Germany where ‘what they value, in theory at any rate, 
is the creative struggle for something higher than mere bread’. Many of the 
suggestions, particularly those from the Hall memorandum, were worthwhile 
in themselves, but he doubted the time was right for an approach to Schacht. 
The German propaganda machine had been ‘working full blast on the theme 
of colonies: it may soon begin to proclaim the iniquity of British commercial 
policy and to arouse indignation among Germany’s fellow-sufferers. There is no 
74 Ibid., W373/5/50, Minute by Jebb, 9 January 1937.
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doubt some case to be made against us.’ The post-1931 tariff changes had forced 
trade into ‘unnatural channels’. Sooner or later talks like those proposed by 
Jebb would probably be necessary, but Strang thought Britain should wait until 
‘more authoritative and more official approaches’ were made by Germany.75
J. M. Troutbeck of the American Department questioned Bruce’s motive in 
giving a copy directly to the US Ambassador: ‘No doubt it will find its way to the 
State Department and encourage Mr Hull to believe that he has the Australians 
behind him in his endeavour to wean us from our present commercial policies.’ 
Indeed, the ‘rather turgid rhetoric of the memorandum seems designed to appeal 
to Washington rather than to Whitehall’. Troutbeck doubted whether ‘the 
Australians have an exaggerated regard for the interests of the UK, or indeed for 
anything outside Australia’s particular welfare. Throughout the long drawn out 
discussions on meat, for example, they have clung to their pound of flesh and 
more beside.’ If Bruce were genuine then his suggestion was timely, since the 
Americans would demand some dominion sacrifices in return for a commercial 
agreement with Britain. But the immediate beneficiaries of the scheme would 
be the dominions and foreign countries, and ‘any economic proposal emanating 
from Australia wants watching’.76
Jebb admitted that Troutbeck’s suspicions and Strang’s misgivings were justified, 
but thought them not sufficient to destroy the value of McDougall’s proposals. 
He nevertheless modified his earlier recommendation, suggesting that a minute 
to the Board of Trade should simply mention Bruce as one of several authorities 
recommending revision of British tariff policy.77 Again, he was supported by his 
chief, who gained Strang’s agreement to the proposed minute. Ashton-Gwatkin 
believed there was a movement towards a liberalisation of UK tariff policy, which 
‘may improve the chances of peace in Europe (& perhaps the Far East, too). It 
is for us to see if we can push the movement in this direction.’ He instructed 
Jebb to draft the proposed letter to Runciman, adding ‘there is much wisdom in 
[Strang’s] minute—and much blather in McDougall’s memo. But the latter is on 
the side of the angels.’78
In the event, the Foreign Office made no recommendations on McDougall’s 
December 1936 memorandum, beyond mentioning it in a longer paper dealing 
with the effect of British tariff policy on foreign relations, and recommending 
establishment of a ministerial committee.79
75 Ibid., 13 January.
76 Ibid., 14 January. In a brief search in US National Archives, I found no record of the memorandum 
reaching the State Department, but cannot rule it out.
77 Ibid., 15 January.
78 Ibid., 17 January.
79 UKNA, FO371/21215, 125552, W6363, minute by Jebb, 17 March 1937.
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‘The revival of world trade is of first 
importance’
Bruce was not yet defeated. Empire leaders gathered for an Imperial Conference 
in May 1937. Briefings for the Australian delegation by officers of the newly 
formed Department of External Affairs, including two who had been in close 
contact with Bruce and McDougall, former Liaison Officer in London F. K. 
Officer and his successor, Alfred Stirling, reported wide discussion of means 
to ease German economic difficulties as a ‘safety valve to ensure peace’; action 
could begin with a pact with Australia and New Zealand to import more German 
manufactured goods.80 The hands of McDougall and Bruce could be discerned 
in a section of Lyons’ opening speech on economic policy, which included the 
statement that markets beyond the Empire and an increase in world trade were 
essential.
Economic policy, however, also has profound effects upon the political 
relations of the countries of the world. Today we are confronted by the 
picture of a world in which science has made possible standards of living 
for all countries far in advance of anything previously experienced and 
yet in which poverty and unemployment have led to grave political 
discontents.
There is thus urgent need for wide policies of economic appeasement if 
our endeavours to bring about peaceful conditions in the world are to 
be successful.
For this purpose the revival of world trade is of first importance.81
Canada’s Prime Minister, W. L. Mackenzie King, had been persuaded by 
Cordell Hull to plead the case for liberalising trade through a series of bilateral 
agreements, in the hope that Axis nations would perceive the benefits, join in and 
open the way to discussion of political problems. King duly told the conference 
that political tensions would not lessen without economic appeasement and 
‘abatement of the policies of economic nationalism and economic imperialism’.82 
Eden acknowledged that many believed economic appeasement provided ‘the 
key to our difficulties’; most political problems had ‘an economic problem 
inextricably entwined’.83 The conference’s final statement included a declaration 
of readiness to ‘co-operate with other nations in examining current difficulties, 
80 Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937–49. Volume I: 1937–38 [hereinafter DAFP I], eds R. G. 
Neale, P. G. Edwards and H. Kenway, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1975, Document 
6, undated memorandum, pp. 29–30; 17, memorandum, 10 March 1937, pp. 47–8.
81 DAFP I, 25, Speech by Lyons, 14 May 1937, pp. 69–70.
82 Fisher, ‘World Economic Affairs’, p. 63.
83 Cumpston, Lord Bruce of Melbourne, p. 151.
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including trade barriers and other obstacles to the increase of international 
trade and the improvement of the general standard of living’, in the interests of 
prosperity and international peace.84
In rhetoric, the conference was a success for economic appeasement. But these 
were ‘motherhood’ statements, swamped by overwhelming attention to foreign 
relations and defence issues in an atmosphere of urgency and crisis. Bruce 
understood the reluctance of Australia’s government, facing an election later 
in 1937, to appear to be ‘prepared to give up any rights that Australia might 
at present have in the British market’ in the cause of a British–American trade 
agreement or, presumably, of other measures likely to contribute to economic 
appeasement, but he was also anxious to avoid any impression that dominion 
reluctance to discuss concessions was the only obstacle to a trade agreement 
between Britain and the United States. He suggested a statement asserting that 
the Government ‘would only agree to forgo anything we at present have if as a 
result we saw an expansion in the markets for our exports’.85
Bruce could exercise paramount influence on Australian policy as it was presented 
in international forums, but the international bias of his thinking became 
increasingly alien to the mood and realities of Australian domestic politics. 
Paradoxically, as Turnell points out, he was, with McDougall, ‘an initiator of 
what was seen to be the policy of Australia’.86 ‘What was seen’ would have 
encouraged British policy in favour of economic appeasement, if only because 
it seemed to carry no threat to empire unity. In fact, if ‘economic appeasement’ 
were pursued as McDougall and Bruce proposed, it held no imperial relationship 
sacred: it was an emergent internationalism that transcended the Empire. If it 
worried some politicians and officials in London, it could have caused much 
more concern in Canberra.
Jebb later recalled that ‘the drive to “Economic Appeasement” began to peter 
out’ from early 1937, though debates on financial and economic assistance 
and approaches to Germany continued.87 Neither Bruce nor McDougall was 
yet ready to abandon the campaign. McDougall continued to develop his 
ideas in memoranda. The Van Zeeland report, finally completed in January 
1938, proposed an offer of financial aid to Germany and Italy in return for 
undefined political, financial and commercial concessions in a ‘Pact of Economic 
Collaboration’. But Van Zeeland had neglected what McDougall still saw as the 
key to success: appeals to the idealism and self-interest of ordinary citizens.88 
By then McDougall was prepared to admit that the dictators had succeeded 
84 DAFP I, 45, 14 June 1937, p. 162.
85 NAA, M104, 5/1, Bruce to Lyons, 23 June 1937.
86 Turnell, ‘Butter for Guns’, pp. 17–18.
87 Jebb, The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn, pp. 64–5.
88 NLA, MS6890/4/5, ‘The Road to Economic Appeasement’, 31 January 1938, pp. 2, 5.
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in ‘persuading their peoples that glory, prestige and military power are more 
desirable than human welfare’, but he clung to a hope that the combined effects 
of autarky and rearmament on standards of living might yet prove to be their 
‘Achilles heel’.89 Once again McDougall suggested a declaration of intention 
to improve living standards by attention to nutrition, housing, efficiency and 
diversity of agriculture, together with settlement of problems of raw materials, 
colonial trade and migration, calling for a ‘vigorous lead’ from Britain and France 
in association with the League. He added: ‘the United States of America appears 
to be the only country where Government is attempting to interpret its efforts 
towards international economic co-operation in terms which will appeal to the 
average citizen.’90 In spite of his concerns about US isolationism, McDougall had 
identified the direction in which his own ideas were tending with other strands 
of thought in the United States.
Bruce felt strongly enough to take the issue to new Prime Minister, Neville 
Chamberlain, in a letter that followed the lines of ‘The Road to Economic 
Appeasement’.91 An unidentified Foreign Office commentator described Bruce as 
‘next to Mr Cordell Hull the principal apostle of economic appeasement, i.e. of a 
relaxation of protective measures as a necessary prelude to political settlement’. 
The commentator took issue with a claim in Bruce’s letter that attempts to solve 
economic problems had failed because they did not appeal to the interests of 
ordinary people. There were other reasons, including governments putting 
military aggrandisement ahead of economic advantages. Of the democracies, 
neither France, hampered by financial difficulties and a weak franc, nor the 
United States, its Congress dominated by isolationists, could play a significant 
role in international economic action. Great Britain had done all it could: it 
had no exaggerated protective measures and had modified its trade barriers 
against manufactures. Its best contribution should be conclusion of a bilateral 
agreement with the United States. He added that most matters raised by Bruce 
were already the subject of action by the League of Nations. Bruce had made 
no specific requests, other than a British–American declaration in favour of 
peace, limitation of armaments, higher standards of living, fewer obstacles to 
trade, maintenance of commodity prices and stabilisation of currencies. The 
commentator doubted the usefulness of a non-specific manifesto to which 
totalitarian states were not party. It might have some ‘psychological value’, but 
the League was dependent on national states for practical action. A chilling 
conclusion warned that accentuating the difference between living standards in 
the democracies and those of the totalitarian states might ‘make it more difficult 
for the democratic powers to organise their peoples for the sacrifices that they 
may be called upon to make’.92
89 Ibid., pp. 1, 4.
90 Ibid., pp. 6–9.
91 UKNA, FO371/22517, 125552, W3279/41/98, Bruce to Chamberlain, 25 February 1938, pp. 171–7.
92 Ibid., p. 177.
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Attention had shifted from avoiding war to preparing for it. Late in 1938, 
shortly after the Munich Agreement, McDougall joined Orr and Hall in an 
attempt to persuade the British Government ‘to take seriously and put into 
practice’ consumption and nutrition policies, to increase empire preparedness 
and foreign support. Notes of the discussion reflect an atmosphere of crisis. 
Having failed to interest the Prime Minister, they proposed to lobby the City 
and industry. Preparedness and national unity demanded moral leadership 
and economic strength. Policies to increase consumption would persuade less 
prosperous Britons that their own social system was worth defending; sound 
nutrition would contribute to defence and to health. McDougall now used 
‘economic appeasement’ as a broad term for reform of commercial policy to 
combat subsidised foreign exports; to provide loans and technical advice to 
assist reorientation of agriculture in Eastern and south-eastern Europe, the Near 
and Middle East and British colonies; and for any measures to increase prosperity 
throughout the world. Sympathetic support for Britain would depend on ‘really 
liberal policies in regard to such questions as trade with non-self-governing 
areas and availability of raw materials, allowing foreign countries the fullest 
access to markets’.93 The only answer to a looming US recession, affecting 
raw materials and world economies, he argued, was increased consumption; 
nutrition policies would be ‘a sure basis for both preparedness for defence and 
for appeasement…a fresh stimulus to the “peace” trades in this country and a 
check to the psychology which makes for recession, will react favourably upon 
our external relations’.94 Though he urged an agricultural policy adequate for 
defence, McDougall did not suggest self-sufficiency; losing control of the sea 
lanes would mean defeat. But the prospect of interrupted sea-borne trade should 
be faced, and Britain should specialise in products such as fruit, vegetables and 
dairy products.95 McDougall was not alone: a study by Viscount Astor and 
Seebohm Rowntree similarly urged an agricultural policy preparing for war and 
based on production of protective foods. The authors recommended storage of 
imported cereals, increased livestock production as ‘little granaries of corn’ to 
be slaughtered at need, increased production of protective foods, and ‘in the 
forefront of our proposals a national policy of improved nutrition’.96
Economic appeasement, like political appeasement, ‘presupposed a rational 
element in Nazi Germany’ seeing that Germany’s best interest lay in cooperation; 
that element existed, but it ‘existed powerlessly within an essentially irrational 
system’. In the months before the Munich Agreement and in his subsequent 
assurance of ‘peace in our time’, Chamberlain and those who supported him 
93 NLA, MS6890/4/5, ‘Notes’, 22 October 1938.
94 FAO, RG3.1, Series D3, ‘Appeasement and Reconstruction’, October 1938.
95 Ibid., ‘Notes on Agriculture and Defence’, 16 November 1938.
96 Viscount Astor and B. Seebohm Rowntree, British Agriculture: The Principles of Future Policy, second 
revised edn, Pelican, London, 1939, pp. 53–8, 265.
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failed to understand ‘the irrational dynamics of Nazism’.97 Chamberlain had 
reached that understanding by 1939. He tried to dissuade Roosevelt from 
sanctioning Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles’ last attempts at negotiation 
with the Axis powers early in 1940, and spoke to Welles ‘with white hot anger’ 
of the German Government’s deceit and Hitler’s determination to dominate 
Europe. Welles himself eventually acknowledged Mussolini’s ‘obsession’ to 
recreate the Roman Empire, and that in Germany ‘lies have become truth; evil, 
good; and aggression, self-defense’. Roosevelt declared on 29 March 1940 that 
there was ‘scant immediate prospect’ of establishing peace in Europe, though he 
privately continued to press the British to state that they wanted only security, 
disarmament, equal access to raw materials and markets, and not the breakup 
of Germany. Germany’s invasion of Norway and Denmark in April ended any 
possibility of peace negotiations. The US Administration then depicted the Axis 
powers as an ‘unholy alliance…seeking to dominate and enslave the human 
race’, insisting that experience of the past two years had ‘proven beyond doubt 
that no nation can appease the Nazis’ and that there ‘can be no appeasement 
with ruthlessness’. ‘Like the British it now knew that the regime in Berlin had 
to be vanquished.’98
Bruce and McDougall would doubtless have endorsed Jebb’s account of the 
mood of the time: ‘we all felt in our bones that war was probably coming—it 
hung all the time like a black cloud at the back of my own consciousness—and 
that all means of avoiding it must at least be considered, however unorthodox 
they might be thought to be.’99 All three had helped provoke discussion on 
an issue they believed to be vital, and which was already widely discussed. 
Their efforts became only a tiny strand in the complex web of British policy 
formulation. In the light of subsequent understanding that their ideas could 
not have succeeded, ‘appeasement’, whether economic or political, has lost its 
sense of peace and comfort. Unfairly, to those who promoted it, the word is now 
irrevocably tainted with betrayal.
Revitalising the League
McDougall had concluded his memorandum on economic appeasement in late 
1936: ‘If the nations learn to turn to the League for information, help and advice 
on economic and social questions, the prestige that has been lost on the political 
plane may be regained on a firmer basis.’100 He took up his appointment to the 
Economic Committee with ideas for ‘a wider program [of economic activity] 
97 MacDonald, ‘Economic Appeasement’, p. 131.
98 Offner, ‘Appeasement Revisited’, pp. 389–93.
99 Jebb, The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn, p. 55.
100 NAA/CSIR, A10666, [5], ‘Economic Appeasement’, 21 December 1936. 
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than mere [tariff] barrier sweeping’.101 In July 1937 he predicted that a sense of 
futility and hostility would inevitably accompany a concentration on political 
discussions. ‘Special prominence’ should therefore be given to economic issues 
in speeches at plenary meetings.102 There would be no lack of positive material. 
The 1937 League Assembly would have before it information on progress of a 
report into means of reducing obstacles to world trade by Belgian economist 
and Prime Minister, Paul Van Zeeland, commissioned by the British and French 
Governments, and that of a League committee inquiring into access to raw 
materials. The Economic Committee’s report to the Council would emphasise 
the importance of measures to improve living standards, and there would be 
the final report of the Mixed Committee on Nutrition. The Second Committee 
would have the opportunity to consider his own memorandum on economic 
appeasement, which was published as an annex to the Economic Committee’s 
report. This body of evidence should present ‘a picture of the League of 
Nations actively concerned to secure a general improvement in human welfare 
through practical economic measures’, resulting perhaps in a ‘greater spirit of 
co-operation than has existed for several years’. The Second Committee should 
recommend investigation of ‘subjects of great significance to economic welfare’: 
avoidance or amelioration of a slump; the standard of living; trade barriers; 
agricultural credits in peasant Europe; and the extension of the Tripartite 
Agreement towards progressive decontrol of currencies and other factors 
affecting monetary policy.103
The Economic Committee’s report in September, however, was less positive. 
Removal of obstacles to trade had been slow; self-sufficiency remained a 
problem; and any trade improvement derived largely from rearmament, which 
must ultimately ‘frustrate any tendency towards the raising of the standard of 
living’. There remained some hope for improved economic activity. The Mixed 
Committee had shown ‘the unwisdom of maintaining high food prices and 
limiting exports’. International action might include a joint statement, affirming 
general objectives that should include peace, prosperity and improved standards 
of living.104
McDougall had hoped in vain for determination in Second Committee to 
cooperate on reducing trade restrictions. Van Zeeland’s report had not yet been 
completed; it was to prove disappointingly lacking in practical proposals for 
joint action when it was produced early the following year. The committee’s 
rapporteur gloomily summed up discussion: ‘Countries did not seem disposed 
101 LN, 1933–40, 10A, 27571/357, McDougall to Stoppani, 5 February 1937.
102 NAA, M104, 5/1, ‘The Keynote of the Next Assembly’, 20 July 1937.
103 Ibid., pp. 2–5.
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to try and find suitable means…to enable them to emerge from their isolation 
and enter the world flow of trade once again.’105 McDougall’s own paper drew 
almost no comment. Enthusiasm for economic appeasement was muted. He did 
succeed in amending a sentence about the effect of improved economic relations 
on political relations from ‘there might be some justification for hope’ to ‘there 
is indeed justification for hope’.106 Anodyne resolutions reflected the equivocal 
nature and outcome of the debate, requesting the Economic and Financial 
Committees to continue their studies into ways of removing trade barriers and 
exchange controls, appealing to ‘all countries concerned to lend every possible 
support…in order to arrive at practical results’.107
Plans to extend the work of the Economic Committee were more successful. Bruce 
told the Assembly he could not accept a view that political appeasement must 
precede economic cooperation: ‘our political difficulties arise…in a considerable 
measure from economic causes. With poor and insecure living standards, 
with low incomes, a poor scale of consumption, with fear of unemployment 
ever present, individual and family life becomes depressed and hopeless.’ In 
these circumstances ‘people are driven to seek distraction or inspiration in 
exaggerated forms of nationalism and in dreams of national aggrandisement’. 
Bruce reminded the Assembly that economic and financial problems affected 
people’s lives, ‘the way which human beings are fed, clothed and housed, and 
on the quality of health and general welfare which is possible for them’. The 
response to his invitation to the Assembly to consider the question of nutrition 
had exceeded anything he had dared hope for, but had also revealed the extent 
of malnutrition and its effects; he now called upon the League to ‘face realities’ 
and to exercise ‘constructive and heartening’ leadership on economic and social 
questions. ‘By these means we shall best restore the prestige of the League in the 
eyes of the world and carry out the great responsibilities that rest upon us.’108
As McDougall had suggested in ‘Keynote of the Next Assembly’, Bruce followed 
this remarkable speech by successfully proposing a series of League inquiries 
into means of raising standards of living, of prevention or mitigation of 
depressions, and into agricultural credits with special reference to Central and 
Eastern Europe. In the first step towards the Bruce Report, another resolution 
invited the council to inquire into the structure and functions of the Economic 
and Financial Organization.
105 Ibid., Official Journal 1937, Special Supplement 171, Minutes of the Second Committee, M. René Brunet 
of France, introducing his draft report, 30 September 1937, p. 95.
106 Ibid., p. 97.
107 Ibid., Annex 5, p. 126; Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers: 1937–38–39–40, Vol. III, no. 42, ‘Report 
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A leading article in The Times commended Bruce’s constructive approach at the 
1937 Assembly, linking it with Cordell Hull’s bilateral treaties campaign and the 
idea of cooperation in the cause of peace between nations within and outside the 
League. The editorial commented that Bruce ‘clearly had in mind’ McDougall’s 
‘instructive memorandum’ of which it had published a full summary a few days 
earlier.109 The leader writer doubtless knew exactly whence Bruce drew his 
inspiration, given McDougall’s close ties with Printing House Square. Turnell 
suggests that from the nutrition campaign until after World War II, The Times 
gave ‘saturation coverage’ to McDougall’s and Bruce’s ideas.110
Standard of Living Inquiry
The Economic Committee’s agenda in December 1937 included preparation of a 
regime of permanent guarantees for free circulation of raw materials; demographic 
questions and emigration; and preliminary discussion of the standard of living 
inquiry proposed by Bruce. On McDougall’s recommendation, Professor Noel 
Hall was invited to draft a substantial paper to guide that inquiry, subject to 
discussion with a small subcommittee, which included McDougall. Stoppani 
expected that directions for the major paper would be prepared jointly by Hall 
and McDougall.111
Hall’s memorandum, ‘National and International Measures to be employed for 
raising the Standard of Living’, was circulated to the Economic Committee as a 
basis for discussion. Many of McDougall’s ideas are represented within it, not 
least his emphasis on the central importance of raising standards of living. But 
whereas McDougall’s aim was always to simplify and persuade, this paper—
the work of a professional economist—stressed the complexity of the problem. 
There was no easy answer. On the contrary, there was danger in promoting a 
general international or national policy without proper consideration of all its 
aspects. A ‘practical study of the economics of consumption’ was needed, for 
both national and international levels. Problems of the organisation and control 
of production, of finance and of international trade should be combined with 
a study of consumption, the constituents of real income and the capacity of 
the individual to increase his standard of living. Price movements had variable 
and complex effects on consumption. He noted that higher prices lowered 
consumption of ‘protective foods’ to a greater degree than that of energy foods, 
and referred to McGonigle’s much quoted study, ‘Poverty, Nutrition and the 
Public Health’. The paradox of poverty in the midst of plenty could only be 
109 The Times, 22 September 1937, Summary of ‘Economic Appeasement’, 18 September 1937.
110 Turnell, ‘Butter for Guns’, p. 16.
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resolved by painstaking study of prices, of demand and of effects upon costs and 
earnings of changes in the relative quantities of different goods produced. All 
of these touched on government policies, but ‘policy can only be rightly framed 
when all aspects of the problem have been considered’. Hall therefore proposed 
a study ‘distinctive in the fact that it will emphasise the inter-relationships of 
previous sectional inquiries’, but focused on the problem of raising the standard 
of living. ‘It is this problem which is capable of providing a new dynamic to 
economic policies both national and international.’ The inquiry would involve 
‘pioneer work in a subject which is co-extensive with the whole international 
economic system’.112 In at least one sense this was McDougall’s document: it 
proposed exactly what he hoped the Economic Committee would do. Sadly, time 
ran out before Hall’s plans could be achieved.
Following the report of the first committee led by Bruce to inquire into the 
structure of the League Economic and Financial Organization in 1937, officials 
in Whitehall discussed a proposal by League Secretary-General, Joseph Avenol, 
for an ‘economic superman’ to coordinate the work of the Economic and 
Financial Committees and to ‘inspire and activate the various inquiries’ then 
under consideration by both committees. The records demonstrate a general 
approval of Bruce the man, if not of his economic views, but little enthusiasm 
for McDougall. Ashton-Gwatkin noted that the League Secretariat wanted Bruce 
for the role, and that F. P. Walters, a senior league official, believed an otherwise 
very busy Bruce would be able to manage, ‘with McDougall’s help’.113 Leith-
Ross had ‘great admiration for Mr. Bruce’s personality’ but thought he lacked 
competence to deal with technical questions, adding, ‘you know McDougall 
as well as I do, and I can only say he has just joined the Economic Committee 
himself’. It would be a mistake, he argued, to put the work of technical experts 
under a political director.114 R. M. Makins suggested McDougall hoped for the 
position of an economic éminence grise. The Junior Foreign Office Minister, Lord 
Cranborne, noted: 
No doubt Mr. McDougall will move heaven and earth to get [Bruce] to 
accept. Mr M. is, and always has been, an intriguer of the first order…
but whatever happens, we should not risk hurting Mr. Bruce, who has 
very definite views on economic subjects, to which it is probably true 
that he feels that HMG have not always been over-sympathetic.115 
The offer was made, but Bruce did not accept it.116
112 Ibid., League Document E.1008, 30 November 1937.
113 UKNA, FO 371/22516, note by Ashton-Gwatkin, 10 January 1938.
114 Ibid., letter from Leith-Ross to Ashton-Gwatkin, 12 January 1938.
115 Ibid., memorandum by R. M. Makins, 20 January 1938.
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The Bruce Report
The League’s ‘technical’ work strengthened as its political authority waned in 
the 1930s, and greater collaboration between League bodies and others increased 
to that end. The Health Organization took initiatives of its own; the Mixed 
Committee on nutrition broke through boundaries and drew on experts within 
and beyond the League, encouraging and cooperating with national nutrition 
committees around the world. A similar pattern was undertaken for work 
on housing. Yet, at the top, technical agencies remained subject to a Council 
whose diplomats and politicians lacked the expertise to do more than authorise 
circulation of technical reports for debate in the Assembly. A system suited to 
promoting formal agreements between governments was ‘totally inadequate’ to 
new forms of action. ‘What was needed was a directing body of responsible 
ministers corresponding in authority to a Council of Foreign Ministers and 
meeting…regularly and frequently.’117
In 1937 a committee chaired by Bruce therefore suggested changes in control of 
the Economic and Financial Organization of the league. These proposals were 
elaborated by the Committee for the Co-ordination of Economic and Financial 
Questions, which met in May 1938—again with Bruce as Chairman. A year 
later, he chaired the Special Committee on the Development of International 
Co-operation in Economic and Social Affairs, generally remembered as ‘the 
Bruce Committee’. Its report, ‘The Development of International Co-operation 
in Economic and Social Affairs: Report of the Special Committee’, was submitted 
in August 1939 and known as the ‘Bruce Report’, recognising ‘the decisive 
contribution made to it at every stage by the Australian statesman’.118
The Bruce Report recommended a permanent change in terminology and in 
structure. It argued the inadequacy of the phrase ‘technical problems’ and of 
the distinction made in the League between ‘political’ and ‘technical’: ‘So called 
“technical problems” are in every country political questions, frequently the 
cause of internal controversy and often necessitating international negotiation.’ 
The committee therefore used the term ‘Economic and Social Questions’. It 
pointed to
the growing extent to which the progress of civilization is dependent 
upon economic and human values. State policies are determined in 
increasing measure by such social and economic aims as the prevention 
117 Walters, ‘The League of Nations’, pp. 36–7.
118 Ibid., p. 38. The report was officially published as LN, A.23. 1939. A copy included as a special 
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of unemployment, the prevention of wide fluctuations in economic 
activity, the provision of better housing, the suppression and cure of 
disease…
Modern experience has also shown with increasing clearness that none 
of these problems can be entirely solved by purely national action. The 
need for the interchange of experience and the co-ordination of action 
between national authorities has been proved useful and necessary time 
after time in every section of the economic and social fields.119
The League was not simply a body to prevent war: more than 60 per cent of 
its budget was devoted to economic and humanitarian work, benefiting both 
members and non-members. All countries faced similar problems and could 
benefit from sharing experience with other states. All were concerned with 
the economic welfare of their citizens and with nutrition, housing and health: 
‘And all these questions are subject to scientific treatment. What is required 
therefore, and what is being accomplished, is a joint and intensive study of 
those common problems on which the security of all nations and all classes of 
the population depends.’120
The report argued for fuller participation of non-member states and more 
central direction in view of the ‘growing intertwining of the different branches 
of the work’. It sought greater publicity and a platform for discussion to 
make use of ‘the only really potent instrument of progress—an enlightened 
public opinion’.121 It proposed that economic and social work be overseen by 
a new ‘Central Committee for Economic and Social Questions’, comprising 
representatives of 24 states and up to eight experts, with member and non-
member states participating on an equal footing.122 The report was approved by 
the League’s last full Assembly on 15 December 1939. Its principles were to be 
‘effectively embodied’ in the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations 
(ECOSOC).123
The Bruce Report stressed the interconnection of social and economic problems: 
‘social welfare, the care of the child, and the protection of the family, link up 
directly with the problems of better housing and of better feeding. These in 
turn are in many ways dependent on economic conditions, on transport facilities 
and on methods of taxation.’124 It has been suggested the report ‘smacked of a 
radical humanism rather foreign to the international organisations set up in the 
1940s’, and that Australian policy on economic questions in the 1940s, such 
119 ‘Bruce Report’, p. 6.
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as the full-employment approach—sometimes seen as ‘essentially novel’—was 
foreshadowed in the 1930s by men such as McDougall and Bruce, who were 
aware of the ‘potentially radical significance of what they were doing’.125
The Last Assembly
Bruce had done what he could to help bring McDougall’s vision into being, but 
there were limits to optimism. By 1938 he gave much of his attention to matters 
of rearmament in Britain and in Australia. He oversaw preparations to protect 
occupants of Australia House against gas, splinters and incendiary bombs. An 
air-raid shelter for 500 people was created in the basement, with air filtration, a 
decontamination centre, internal emergency lights and power supply, sandbags 
and protective window coverings. Beyond that, he reported to Canberra, 
protection of the building against high explosives was not practicable.126
Bruce and McDougall did not abandon the League on the outbreak of war. In 
October 1939, Bruce, Stirling and McDougall agreed with Australian Prime 
Minister, R. G. Menzies, that the League’s political activities ‘should…be put 
into cold storage’, but there should be ‘a strong expression of the Commonwealth 
Government’s appreciation of the value of the economic and social work of the 
League’ and a decision to implement the Bruce Report, which might well ‘tend 
to strengthen the general position of the League and may even tend to attract 
back support of countries such as Italy, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Spain’.127
In December 1939, during the uneasy calm of the ‘phoney war’, the Soviet Union 
invaded Finland and three days later Finland appealed to the League. Although 
Britain and France had decided nothing could be achieved by a meeting except 
a further demonstration of League weakness, Council and Assembly were now 
obliged to meet. Despite public sympathy for the Finns, Britain and France 
were not willing to risk strengthening Soviet ties with Germany or further 
discrediting the League. Bruce therefore advised Canberra that ‘delegates of 
secondary importance’ should attend; he was leaving representation at the 
League’s Twentieth Assembly to McDougall, who was already in Geneva.128
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This ‘last piece of meaningless ritual’ must have been a dismal experience.129 
McDougall was instructed to support an Assembly resolution condemning the 
Soviet action, which was passed with some abstentions. He was to point out that 
Commonwealth Government policy was not to impose sanctions unless applied 
by the whole League membership, but the question of sanctions was not raised. 
He should consult Canberra and work with the British if the Assembly were 
asked to give an opinion on the expulsion of the Soviet Union. The Assembly 
was not consulted; Council members voted in favour with some abstentions.130
With hindsight, ironies can be seen in other business undertaken. In debate 
over a new scale of contributions, McDougall protested against the relative 
treatment of Australia and Argentina, and the Fourth Committee agreed the 
scale should apply for one year rather than three. McDougall stressed the need 
to reduce Secretariat expenses, especially on political activity. The total League 
budget was cut by one-third, and League and ILO staff agreed to accept salary 
reductions ranging from 2 to 20 per cent. A policy of staff reduction would 
continue. A new Council was elected, but would never meet. Delegates returned 
home to face the real war; staff of the technical organisations relocated to the 
United States. ‘The immense palace of the League was empty and silent.’131
Bruce and McDougall continued to push for reformation of the League. Bruce 
acted promptly to gain British reassurance that a rumoured intrigue by the ILO 
would not affect British support for implementation of the Bruce Report.132 In 
February 1940, McDougall attended a meeting of the organising committee for 
the recommended new Social and Economic Central Committee. Before that 
meeting he wrote to J. H. Willits, Director of the Social Science Division of the 
Rockefeller Insititution, seeking help for a shortfall in the League’s budget. A 
second letter to Willits, written in very different circumstances on 5 June 1940, 
maintains an obstinate hope:
...there may appear to be little justification in believing that it is an 
urgent matter to consider the problems of post-war reconstruction, yet 
it may well prove that from next October…those of us who feel vitally 
concerned with this subject may be convinced that there is little time to 
lose. I feel these things so strongly that I have asked Mr. Bruce to consult 
with the British Government…and I hope that, as a result, decisions 
129 Hudson, Australia and the League of Nations, p. 94.
130 DAFP II, 414, Prime Minister’s Department to Bruce, 11 December; 415, McDougall to Department of 
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may be taken to preserve a strong economic and social organization 
of the League and with that part of the ILO which can make effective 
contributions to the subject of post-war reconstruction.133
Conclusion
The efforts of Bruce and McDougall to rejuvenate the League were defeated in 
the short term by time and circumstance. But the recommendations of the Bruce 
Report, and its aspirations, were reflected in the establishment of the Economic 
and Social Council of the United Nations.
McDougall’s attempt to deal with the problem of Germany had expanded the 
‘marriage of health and agriculture’ to something much broader: an agenda 
to draw the poor and the hungry away from the forces of totalitarianism and 
communism. His thinking had moved beyond the British view of ‘economic 
appeasement’ as a renewal of old ideas of ‘treaty revision’ to contain Germany’s 
territorial ambitions and encourage a reversal of autarky, to something closer to 
the US version, which added to those aims a questioning of existing structures, 
including the British Empire and its preferential systems, looking instead to a 
new internationalist social order. Washington wanted to create a ‘New Deal for 
the World’. McDougall and Bruce were ready to embrace that vision.
133 FAO, RG3.1, Series 1, file 1.C, McDougall to Willits, 30 January and 5 June 1940.




McDougall visited Washington with Bruce briefly in 1938, and for longer 
periods alone in 1941 and 1942. There his ideas were well received; the ground 
had already been prepared.
In nineteenth-century America, ‘Social Darwinism’ inspired Andrew Carnegie’s 
Gospel of Wealth, which argued in favour of accumulation of wealth, but 
also that wealth must be used for the benefit of society. Inherent in this view 
was capitalism without restriction. ‘Progressivism’ developed as an informal 
movement aiming to mitigate the harsh effects of unregulated capitalism 
through measures including democratic reform, regulation of corporations and 
monopolies, labour rights and social justice. Many progressives campaigned for 
professionalism, rationality and efficiency in government. Scientific progress 
and training were essential to that efficiency. 
Progressivist thinking underlay much of the ‘New Deal’ promised by Roosevelt 
in 1932; the influence of progressivism can be seen in the careers and thinking 
of many key figures in his administration. In the early 1940s, some of the most 
senior members would influence and be influenced by McDougall. Foremost 
amongst these was Vice President Henry Wallace, a former Republican who 
campaigned for Roosevelt in 1932. As a precocious student, Wallace’s interests 
had ranged from plant genetics and agricultural economics to quantitative 
analysis. He developed statistical correlation techniques in pioneering corn-
hog ratio studies; experiments with corn cross-breeding brought him wealth 
and fame. From Thorstein Veblen, he took up the idea of ‘cultural lag’: the 
inability of economic and social institutions to keep pace with advancing 
technology. In his first book, Agricultural Prices, published in 1920, Wallace 
‘hoped that contemporary business civilization would soon give way to the 
rule of “production engineers” and “statistical economists”’. This reflected the 
ideas of ‘evolutionary positivism’: a belief that ‘progressive social change occurs 
naturally as more information becomes available, enabling men to use their 
reason more effectively to control environment. Eventually the data become 
the mechanism of social change, their mastery and administration the solution 
to social problems.’1 McDougall, the self-taught collector of statistics and 
proponent of thorough investigations, might not have described his views in 
so theoretical a fashion, but this accorded closely with his approach to effecting 
change.
1 Norman D. Markowitz, The Rise and Fall of the People’s Century: Henry A. Wallace and American Liberalism, 
1941–1948, Free Press, New York, 1973, pp. 12–14.
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In March 1933 Wallace was appointed Agriculture Secretary, a position earlier 
occupied by his father, and became one of the Administration’s foremost 
advocates of economic planning. He persuaded Roosevelt to adopt the domestic 
allotment plan, production control through voluntary crop reduction, which 
became the basis of the first Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA). Wallace’s 
book New Frontiers portrayed the New Deal as ‘an adventure in planning and 
popular participation—a movement towards economic democracy’; he defined 
the New Deal as ‘an attempt to mediate between the extremes of total security 
and total freedom’. Like most New Dealers, Wallace stressed the need for 
mass purchasing power and high levels of consumption to achieve recovery. 
Administration supporters portrayed him as ‘an idealist and philosopher, a 
dreamer who epitomized the best hopes of the New Deal’.2 By the late 1930s, 
his Department of Agriculture led the way in social programs, providing loans 
to tenants and farmers and relief for the rural poor, production and general 
agricultural planning, ‘ever-normal granary’ measures of crop insurance and 
storage, and food-stamp programs that aimed at both relief for the poor and 
disposal of surplus produce. He was also held responsible for failures of some 
programs to achieve their intended goals and for ‘destruction of ten million 
acres of cotton and the slaughter of six million little pigs’ under AAA crop-
reduction programs. But, like Bruce and McDougall, Wallace thought that ‘to 
have to destroy a growing crop is a shocking commentary on our civilization…
made necessary by the almost insane lack of world statesmanship’ from 1920 
to 1931.3
During McDougall’s visit to Washington in 1941, Wallace was appointed head 
of an Economic Defense Board, which was described as a ‘sort of ministry of 
economic warfare’. McDougall sent Bruce a cutting referring to the position 
giving Wallace ‘jurisdiction over post-war planning’ and putting him ‘in an 
advantageous position to develop a program which might later serve as a platform 
for his Presidential candidacy’.4 Wallace suggested McDougall see economist 
Winfield Riefler, who was Adviser to the board, following ‘a significant career’ 
with the Federal Reserve Board. He had been Economic Adviser to the Executive 
Council during the New Deal, advising both Treasury and the Department of 
Agriculture, and had also been Chairman of the Central Statistical Board.
Riefler was a graduate of experimental teaching programs at Amherst College 
and at the Robert Brookings Graduate School, where students were exposed 
to the ‘institutional approach’ to economics. Institutionalism saw economics as 
a study of the nature and functioning of the ‘economic order’ and as relevant 
2 Ibid., pp. 20–1.
3 Ibid., p. 26; Walter J. Samuels, Henry A. Wallace and American Foreign Policy, Greenwood Press, Westport, 
Conn., 1976, p. 37.
4 NAA, M104/1, 9(6), letter, 1 August.
Prologue
213
to ‘the problem of control’ rather than exercises in ‘formal value theory’. The 
graduate school, established to prepare graduates for policy research and senior 
public service positions, taught ‘the art of handling problems rather than…
accumulated knowledge’. Its aim was to produce ‘craftsmen who can make 
contributions to the intelligent direction of social change’. It emphasised 
‘self-motivation, wide-ranging intellectual curiosity, and…the analysis and 
creative solution of social problems’.5 McDougall knew Riefler as a member 
of the Financial Committee of the League of Nations and again when Riefler 
became Minister in charge of Economic Warfare at the US Embassy in London 
in 1942. They, too, had attitudes in common. The Amherst–Brookings approach 
could well describe much of McDougall’s own. Graduates of these programs 
formed an influential network in the 1930s and 1940s. Many occupied key 
positions in government and in movements for social and institutional reform 
and international cooperation.6 These included Stacy May, Assistant Director 
of the Rockefeller Social Sciences Division until 1942, whom McDougall met 
in New York in 1938; Mordecai Ezekiel, Economic Adviser to the Secretary 
of Agriculture from 1933 to 1944 and later Special Assistant to the Director-
General of FAO; and Isador Lubin, Commissioner of Labor Statistics and a 
Special Adviser to Roosevelt during World War II.
Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle was an important mentor to McDougall 
during his 1942 visit. Berle was an original New Dealer, a ‘brain-truster’ in 
Roosevelt’s 1932 election campaign and known to be personally close to the 
President. A brilliant corporate lawyer, he was co-author of ‘one of the most 
influential books of the twentieth century’, The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property, written with the assistance of a young economist, Gardiner 
C. Means, and published in 1932. It argued for government responsibility to 
ensure that corporate power worked for the benefit of individuals—a middle 
way between socialism and capitalism—and was described by Time magazine 
as ‘the economic bible of the Roosevelt administration’. It laid the foundations 
for much of the industrial, banking and finance legislation of the New Deal.7 
Roosevelt appointed Berle Assistant Secretary in the State Department early in 
1938, suggesting the department needed ‘an adventurous mind’.8 In 1938 there 
were fears of renewed depression; Berle was, writes his biographer, probably the 
highest-ranking official in Washington conversant with Keynes’s ideas. He acted 
in the State Department as ‘a free-lancer with special access to the President’, his 
primary mission ‘to focus Roosevelt’s and Washington’s economic thinking…on 
5 Malcolm Rutherford, ‘Walton Hamilton, Amherst, and the Brookings Graduate School: Institutional 
Economics and Education’, (Draft), September 2001, <http://ideas.repec.org/p/vic/vicddp/0104.html> 
[accessed 2006], pp. 2, 16, 17.
6 Ibid., pp. 24–6.
7 Jordan A. Schwarz, Liberal: Adolf A. Berle and the Vision of an American Era, Free Press, New York, and 
Collier Macmillan, London, c. 1987, pp. 55–62.
8 Ibid., pp. 110–11.
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recovery schemes consistent with business realities and America’s place in the 
world’. He advocated increasing America’s national wealth by means of ‘pump-
priming’ through an enhanced Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC).9 
Berle had predicted that the United States might find it necessary to use ‘the 
enormous resources of the Federal Reserve system as a means of rebuilding the 
shattered life’ of Europe after the war. He and Roosevelt shared a conviction 
that ‘the time for making peace was during war’. A firm anti-imperialist, Berle 
believed that 
Britain must realize that her postwar world influence did not rely upon 
empire but rather ‘on her moral and intellectual ability to bring about 
common action among a great number of nations’…A poorer Britain 
could not afford a great world role, but the gradual relaxation of its 
imperialism would encourage American generosity that surpassed even 
lend-lease. 
Foreign aid to Europe and undeveloped countries made sense in Washington, 
which needed a postwar ‘system of open finance so that no country shall find 
itself short of supplies because it is short of exchange’.10
Nutrition had become an important field of study in US academic and philanthropic 
institutions. The Rockefeller International Health Board was concentrating on 
methods of assessing nutritional deficiencies and their significance to health. The 
Wall Street-funded Milbank Memorial Fund, a medical research body directed 
by Dr F. G. Boudreau, formerly of the League Health Organization and an old 
ally of McDougall, devoted much of its resources to nutrition studies. Its journal 
in the late 1930s carried articles on various aspects of the subject, including a 
review of the League Mixed Committee Report.11 Boudreau had contributed one 
on the international campaign for nutrition, which concluded:
The relation of better nutrition to peace may seem very remote. But 
there is no single road to peace, and if in the attempt to improve national 
nutrition, the governments succeed in promoting a fuller measure of 
social justice and in doing away in part at least with economic nationalism 
in the interests of health, it may be that the real objective of the League 
and of the Labour Office will not seem so remote as it appears today.12
Boudreau, says Daniel M. Fox, was committed to social medicine and focused 
on means to promote positive health; his ‘strongest personal interest was in 
policy for food and nutrition’. Fox also notes a longstanding policy endorsed 
9 Ibid., pp. 118–19.
10 Ibid., pp. 211–12.
11 H. D. Kruse, ‘Ever Normal Nutrition’, Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, Vol. XVI, no. 1, 1938, pp. 110–18.
12 F. G. Boudreau, ‘The International Campaign for Better Nutrition, Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, Vol. 
XV, no. 1, 1937, pp. 104–20.
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by Albert G. Milbank, President of the fund board, that ‘the fund should only 
advocate policy that already had some support among leading public officials; 
to be radical was to risk irrelevance’.13 Boudreau presumably knew that others 
agreed with his views.
Postwar planning had been receiving attention in Washington well before 
Pearl Harbor. Influential people from the President down believed that the 
mistakes of 1919 could only be avoided by early attention to planning. The 
Roosevelt Administration sought to avoid the errors made by Woodrow Wilson 
in 1918–19, including a failure to involve political opponents, particularly 
isolationists, in discussion, and delaying consideration of the peace until the 
war was won. A lesson in line with McDougall’s arguments was the need ‘to 
seek a more integrated vision of collective security through combining political 
and military co-operation with economic security…[a] precept based on the 
perceived successes of some of the League of Nations-affiliated agencies…as 
well as the harsh experience of interwar economic diplomacy.’14 Many must have 
felt, like Berle, that American resources would have to be used.
McDougall’s ideas appealed to New Dealers. Their approaches to planning and 
consumption accorded with his, and the Amherst–Brookings institutionalist 
approach gave a theoretical basis to his methods. Speeches by Wallace, Welles 
and others, urging attention to social justice, prepared his way. As far back 
as 1934 Berle had written: ‘A question has been asked why, in a civilization 
over-full of material things, more than able to supply every human need, the 
organization of economics leaves millions upon millions of people in squalor and 
misery?’15 McDougall asked that question in memorandum after memorandum. 
Herbert Hoover, who had headed a national food authority during World War 
I and was chief organiser of relief food supplies for Belgium, was ‘among the 
earliest and most forceful proponents of a novel strategic concept that linked 
security to social welfare’. Hoover argued that ‘famine breeds anarchy. Anarchy 
is infectious, the infections of such a cess-pool will jeopardize France and 
Britain, [and] will yet spread to the United States’; nationalism and Bolshevism 
would not cure hunger or unemployment, but ‘desperate populations would 
take up radical creeds’.16 McDougall used that argument too.
While isolationism persisted as a significant, and indeed strengthening, force in 
US politics in the early 1940s, Elizabeth Borgwardt argues that ‘a new iteration of 
the New Deal was becoming nothing less than America’s vision for the postwar 
13 ‘The Significance of the Milbank Memorial Fund for Policy: An Assessment at its Centennial’, Milbank 
Quarterly, Vol. 84, no. 1, 2006, <http://www.milbank.org/quarterly/8401PN.html>
14 Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World, pp. 14–15.
15 Schwarz, Liberal, p. 105.
16 Nick Cullather, ‘The Foreign Policy of the Calorie’, The American Historical Review, Vol. 112, no. 2, 2007, 
pars 26–7, <http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/ahr/112.2/cullather.html> [accessed 3 July 2008].
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world’. Proponents included journalists, social welfare activists, academics, 
professionals and church leaders as well as elected political leaders and 
bureaucrats.17 She identifies three ‘idioms’ in the US approach to international 
problems. The ‘legalistic idiom’ sought solutions in codes, conventions and 
arbitration. A ‘moralistic idiom’ after World War I brought declarations of 
principle, rather than the ‘neutral amorality’ of the legalistic idiom that had 
proved ‘tragically inadequate’. Yet the moral approach was partly responsible 
for the weak international response to Japanese aggression in Manchuria, as 
‘ineffectual intellectual moralism met studied American indifference’. The ‘New 
Deal idiom’ looked for ‘sweeping institutional solutions to large-scale social 
problems’.18 The domestic New Deal had persuaded Americans that central 
government was able to tackle ‘seemingly intractable problems’. It had also 
shown ‘a connection between individual security and the stability and security 
of the wider polity’ and that government must help individuals achieve that 
security.19 ‘A groundswell of public opinion…had developed internationalist 
and interventionist sensibilities on an epic scale, by means of direct personal 
experiences’ so that ‘by the end of the 1930s it was a truism that turning 
one’s back on the international economy would have unfavourable domestic 
repercussions’.20 McDougall was to encounter this aspect of American politics 
in Washington.
17 Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World, p. 50. 
18 Ibid., pp. 61–70.
19 Ibid., pp. 77–8.
20 Ibid., pp. 86, 96.
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8. The War of Ideas
Summary
Two influences helped reshape the nutrition campaign in the early years of 
World War II. One was McDougall’s new responsibility at Australia House for 
‘political warfare’. The other was America. McDougall’s thinking developed 
along three intertwining paths: the idea for an international body to promote 
nutrition; the overwhelming need for British–American cooperation; and ways 
to harness the nutrition idea to the needs of wartime propaganda.
Bruce and McDougall visited the United States briefly in 1938, and discussed 
the idea of McDougall, Orr and Hall for an international food institute. The 
experience gave McDougall some understanding of how the approach might 
appeal to Americans and the importance of American–British collaboration. In 
London both men worked to incorporate the nutrition approach into positive 
and constructive war aims, and into British domestic policy. McDougall’s major 
memorandum of 1940, ‘Notes on the Re-statement of Our Aims’, written after 
the fall of France, stresses the need for Anglo–American collaboration in the 
new world order and draws upon ideas from the United States.
Roosevelt’s call for ‘freedom from want’ provided a new impetus for their 
arguments. The US Ambassador, John Winant, became a valuable ally in 
London and in Washington. When McDougall returned to Washington in 1941, 
he had the support of Vice President Henry Wallace, and senior officials in the 
Departments of Agriculture, Health and State. Plans for a formal agreement and 
a conference between US and British Empire experts in 1942 were agreed, but 
prevented by events following Pearl Harbor. McDougall’s ideas were influenced 
by a briefing in London on political warfare and the need for effective material 
to persuade peoples of occupied and enemy countries that the allied nations 
offered something positive. His seminal memorandum ‘Progress in the War of 
Ideas’ was written in response to that need.
The Approach of War
A proposal by McDougall in 1938 for an organisation to promote nutrition 
policies owed much to the models of the Empire Marketing Board and Imperial 
Agricultural Bureaux in the 1920s. In discussions with Orr and Hall, a new 
idea was added: the involvement of financial and industrial groups in an 
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‘International Food Institute…to promote the increased consumption of food 
along the lines indicated by the newer knowledge of nutrition’. The functions 
of the institute would include interpreting in economic terms and then 
popularising scientific literature on nutrition and ‘seeking ways to reconcile 
national policies on agriculture and commerce with policies for sound nutrition’. 
It would work closely with the Economic Organisation of the League of Nations, 
the Imperial Bureau of Nutrition at Orr’s Rowett Institute and the national 
nutrition committees being formed as recommended by the League resolution 
on nutrition. It would not engage in publicity, ‘indeed its work would have to 
be objective’, but development of ‘nutrition consciousness’ and stimulation of 
demand would benefit many interests, including banks, shipping companies, 
food exporters and suppliers of fertilisers, tin plate and gas. All might contribute 
to its support, much as they might allocate funds for advertising.1
McDougall took this idea with him on a visit to Washington in December 1938, 
accompanying Bruce on the first leg of a visit to Australia. Apart from a brief time 
in New York after the Ottawa conference, it was McDougall’s first experience of 
the United States.2 They found the Administration ‘prepared to take a marked 
interest’ in the nutrition approach. Bruce detected ‘latent keenness’ in talks 
with Henry Wallace and with Norman Davis, foreign policy and financial 
adviser to the President and head of the American Red Cross. McDougall met 
key officials in the Departments of Labor, Agriculture, State and Health. State 
Department officials were ‘prepared to see the significance’ of a larger US role 
in an international campaign to increase nutrition consciousness in Europe and 
its likely impact on greater consumption. Wallace understood its implications 
for the reorientation of agriculture and US exports, but his officials were more 
interested in its relevance to disposal of surplus produce. McDougall learned 
about experimental schemes to dispose of surpluses to the poor by means of 
subsidised low prices, cheap milk deliveries to certain areas, school lunches and 
food stamps. Surgeon-General, Dr Thomas Parran, hoped ‘our visit would enable 
him to take up the question with the President and he hoped to make health the 
main objective and yet to secure support of Mr Wallace and his Department’. 
On his way home, McDougall visited philanthropic institutions in New York. 
Stacy May of the Rockefeller Institution suggested the food organisation idea 
might be put to the institution’s European headquarters in Paris, and stressed 
the importance of demonstrating clearly its objectivity. He offered to fund a 
visit by Orr to the United States if it were requested by a US government body.3
1 NLA, MS6890/4/5, ‘Food Policies in Relation to Economic Activity and Appeasement, part 2’, 21 
November 1938.
2 Mr Hume Dow, son of then Australian Trade Commissioner in New York, D. McK. Dow, recalled taking 
McDougall to see the Empire State Building in 1938. Discussion with W. Way, 1985.
3 NLA, MS6890/3/2, undated letter to Orr and Hall, written in mid-Atlantic and typed in London.
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McDougall spent the return voyage to London considering how progress might 
be quickened and the idea widened to appeal to a transatlantic audience. The 
proposed organisation might halve the time needed to achieve adequate food 
policies: an estimated 25 years for more advanced countries might be reduced to 
10, and a much longer period for less developed areas could be reduced to 25. In 
deference to concerns encountered in New York, he now added that it would be 
‘essential to secure a governing body of such eminence as to ensure the complete 
objectivity of the Commission’s work’.4 Fresh from his encounters with the US 
Department of Agriculture, he emphasised that, although public health was 
the primary justification, increased economic activity would ‘produce a general 
reorientation of European agriculture…the only permanent solution of the 
world wheat problem’. And, in a nod to the policy of the Secretary of State to 
liberalise international trade, he wrote: 
A revival of international trade in foodstuffs will favourably affect 
transport, international finance, and generally all the industries that 
supply farmers. The need for increased consumption is the justification 
for policies intended to increase international trade. The policies here 
advocated are indeed the true fulfilment of those of Mr Cordell Hull.5
‘Closest collaboration’
Soon after Germany annexed Czechoslovakia in March 1939, McDougall 
wrote, in a long letter to reach Bruce during his return journey, ‘your days in 
Washington might be made of the utmost importance to the whole future of 
the British Empire and of our civilisation’. Roosevelt and Hull seemed to be 
influencing public opinion with their efforts to preserve peace: ‘I feel that you 
perhaps might initiate large scale policies which, if you found they appealed to 
Washington, you could urge upon London and this might lead to the closest 
collaboration between the Empire and USA, whether it is to be war or peace.’
In the event of war, Britain should immediately invite allied and neutral 
countries to draw up the basis for a just peace. Preparation should be made 
before hostilities began:
If the U.S.A. can see that the British Empire is not only engaged in 
fighting for her own ‘vital interests’ but also for a peace based on justice, 
and if there is the clearest evidence of this from the very first moment of 
the war, then we can rely even more emphatically than is now the case 
upon American support and participation.
4 NLA, MS6890/4/5 and NAA, CP43/1/1, bundle 14A/1943/792, ‘A Proposal for Accelerating the Movement 
towards Better Nutrition and Higher Standards of Living’, 18 January 1939, p. 15.
5 Ibid., pp. 4, 6.
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In a period of tension short of war there should also be a declaration by ‘the great 
“have” countries’, combining firm resistance to aggression with a declaration of 
intent to remove the legitimate grievances of poorer countries.
McDougall added new thoughts to this familiar ground. Henry Wallace had 
secured legislation in 1938 for a domestic ‘ever-normal-granary’: stockpiles 
to prevent food shortages in times of poor crops, ensuring fair prices in times 
of surplus and protecting consumers from high prices in times of shortage by 
releasing stored surpluses. Wallace continued to promote the idea for use on 
an international scale.6 McDougall suggested buffer stocks of problem raw 
materials and foodstuffs be internationally administered and financed, and used 
to moderate prices. His talks in Washington had broadened his perspective, 
beyond redress of colonial grievances and increased food consumption to 
the ‘far more important’ question of bringing about ‘a correlation between 
the productive capacity, either of separate countries or of the world, and the 
physical requirements of populations’. Establishment of the food commission 
could give practical expression to a declaration that the governments of Britain, 
the United States and other creditor nations were prepared to assist other 
countries develop resources and access external supplies. McDougall concluded 
from his discussions in Washington that the proposal would find considerable 
support in the United States. Declaration of such a policy could ‘prove of the 
utmost importance’ to peace. While it would not please the Nazis, it could help 
‘a Germany that had turned away from aggression towards co-operation’ and it 
might be acceptable to Mussolini.7
In 1939 there was no separate Australian representation in Washington. Bruce’s 
talks, on instruction from Canberra, were largely limited to the more urgent 
business of seeking US assurances for support for the British Empire in Europe 
and in the Pacific. Cordell Hull did show ‘he was aware of the work I was doing 
on the economic side and expressed his admiration of it’, while Norman Davis 
expressed admiration for Orr, who was then in Washington. Davis promised 
to put Bruce’s suggestion for a committee to report on nutrition to Roosevelt, 
‘when he got the opportunity for a long and quiet talk with him’. Bruce 
limited his points to the domestic advantages of a nutrition policy. He did not 
canvass McDougall’s suggestions for British–American cooperation and a food 
organisation.8
6 Samuels, Henry A. Wallace and American Foreign Policy, pp. 46–7.
7 NLA, MS6890/3/2, McDougall to Bruce, 14 April 1939.
8 For Bruce’s report to Canberra, dated 8 May 1939, and his records of interview with Davis and Roosevelt on 
3 and 4 May respectively, see DAFP II, 82, and attachments 1 and 2, pp. 108–12. A record of his conversation 
with Hull is in NAA, M104/1, 7(4) (1939).
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Political Warfare
At Australia House, the High Commissioner presided over representatives of 
many Federal Government departments. The External Affairs Liaison Office, 
located in premises close to the British Cabinet Offices, had been created in 
1924 by Bruce as Prime Minister, to be his ‘eyes and ears’ in London. The first 
Liaison Officer, R. G. Casey, reported informally and directly to Bruce, though 
he was officially responsible to the one-man External Affairs Branch of the Prime 
Minister’s Department.9 By 1939, the Liaison Officer, A. T. Stirling, was part of 
a nascent diplomatic network and reported to the External Affairs Department 
established in Canberra late in 1935. An Australian Liaison Officer had been 
appointed within the British Embassy in Washington in 1937; Australian 
Legations in Washington and Tokyo and a High Commission in Ottawa were 
established during 1940. Stirling and his deputy, John Hood, shared premises 
with the Committee of Imperial Defence in Richmond Terrace, Whitehall, and 
undertook routine gathering of information and preparation of cables. Bruce 
was their Head of Mission, but, unlike other heads of mission, he reported 
directly to the Prime Minister. Being Bruce, he assumed an authority and access 
that were readily granted both by British ministers and by Canberra. His was 
the guiding hand on all Australian foreign policy as it operated in the northern 
hemisphere, although he paid lip-service to Canberra.
McDougall’s position had always been an anomaly in Australia House. 
Representing no single department, his responsibilities grew haphazardly, 
usually on his own initiative and largely beyond control of earlier high 
commissioners. Under Bruce, there was discussion and cooperation, each man 
working at his own level to a common agenda. When war came, McDougall was 
given responsibility for ‘political warfare’ at Australia House.
This was at first the old agenda with a new name and some change of emphasis. 
It drew from the economic appeasement campaign the need to shore up allied, 
neutral and particularly American support, and to appeal to moderate elements 
in Axis countries. Once there was a war, however, it was necessary to prepare 
for peace. The lessons of Versailles must be applied: the next peace settlement 
had to be ‘an instrument of social and economic betterment’, demanded not 
only by justice but also by expediency, to prevent revolution, communism and 
the crippling costs of a potential ‘Pax Anglo–Gallica’: ‘Neither this country, 
Australia nor France will tolerate the indefinite postponement of the long overdue 
attack upon the problems of poverty.’10 Plans should be made immediately for a 
peace settlement based on ‘international economic co-operation on a scale never 
9 Hudson and North, eds, My Dear P. M., pp. xi–xiv. 
10 FAO, RG3.1, Series D 3, McDougall memorandum: ‘Can we Maintain a Pax Anglo–Gallica?’, 23 November 
1939. I am grateful to Sean Turnell for copies of his notes from this file.
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previously envisaged’, including a coordinated attack on problems of poverty 
to secure a progressive rise in the standard of living, international solutions 
to commodity problems, reduction of trade barriers and policies to facilitate 
creditor assistance to other nations.11
In the ‘phoney war’ period, the British Government was obliged to formulate 
its postwar vision in responses to offers of peace from Hitler and mediation by 
the Dutch and Belgian monarchs. The view of the French and of some Britons, 
including Churchill, was that the postwar world should be similar to the 
prewar one, but with a disarmed Germany. Others, like Bruce and McDougall, 
visualised ‘a new world resulting from a peace settlement which had faced 
the vital problems of disarmament, territorial adjustment, colonies and the 
economic needs of all nations, in which Germany would play an appropriate 
part as a great nation’.12
This view was supported by the governments of Australia and New Zealand, 
and Bruce and McDougall must have been delighted by the words of South 
Africa’s Jan Smuts: ‘No peace is worth while which does not result in raising the 
living standards of the people.’13
‘Oh the boredom of war!’
McDougall’s new responsibility and an increasing diplomatic workload meant 
that he spent much of his time in the External Affairs Office. Bruce, Stirling and 
McDougall worked long hours together over important cables to Canberra, on 
at least one occasion right through the night. Stirling recalls in his published 
memoirs that in the early war years Bruce himself spent most mornings and 
afternoons at Richmond Terrace, where McDougall would often come to see 
him towards evening. He remembers ‘McDougall bursting in very soon after 
the declaration of war, saying as he came, “Oh the boredom of war!”.’ In his 
unpublished diary, Stirling records that remark on 15 September, having 
previously explained on 10 September that McDougall ‘is very genuinely 
seized with what he calls the “boredom” of war when there is so much else 
to be done—his new League scheme, for instance’—possibly a reference to 
the Bruce Report.14 McDougall may have experienced uncharacteristically low 
spirits for a period in 1940. On 7 February, Stirling recorded in his diary: ‘At 
11 Ibid., ‘The Peace Settlement—Which is the More Practical—a Co-operative or an Enforced Peace 
Settlement?’, 27 November 1939.
12 DAFP II, 308, cable 586 from Bruce to Menzies, 26 October 1939, pp.353-5.
13 DAFP II, 311, 318, 326, Menzies to Chamberlain, 28 October, Jan Smuts, 31 October, and Michael Savage 
(New Zealand), 5 November, to Commonwealth Government, pp. 357–8, 365, 369–71.
14 Stirling, Lord Bruce, pp. 126–7; DFAT, unpublished Stirling Diaries, 10 and 15 September 1939. I am 
grateful to Jeremy Hearder for copies of relevant extracts from the diaries.
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McDougall’s request I took Mr Bruce E. H. Carr’s Years of Crisis. It has shocked 
McDougall greatly.’15 Carr’s ‘realist’ approach to international affairs perhaps 
gave McDougall some reason to doubt his own belief in reason and cooperation. 
His output of memoranda slowed: none seems to have been written in the 
first nine months of that year—an unusually long gap.16 Pressures of work, 
uncertainty in the early war months and the shocks of the fall of France and the 
Blitz probably forced a less vigorous prosecution of broader campaigning. The 
day after Italy entered the war, McDougall fell in the blackout, breaking his 
collarbone. Stirling recalled that he looked ‘badly shaken up’ and that he was 
‘deeply affected by the situation in France—still quoting endlessly the sombrest 
passages of Shakespeare’. On 22 June, McDougall was more positive, appearing 
at the External Affairs Office ‘very eager for some action to transfer part of the 
League of Nations to America’.17
Bruce’s new responsibilities were far greater than those borne by McDougall. 
His personal files record incessant representation to the British Government 
on war-related issues: strategic matters, military appointments, supplies to and 
from Australia, and Australia’s claim to a voice in top-level decision making, the 
last leading to his being given the right to attend the War Cabinet. He carried 
responsibility for the safety of a large workforce in Australia House and concern 
for the welfare of Australian troops in Britain. He pursued personal hobbyhorses, 
particularly the efficacy of air power against sea power, a subject of debate in the 
early war years. He saw anyone who might have useful information or ideas and 
carefully chose targets for his own lobbying. Stirling recalls a long meeting with 
Bruce and McDougall ‘trying to think of outstanding Englishmen for various 
missions’.18 Bruce had virtually unlimited access to British ministers, the City, 
the diplomatic community and Commonwealth representatives. His career and 
reputation carried weight in all those circles.
Despite his workload, Bruce continued to lobby for the nutrition approach 
domestically and internationally. Before the length and geographical spread of 
the war could be predicted, he shared McDougall’s fear that the postwar trading 
situation might repeat that of the interwar years: surplus primary production 
from overseas producers, particularly the United States, which Britain and 
Europe could not afford to buy, and a trade war spelling disaster to transatlantic 
relations. His considerable efforts on behalf of a peace plan with broad appeal 
embodying social justice had good reason to draw upon the nutrition approach.
15 Ibid. The words ‘but not the HC’ appear to have been added later.
16 FAO files list 10 memoranda from 1940 that I have not seen. Most deal with war aims and the peace 
settlement and are unlikely to have been written in the lean period.
17 DFAT, Stirling Diaries, 14, 17 and 22 June; Stirling, Lord Bruce, pp. 156–7.
18 DFAT, Stirling Diaries, 4 October 1939.
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Figure 15 High Commissioner, S. M. Bruce, and Mrs Bruce with Australian 
troops in London. 
Source: Argus Newspaper Collection of Photographs, State Library of Victoria.
Those efforts met with little success. He began in 1939 with Lord Hankey, 
Australian-born Secretary of Cabinet and of the Committee of Imperial Defence 
until 1938, then Minister without Portfolio in the War Cabinet. Hankey told 
Bruce his colleagues in the War Cabinet laughed at him when he suggested a 
nutrition standard be considered in relation to any rationing scheme; he ‘was 
forced to the conclusion they attached no importance to the matter and were 
completely ignorant of its importance’. Bruce reminded him of the importance 
of food shortages, largely brought about by the British strategy of blockade, in 
destroying German civilian morale in 1914–18. Later scholarship has supported 
Bruce’s view, suggesting that changes to traditional dietary patterns played a 
‘critical role’: ‘great mental fatigue’ and ‘real’ and ‘psychological deprivation’ 
depressed German civilian morale and ‘affected military motivation’.19 Bruce 
recommended that Orr and Andrew Cairns, Canadian-born Secretary of the 
International Wheat Advisory Committee, be attached to a broader authority, 
possibly the Committee of Imperial Defence, to ensure cooperation between 
food, health and agricultural bureaucracies. Like Orr, Cairns was persona non 
grata in Whitehall, particularly in the Ministry of Agriculture, where he was 
19 Avner Offer, The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989, p. 2.
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blamed for a draft international agreement on wheat to which the ministry 
objected.20 Hankey feared ‘Orr would be regarded as something in the nature of 
a crank’. Bruce deplored the ‘lack of imagination and vision’ of the Ministry of 
Health, but modified his suggestion to a small advisory committee to the War 
Cabinet, to include Orr.21 Hankey doubted he could convince his colleagues. 
Bruce also recommended Orr to W. S. Morrison, Minister of Food, and to Home 
Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare, who, as ‘head man of the Home Front’, agreed to 
talk to Orr.22
There were many nutrition scientists in Britain. Orr’s distinction was that he 
had become associated with outspoken advocacy of change; official wariness of 
him, and of McDougall, perhaps helps to explain why Bruce’s recommendation 
could not have succeeded at this stage. Policies were gradually undertaken 
in accordance with nutritional thinking, including giving priority to milk 
production. Much has been written of the beneficial effects of wartime dietary 
measures in Britain such as the greater extraction rate of flour.23 The official 
war historian gives credit to Orr for spearheading the nutrition movement of 
the 1930s, which provided both pressure for and acceptance of these measures, 
but notes that Orr’s Food, Health and Income was referred to, in the 1937 
Report of the Advisory Committee on Nutrition, in a manner ‘so covert as to be 
unrecognisable’.24
‘The Re-statement of Our Aims’
In August 1940, Clement Attlee, Leader of the Labour Party and Lord Privy 
Seal from May 1940, effectively (and officially from February 1942) Deputy 
Prime Minister in the National Government, was appointed chair of a Cabinet 
subcommittee on war aims. Bruce considered development of a clear statement 
of aims a high priority and immediately offered help, suggesting ‘possibly 
McDougall could do some valuable work’. Attlee noted the name, but his assistant 
Harold Laski subsequently confirmed Bruce’s fears that ‘the committee was in 
fact making very little progress and that Attlee himself has hardly sufficient 
drive for the job’. An outspoken left-wing critic of Attlee’s apparent timidity 
within the National Government, Laski published an ‘Open Letter to the Labour 
Movement’ in October 1940, urging Labour to demand a statement of war aims 
from the Government. He was later forced to apologise in the National Executive 
20 R. J. Hammond, Food. Volume I: The Growth of Policy, History of the Second World War: United Kingdom 
Civil Series, ed. W. K. Hancock, HMSO, London, 1951, p. 352, fn. 
21 NAA, M100,1939, record of conversation with Hankey, 19 October 1939.
22 Ibid., records of conversations with Hankey, 27 October, Morrison, 13 November, and Hoare, 1 December.
23 See Lizzie Collingham, The Taste of War: World War Two and the Battle for Food, Allen Lane, London, 
2011, pp. 384–405.
24 Hammond, Food: The Growth of Policy, p. 219.
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Committee.25 Laski did commend ‘the short memorandum we had put in [as] 
much the best of all the contributions he had read to Attlee, and [said] that both 
he and Attlee would be prepared to subscribe to it entirely’.26 Laski, Bruce and 
McDougall discussed ways of interesting Churchill in the question. The war 
aims committee recognised the demand for an early statement of the general 
principles and objectives for which the British were fighting, but agreement 
on its terms proved difficult. Various drafts were prepared, but after Churchill 
vetoed the most promising one ‘the committee had decided to postpone its 
meetings and faded away’. A biographer argues that Attlee’s acquiescence was 
not ‘timidity’, but concern for the fragile cohesion of a government still including 
many Chamberlain supporters, compelling Attlee to avoid a potentially divisive 
statement.27
The Bruce–McDougall ‘short statement’ to Attlee’s committee has not been 
identified. A 29-page memorandum called ‘Notes on the Re-statement of Our 
Aims’ is dated 22 October. It refers to an earlier version called ‘War Aims’ and 
reiterates some of its content. It seems reasonable to conclude that the October 
memorandum reflects much of what had been submitted earlier to the Attlee 
committee, and possibly content of a document referred to by Alfred Stirling, 
on 28 July, as a ‘Bruce–McDougall memorandum handed to [the Foreign 
Secretary, Lord] Halifax last week’, which related to rejection of any peace 
offer by Hitler. Bruce had cabled Canberra on 21 July that it was necessary to 
counter Nazi economic propaganda with ‘a positive and constructive policy’ and 
Prime Minister Robert Menzies had agreed.28 Stirling also records McDougall 
preparing a 33-page memorandum on war aims in October 1940, its progress 
closely watched by Bruce.29
‘Notes on the Re-statement of Our Aims’ is McDougall’s most important 
memorandum of 1940. The title refers to the fall of France. Until then, most 
people had expected that ‘the keystone of post-war reconstruction would 
be Anglo–French collaboration’. After the fall of France, British–American 
collaboration was the only alternative to Nazidom, hence the need to rethink 
war aims. From this time on, both McDougall and Bruce believed in the absolute 
necessity of British–American cooperation for the new world order: ‘In the post-
war political reconstruction it will be essential to secure the full and permanent 
participation of America.’30
25 Trevor Burridge, Clement Attlee: A Political Biography, Jonathan Cape, London, 1985, pp. 140, 144.
26 NAA, M100, records of conversation with Attlee, 27 August 1940, with Laski and McDougall, 21 October 
1940.
27 Burridge, Clement Attlee, pp. 144–5. A note suggests the postponement dated from January 1941.
28 W. J. Hudson and H. J. W. Stokes, eds, Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937–1949. Volume IV: July 
1940 – June 1941 [hereinafter DAFP IV], Department of Foreign Affairs, Australian Government Publishing 
Service, Canberra, 1980, Document 30, Menzies to Bruce, 22 July, pp. 40–1.
29 Stirling, Lord Bruce, p. 171.
30 NLA, MS6890/4/6, ‘Notes on the Re-statement of our Aims’, p. 27.
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‘Notes on the Re-statement of Our Aims’ repeats an assertion from the missing 
earlier paper that to save Europe from tyranny, ‘we must fearlessly decide upon 
profound adjustments in the political, economic and social spheres’ and must 
lead ‘a beneficent revolution by associating with our defence of liberty and 
International Law effective proposals for securing economic freedom and social 
justice’. In the later paper, McDougall began to consider the nuts and bolts of 
framing and organising such a peace settlement, although he made ‘no attempt…
to put forward ideal solutions’. He aimed simply to indicate ‘the minimum of 
change needed’ for security, equity between nations and greater social justice 
between classes.31
Under the heading of security, McDougall acknowledged the need to reconsider 
‘doctrines of national sovereignty’ in view of the ‘inter-dependence for security’ 
and possible ‘substitution of international for national forces’, as well as control 
of civil aviation and international industrial cartels. Methods should be devised 
to prevent ‘violent breaches of the international system’ more effectively, 
and methods for modification and change of that system: political machinery 
rather than arbitration was needed.32 This section perhaps owes something to 
McDougall’s reading of E. H. Carr, who had condemned the ‘pathetic fallacy that 
international grievances will be recognised as just and voluntarily remedied on 
the strength of “advice” unanimously tendered by a body representative of 
world public opinion’.33 Carr argued that interwar internationalism had failed 
to take account of the importance of power, yet power—military, political and 
economic—had consistently determined outcomes.34
A second section of ‘Notes on the Re-statement of Our Aims’ dealt with another 
new idea: the duties, as well as the rights, of man. Again, McDougall seems to 
have been influenced by Carr, who wrote of the complexity and impersonality 
of modern industrial society: ‘The real international crisis of the modern 
world is the final and irrevocable breakdown of the conditions which made 
the nineteenth century order possible. The old order cannot be restored, and 
a drastic change of outlook is unavoidable.’35 McDougall wrote: ‘In the middle 
decades of the twentieth century we cannot return to the individualism of the 
nineteenth century but must rather seek new definitions of the relationship of 
the State and the individual. This will involve the consideration both of human 
rights and [of] human duties.’ The weakness in totalitarianism is that 
once the State is regarded as an end in itself, its glory, and its power 
superior to all other considerations, the virtues of pity, forbearance, 
31 Ibid., pp. 1–3.
32 Ibid., pp. 3–6.
33 Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, p. 210.
34 Ibid., pp. 102–8.
35 Ibid., pp. 236–7.
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charity, come to be regarded as weaknesses. Ruthlessness in the service 
of the State becomes a virtue and cruelty, that intolerable insult to the 
dignity of man, is the inevitable consequence. 
McDougall wanted a ‘statement designed to emphasise individual responsibility 
towards collective well-being’ based, he suggested, on sources including 
the medieval theologians, modern constitutions such as those of the Weimar 
Republic and some Latin American states, and the literature of the ‘Corporative 
state’.36 The last two suggest the influence of his American experience.
Sections on economic relations included much of McDougall’s previous thinking 
on avoiding uneconomic forms of industry and agriculture, removal of trade 
barriers and social policies to improve living standards. On colonial policy, he 
suggested that an international commission, administering an international 
fund for active policies to improve living standards, would give ‘all nations 
some degree of responsibility for non-self-governing areas’. The experience 
of the Empire Marketing Board had shown the effectiveness of grants ‘made 
with imagination’ and building upon expertise already existing in the receiving 
country. An ‘International Commission’ controlling an international fund 
‘mainly subscribed by the creditor nations’ could provide financial assistance 
and technical advisers, thus allowing for increasing international responsibility 
and control ‘without any formal transfer of administrative authority’.37 The idea 
of a supervisory commission for colonial territories had evolved into provision 
of practical assistance on the ground, becoming closer to what were to be the 
functions of FAO.
A section headed ‘Social Justice’ reiterated a call in the earlier paper for ‘positive 
action on the boldest scale to associate our defence of liberty with the re-dress 
of economic inequalities’.38 The wartime economy saw ‘all resources…harnessed 
to the war effort’; in the postwar world, ‘our effort should not be slackened by 
peace but at once deflected to the tremendous task of solving the problem of 
poverty’. Controversies between capitalism and socialism should be avoided. 
McDougall hoped ‘British political instinct will find the way to increase the 
powers of the State to secure a far wider conception of economic security and 
yet to retain in large measure the flexibilities and initiative of private enterprise’. 
In other words, he aspired to what was sometimes called in the United States 
‘a middle way’. McDougall concluded with tentative suggestions about an 
international organisation: it should be based on the experience and machinery 
of the technical organisations of the League of Nations and the Bruce Committee 
recommendations.39
36 ‘Notes on the Re-statement of our Aims’, pp. 7–8.
37 Ibid., p. 11.
38 Ibid., p. 21.
39 Ibid., pp. 22–3, 29.
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With this memorandum, the elements of McDougall’s postwar vision were largely 
in place. Predominant were American–British collaboration in the context of 
internationalism, machinery to enable individual and collective responsibility 
for assisting less fortunate peoples and states, and association of the defence of 
liberty with social justice. What remained to be established was a strategy for 
achieving them.
‘Freedom from want’
On 6 January 1941, a key part of that strategy was provided. In his third 
Inaugural Address, President Roosevelt pledged increased production of 
armaments, foreshadowed the Lend–Lease program to assist Britain and called 
for cooperation from all sectors of the American community. He also declared 
‘the mighty action that we are calling for cannot be based on a disregard of all 
things worth fighting for’. He listed the foundations of a healthy democracy, 
and he undertook to remedy deficiencies at home. Then he continued:
...we look forward to a world founded upon four essential human 
freedoms.
The first is freedom of speech and expression—everywhere in the world.
The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way—
everywhere in the world.
The third is freedom from want, which, translated into world terms, 
means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a 
healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants—everywhere in the world.
The fourth is freedom from fear, which, translated into world terms, 
means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such 
a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act 
of physical aggression against any neighbour—anywhere in the world.
That is no vision of a distant millennium. It is a definite basis for a kind 
of world attainable in our own time and generation.40
Bruce and McDougall saw immediately that the worrying possibility of a postwar 
clash of economic interests between the United States and the British Empire 
could be avoided by the realisation of ‘Freedom from Want’. Civil servants on 
both sides of the Atlantic would subject the ‘Four Freedoms’ to close analysis, 
searching for precise meanings. McDougall was happy to provide his own simple 
40 <http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/4free.html> [accessed 8 October 2008].
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interpretation of the third: ‘Freedom from want means sufficient food, adequate 
housing and clothing, reasonable leisure and the means for its enjoyment.’ 
Problems of oversupply would then dissolve and increased standards of living 
might be made affordable for two reasons. First, Roosevelt had also promised 
freedom from fear; if that could be achieved in the peace settlement, resources 
formerly used for armaments could be devoted to social welfare. And second, 
industrial countries could not afford to neglect measures to raise standards of 
living; adequate markets for their products would depend on them.41
A set of typed notes, found in Bruce’s personal files and apparently written in 
the early months of 1941, spells out a new nutrition campaign based on giving 
‘practical expression to the third of President Roosevelt’s four freedoms…and to 
expand slightly what he means by it’. Roosevelt should ‘strengthen the Allies’ 
hands in the war of ideas by adding to the concept of freedom that of economic 
welfare and social justice’. To persuade him, it would be necessary to emphasise 
that ‘the achievement of these aims is physically practicable but requires some 
revolutionary thinking’ and that unless the British Empire and the United States 
‘do some of this thinking jointly, we may find ourselves poles apart’. Roosevelt 
need only commit to joint British Empire–US examination of agricultural, trade 
and health factors involved and the national and international action required 
to translate the general objective into terms of practical policies.42 The presence 
of these unsigned notes in Bruce’s own file suggests that he, like McDougall, 
had seized upon the Four Freedoms as the rhetorical basis for their campaign: 
although British cooperation remained essential, both men now believed that 
the best hope of action lay with Roosevelt.
McDougall wrote several short papers on this theme. One proposed a formal 
US–British agreement to adopt policies of ‘diets adequate for health’ at home 
and in relief and reconstruction policies.43 Others stressed the importance of 
the United States as a potential competitor in world export markets and the 
consequent importance of its placing ‘the standard of living in the forefront of 
economic policy’. Another worried that commitment to a prosperous British 
agriculture, as sought by agricultural interests, could ‘prejudice the whole 
position’ of basing reconstruction on increased consumption and reorientation 
of agriculture.44
41 Speech, ‘Empire Primary Products in Relation to Post-War Reconstruction’, given on 1 April to a meeting 
of the Royal Society of the Arts, chaired by Bruce, printed in Journal of the Royal Society of Arts, 25 July 1941. 
Copy supplied by E. McDougall.
42 NAA, M100, May 1941, untitled, unsigned and undated paper.
43 NLA, MS6890/4/6, ‘Freedom from Want, a beginning’, undated, one-page version.
44 Ibid., ‘United States Agriculture and World Markets’, 26 March 1941; ‘Reconstruction Problems: the 
Urgency of British–American Understanding’, 29 March 1941; ‘United Kingdom Agriculture and the Future’, 
10 March 1941.
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The American Ambassador
Bruce had a valuable ally in the person of the new American Ambassador, John 
Gilbert Winant, who replaced the outspoken, defeatist and unpopular Joseph 
Kennedy early in 1941. Winant was a Republican three-time Governor of New 
Hampshire, sometimes considered a potential presidential candidate, and an 
idealist and independent thinker. He supported the New Deal and Roosevelt’s re-
election for a third term in 1940 and was personally close to the President and his 
adviser Harry Hopkins.45 Winant saw his mission as facilitating understanding 
between Britain and the United States; he cultivated a wide range of contacts 
and reported in detail not merely through normal State Department channels, 
but directly to the President and Hopkins. His allies in Washington included 
Eleanor Roosevelt, Interior Secretary Harold Ickes, Secretary of War Henry 
Stimson, and Justice Felix Frankfurter. A notable exception was Cordell Hull.46 
Winant’s Economic Advisor in London, E. F. Penrose, has written:
To him the outbreak of war was an occasion not for suspending 
public concern with economic and social questions but rather for re-
examining the existing order to determine how far past shortcomings 
had contributed to present strife. He did not believe that political 
settlements in themselves could provide an enduring basis for peaceful 
international relationships, and he knew that economic settlements 
would require long and arduous preparation if the errors made after the 
First World War were not to be repeated…he took every opportunity, 
from an early stage of the war, to advise the State Department and 
sometimes the White House to take constructive action on a variety of 
postwar international economic matters.47
Winant also had experience in international organisation: he was Assistant 
Director of the International Labour Office in Geneva for a few months in 1935, 
including the time when the ILO Conference carried the Australian resolution 
on nutrition. He returned to Geneva in 1937, becoming ILO Director in 1939. In 
1940 he oversaw its move to Montreal, whence he was summoned by Roosevelt 
to his new appointment. In Geneva Bruce had ‘close associations with him’.48
45 Nina Davis Howland, ‘Ambasssador John Gilbert Winant: Friend of Embattled Britain, 1941–1946’, PhD 
thesis, University of Maryland, 1983, pp. 3–12; Sylvia B. Larson, ‘Winant, John Gilbert’, American National 
Biography Online, February 2000, <http://www.anb.org.virtual.anu.edu.au/articles/06/06-00727.html> 
[accessed 8 October 2008].
46 Howland, ‘Friend of Embattled Britain’, pp. 14–15, 19–32, 47–8.
47 E. F. Penrose, Economic Planning for the Peace, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1953, p. 12.
48 NAA, M104, 9(1), Bruce to Fadden, 25 September 1941.
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Figure 16 John Winant with F. L. McDougall in Geneva. Winant (centre) 
seated next to McDougall (with pipe). 
Source: E. McDougall.
Bruce discussed the nutrition campaign with Winant in May 1941. He found 
him ‘generally receptive to everything I had been saying…we can I think take 
it that our ideas are well sold to Winant’. In particular, Winant agreed with 
Bruce’s view that ‘so far from detracting from the President’s determination to 
aid the Democracies it would strengthen it, if he had the picture of a practical 
policy in his mind that was going to help to realise all that he stood for once 
peace was achieved’. They agreed that Bruce should continue his nutrition 
campaign in London.49
To press the importance of transatlantic cooperation to the Australian and 
British Governments, Bruce wrote an untitled memorandum, which he labelled 
‘A’, and, with McDougall’s ‘enthusiastic and useful assistance’, another, labelled 
‘B’. ‘A’ dealt with the need to reinforce physical force against Germany with 
the ‘psychological factor’ of assured higher standards of living. ‘B’ was given a 
title: ‘British–American Understanding.’ It stressed the importance of economic 
cooperation between Britain and the United States to avoid repetition of inter-
49 Ibid., M100, May 1941, record of conversation with Winant, 22 May 1941.
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war problems and outlined the nutrition campaign.50 Bruce distributed them 
widely in London: recipients included Winant, Anthony Eden, press baron 
Lord Camrose, Home Secretary Herbert Morrison, shipping magnate Sir Alan 
Anderson, Labour Cabinet member Arthur Greenwood, Lord President of 
the Council Sir John Anderson, Orr and Sir George Schuster. They were also 
submitted to the War Cabinet’s Committee on Post-War Economic Problems and 
Anglo–American Co-operation. They were sent to Menzies on 18 July, but did 
not reach him before he lost office; Bruce then wrote to the new Australian 
Prime Minister, Arthur Fadden, recommending he read them. They were also 
sent to economist Dr Roland Wilson and Rivett in Australia.
Winant believed Britain’s desperate situation was not understood in Washington. 
At the end of May 1941 he returned at his own request to argue for greater 
material support. He was invited to stay at the White House so that he could 
have easy access to Roosevelt and Hopkins, and he saw many other officials. 
Most of the discussion concerned immediate military assistance to Britain.51 
Winant also took copies of Bruce’s memoranda ‘A’ and ‘B’, and told Bruce he 
had discussed them with Roosevelt and Vice-President Wallace, who were 
both ‘very receptive and anxious that some definite steps should be taken’.52 
Back in London at the end of June, he told Eden and the Canadian and South 
African High Commissioners of his Washington talks on the subject. Bruce 
was delighted by Winant’s account and with his enthusiasm and grasp of the 
subject. Winant suggested Bruce send a cable to Wallace expressing his interest 
in Winant’s report.53
Efforts by the International Wheat Advisory Committee to replace the failed 
1933 Wheat Agreement had stalled in 1939, but negotiations between Argentina, 
Canada, Australia, Britain and the United States were resumed in Washington 
in July 1941.54 McDougall was to attend. Bruce sent a letter to Wallace with 
McDougall, stating that ‘McDougall has my complete confidence’ and hoping 
Wallace would discuss questions of nutrition and agriculture with McDougall 
personally. He also cabled Wallace on 26 June: ‘extremely interested in Winant’s 
report of his conversations with you.’55 Bruce told Winant of his hope ‘that 
something to tidy it up might be accomplished while McDougall was in America, 
and a possible line of action determined upon’.56
50 The papers are in NAA, M103; information about their distribution is in NAA, M104, 9(1).
51 Howland, ‘Friend of Embattled Britain’, pp. 107–17.
52 NAA, M104, 9(1), Bruce to Menzies, 18 July 1941.
53 Ibid., M100, record of conversation with Winant, 24 June 1941.
54 Dunsdorfs, The Australian Wheat Growing Industry, p. 310.
55 University of Iowa, Henry Wallace Diaries, microfilm copy in Library of Congress, Washington, DC 
[hereinafter HWD]. A copy of Bruce’s letter, dated 3 July, is in NAA, M104, 9(1).
56 NAA, M100, record of conversation with Winant, 24 June 1941.
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‘I like these Americans’
McDougall travelled to Washington in the summer of 1941. Bruce explained 
the journey to Fadden, first recounting his concerns about postwar policy and 
the importance of British–American cooperation, the history of the nutrition 
question and its advantages for Australia, his discussions with Winant, and 
Winant’s recent discussions in Washington. He continued:
Soon after the Ambassador returned to London it was decided to send 
McDougall to Washington to represent Australia at the Wheat Conference. 
As you know McDougall has worked in very close co-operation with me 
for many years on these questions and a great part of the results which 
have been achieved are due to his initiative, industry and perseverance. 
I decided to take advantage of his visit to America to put him in touch 
with the Vice President who is playing an increasing part in regard 
to questions of post war reconstruction, and after consultations with 
[Australian Minister in Washington R. G.] Casey to sound out American 
official opinion on these subjects.57
Wartime travel across the Atlantic was dangerous, subject to long delays and 
to permission from the governments involved. Without the official reason of 
the wheat negotiations, McDougall might not have made the journey. He left 
London by air in the first week of July and was forced to spend three ‘trying hot 
days’ in Lisbon before crossing the Atlantic.58
Washington before the New Deal, according to one observer, had been ‘a 
small town, mildly important as the seat of the national legislature, a place 
where President Coolidge habitually had taken a nap after lunch’. The New 
Deal increased the tempo and the range of government activity: ‘Bright young 
men and women flocked to Washington…They put in uncounted hours with 
a gusto.’59 The looming war accelerated industrial recovery; planning to effect 
Roosevelt’s undertakings of aid to Britain increased the attraction and power 
of the capital. Journalist Marquis Childs wrote that the atmosphere of wartime 
Washington was ‘in many ways a reprise of the early New Deal era’.60 McDougall 
found its energy exhilarating. The Americans he met were enthusiastic about his 
ideas and keen for Empire–US cooperation. He was busy and confident: ‘I’ve not 
57 Ibid., M104, 9(1), Bruce to Fadden, 25 September 1941.
58 Ibid., M104, 9(6), McDougall to Bruce, 19 July 1941.
59 Extracts of Helen Hill Miller’s unpublished ‘Washington Observed: A Reporter’s Notebook’, <http://
www.cosmos-club.org/web/journals/1995/miller.html> [accessed 19 January 2006].
60 Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World, p. 70.
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touched a golf club, indeed apart from one swim I’ve not had a moment before 
10 p.m.…The humidity is very great and I feel I could do with a few days quiet 
in a cool place but it’s all extraordinarily interesting. I like these Americans.’61
The most important American to McDougall in 1941 was the Vice President, 
Henry Agard Wallace, who, as Bruce had hoped, acted as his mentor. McDougall 
saw Wallace several times in his office and at social occasions.62 Roosevelt had 
explained his choice of Wallace as running mate in 1940 in terms both of farm 
states’ support and of ideology: Wallace would reaffirm the Administration’s 
domestic and foreign policies. ‘He is no isolationist, he knows what we are up 
against in this war that is rapidly engulfing the world.’ Norman D. Markowitz 
writes that Wallace was ‘possessed of a keener intellect than Roosevelt, [but] 
lacked the charm and cunning with which to build a career of his own in a 
politics increasingly dominated by personality. His vision, however, remained 
large and his imagination open.’63 Walter J. Samuels describes a figure out of 
place in the increasing sophistication of Washington: ‘Never a glad-hander 
or back slapper, he was basically a shy person who felt uncomfortable with 
strangers and often appeared detached and aloof.’ Although Wallace had ‘many 
friends and a group of capable advisers in the Department of Agriculture, he 
was essentially a loner who arrived at positions more on the basis of his own 
thinking than on the advice or suasion of others’.64
Wallace advocated a middle course between isolationism and internationalism. 
He believed that US policies of the 1920s, limiting the ability of debtor countries 
to earn dollars, had played a major role in creating world depression and war. In 
1940 he set out in a letter to Roosevelt his ideas for postwar economic programs 
to create stability and improve ‘conditions of life among the common peoples 
of the world’. They included continuation of Cordell Hull’s reciprocal trade 
agreement program to ensure freer flow of goods and services, international 
commodity agreements, a world ever-normal granary to stabilise prices and 
encourage consumption, and US credit to rebuild war-torn countries, given in 
such a way as to make debt repayment possible: ‘I would hate to see us again 
commit the various errors that we committed during the twenties and early 
thirties.’ ‘The overthrow of Hitler is only half the battle’, he wrote, shortly before 
Pearl Harbor; Americans should ‘think hard and often about the future peace’. 
Determining national boundaries and creating a new international organisation 
would not guarantee a durable peace. Economic planning and a concerted effort 
to promote industrialisation and improved living standards throughout the 
world were also necessary.65
61 NAA, M104, 9(6), McDougall to Bruce, 19 July 1941.
62 HWD. For the relevant period in 1941, the diaries record only dates of meetings, without detail or comment.
63 Markowitz, People’s Century, pp. 28–31.
64 Samuels, Wallace and American Foreign Policy, p. 35.
65 Ibid., pp. 83–4.
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Bruce had instructed McDougall to be guided by Wallace. At their first meeting 
on 17 July, McDougall found him ‘in good form and spirits and clearly quite 
keenly interested in our approach’. Wallace suggested McDougall see Assistant 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Dr M. L. Wilson of the Department of 
Agriculture, Surgeon-General Thomas Parran, and economist Winfield Riefler.66 
McDougall also carried a letter of recommendation from Bruce to Under Secretary 
of State, Sumner Welles. Welles was interested enough in his ideas to comment, 
but went no further on their first meeting. McDougall met other senior State 
Department officers: Assistant Secretaries Dean Acheson and Adolf Berle, and 
Harry Hawkins, head of the Trade Treaties Section. Most expressed interest and 
even enthusiasm, but McDougall remained unsure of Acheson’s views. It was 
not until his visit the following year, and after Orr had also talked to Acheson, 
that he discovered how far Acheson was prepared to support the nutrition 
campaign. Following his meeting with Orr later in 1941, Acheson dictated a 
note supporting ‘the nutrition program recently discussed in Washington by 
Sir John Orr and Mr McDougall’. He thought the approach would ‘ultimately 
involve nearly all the most thorny problems of domestic and international finance 
and economics’, but that efforts ‘should not…be diluted into ultimate problems 
at the expense of developing the core of the nutrition program’, the success of 
which might facilitate solution of more difficult problems. He suggested steps for 
approaching the problem. This paper was intended for McDougall, Orr, Parran 
and Boudreau. It did reach Boudreau’s office and was filed by a secretary, but 
was not received by the other three. McDougall commented ruefully in 1942 
that as Acheson was the Assistant Secretary directly involved in commercial 
policy, the paper ‘would have been of great help in dealing with Whitehall’.67
Washington’s political and official life extended well beyond its office buildings 
to evening functions where informal discussion of substantial issues could take 
place. Wallace took McDougall to a ‘party’ to discuss Empire–US cooperation 
and presided over a ‘discussion dinner’ with ‘the people engaged in the National 
Nutrition drive and the two most active scientists. I had to open the show and 
then for two hours had a barrage of questions and points fired at me. The interest 
was very keen and the evening most useful.’68 Wallace asked McDougall, Wilson 
and Parran to draft a possible agreement between the United States and British 
Empire countries ‘on the lines of our suggestion’, and also wanted notes on a 
possible speech on the subject. He also suggested the three see Eleanor Roosevelt 
‘thus to strengthen his own approach to the President’. Casey gave a dinner for 
Wallace, his guests including British Ambassador Lord Halifax, Minister at the 
66 NAA, M104/, 9(6), McDougall to Bruce, 19 July 1941.
67 Ibid., M104, 10, McDougall to Bruce, 4 October 1942. Acheson’s paper, ‘A suggested Program of Work to 
Develop the Plan of Advanced Standards of Nutrition’, 7 November 1941, is attached.
68 NAA, M104, 9(6), McDougall to Bruce, 19 and 22 July.
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British Embassy Dr H. B. Butler, Acheson and Parran: ‘We started serious talk 
at 9.30 and went straight on to 12.30.’69 McDougall dined with the nutrition 
scientists and Parran and Boudreau for more discussion.
A US–British Empire conference
Throughout July the Wheat Conference occupied most of McDougall’s time. By 
early August a draft Memorandum of Agreement, which McDougall had helped 
prepare, was ready for submission to governments, allowing the conference to 
adjourn for 10 days. ‘The wider international business’ was also progressing 
well. The Americans McDougall met were 
extremely keen on the early getting together of Empire–US interests 
both because they feel the need to start now if we are to be successful 
and also because they seem clearly to realise that there is urgent need of 
an Anglo–American declaration of post-war purposes if Europe is to be 
rallied against Hitler.70 
The McDougall–Parran–Wilson draft was completed. It aimed ‘to test the 
practicability’ of an agreement between the United States and British Empire 
countries to adopt policies to improve the diets of their own peoples and to 
offer practical assistance to other nations for improved nutrition. Acheson’s 
staff were keen, but McDougall was dubious about Berle’s suggestion that 
Latin America be included. He hoped to be able to ‘leave the issue in the Vice 
President’s hands, put as clearly as possible and in the best form for his use 
with the President’. McDougall had agreed with the Chairman of the Advisory 
Committee on Nutrition, Dr Russell Wilder, Parran and others that in March or 
April 1942 the United States should call a conference of scientists, economists 
and agriculturalists from the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand to consider the possibility of such an agreement and its application 
during the reconstruction of Europe. He intended to discuss this idea with 
Wallace.71
The conference idea was warmly supported by Agriculture Secretary Claude 
Wickard, Sumner Welles and Harry Hawkins. Welles said he was ‘intensely 
interested’ in the food proposals as a means of preventing postwar conflicts of 
interest; when McDougall asked for permission to repeat those words, Welles 
‘remarked that I must go further and state that he was “determined to use 
such influence as he possessed to try and bring the [conference] proposal to a 
69 Ibid., McDougall to Bruce, 26 July and 1 August.
70 Ibid., McDougall to Bruce, 19 July.
71 Ibid., Letters of 1, 8 and 11 August.
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successful fruition”’.72 Hawkins told McDougall that the State Department was 
‘inclined to attach considerable importance to the idea of putting food policies 
in the forefront of post-war reconstruction’, and had ‘put one of their men on to 
examine the whole picture’. He suggested McDougall return early in 1942 to help 
prepare for the conference. Hawkins, Riefler and Agriculture officials all asked 
McDougall for ‘suggestions for a programme of work’.73 The State Department 
was liaising with Health and Agriculture, where Wickard instructed H. R. Tolley, 
Director of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, to keep in touch with Wilson 
on the matter. Wallace ‘strongly supported’ the idea, but added that the British 
attitude would determine its future.74 Thus, to cooperation and a published 
agreement between the United States and the British Empire, McDougall could 
now add the idea of a conference at government level.
The five-government agreement drafted by McDougall, Parran and Wilson 
declared intentions to ‘enable all sections of their own populations to secure a 
full sufficiency of those kinds of food needed to meet all human physiological 
requirements’, to pool experience and to establish a ‘joint consultative 
commission’ to report on necessary ‘adjustments of agriculture and commercial 
policies’ and steps necessary to help other countries achieve the same ends.75 
McDougall elaborated in memoranda on the national and international benefits 
of such an agreement; the importance of surveys to establish national resources 
and demand; desirable adjustments in agriculture; economies possible in 
distribution; international obstacles to achieving adequacy of food in various 
countries and to trade in foodstuffs; and a suggestion for a ‘Council on Food 
Problems’ representing each contracting party.76
One of these Washington memoranda had an important effect on his subsequent 
work. The British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, ‘challenged me to put the whole 
idea on one sheet of paper. This I have done and enclose the highly concentrated 
results.’77 One wonders how much more effective McDougall and his campaigns 
might have been had Bruce thought to give him this common bureaucratic 
instruction much earlier in his career. The ‘highly concentrated’ memorandum 
makes use of every inch of the single sheet, but loses nothing in scope and gains 
considerably in comprehensibility.78 The discipline seems to have been lasting. 
Subsequent memoranda tended to be shorter: the average length of memoranda 
written in 1941 is some four pages, compared with nearly 14 pages in 1936. 
72 Ibid., M104, 9(1), ‘Note on Food Policy Discussions in Washington’, 11 September 1941.
73 Ibid., M104, 9(6), handwritten letter to Bruce, 19 August.
74 Ibid., M104, 9(1), ‘Note on Food Policy Discussions in Washington’.
75 Ibid., M104, 9(6), undated draft.
76 Ibid., M104, 9(1), memoranda including ‘Food Policies in Reconstruction: Program of Work’, 25 August; 
‘Freedom from Want: the Food Problem’, n.d.; both written in Washington.
77 Ibid., M104, 9(6), handwritten letter to Bruce, 19 August.
78 Ibid., M104, 9(1) and MS6890/4/6, ‘Freedom from Want a Beginning’, undated.
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Wartime shortages of paper and staff may have contributed to the change but 
it seems likely that Halifax’s challenge, and the experience of working closely 
with American bureaucrats, finally taught McDougall the value of brevity.
American–British Cooperation
In July, Winant, prodded by Bruce’s memoranda ‘A’ and ‘B’, had suggested US–
British–dominion talks on economic cooperation, beginning with agriculture 
and nutrition. Both Winant and Bruce lobbied ministers.79 Bruce was pleased 
with their progress, telling McDougall in mid July: ‘position developed 
considerably since you left.’ He was even more optimistic in mid August: ‘there 
may be interesting developments following on joint declaration by President 
and Prime Minister.’80 He therefore instructed McDougall to return to London, 
subject to Wallace’s agreement. McDougall obtained a reservation on a bomber 
leaving Montreal on 28 August and was back in London on 30 August.81
Bruce reported to Canberra that he was convinced by McDougall’s reports and 
by his own discussions with Winant that ‘the United States Administration is 
intensely interested in the idea of placing policies with regard to food in the 
forefront of post-war economic reconstruction’. It was likely that the United 
States would shortly approach the United Kingdom, which in turn would 
consult the dominions about holding a conference in the early months of 1942.82 
But Bruce’s habitual pessimism about British ministers, frequently expressed at 
the end of a record of what otherwise had seemed a useful conversation, was 
justified; nothing came of his and Winant’s midyear campaign for American–
British discussions.
As the year neared its end and the United States was finally drawn into war, 
a philosophical McDougall set out in memoranda his understanding of the 
differences between the views of the two allies on postwar planning. There 
were ‘encouraging’ signs in Washington that Americans realised that ‘security 
and welfare cannot be attained in isolation’; that ‘America’s best interest will be 
served by the generous use of American resources to promote reconstruction 
in other countries’.83 The United States was thinking in ‘large scale terms’ of 
schemes such as a Tennessee Valley Authority for the Danube Valley, of proposals 
to stabilise world agricultural and raw material prices and to raise the standard 
79 Ibid., M104, 9(1), Bruce to Menzies, 18 July.
80 Ibid., M100, July 1941, cable from Bruce to McDougall, 12 July; M104, 9(6), 15 August.
81 Ibid., M104, 9(6), handwritten letter to Bruce, 19 August.
82 Ibid., M104, 9(1), Bruce to Fadden, 25 September.
83 Ibid., M104, 10, ‘British–American Co-operation’, 21 January 1942, p. 4.
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of living in raw material producing countries. Cooperation with the United 
States would achieve ‘an era of security in which all countries will be able to 
engage in a campaign against poverty and in the organisation of well-being’.84
Whitehall, on the other hand, was obsessed with the difficulties Britain would 
face after the war. Treasury worried about postwar balances of payment; the 
Ministry of Agriculture and farmers wanted to protect high-priced domestic 
agriculture; imperial enthusiasts feared the threat to imperial preferential tariffs 
in US multilateralism. McDougall believed nevertheless that a much wider 
section of official opinion—including some Treasury figures, economists in 
the War Cabinet Secretariat, principal officials of the Board of Trade, Labour 
members of the War Cabinet, and The Times, Manchester Guardian and the 
Economist—was convinced the difficulties must be overcome. The alternative 
for Britain was balance-of-power politics in a Europe dominated by the USSR, 
heavy military commitments undermining material welfare and strain on the 
cohesion of the Commonwealth: 
There is really no choice. The advantages of co-operation with America 
are overwhelming, the disadvantages of its failure are so patent that 
every Empire Government will determine that nothing must stand in the 
way of joint action to secure for ourselves and for the world…Freedom 
from Fear.85
McDougall’s Washington experience had led him by then to abandon ideas 
of reworking Geneva organisations, which would not be acceptable to the 
US Congress or to the USSR. League of Nations and ILO staff and expertise, 
however, should still be used.86
Progress in the War of Ideas
By 1942 McDougall’s definition of political warfare was precise:
Its object is to achieve the political purposes of the State, either without 
bloodshed or, after hostilities have commenced, to ease the tasks of the 
Armed Forces. Its purpose is to undermine enemy morale, to secure 
Allies, and to strengthen the will to victory of our own people and those 
associated with us. It is the war of Ideas.87
84 Ibid., pp. 8–10.
85 Ibid., p. 10.
86 Ibid., M104, 10, ‘The I. L. O. and Reconstruction’, 10 February; ‘International Mechanism for 
Reconstruction’, 13 February; ‘International Mechanism for Reconstruction Plans’, 3 March 1942.
87 Ibid., A 2937, ‘Political Warfare’, secret memorandum, 4 May 1942.
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In the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor, American interest in postwar 
matters was temporarily diverted. Riefler warned a small dinner group including 
McDougall that ‘America was today an angry nation’; effective public discussion 
of postwar reconstruction projects would have to wait until there had been 
some military successes. American–British agreement was urgent, nevertheless, 
so that plans could be announced as soon as those victories had been achieved, 
and Americans would welcome early action on nutrition.88
McDougall’s own sense of urgency was soon jolted. In April 1942 Bruce arranged 
for him to be briefed on the British political warfare organisation. He visited 
its headquarters, met regional directors for German, French and Scandinavian 
areas, and attended a meeting of the Political Warfare (Japan) Committee at the 
Foreign Office. He made it clear he did not want to know the techniques of 
‘black’ warfare, but ‘desired to understand the major problems…the lines of 
policies adopted, and the particular gaps which existed in the political warfare 
armory’. He found that the British authorities ‘considered that they now knew 
as much about how to conduct war propaganda as Goebbels. What they really 
lack is the most effective material.’ Political warfare used weapons based on fear 
or hope. ‘So far as the United Nations were concerned, fear was not a factor 
which could operate’; the authorities therefore needed ‘hopes which are both 
substantial and definite’. But each official McDougall spoke to 
said that they are, in effect, carrying on with their right hand tied 
behind their backs so long as there is no predominantly British plan 
for the future of Europe. Europe, in effect, wants to know what we are 
prepared to do with our power once we have broken Nazi domination. 
On economic and social issues, the Atlantic Charter was ‘too vague to be of 
much value’; the need was for definite plans for the welfare of particular areas; 
undertakings ‘for co-operation of a practical kind to maintain full employment, 
to improve standards of living, to reduce social inequality’. He noted the 
statement of a former Bulgarian official: ‘we know what Germany will give us 
and we don’t like it, we know what Russia will give us and we are doubtful 
whether we like it. We have no idea what Britain and America will give us and 
so we feel compelled to choose between Germany and Russia.’89
While none of this was really new to McDougall, the sense of urgency and of 
the desperate need for ‘ammunition’ in the ‘war of ideas’ and the unanimity 
of the demand for action all galvanised and reshaped his campaign yet again. 
Much of what he learned, and in particular the sense of urgency, reappeared in a 
new memorandum called ‘Progress in the War of Ideas’, which exists in several 
locations and forms. The first version was written hurriedly after discussion 
88 Ibid., M104, 10, ‘Dinner to Sir William Jowitt’, 24 March 1942.
89 Ibid., A 2937, ‘Political Warfare’, secret memorandum, 4 May 1942.
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with Bruce in July 1942 when McDougall was about to set off on another visit 
to the United States. He jotted down two and a half pages summarising their 
conclusions, which began, in part:
The vigorous prosecution of the War of Ideas is essential because: —
Our political warfare directed towards enemy-occupied countries lacks 
ammunition…
Our own peoples need the stimulus of positive ideas if they are to give 
full support for an all out offensive effort…
To win the peace, we must secure agreement now regarding many of the 
methods of international co-operation which will be essential. If we 
delay until the end of the war, we are almost certain to fail.
The tone was urgent. Concrete proposals were needed now to give body to the 
vague terms of the Atlantic Charter and President Roosevelt’s ‘Four Freedoms’. 
Severe winter food shortages were predicted for Europe in its third year of war: 
‘Men’s minds everywhere will be concerned with food. This will be the time 
for the United Nations to present to the world the picture of how they propose, 
on the food front at least, to secure “Freedom from Want, everywhere in the 
World”.’ Some economic issues would take time to solve, but for others immediate 
steps were practicable. Food was essential and the need was measurable: ‘there 
are many advantages in starting the United Nations’ campaign against poverty 
with a limited and realisable objective.’ Planning should begin for assessing all 
countries’ food requirements and resources, special problems of backward areas 
and methods of safeguarding the interests of both producers and consumers of 
key commodities.90
The nutrition campaign had reached solid ground. The combined impacts of the 
American visit and the briefing on the needs of political warfare had given it 
purpose and definition. The urgent need for ‘Progress in the War of Ideas’ would 
be the basis of McDougall’s discussions during his next visit to Washington.
90 Ibid., M104, 10, ‘Progress in the War of Ideas’, undated three-page version. Sending a later version to 
Stafford Cripps, Bruce wrote that it had ‘originated from a paper which McDougall drafted after discussions 
with me here’. W. J. Hudson and H. J. W. Stokes, eds, Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937–1939. 
Volume VI: July 1942 – December 1943 [hereinafter DAFP VI], Australian Government Publishing Service, 
Canberra, 1983, Document 42, 9 September 1942, pp. 85–90.
243
9. ‘A Keen Outsider’
Summary
McDougall returned to Washington in 1942, bringing with him rudimentary 
notes on ‘Progress in the War of Ideas’. He came at a time when prominent 
members of the Administration were calling for a peace based on higher 
standards of living. Vice President Wallace arranged introductions for him, 
including a meeting with Eleanor Roosevelt, which led to his dining with the 
President. He was also encouraged by Under Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, 
and Assistant Secretary of State, Adolf Berle.
Although deeply divided, the State Department was responsible for postwar 
planning; McDougall was briefed on progress by key officials and asked to 
facilitate discussions with the Department of Agriculture. During the process of 
rewriting ‘Progress in the War of Ideas’ in consultation with these officials, the 
memorandum was read by many influential people, including the Roosevelts. 
McDougall was also asked to prepare a draft program for action on food and 
agriculture. Under his direction, the Department of Agriculture prepared 12 
papers that were discussed by an ‘assessment group’ of senior officials in the 
Agriculture and State Departments. A final draft of ‘Progress in the War of 
Ideas’, renamed ‘Draft Memorandum on a United Nations Program for Freedom 
from Want of Food’, became the fourth of the seminal documents subsequently 
published by FAO.
This chapter considers possible reasons for the privileged treatment McDougall 
was given in Washington: that he was seen as Australian rather than British; 
that his ideas on social justice and nutrition were mirrored in the United States; 
and that he came at a propitious time. Finally an attempt is made to assess the 
extent to which McDougall’s work influenced Roosevelt’s decision to call the 
conference at Hot Springs early in 1943.
McDougall’s Third Visit to Washington: August 
to October 1942 
Wheat negotiations had continued in 1941 after McDougall left Washington, 
and the resulting Memorandum of Agreement to attend an International Wheat 
Conference and to establish an International Wheat Council was initialled by 
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government representatives, including Australia’s Edwin McCarthy. Thus 
McDougall had an official reason to return in 1942. As Bruce later reported to 
Labor Prime Minister, John Curtin, who had taken office in October 1941:
…you cabled to me suggesting that Mr F. L. McDougall should go to 
Washington to attend the first meeting of the International Wheat 
Council. I greatly welcomed this suggestion as…it afforded an 
opportunity of ascertaining, relatively at first hand, the trend of thought 
in the United States with regard to post-war reconstruction through the 
contacts made when I took McDougall with me to Washington in 193[8] 
which were renewed, in his case, when he went there last year.1
McDougall left Bristol on 31 July for a 16-hour flight across the Atlantic to New 
Brunswick via Eire and Newfoundland, reaching New York late on Saturday, 1 
August, and Washington the next day. The Wheat Council was established soon 
afterwards with Paul Appleby as Chairman and Andrew Cairns as Secretary, but 
McDougall did not return to London until 29 October.
McDougall took with him notes headed ‘Progress in the War of Ideas’, urging 
the need to establish concrete allied plans for the postwar world to be used as 
‘ammunition in the war of ideas’ in the winter of 1942–43, when Axis morale 
was expected to be vulnerable. As in 1941, he also took with him letters of 
commendation to Vice President Henry Wallace, and Under Secretary of State 
Sumner Welles.
The previous May, in an encouraging sign that the US Administration had 
recovered from the shock of Pearl Harbor, which temporarily paralysed thinking 
about postwar planning, Wallace had made his most famous broadcast, saying:
The peace must mean a better standard of living for the common man, 
not merely in the United States and England, but also in India, Russia, 
China and Latin America—not merely in the United Nations, but also in 
Germany and Italy and Japan.
Some have spoken of the ‘American Century’. I say that the century 
on which we are entering—the century which will come out of this 
war—can be and must be the century of the common man…No nation 
will have the God-given right to exploit other nations. Older nations 
will have the privilege to help younger nations get started on the path 
to industrialization, but there must be neither military nor economic 
materialism…
1 DAFP VI, 78, Bruce to Curtin, 22 November 1942, pp. 157–8.
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Those who write the peace must think of the whole world. There can 
be no privileged peoples…we cannot perpetuate economic warfare 
without planting the seeds of military warfare. We must use our power 
at the peace table to build an economic peace that is just, charitable and 
enduring.2
Soon afterwards, Sumner Welles, whose words were generally taken as an 
indication of Roosevelt’s thinking, spoke of the ‘frontier of human welfare’. 
He declared there must be no repetition of US failure to ensure reconstruction 
after World War I. He also acknowledged need for an international police power 
in the postwar world, and that the United Nations would become the nucleus 
of a future world organisation. For constitutional reasons, ‘United Nations’ 
was the preferred US term for all countries fighting against the Axis. Welles 
denounced discrimination on grounds of race, creed and colour, and said ‘the 
age of imperialism was ended’.3 From the British Embassy, Isaiah Berlin reported 
to London that Welles chaired a secret State Department advisory committee 
on postwar reconstruction; the speech was likely to have been inspired by 
committee members. Berlin understood that views already established in the 
Administration and particularly likely to appeal to Americans included abolition 
of colonial empires and equal access for all democracies to raw materials. He 
understood that Roosevelt talked privately in similar fashion to Welles’s speech.4
More encouraging speeches followed, including one by Dean Acheson, who also 
declared determination to avoid the mistakes of the past and to reject ‘special 
privileges and vindictive exclusions’. United action was necessary to achieve 
increased production, employment, trade and consumption, and to meet
a need such as we have never known to move goods between nations—
to feed and clothe and house millions whose consumption has for years 
been below minimum requirements, to restore devastation, to build 
and rebuild all the means of production, and, in the years beyond, to 
move that far greater volume of goods required by the standards we are 
determined to achieve.5
While to some British ears such statements veiled an attack on Britain’s interests—
in particular, on the Ottawa tariff preference system—they also signalled a 
welcome rejection of isolationism and a vision very much in accord with that 
of Bruce and McDougall. On 18 July, the Economist published what McDougall 
2 NAA, M104, 10, ‘The Price of Free World Victory’, text of broadcast address, 8 May 1942.
3 H. G. Nicholas, ed., Washington Despatches 1941–1945, Weekly Political Reports from the British Embassy, 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1981, 4 June 1942, p. 42.
4 Ibid., 11 June 1942, pp. 43–4.
5 NAA, M104, 10, ‘Building in War for Peace’, text of speech at the Institute of Public Affairs, University of 
Virginia, 6 July, sent to Bruce 24 July 1942.
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described as ‘a very remarkable article’ summarising recent speeches by leading 
Americans on postwar reconstruction. The tenor of the paper’s comments is 
reflected in the following passages scattered throughout:
War is seen as part of a continuous process whose roots lie deep in 
poverty, insecurity, starvation and unemployment.
Here is a new thesis, a far deeper view of social and international 
responsibility than was ever enunciated at the close of the last war…
Above all, it seeks to put an end to isolationism, not only on the grounds 
of comradeship and world solidarity, but also in plain self interest.
The key is expanding markets…a future planned ‘in terms of increase 
and not curtailment’.
Let there be no mistake about it. The policy put forward by the American 
Administration is revolutionary. It is a genuinely new conception of 
world order. It is an inspiring attempt to restate democracy in terms 
of the twentieth century situation, and to extend its meaning in the 
economic and social sphere.
The sting in the article was criticism of British failure to make ‘a concrete 
and creative reply’ to these speeches from ‘the most progressive elements in 
America’.6 The auspices nevertheless seemed good for McDougall’s visit.
Bruce’s letter to Wallace began with congratulations on his May speech: 
I need hardly tell you how greatly I am in accord with what you then 
said. The series of speeches by responsible men in the United States 
which have followed your broadcast are most encouraging…McDougall 
knows my views on economic and social questions and he will be able 
to convey to you much that I could not write. 
He wrote in similar terms to Welles.7
Bruce’s hopes were amply fulfilled. Henry Wallace and Sumner Welles acted as 
mentors to McDougall for the next three months. They introduced him to useful 
people, they suggested strategies, they even sought his help and advice. Through 
Welles, he gained access to high levels of State Department thinking on postwar 
planning. Wallace gave him access to other parts of the Administration and to 
the White House. And they used him as a facilitator to achieve cooperation 
between parts of the Administration generally at loggerheads.
6 Ibid., A989, 43/735/658, typed copy of article in the Economist, 18 July 1942, sent by McDougall to 
Canberra.
7 Ibid., M104, 10, letters to Wallace and Welles, 29 July 1942.
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Henry Wallace
McDougall first had a brief meeting with Wallace, who said his coming was 
‘timely and very welcome…he asked me to see a number of people and then 
see him again. He told me to seek an interview with Mrs Roosevelt.’8 Wallace 
probably made that arrangement himself as he and others used Eleanor Roosevelt 
as a conduit for raising issues with the President. McDougall subsequently 
reported to Bruce that his luncheon with Mrs Roosevelt occurred ‘owing to a 
suggestion by the Vice President’.9
Wallace noted in his diary that McDougall
thinks the time has come for the President to speak out clearly with 
regard to how the United Nations are going to make the world ability to 
produce abundantly, work in terms of a higher standard of living for all 
the people. He thinks if something of this sort is said very clearly and 
very strongly, it will have a decisive effect on the people of Germany.10
At a much longer meeting a few days later, McDougall found Wallace
for the first time…very easy to talk with and he showed the keenest 
interest in the Food approach and saw at once its significance for political 
warfare. He wants to see if it is possible to go right ahead but considers 
that this mainly depends upon whether we can get the State Department 
to take the right line.
He gave me his views of leading personalities here and said that the key 
people at the State Department for these purposes were Sumner Welles, 
Berle and Acheson…
Wallace asked me to see the people in the Office of War Information 
about the political warfare aspects of the Food approach…
Wallace was also keenly interested in the Security aspects of buffer 
stocks or as he prefers to say ‘ever-normal granaries’.11
Wallace wrote in his diary: ‘McDougall was visioning a committee to work 
on this problem of international food planning.’ They discussed this to the 
extent of listing suitable members.12 Tolley recorded this discussion in the first 
sentences of his memoirs regarding the Hot Springs conference: ‘On August 12, 
8 Ibid., letter to Bruce, 11 August 1942.
9 Ibid., 19 August 1942.
10 HWD, 6 August 1942.
11 DAFP VI, 22, pp. 43–5, McDougall to Bruce, 13 August 1942.
12 HWD, 12 August 1942.
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1942, Henry Wallace and Frank H. McDougall [sic] decided that a good United 
Nations food committee would consist of Alvin Hansen, Dr Thomas Parran…
Winfield Riefler, Dean Acheson and myself.’13 Alvin Hansen was a Harvard 
economist at the centre of a group known as ‘the American Keynesians’ who had 
been opposing ‘pump priming’ by private capital, advocating instead programs 
of public spending, redistributive taxation and full employment.14
The State Department
The State Department in 1940 was overwhelmed by intrigue and 
fatigue…Secretary of State Cordell Hull
complained openly and often about prima donnas of the department. 
[Assistant Secretary Adolf] Berle ranked high on that list because he 
showed ‘extreme egotism and ambition’, worked almost exclusively to 
the President and covered too much ground in the Department. Hull also 
distrusted Welles…[who] increasingly acted independently of Hull in 
1940 because he anticipated that in 1941 either Hull would be President 
and sack him or Roosevelt would be President and sack Hull. It seemed 
inconceivable that Hull, Welles and Berle would be around for a third 
Roosevelt term.15
All three were still there in 1942 and, if anything, relations were worse. Ranged 
on the side of Hull were Assistant Secretaries Breckenridge Long and Dean 
Acheson. Acheson later wrote that Hull, ‘suspicious by nature…brooded over 
what he thought were slights and grievances…His hatreds were implacable…
long cold ones’. Hull’s relations with Roosevelt were strained from the first 
by economic problems, beginning with the London Economic Conference of 
1933, ‘torpedoed by the President with the Secretary on the bridge’: Roosevelt’s 
decision to float the dollar was announced just before the conference began. 
Hull’s determination to liberalise international trade was thwarted by policies 
like Wallace’s AAA, while Roosevelt turned more and more ‘to other, more 
energetic, more imaginative, more sympathetic collaborators’, to the extent that 
Hull, ‘the senior Cabinet officer, became one of the least influential members 
at the White House’. Even in his own department, ‘the Secretary’s influence 
and authority were diluted’, particularly after Welles became Under Secretary. 
Unlike the ‘slow, circuitous, cautious’ Hull, Welles, with his ‘incisive mind and 
decisive nature…grasped ideas quickly and got things done. More and more he 
13 Hollis Library, Harvard [hereinafter HLH], ‘The reminiscences of Howard R. Tolley’, microform, p. 578. I 
am grateful to Tim Rowse for locating this and similar material in the Hollis Library.
14 Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World, p. 137.
15 Schwarz, Liberal, pp. 134–5.
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took over liaison with the White House on international political matters. Mr 
Hull rankled under what he believed to be Welles’s disloyalty and the President’s 
neglect.’ The department became divided into ‘Welles men’ and ‘Hull men’.16
Acheson and Adolf Berle were both responsible for aspects of postwar planning. 
Acheson records that his own relations with Welles were good, but that he and 
Berle disliked one another: ‘for four years…we maintained a wary coexistence on 
the second floor of old State, separated by the offices of the Secretary and Under 
Secretary, who side by side managed to do the same thing.’ The dysfunction 
spread downwards. Bureaucratic power rested essentially with division chiefs 
and advisers who were also ‘constantly at odds, if not at war…obscurity in 
lines of command of the assistant secretaries permitted the division chiefs to 
circumvent them at will and go directly to the Secretary or Under Secretary’.17
By the time of his second meeting with Wallace, McDougall had also seen Welles. 
Sumner Welles had a formidable reputation. He was described by columnists as 
‘one of the most-discussed human enigmas in Washington’ and as ‘this tall, 
powerfully built, beautifully-tailored man with the glacial manner, and an 
expression which suggests that a morsel of bad fish has somehow or other lodged 
itself in his mustache’.18 Welles was close to Roosevelt, ran the State Department 
and wielded major influence in US foreign policy. Remarkably, Welles himself 
sought a meeting with McDougall, who reported to Bruce:
He could not have been more cordial, it was quite remarkable. He spoke 
of you with great admiration. He said that my coming over delighted 
him and that he hoped I should be here for some time. He then gave 
me a brief outline of the work being done on post-war problems in the 
State Department and said that while he did not propose to discuss 
this work with the U.K. at this stage he would discuss it with me after 
I had seen a number of people. I said that if he regarded me as your 
personal representative and not as an accredited representative of the 
Commonwealth Government I thought I could discuss any post-war 
question. He asked me to see Berle and Acheson and get other names 
from them and then he would devote much time to a general discussion 
of American ideas of post-war. He was impressed with the need of 
concrete plans for political warfare and said that he thought you and he 
were very close in ideas.19
16 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, W. W. Norton & Co., New York, 
1969, pp. 9–12. 
17 Ibid., pp. 14–16.
18 Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner, quoted in Benjamin Welles, Sumner Welles: FDR’s Global Strategist: A 
Biography, St Martin’s Press, New York, 1997, p. 209.
19 NAA, M104, 10, handwritten letter, 11 August 1942.
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McDougall added as a postscript: ‘Whatever the level of your stock elsewhere 
it’s very high here.’
McDougall understood that external economic relations had been the subject of 
a bureaucratic battle between the State Department and the Board of Economic 
Warfare (BEW), headed by Wallace, with Milo Perkins as his deputy. Early in 
1942, BEW had sought control over Lend–Lease (a move soon dropped) and 
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) purchasing of strategic supplies. 
Opposition came particularly from Secretary of Commerce, Jesse Jones, head 
of RFC, and a determined opponent of apparent BEW aims to combine its 
operations with social justice policies, thus ignoring the needs of US business 
in sourcing strategic materials. Conservative opinion was further alienated by 
accusations of a ‘communist front’ in BEW and an earlier obscenity case against 
a BEW employee. A Presidential Order in April required automatic approval of 
BEW funding requests, but left RFC subsidiaries under the control of Jones. 
The order, however, also gave BEW authority to advise the State Department 
on terms of Lend–Lease agreements, and for BEW representatives to negotiate 
with economic warfare agents of foreign governments, leading Welles to protest 
against the creation of ‘a second State Department and a second foreign service’. 
Roosevelt subsequently authorised a series of compromises making BEW 
personnel abroad responsible to local chiefs of mission, thus handing control to 
the State Department. The war between Jones and Wallace was to continue until 
the very public ‘Battle of Washington’ in mid 1943, arising from charges by 
Wallace that the RFC had procrastinated in procurement of vital war materials, 
including quinine. The result was an executive order abolishing both BEW 
and the procurement functions of RFC, establishing a new Foreign Economic 
Administration under Leo Crowley, and publicly humiliating Wallace. It has 
been suggested that Hull feared BEW powers might be expanded to include 
negotiation of a postwar economic settlement, which would be a reasonable 
move ‘if the administration had seriously considered creating any administrative 
vehicle for the world New Deal’. But, adds Norman D. Markowitz: 
Roosevelt the broker had always dealt on the basis of existing power. 
From the outset the BEW’s plans to combine the war emergency with 
model programs for economic development and improved labor and 
welfare standards abroad became subordinate to the superior power of 
the State Department and the President’s need to retain the appearance 
of unity within his administration.20 
The State Department was effectively declared in control of postwar planning. 
As a result, wrote McDougall, the department was ‘spurred into quite vigorous 
activity’: committees had been established on all aspects of political and economic 
20 Markowitz, The Rise and Fall of the People’s Century, pp. 66–74.
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reconstruction, chaired by Assistant Secretaries of State and including senior 
officials from other departments and some non-officials. Responsible to these 
were subcommittees and a research section directed by Leo Pasvolsky, ‘a rather 
key person since he has Mr Hull’s special confidence’. The general approach 
seemed ‘very international and liberal’, but progress varied: a committee on 
‘Monetary and Banking’ under Assistant Secretary Berle was drafting its report 
and work had been progressing on world transport questions. On food and 
agriculture, Paul Appleby, Under Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, 
was ‘regarded as a rather key man’, but little progress had been made because 
key men from the Bureau of Agricultural Economics had been moved to war 
agencies. Now, after several meetings at Wallace’s request between Bureau head, 
Howard Tolley, and McDougall, Tolley was ‘working out a tentative scheme’. 
State Department preparations were ‘being kept pretty secret. It is only because 
Mr Welles definitely authorized talks with me that I am being given information. 
The [British] Embassy has not, so far as I know been given more than hints at the 
scale of the State Department’s operations.’ In fact, Isaiah Berlin had reported on 
11 June that a State Department advisory committee on postwar reconstruction, 
presided over by Welles, met weekly, but ‘discussions, and indeed the existence 
of this committee, are strictly secret’. There was, wrote McDougall, a strong 
view that Winant had erred in giving the impression in London that the United 
States was ready for talks: ‘the State Department is determined to clear its mind 
before proceeding to Anglo–American discussions.’21 
Adolf Berle
After Sumner Welles, Assistant Secretary Adolf Berle was McDougall’s most 
important contact in the State Department. Berle’s reputation was equally 
formidable; indeed, Welles has been described as ‘one of the few people in 
Washington who could match Berle for intellectual arrogance’.22 Berle was 
‘a ganglion of complexes. Known to be short-tempered, difficult, abusive, 
snobbish and elitist, [he] was unexpectedly genial and generous with his time 
with strangers who dared to seek him out in spite of his forbidding reputation.’23 
This, and doubtless his genuine interest in McDougall’s message, meant it 
was the genial Berle whom McDougall encountered. During ‘a long evening’ 
together, Berle ‘said that Mr Welles had asked him to give me a clear idea of the 
way in which the State Department was approaching the whole reconstruction 
problem’.24 On 7 September, McDougall had a two-hour meeting with Berle, 
21 NAA, M104, 10, McDougall to Bruce, 19 August 1942; Nicholas, Washington Despatches, p. 43.
22 Schwarz, Liberal, p. 189.
23 Ibid., p. 203.
24 NAA, M104, 10, letter to Bruce, 19 August.
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who showed him, in confidence, State Department papers on postwar planning. 
Berle also gave McDougall some tactical advice, suggesting that he make a 
point of seeing Cordell Hull since his close association with Wallace made his 
approach to the Administration ‘rather lop-sided’.25 McDougall did not manage 
to see Hull, but did meet Hull supporter Dean Acheson, and worked closely 
with Harry Hawkins, head of the Trade Treaties Section and a close associate in 
Hull’s multilateral trade campaign.
Because of the link McDougall was making between political warfare and food 
policy, he also saw Archibald MacLeish, second-in-command of the Office of 
War Information (OWI), and officers of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). 
On Wallace’s instruction, he read a draft relief and rehabilitation policy, later 
emphasising to Milo Perkins and Riefler the importance of coordinating short-
term relief measures with long-term reconstruction policies.26
The White House
The meeting Wallace had suggested with Eleanor Roosevelt took place over 
lunch at the White House on Saturday, 15 August. ‘She was very nice and 
friendly, and suggested the possibility of getting me to dinner to have a chance 
of a few words with the President. I should not be surprised if this benevolent 
intention failed to materialize.’27 In spite of his doubts, McDougall dined at the 
White House, seated next to the President, at a ‘family dinner’ on 24 August. 
Other guests were Roosevelt’s close adviser Harry Hopkins and his wife, who 
were living at the White House, and ‘several young people associated with Mrs 
Roosevelt’s activities’.
The President was in good form and talked with great animation. I did 
not attempt to press our ideas too hard but talked to him about the 
war of ideas and the need for ammunition for that war in the shape of 
concrete schemes to give real meaning to the Atlantic Charter and to 
the phrase Freedom from Want. He seemed to like that line of country 
and could not have been nicer. After dinner we saw a film and then the 
President retired to work. He is certainly a most remarkable man and his 
immense vivacity is extraordinarily attractive. I am very grateful to Mrs 
Roosevelt for arranging this opportunity.28
25 DAFP VI, 40, p. 82–3, letter to Bruce, 6 and 7 September.
26 NAA, M104, 10, private note for Board of Economic Warfare, ‘Relief and Reconstruction, Joint or 
Separate Agencies, some Pros and Cons’, n.d., enclosed with letter to Bruce, 20 August.
27 Ibid., letter to Bruce, 19 August.
28 DAFP VI, 29, p. 62, letter to Bruce, 26 August 1942.
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At the request of Mrs Roosevelt, McDougall later chaired a round-table 
discussion of the International Students Assembly.29
Figure 17 F. L. McDougall presenting a copy of the Story of FAO by Gove 
Hambidge to Eleanor Roosevelt in 1955. 
Source: E. McDougall. 
Rewriting ‘Progress in the War of Ideas’
McDougall’s memorandum ‘Progress in the War of Ideas’, brought to Washington 
in rough note form, underwent a series of revisions. On the weekend preceding 
his White House dinner, he worked over it with Harry Hawkins and other State 
Department officials. He sent Bruce a copy of the new version and another to 
Mrs Roosevelt with his letter of thanks for the dinner meeting, commenting that 
he thought the case for urgent action was ‘overwhelmingly strong’. She replied 
that she was ‘most interested’ in the memorandum.30
29 DAFP VI, 40, pp. 79–80, letter to Bruce, 6 and 7 September.
30 Ibid.; Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, handwritten letter to Mrs Roosevelt, 25 August, with copy of seven-
page version of ‘Progress in the War of Ideas’, and Mrs Roosevelt’s reply, 26 August.
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On 25 August he dined with Wallace, Milo Perkins, Harold Butler, Riefler and a 
‘remarkable young Englishwoman, [economist] Barbara Ward’.31 His exposition 
on that occasion of the ideas in the memorandum is recorded in Wallace’s diary:
McDougall held forth as usual on the psychological value of the weapons 
which we have in the form of food. His battlecry is ‘Freedom from want 
everywhere in the world’. He would have established a number of 
technical expert commissions to study and report on the freedom from 
want problems in the different parts of the world. The commissions 
would report to an economic council of the United Nations which would 
make decisions based on the reports, arrange for publicity and in effect 
become a munitions factory for the war of ideas. There should be the 
closest possible co-operation with the Office of War Information in the 
United States and the British Ministry of Information.32
The following evening he was taken by Wallace to dine with Francis Miller 
and his wife. Miller was Chairman of the Donovan Committee on Psychological 
Warfare. His wife, Helen Hill Miller, was American correspondent for the 
Economist. She had been an executive of the National Policy Committee, 
founded by her husband, which advocated support for Britain and an end to 
isolationism. She had served as liaison between the British Ambassador and the 
Administration and had worked as a writer for Henry Wallace when he was 
Agriculture Secretary.33 Also present were staff of OWI and OSS. McDougall 
talked of timing a psychological offensive to coincide with German morale 
reaching a new low in the coming winter as difficulties with food and transport 
increased. After dinner they discussed the latest version of ‘Progress in the War 
of Ideas’, Wallace reading aloud and pausing for comment as he went. McDougall 
made further revisions as a result of these ‘constructive comments’.34 During a 
meeting lasting one and a half hours, he gave the final version to Wallace, who 
described it in his diary as
a most interesting memorandum. The essence of the McDougall approach 
is that Germany is much weaker internally than we realize, that we must 
hit her with everything we have now, that the situation is perhaps a little 
bit like it was in October of 1917. We must remember that Wilson came 
out with his 14 points in January of 1918 [and although the German 
Army inflicted defeats on the British and French between March and 
July] nevertheless the 14 points took hold; the German psychology 
crumbled.
31 DAFP VI, 29, letter to Bruce, 26 August 1942.
32 HWD, 25 August 1942.
33 <http://www.cosmos-club.org/web/journals/1995/miller.html> [accessed 19 January 2006].
34 NAA, M104, letter to Bruce, 1 September.
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Wallace lunched with the President that day and gave him a copy of the 
memorandum, together with a clipping from The New York Times urging 
‘now was the time to strike with single-mindedness on all fronts including the 
psychological…The President read the four pages of the memorandum very 
carefully’.35 There is thus firm evidence that Roosevelt read ‘Progress in the War 
of Ideas’.
Berle read it and agreed that a psychological offensive should be prepared and 
ready for launching as soon as Roosevelt and Churchill thought the time right. 
But he also thought that priority should be given to enunciation of policy 
for an international bank, to reassure Americans that the financial burden of 
reconstruction would not fall upon them. Standards of living should be placed 
in the forefront to explain that ‘use of US gold reserves to secure economic 
activity will be reflected in increased demands for U.S.A. goods and hence more 
employment in factory and farm’. McDougall told Bruce that he found Berle’s 
point about the politics of US public opinion persuasive.36
With Welles absent from Washington, Berle thought he might himself discuss 
the food and agriculture campaign with Roosevelt, though he admitted he did 
not ‘fully understand’ it. He gave helpful advice. Under Secretary of Agriculture 
Paul Appleby had been asked to produce a document, which had ‘hung fire’. 
McDougall should work with Appleby ‘in getting the position clear’. Berle 
gave Hull a copy of ‘Progress in the War of Ideas’, and Hull told Hawkins ‘it 
seemed to contain much sound sense’. Hawkins told McDougall that Wallace 
had insisted the President read it.37
Thus, by early September, after some five weeks in Washington, McDougall 
had talked to the Roosevelts and Harry Hopkins, to Wallace, and to much of 
the senior echelon of the Departments of State and Agriculture. He had met, 
socially or officially, the second-in-command of OWI, staff of OSS, the Director 
of BEW and the Chairman of the Committee on Psychological Warfare. He had 
talked with senior economists Winfield Riefler and Alvin Hansen, and had 
held ‘long talks’ with officials at the British Embassy responsible for relevant 
areas of economic policy, Harold Butler and Redvers Opie. A two-day meeting 
of the League Economic Committee early in his visit brought him in touch 
once more with international economic experts, including Britain’s Leith Ross, 
Sir Frederick Phillips, Chairman of the League Financial Committee, Canada’s 
Deputy Minister of Finance, W. C. Clark, and American Henry Grady.38
35 HWD, 26 August 1942.
36 DAFP VI, 40, pp. 80–3, letter to Bruce, 6 and 7 September.
37 Ibid. 
38 NAA, M104, 10, letters to Bruce, 19 August and 11 August [handwritten].
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McDougall always enjoyed drafting ‘in committee’ and made good use of the 
information and advice he was given. The outcome of all this discussion was 
a revision of the rough notes on ‘Progress in the War of Ideas’ he had brought 
with him. The two and a half pages had expanded to a polished memorandum 
of more than four, carefully crafted to appeal to Americans.39
A seven-page revision follows the outline of the first version, but is clearer and 
much more telling. Paragraphs are shorter and the text is punchier: ‘the military 
offensive now being demanded by the peoples of U.S.A. and the British Empire 
must be paralleled by a psychological offensive.’ Subject headings have been 
added: ‘The Psychological Factor’, ‘The Time Factor’, ‘Ammunition for the War 
of Ideas’, ‘An Immediate Programme’, and ‘Methods of Progress’. New ideas have 
been added. Historical examples show the value of ideas in winning wars: the 
French revolutionary army even before Napoleon; the Union Army in 1863 after 
the Emancipation Proclamation; and Wilson’s Fourteen Points in 1918. Two new 
points address international and US domestic sensitivities. First, ideas should be 
put forward not as American, or even as Anglo–American, but as of the United 
Nations, to avoid ‘suggestions about American imperialism or of an Anglo–
American hegemony’. Second, tackling hunger ‘can show our own farmers how 
their war-time efforts can be correlated with the health requirements of our own 
peoples and of the rest of the world’.
Most significantly, a vague reference in the first version to assessment of food 
requirements by ‘the best experts’ has now become investigation by ‘technical 
commissions’ reporting to ‘an Economic Council of the United Nations’, 
which would then ‘take decisions…arrange for publicity and thus become the 
munitions factory in the war of ideas’. Ideas could be disseminated by the US 
OWI and Britain’s Ministry of Information, aiming at ‘vigorous discussion of 
our aims [being] reflected to enemy and enemy-occupied countries’. The draft 
concludes with the words: ‘It is essential to draw the peoples of the world into 
the process of discussion…because our hope of actually achieving the Four 
Freedoms will depend upon the people wanting them enough.’40
A third and final version is the one Wallace showed President Roosevelt on 
2 September.41 Changes from the second version are mostly cosmetic. The 
39 There are various copies, mostly undated. The first rough notes occupy two and a half single-spaced 
pages. The seven-page revision, that sent to Eleanor Roosevelt, is double-spaced. The final version, that shown 
by Wallace to the President, is little changed and exists in at least two forms: a single-spaced copy of four and 
a half pages and a double-spaced copy of eight.
40 ‘Progress in the War of Ideas’, seven-page version, n.d., in NAA, M104, 10, and in FDR Library, file ‘McDougall’.
41 It exists in two forms, one of which is dated Washington, 1 September 1942. A single-spaced dated copy of 
four and a half pages is in NLA, MS6890/4/4, and another in NAA/CSIR, A9778/4, M1 N43. An undated version, 
annotated ‘further copy’ in McDougall’s own hand, is in NLA, MS6890/4/4, and another in NAA, M104, 10.
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five sections are retained, though the first title, ‘The Psychological Factor’, is 
omitted. Much of the text is unaltered, but it has been polished and tightened, 
with sentences and paragraphs further shortened. It begins:
The purpose of the United Nations is first to win the war and then to 
win the peace. 
To win the war we must pass from the defensive to the offensive and 
utterly destroy the German and Japanese military despotisms.
To win the peace we must, during the war, reach agreements which will 
determine the pattern of the post war world.
The simultaneous prosecution of these two purposes is necessary since 
the factor of political warfare can be of tremendous importance.
The final version includes one new idea: 
...current fears of some business men, trade unionists and farmers that 
the war production programme will be followed by surplus capacity 
and unemployment is proving a psychological obstacle to an all out war 
effort. We must convince them that an expanding world economy will 
bring them freedom from these fears.
In subsequent weeks, many influential people in the Administration read the 
paper. McDougall told Bruce, for example, that Supreme Court Justices Jackson, 
Douglas and Frankfurter were all ‘greatly interested’.42 It is not clear how 
many of the readers, including Roosevelt, knew that the ideas contained in it 
originated with McDougall. None of the copies cited here bears his name, but 
the information may well have been given informally. His discussions were so 
widespread that his ideas must have been generally known even before copies 
of the memorandum were circulated. Bruce gave him some credit: in sending 
a copy of the final draft to Stafford Cripps, then British Ambassador to the 
Soviet Union, he described it as originating ‘from a paper which McDougall 
drafted after discussions with me here’, revised in discussion with ‘either the 
State Department or Wallace’s people’ and ‘indicating something of what is in 
the minds of the Americans’. He explained that McDougall had been ‘in touch 
with Wallace and the State Department on reconstruction questions’. Although 
these organisations had ‘not at all times been on the best of terms’, McDougall, 
‘who has contacts in both has apparently been used to a considerable extent as 
an outsider to help in composing these differences’.43
42 NAA, M104, 10, letter, 4 October 1942.
43 DAFP VI, 42, pp. 85–6, Bruce to Cripps, 9 September 1942. Here Bruce claimed to have seen three revised 
versions from Washington. He may have been counting what I believe to be the first version as a revision, 
if earlier notes were made of their conversation. There may be other versions I have not seen. Or Bruce may 
simply have lost count.
A New Idea Each Morning
258
‘Active preparation’ in the Department of 
Agriculture 
By early September progress had stalled, and McDougall was frustrated. Key 
contacts were away, including Welles and Parran. Paul Appleby recalled his 
own support for McDougall’s ideas, when Agriculture Secretary Wickard was 
inclined to be cool and suspicious of McDougall. Appleby, ‘irritated…bore down 
on him. I more or less made demands on him, and I dictated to him that this 
was important business—this was the kind of thing that was wholly desirable 
that the United States as a great food producer ought to be interested in.’ But 
Appleby identified a weak point in McDougall’s campaign:
In smaller groups we talked over McDougall’s plan of action, which was 
based on the notion that we had to have a whole lot of popular discussion 
about this kind of thing. McDougall had been having a lot of discussion 
with individuals, and his method was one that would have continued 
discursive, I think, for a pretty long period of time…I happened to think 
that it was not necessary and actually would be delaying to try to build 
up popular sentiment, but that some initial action…was in the area of 
discretion of the executive leaders of the government. I discouraged and 
was more or less in a position to block the effort to get out and start 
beating the drums over the country.44
Appleby directed McDougall to what he thought a more productive approach. 
MacLeish of OWI wanted active preparation for psychological warfare in the 
coming winter, and believed food and agriculture provided ‘much the best 
material’. Appleby suggested he and McDougall collaborate in preparing 
a proposal for action to submit to the State Department. By 14 September 
McDougall had a preliminary draft, amended after comment by Tolley. The draft 
proposed the Department of Agriculture prepare six papers to be discussed by 
an interdepartmental panel and then submitted to Wallace, Hull and Welles, who 
would consider submission to the President. Orr was expected in Washington 
late in September and McDougall hoped to involve him.
Bruce had suggested McDougall return to London by the end of September. 
McDougall replied that with such interest in the idea of combining reconstruction 
with political warfare, with food and agriculture in the forefront of the program, 
his early departure would be damaging: ‘I think Wallace and possibly Welles 
would feel that we had raised very important issues but had not been as helpful 
as possible in following them up.’
44 HLH, ‘Reminiscences of Paul Appleby’, microform, pp. 263–5.
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A handwritten postscript to this letter indicates what ‘positive action’ the US 
Government might take:
1. The approach to other governments to obtain agreement to establish a 
technical expert commission. This would be much easier if an Economics 
Council of the United Nations already existed.
2. A suggestion of Hawkins of the State Department is that if the 
President accepts the view that a major political warfare drive should 
be commenced this winter, then he should decide to call a conference 
on food and agriculture. The invitations should be accompanied by the 
papers we are proposing to produce and the conference should take the 
form of plenary meetings with speeches. The conference to conclude 
its sittings with a request for the establishment of a Technical Expert 
Commission to prepare plans for action by the United Nations.
Bruce agreed that McDougall should remain in Washington until about 10 
October.45
A week later McDougall reported rapid progress by the Agriculture Department: 
BAE staff were working on the capacities of national agriculture to supply food 
requirements, methods to bring food within the purchasing capacities of lower-
income groups and the role of international trade in food. Staff of the Farm 
Security Division were applying their domestic experience to international 
problems. The Division of Foreign Agricultural Relations had produced and 
discussed with McDougall a paper on Eastern Europe and was now working on 
Latin America and China. Staff of the Advisory National Committee on Nutrition 
were ‘going into the vital statistics approach’. McDougall must have been very 
busy: ‘I am seeing all these people and discussing the way in which the papers 
shall be presented.’ The assessment committee, which was to begin a series of 
meetings on 1 October, would comprise, as representatives of the Department of 
Agriculture, Dr M. L. Wilson, Tolley, Director of Foreign Agricultural Relations 
Leslie Wheeler, and one other. Berle or Hawkins would represent the State 
Department together with Parran for Public Health, Boudreau for nutrition, 
Milo Perkins or his nominee for BEW, Eisenhower, ‘brother of the General’, 
for OWI, with Orr and McDougall. ‘The main objective will be to get an agreed 
statement which would be the sort of document the President could send to 
other United Nations Governments if he decided to go ahead on these lines…I 
shall try to have a preliminary draft ready before the group meets.’46
The Department of Agriculture prepared 12 papers, rather than the six earlier 
proposed, and McDougall spent the first weekend of October summarising 
45 NAA, M104, 10, letters to Bruce, 14 and 20 September.
46 Ibid., letter to Bruce, 20 September.
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their 120 pages for a dinner discussion of 30 people, headed by Wallace, Berle, 
Hawkins, Parran and Boudreau. Berle was ‘very pleased with the progress made 
over food and agriculture’. Orr had not arrived: ‘It is a great nuisance’, wrote 
McDougall on 12 October. Group discussions had taken place, a small drafting 
committee was working ‘pretty solidly’, but he wanted Orr to consider the draft 
before the final meeting of the whole group. He was confident that Wallace, 
the State Department and OWI believed ‘the Food and Agriculture approach 
is right and should have a high priority’, but there had been no indication of 
Roosevelt’s thinking. 
The Vice President tells me that the President is keeping his own counsel 
about post-war questions. Wallace feels sure that the President is having 
some members of his White House entourage work in strict secrecy on 
the subject and that neither he, nor the State Department can get any 
inkling of how the President’s mind is shaping.47
In ‘a most satisfactory hour’, Sumner Welles told McDougall he
had been unhappily conscious of a gap in the State Department’s 
preparation on reconstruction because the Department of Agriculture 
had not found time to do a real job on Food and Agriculture. He had now 
been told that this gap was being well filled by our joint group’s work 
and that pleased him very much…he anticipated that by the middle of 
December the committees on all aspects of reconstruction would have 
reported and that it would then be possible to go to the President and 
propose methods of consultation with other nations.
Welles agreed with McDougall’s view that they might have only 18 months to 
formulate joint schemes, obtain the approval of governments, ‘sell the ideas’ to 
American, British and dominion peoples and ‘put them across the air to Europe’. 
He had read ‘and much liked’ McDougall’s memorandum ‘Progress in the War 
of Ideas’, and agreed that political warfare ‘might play an important part [if] 
supplied with proper munitions’. To counter Welles’ view that the United States 
must know its own mind before discussions with other nations, McDougall 
suggested advantages in early informal discussion: ‘it was harder to modify 
completed proposals than those which were in a less advanced stage.’ Welles 
seemed to agree, and thought ‘we should get to a United Nations basis early 
in 1943 and hoped I should be back in Washington then’. He wrote to Bruce 
that McDougall’s visit had been ‘most helpful. It has not only been agreeable 
but most useful to all of us to have the opportunity of talking with him and 
of exchanging views.’ He repeated his hope that McDougall would return in 
1943.48
47 Ibid., letters to Bruce, 4 and 12 October.
48 DAFP VI, 61, pp. 132–4, handwritten letter, 16 October; NAA, M104, 10, Welles to Bruce, 14 October 1942.
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The draft prepared by the group is the memorandum published in 1956 by FAO 
as the fourth document in The McDougall Memoranda, the booklet referred to 
in the introduction to this study. Orr arrived just in time to give his opinion, 
and it was approved by the full group on the day McDougall departed for home. 
Orr urged American business leaders to persuade government of the economic 
advantages of what he called ‘a World Food Plan’. He also discussed it with 
senior officials, but his memoirs give no indication that he influenced any 
changes to their approach. He declined a suggestion that he be invited by Mrs 
Roosevelt to meet the President, but left America ‘hopeful that the President 
would call a conference of the nations to consider a world food policy’ and that 
he would be supported by ‘the more intelligent industrialists and financiers’.49
After reading the group draft, Wallace ‘expressed great interest and warm 
appreciation’. Hawkins assured McDougall that ‘close attention would be given 
to the paper in the Department’. In sending a copy to Curtin, Bruce warned it 
should be regarded as unofficial and as expressing the personal views of 
the members of the group. It will, however, be closely considered in the 
State Department in the hope that it may be found to provide a suitable 
basis for the formulation of the Administration’s policy on this subject. 
He went on:
McDougall tells me that he is satisfied that the Vice President, Mr. 
Sumner Welles, Mr. Acheson and Mr. Berle are now convinced that 
the Food and Agriculture approach should be given a high priority in 
the United Nations programme for reconstruction. He cannot indicate 
what Mr. Cordell Hull’s attitude is likely to be but Mr. Hawkins, the 
head of the Commercial Treaties Division of the State Department, was 
a keen member of the group and Mr. Hawkins is a trusted adviser to 
Mr. Cordell Hull. McDougall found the officials of the United States 
Department of Agriculture keenly interested and desirous of playing a 
considerable part in the development of policy along these lines. He has, 
however, emphasised that he cannot form any opinion as to whether the 
method suggested in the Memorandum of the setting up of technical 
expert commissions appointed by a projected United Nations Economic 
Council will commend itself to the Administration.50
49 Orr, As I Recall, pp. 157–9.
50 DAFP VI, 78, pp. 157–60, Bruce to Curtin, 22 November 1942. The full memorandum is published as an 
attachment, pp. 160–8.
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‘Draft Memorandum on a United Nations 
Program for Freedom from Want of Food’
Like many of McDougall’s memoranda, this jointly authored paper bears an 
unwieldy title. Its substance is little more than a polished version of ‘Progress 
in the War of Ideas’. The first words, indeed, repeat those of the earlier 
memorandum: ‘The purpose of the United Nations is first to win the war and 
then to win the peace.’ It moves on quickly to a more vigorous statement of 
campaign: ‘We have promised to our own citizens, and to the peoples of the 
world, freedom from want through an expansive economy with full employment, 
better labour conditions and social security. We have, in effect, undertaken to 
engage in a world wide campaign against poverty.’
Preparation to fulfil those promises for the peace should be made before the 
war’s end, and would require ‘many forms of action in the economic and 
financial fields’, but food—‘the most essential of human needs’, the production 
of which ‘is the principal economic activity of man’—must be given priority 
and adequate nutrition must be ‘the first concern of agricultural policy’. 
Realisation of ‘Freedom from Fear’ and of ‘Freedom from Want’ would require a 
world authority with both political and economic functions. The memorandum 
suggests steps for its formation and for ‘technical commissions’, including one 
to ‘formulate action programs designed to assist the nations to achieve freedom 
from want of food’. It repeats the call for a pledge by the prosperous countries 
of the United Nations to institute national policies for adequate nutrition and 
to assist others towards that objective. Its concluding paragraph stresses the 
urgent need for action ‘if we are to avoid losing the peace’, and the universality 
of its objectives:
The end of the war will find all peoples impatient for a return to peace 
conditions. The United Nations must be ready with measures and 
organizations to carry out their pledges, otherwise national legislatures 
may adopt ill-considered, short-sighted and nationalistic policies and 
vested interests will re-entrench themselves…We look forward to a co-
operative World Commonwealth to which every nation will make its 
individual contribution, in which variety of culture will be matched by 
unity of purpose to secure for all the four essential freedoms, and the 
right to participate in, and contribute freely to, international counsels 
for the future welfare of mankind.
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‘A keen outsider’
Early in his visit McDougall had explained how he might be useful amidst the 
‘warring principalities’ of Washington: ‘there is much confusion and a good 
deal of jockeying for position between Departments. A keen outsider comes 
into the picture and may be able to get action by bringing people together on an 
extra-departmental basis.’51
That is hardly sufficient to explain why an official on the staff of a dominion 
high commissioner in London was paid such attention by some of the most awe-
inspiring figures in the Roosevelt Administration. What was it that made this 
‘keen outsider’ so acceptable and interesting to his hosts? There are, perhaps, 
several answers, including the fact that he represented Australia, the coincidence 
of his ideas with much US thinking, and the timing of his visit.
Representing Australia 
There was an identified ‘Anglophile’ faction in Washington, but almost all the 
senior figures McDougall saw, including Roosevelt, Wallace, Welles and Berle, 
were not part of it. They acknowledged that alliance with Britain was necessary 
to defeat the Axis but remained deeply suspicious of British motives in postwar 
planning, even expecting to find it easier to work with their Soviet allies than 
with British statesmen who were probably doing all they could to shore up 
Britain’s empire for the future. New Dealers saw Britain as the centre of bankers’ 
capitalism against which the New Deal was directed. Roosevelt distrusted the 
British aristocracy, he suspected the Foreign Office of pro-fascist tendencies and 
thought British representatives generally were determined to trap Americans 
into defending purely British interests. The imperial preference system 
established at Ottawa in 1932, which was seen as an obstacle to expansion of 
US trade, was the object of particular anger.52 It has been suggested that this 
distrust was the reason for State Department reluctance to permit negotiations 
in London or, indeed, negotiations with the British at all, until Washington was 
adequately prepared.53
Welles was prepared to show much of the confidential planning material to 
McDougall and to seek his comments, because McDougall represented not 
Britain, but Australia. There were reasons for Americans, both private and 
official, to think sympathetically of Australia in 1942. America was at war, but 
51 DAFP VI, 22, p. 42, letter to Bruce, 13 August 1942.
52 Robert Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes: Fighting for Britain 1937-1946, Macmillan, London, 2000, p. 92.
53 The frustration by Hull of Winant’s efforts to arrange such negotiations are detailed in Howland, ‘Friend 
of Embattled Britain’, pp. 202–10.
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the only significant fighting in which its forces had a major part had been in the 
Pacific. General MacArthur had his headquarters there; American soldiers were 
based there; Australia was in the news and high in American consciousness. Some 
would have been aware of issues apparently dividing Australian interests from 
British: Curtin’s ‘look to America’ speech and his differences with Churchill over 
withdrawal of Australian troops from the Middle East. Official Washington had 
been intrigued by another matter. Early in 1940 Australia opened its first foreign 
diplomatic mission, a legation in Washington, led by former Federal Treasurer 
R. G. Casey, whose energy, charm, skill at public relations and enthusiasm for all 
things technological (he flew his own plane) quickly won him influential friends 
at the highest level.54 Then in March 1942 the British Government appointed 
Casey its Resident Minister in Cairo. Casey and Roosevelt were happy with the 
appointment, and Curtin had apparently given his consent, but the manner of 
its announcement infuriated him and cables between Curtin and Churchill were 
subsequently published.55 Isaiah Berlin reported from Washington that ‘even 
in friendlier quarters the treatment of what appeared to be an intra-Imperial 
dispute showed traces of Schadenfreude and gave further evidence that the wave 
of anti-British feeling is running strongly’.56
As a representative of Australia in 1942, McDougall thus represented both 
America’s brave fighting ally in the Pacific and a victim of British imperial 
high-handedness. It seems clear that Bruce was also well regarded. His 
recommendation of McDougall appears to have carried weight and considerably 
eased McDougall’s path.
A Coincidence of Ideas
In London Bruce and McDougall had hammered away on doors that for the most 
part remained closed. Established agricultural and commercial policies made it 
unlikely that their ideas could be accepted. Public health and food authorities 
were at best lukewarm. Longstanding antipathies in Whitehall to McDougall 
and a suspicion that the idea was merely a ploy to sell more Australian produce 
added to the barriers against them. In Washington there were no barriers. 
Indeed, McDougall was largely preaching to the converted, his contribution 
being to bring together problems and ideas already current in a way that was 
new.
In the United States there was widespread scientific interest in nutrition, 
particularly in the large foundations, as noted in the prologue to this section. 
54 Hudson, Casey, pp. 117–19.
55 Ibid., pp. 132–3.
56 Nicholas, Washington Despatches, 26 March 1942, p. 27.
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Work was also being done in the Health Department, although Thomas Parran 
told McDougall in 1938 that his department should do more.57 In Wallace’s 
Department of Agriculture much of the focus during the 1930s had been on 
disposal of surplus in schemes of distribution to the needy. The preoccupation 
with surplus throughout that decade made agricultural authorities amenable 
to suggestions of increasing consumption in a way unimaginable in Britain. 
Howard Tolley recalled that when McDougall came to Washington
he found a rather surprising agreement among a lot of people…on the 
importance of more and better food in making and preserving peace 
after the war. Some of us who had been so greatly concerned about 
agricultural surpluses in the United States in the pre-war period saw 
that here might be an opportunity to escape from burdensome surpluses 
and reduction of production…and turn our efforts and programs toward 
expanding food production and distribution of food to hungry people 
and low-income people throughout the world. It had appeal for Henry 
Wallace. Then the question of getting full U.S. support of course arose, 
and attention was turned toward the White House and FDR.58
The fact that postwar planning was receiving much attention in Washington, and 
the appeal of McDougall’s approach to New Dealers influenced by progressivism 
and other ideas emphasising science and efficiency, also prepared the way for 
his contribution. 
Timing
McDougall’s 1942 visit could not have been better timed. Some military successes 
had occurred, and the paralysing anger of the months immediately after Pearl 
Harbor had been transformed into energy not only for waging war but also for 
planning a just and lasting peace. Officials eager for such action were frustrated 
by bottlenecks in the planning process and by the difficulty of bridging the 
gaps between the fortress departments. Cooperation must surely have occurred 
eventually in some way, but McDougall’s arrival at a moment of need suggested 
a solution.
To have arrived earlier in 1942 would have been too soon, but a few months later 
could have been too late. Congressional elections in November entrenched the 
conservative hold on Congress and made the President wary. Henry Wallace’s 
importance diminished accordingly, declining further in the bureaucratic battle 
throughout 1943, and Roosevelt chose the conservative Democrat Senator Harry 
57 NLA, MS6890/3/2, letter to Hall and Orr, n.d.
58 HLH, ‘The reminiscences of Howard R. Tolley’, p. 579.
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S. Truman as his fourth-term running mate over a marginalised Wallace. Late 
in 1943 Sumner Welles was forced by personal scandal to resign. He continued 
to write of his visions of the peace from outside the Administration, but was 
powerless to implement them. Roosevelt, in failing health, was increasingly 
constrained by domestic and international pressures.
A Conference on Postwar Food
On 24 February 1943, McDougall opened his Times to find a headline, 
‘Conference on Post-war Food’. President Roosevelt had told his press conference 
that he was considering the possibility of ‘a conference in the spring to discuss 
postwar food production’, not relief, but ‘the permanent food supply of the 
world’. He recalled the ‘near success’ of wheat conferences that had sought 
to prevent wide fluctuations in the wheat price and said that this conference 
would seek ‘to prevent both famines and large surpluses, and at the same time 
to give the producer the assurance of a decent price’. He saw the conference 
as an ‘exploratory investigation’.59 The Australian Legation in Washington 
could only tell McDougall that there had been ‘a number of public suggestions 
that a conference of United Nations should be held’, including one from New 
Zealand’s representative on the advisory Pacific War Council, Walter Nash, some 
weeks earlier. Roosevelt had said then that he thought a conference might do 
more harm than good. Public pressure had continued, and some days before the 
press statement Roosevelt had made a similar announcement to the Pacific War 
Council, saying that the conference ‘should be confined to what he thought was 
the safe topic of post-war food, mentioning specifically wheat’.60
The 1956 booklet discussed in the introduction to this study, The McDougall 
Memoranda, followed the reproduction of ‘Draft Memorandum on a United 
Nations Program for Freedom from Want of Food’ with these words:
The rest of the story is well known. The President of the United States, 
through the intervention of Mrs Eleanor Roosevelt, became interested 
in ideas which in many respects were close to his own. He talked to 
McDougall and convened the Hot Springs Conference in May 1943, 
which was followed by preparatory work and the final establishment 
of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations at the 
Quebec Conference, in October 1945.
59 NLA, Times Digital Archive, accessed 2 August 2006.
60 NAA, A2937, ‘Post-War—Food’, cable 9 from McDougall to Washington Legation, 24 February; cable 38 
from Washington Legation, 28 February 1943.
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Similar versions are given in early histories of FAO.61 Bruce also made that link, 
urging Curtin to cable Australia’s support, to ‘reinforce constructive elements 
both here and in Washington’, and adding that he had ‘good reason to believe’ 
that Roosevelt’s announcements were ‘inspired’ by the memorandum McDougall 
had written with the aid of the committee in Washington late in 1942.
But what evidence exists to support this claim, beyond the words of Bruce and 
McDougall themselves? What other influences might have been responsible? 
Contemporary documents support claims made in FAO literature that McDougall 
met Roosevelt and Harry Hopkins and urged the idea of starting international 
postwar planning with food and agriculture. They show that Mrs Roosevelt 
received a copy of the memorandum ‘Progress in the War of Ideas’, and that the 
President read it in the presence of Wallace. It is not clear from material I have 
seen whether Roosevelt read the later ‘Draft Memorandum…’ resulting from the 
work of the committees in October. Apart from questioning the primacy given 
to the ‘Draft Memorandum…’ in FAO, lack of this evidence signifies little. The 
difference between the two memoranda is not great: both, in their final form, 
were the result of extensive consultation in Washington and both argue for 
urgent action on food and agriculture as a starting point for postwar planning.
Writers about the Roosevelt Administration generally agree that it was never 
possible to know what was in the President’s mind or to do more than guess 
at reasons for his decisions. Roosevelt’s method of government was calculated 
inscrutability. Contemporary and later accounts suggest that trying to guess 
at his thinking was a major preoccupation of Washington insiders. Some argue 
that he found it difficult to make up his mind, particularly when an unpopular 
or painful decision was to be made. One commentator suggested that ‘Mr 
Roosevelt relies upon opposites to coax him first to one side and then the other, 
believing apparently that this will ensure a middle course approximately in line 
with the temper of the average American’.62 Whatever the reason, his method 
ensured that he kept decisions firmly in his own hands. Harry Hopkins was 
his closest adviser, living in the White House, with unlimited access and an 
unlimited bailiwick. By 1942 the State Department had been given authority in 
postwar planning but, as noted earlier, Wallace for one believed that postwar 
planning was also being considered at the White House. This was typical. 
Roosevelt would authorise planning, sometimes by more than one person or 
group, without their knowing that others were also at work on the issue. He 
liked to be given a range of options. He would listen, as he did to McDougall, 
and read, as he did McDougall’s memorandum, but give no indication of his 
61 A similar version of these events, probably based on McDougall’s own account, is given in Gove Hambidge, 
The Story of FAO, D. van Nostrand, Princeton, NJ, 1955, pp. 45–9. Briefer references to the account are in Paul 
Lamartine Yates, So Bold an Aim: Ten Years of International Co-operation toward Freedom from Want, Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome, 1955, p. 49; and in Orr, As I Recall, p. 158.
62 Marquis Childs, quoted in Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World, p. 74.
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views. He would allow Welles and others to make speeches that might or might 
not have his endorsement, and he would judge reactions. When persuaded 
to a particular course of action, he still waited until he judged the time was 
right. Amongst many examples are the following comments: Roosevelt ‘enjoyed 
dividing authority among competitors’; he ‘tacitly and cynically’ encouraged 
conflicts’.63 Roosevelt himself said: ‘I am a juggler, I never let my right hand 
know what my left hand does’; ‘spreading power among contending forces 
allowed [him] to retain undisputed authority in his own hands’.64
By 1942 Roosevelt was on shifting political ground: he was dealing with 
momentous issues of war and peace in a complex domestic political system 
with strengthening forces of opposition. Alonzo L. Hamby argues that having 
led ‘a nation unprepared for the grim realities of international power down a 
twisting and often devious path to war’, Roosevelt represented ‘an inconsistent 
amalgam’ of the two dominant strains of twentieth-century American 
liberalism: Theodore Roosevelt’s emphasis on a need for national strength and 
self-interest, his ‘imperative of a forceful American role in the larger world’; and 
Woodrow Wilson’s vision of a ‘pacific world community, united in adherence 
to a supranational body striving to meet the needs of all mankind’. At home, 
with isolationism still a potent factor, Roosevelt was forced to exercise a 
leadership of ‘constant interaction with an inconsistent self-deceptive public 
mood’; the majority followed him because ‘in his inconsistencies he reflected 
their conflicting concerns’. In the wider world, he faced the difficult task of 
dealing with Stalin across an ‘unbridgeable ideological gulf’. In that situation, 
Roosevelt’s ‘splendid inspirational banner’ of the Four Freedoms ‘could only 
interfere with the realistic diplomacy’ needed to deal with the world as it was; 
instead he tried to secure peace through ‘atmospherics…compromise and…
postponement of differences’.65 This perhaps explains his decision to begin 
postwar planning with a ‘safe topic’.
Elizabeth Borgwardt gives Roosevelt more credit for commitment to the ideals 
professed in the ‘Four Freedoms’, noting that he had written that section of 
his speech himself. In April 1939 he had suggested discussions with the Axis 
powers on opening up international trade, stating that every nation was entitled 
to ‘assurance of obtaining the materials and products of peaceful economic 
life’. Borgwardt suggests this marked ‘the transition toward blending economic 
concerns with the politics of collective security’. The President had been 
interested in the British debate about social welfare that was to culminate in 
63 Schwarz, Liberal, pp. 88, 159.
64 Doris Kearns Goodwin, No Ordinary Time: Franklin & Eleanor Roosevelt: The Home Front in World War 
II, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1994, pp. 137, 156.
65 Alonzo L. Hamby, Liberalism and Its Challengers: F. D. R. to Reagan, Oxford University Press, New York, 
1985, pp. 37–46.
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the Beveridge Report; he kept a file of press clippings labelled ‘economic bill 
of rights’. The phrase ‘freedom from want’ had been suggested to him by a 
journalist at a press conference in 1940.66
A confident assessment of McDougall’s place in Roosevelt’s decision making 
seems out of the question. There were many voices raising ideas similar to those 
McDougall was putting forward. Isaiah Berlin noted, at the time of McDougall’s 
visit, ‘many writers over a period of time have argued the United Nations 
need a more definitive statement of war aims’.67 We know that Winant raised 
nutrition with Roosevelt in some form before McDougall’s 1941 visit, and that 
an international conference on the subject had been proposed during that 
visit, only to be lost in the tumult surrounding Pearl Harbor. Given that Welles 
was a close adviser, and in 1942 was masterminding the committee bridging 
Agriculture and State, it seems likely that Roosevelt would have known of its 
work, and might well have seen its final ‘Draft Memorandum…’.68
The President’s interest in food questions may have been heightened in the last 
months of 1942 when committees in both Washington and London assessed the 
food needs of liberated areas in the ‘emergency period’ immediately following 
liberation. Tolley chaired the Washington committee; in London McDougall 
was one of ‘a distinguished group of British and European agricultural and 
nutrition experts’. Their difficult and complex task undertaken over some 
two months produced a report ‘widely circulated’ in London and Washington 
bureaucracies. The magnitude of the requirements put forward impressed the 
supply authorities and helped to correct overly optimistic ideas still lingering 
from the days of surpluses. E. F. Penrose, chairman of the London committee, 
notes that the two reports had ‘hardly been completed when President Roosevelt 
called for a United Nations Food Conference’.69
In his press conference announcement, Roosevelt specifically excluded emergency 
relief problems from the ambit of Hot Springs. These, he said, were already being 
dealt with. The emergency matter might nevertheless have reminded Roosevelt 
of the longer term problem, or perhaps he judged that it had paved the way for 
a longer term discussion he had earlier considered. Throughout the war farm 
66 Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World, pp. 48–9, 98.
67 Nicholas, Washington Despatches, 5 October 1942, p. 90.
68 Borgwardt writes that Roosevelt had ‘actively reviewed’ ‘Draft Memorandum on a United Nations 
Program for Freedom from Want of Food’, which had ‘clearly captured his capricious imagination’. But her 
identification of the memorandum Roosevelt actually read seems based only on statements in the FAO booklet 
in which it is reproduced. Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World, p. 115.
69 Penrose, Economic Planning for the Peace, pp. 133–9.
A New Idea Each Morning
270
prices were the subject of constant pressure in Congress; it was not an issue 
Roosevelt was likely to forget.70 It is perhaps significant that Roosevelt recalled, 
in his press conference, attempts in the 1930s to solve the wheat price problem.
The contemporary records provide a rather different impression from the 
vague accounts circulated through FAO. It is clear that a carefully constructed 
campaign was waged to attract the inscrutable president to the idea of urgent 
preparation for international action on food and agriculture. McDougall was 
undoubtedly a key player, both in bringing together like-minded people from 
the warring principalities of Washington as the ‘keen outsider’ and in providing 
telling arguments to support it, thus giving shape to ideas less focused, though 
widely accepted within the Administration. But his success depended on the 
readiness of the key figures to accept those ideas and to provide high-level 
facilitation, to use him to ends they thought valuable. There remains a question 
about the role of Bruce, certainly in prompting Winant’s discussions, and in 
using his weight in support of McDougall. How much real influence did he 
have in Washington? In the end, it is not possible to apportion credit to any one 
individual with certainty.
McDougall’s credit remains undiminished, nevertheless. His relentless 
campaigning provided a catalyst for action within the Administration. Once 
the international conference was called, the 12 papers that his committees had 
produced shaped its agenda and its decisions, and thus the ultimate nature 
of FAO. In that sense ‘Draft Memorandum on a United Nations Program for 
Freedom from Want of Food’, which is also a result of that work, deserves its 
place as a fundamental document of the organisation.
70 Walter W. Wilcox, The Farmer in the Second World War, Iowa State College, Ames, Ia, 1947, Chapters 9 
and 15. See also Nicholas, Washington Despatches, passim. 
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10. ‘A New Era in the World’s 
History’
Summary
Bruce, McDougall and Orr played significant roles in the formative years of the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, sometimes recalling 
the ideas of 1935. That their world was changing rapidly and posing new 
problems does much to explain the difficulties they and their fellow idealists 
were to encounter.
As the 1943 conference called by Roosevelt approached, Britain and the United 
States agreed that the new organisation should be an advisory body; they feared 
a body with executive powers, as envisaged by Orr, would interfere with trade 
and commodity policies. There was confusion about its purpose: some, like J. M. 
Keynes, believed more fundamental economic problems should be solved first. 
Participants hailed the conference itself as a success, and a spirit of optimism 
prevailed. McDougall joined the Australian delegation at Hot Springs, and was 
appointed Australian representative on an interim commission established by 
the conference to prepare for the permanent organisation. His contribution to 
the work of the commission was significant: he was one of the most influential 
and active members of Committee C, responsible for preparing for the work 
of the organisation, and he chaired a ‘Reviewing Panel’ established to guide 
specialist committees of experts assisting Committee C.
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) was established by its first 
conference in 1945. Despite British Government opposition, failure to find 
another suitable candidate led to Orr becoming FAO’s inaugural Director-
General; he appointed McDougall one of his two ‘special advisers’. The 
body was constrained by a small budget and by failure of the USSR to join. 
Its constitution was ambiguous, generally favouring an advisory role, but 
allowing room for an executive interpretation. In its first year it faced a world 
food crisis. Orr sidetracked the constitution by establishing a separate body, 
the International Emergency Food Council, to recommend production increases 
and direct supplies, and then sought approval to create a World Food Board to 
provide credit and hold surplus food stocks for distribution in time of need. US 
and British opposition forced the establishment of a preparatory commission to 
consider other proposals. Bruce headed the commission, which recommended 
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a World Food Council lacking the executive functions of Orr’s proposed board. 
The elected Council became the new executive of FAO, and Bruce its first 
chairman.
Orr left FAO in 1948 and was replaced by Norris E. Dodd, who focused on 
technical assistance. McDougall remained as ‘Counselor’, providing advice on 
policy and overseeing relations with other international organisations. His last 
important memorandum, ‘The Challenge to Western Civilization’, brought a 
Cold War interpretation to all that he had previously argued. He saw problems 
of development as paramount, for political as well as for economic reasons, and 
continued to believe that FAO could achieve its goals.
The Hot Springs Conference
As hasty preparations were made in Washington for the conference announced 
by the President, the London Observer published an article by John Boyd Orr, 
who wrote that ‘the carrying out of a world food policy based on nutritional 
needs will bring about revolutionary changes in our social and economic system’, 
changes benefiting ‘every class of the community’. The conference would adopt 
‘a food policy based on needs’ and establish a ‘Technical Commission’ to report 
on food conditions in all countries. Economists and financiers would be asked to 
plan ‘a financial corporation’ to provide long-term credits, and ‘an International 
Agricultural and Food Commission’ would probably be set up to ‘arrange and 
control international trade in food and advise governments so that national 
schemes will fit in to the world scheme’. ‘This conference’, he concluded, ‘must 
mark the beginning of a new era in the world’s history’.1
Policy advisers in Britain and in the United States had been considering postwar 
economic arrangements for more than a year before Roosevelt’s announcement 
of a food conference. Lend–Lease arrangements were made early in 1941; Article 
VII of the subsequent Mutual Aid Agreement and the Atlantic Charter of August 
1941 laid out expansionary aims but no detailed means for achieving them. 
While they agreed that mistakes of the interwar period must not be repeated, 
the United States and the United Kingdom differed on the means to attain their 
agreed objectives. In both countries agriculture departments jealously guarded 
the right to protect farm incomes—in the United States by subsidising exports, 
cutting across the State Department’s aim of liberalising trade. In Britain 
agricultural policy focused on restricting imports. An empire lobby believing that 
Britain should make the most of its imperial advantages persisted. Britain would 
be a debtor nation by the end of the war, with few remaining assets and little 
1 Observer, 25 April 1943.
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trade; the United States would be a creditor; they approached postwar problems 
from different perspectives. Each blamed the other for the currency problems 
of the 1930s; many Americans believed problems had been compounded by 
development of the sterling area, which, together with the Ottawa preference 
agreements, was a focus of US resentment. In British eyes, the sterling area and 
the Ottawa agreements formed an interlocking defensive system allowing empire 
countries to build up ‘sterling balances’ in Britain, thereby enabling London 
to remain a financial centre and maintain a positive balance of trade with the 
United States. British policy emphasised the importance of postwar economic 
expansion, but there remained ‘extreme reluctance to abandon a system which 
combined imperial sentiment with seemingly solid economic advantages’.2
As Maynard Keynes in Britain and Harry Dexter White in the United States 
worked over their respective proposals for postwar arrangements for currency 
and trade, discussion between them and their advisers occurred from time 
to time, but formal intergovernmental negotiations were postponed. The US 
Government wanted to begin with trade talks, which had broken off in mid 
1941; it was not yet prepared for monetary negotiations, while the British were 
not ready to negotiate trade and wanted monetary discussions first. As a result, 
there were no official talks on these fundamental questions until 1943. In the 
meantime, there was to be an official conference on food and agriculture.
Responses to the President’s announcement ranged from scepticism to hostility. 
After the first mention of the conference in the Pacific War Council, the British 
Ambassador in Washington commented that ‘it was an unwise proposal but 
that nothing was likely to come of it’. In Australia one official commented: ‘You 
cannot develop a useful conference out of this proposal’; and another: ‘you may 
be able to develop a conference that is less useless than it threatens to be.’3 A 
common reaction was puzzlement: why hold a conference on food when there 
were so many bigger problems? Keynes, who had been working for some 18 
months on his plan for a clearing union to solve monetary problems bedevilling 
the previous decade, was ‘more dejected than I had ever seen him’, recalled 
Ernest Penrose, then Economic Adviser at the US Embassy in London. Having 
heard Penrose’s explanation of Roosevelt’s possible motives, Keynes replied: 
‘What you are saying is that your President with his great political insight 
has decided that the best strategy for postwar reconstruction is to start with 
vitamins and then by a circuitous route work round to the international balance 
of payments!’ Penrose himself thought Roosevelt believed that ‘if the subject 
2 Skidelsky, Keynes: Fighting for Britain, pp. 182–8.
3 NAA, A989, 43/735/740, cable S.24 from Dixon, 18 February; minutes of interdepartmental committee, 
23 March 1943.
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chosen was of common interest throughout the world and might be expected to 
bring wide agreement at least in aims’, it could ease the way towards ‘the more 
difficult political issues later’.4
The Washington bureaucracy was caught unawares. Dean Acheson claimed 
the conference had been ‘popped on the State Department’, and its officers did 
their best in the circumstances.5 Department of Agriculture officials complained 
that their expertise was ignored and they were not informed of plans.6 The 
War Department worried about transporting delegates over air routes across the 
Atlantic and the Pacific closed to all but military traffic and, with ‘an intense 
battle’ being waged in North Africa, could not undertake to give them priority.7 
Although the conference was postponed from the April date first announced, 
preparations were rushed. Arranging the conference was perhaps the least 
taxing task. A more difficult one was to define its purpose and scope. Lester 
Pearson reported to Ottawa that there was ‘bewilderment’ in Washington about 
the purpose of the conference, noting Acheson’s view that ‘the best chance of 
useful work being done by it would be to take as a basis of deliberation the 
“McDougall Report” on Nutrition of October 1942’.8
The invitation received in Australia stated US belief that it was time to begin 
‘joint consideration of the basic economic problems’ likely to confront the 
world after ‘attainment of complete military victory’; allied and associated 
governments would exchange ‘views and information’ on topics including 
plans for postwar food production, import requirements and exportable 
surpluses, possible agreements and institutions to achieve efficient production 
and adequate supplies; trade and financial arrangements; and coordination of 
national policies for improving nutrition and consumption.9 Acheson responded 
to criticism that the agenda attempted to cover too much ground: by taking the 
broader picture and ‘directing attention to an expanding agricultural economy, 
the danger of concentrating upon restrictive commodity schemes would be 
avoided’. The purpose was to ‘work towards broader objectives and emphasize 
the new responsibility of governments to see that their people are well fed’.10 No 
doubt he also hoped that breadth of subject matter would avoid the difficulty 
of reaching an agreed US policy; there remained a significant gap between 
Agriculture’s lingering fear of surpluses and instinct for production restrictions, 
and State’s policy of freer trade.
4 E. F. Penrose, Economic Planning for the Peace, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1953, pp. 117, 120.
5 NAA, A2937, Post War Food, Halifax to FO, 10 April 1943.
6 NAC, RG 25, Vol. 2261, 5050-C-40, Scott to Pearson, 1 April 1943.
7 USNA, 550.ADI/189, Secretary of War to Secretary of State, 22 April 1943.
8 NAC, RG 25, Vol. 2261, 5050-C-40, Pearson to Ottawa, 25 March 1943.
9 NAA, A989, 43/735/740, Note, 26 March 1943.
10 USNA, Harley Notter files, Box 80, records of State Department Committees, E Minute 44, 7 May 1943.
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The Australian Legation in Washington reported that Roosevelt ‘has no 
acute economic sense, and he did not appreciate the fact that a conference on 
plans for postwar food could achieve very little unless some degree of prior 
agreement had been reached on trade and the exchanges’. Some members of the 
British Government feared the conference could endorse production or export 
restriction, the method favoured in the 1930s to increase farm incomes, thus 
raising food prices; others were anxious about a possible threat to imperial 
preference arrangements. Formally, the British suggested an explicit statement 
that the conference would be held within the context of the Atlantic Charter 
and Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement, thus favouring expansionary 
trade policies.11 No such statement was made, perhaps because of division 
among policy makers in Washington. Britons and Americans were nevertheless 
united in wanting to avoid concrete proposals: the conference should be 
‘technical’ rather than political; hence the invitation specified ‘a small number 
of appropriate technical and expert representatives’. It was to be a low-key 
‘technical wartime meeting’; dress would be ‘business suits only’, and wives 
were not invited.12 An announcement that the press would be excluded raised 
controversy in Washington.
‘A feeling of great trust and faith in the future’
A special train transported delegates to the spa resort of Hot Springs, Virginia, in 
the Allegheny Mountains, some 250 miles (400 km) south-west of Washington. 
The conference might have been ‘low key’ compared with prewar international 
conferences, but it was a luxurious experience for delegates from war-affected 
countries, and there were at least some vestiges of pomp and circumstance: 
‘plenary sessions and flags flying, orchestras playing and state dinners, and 
cocktail parties and so on.’ Most remarkable was the atmosphere. Howard Tolley 
recalled: 
I had hopes that this would be a great forward step toward lasting 
peace…We really expected big things out of the conference before we 
ever went to Hot Springs. As preparations for it went along most of us 
felt more and more hopeful that great things would come out of it.13 
Accounts record almost universal goodwill and optimism. Norway’s Dr K. Evang 
commended the ‘absence of academic hair-splitting discussion’ and found ‘after 
11 NAA, A989, 43/735/740/1, Department of External Affairs comment on Note from Washington Legation, 
14 April 1943.
12 NAC, RG 25, Vol. 2261, 5050-C-40, US Legation, Ottawa, to Secretary EA, 10 April 1943; Secretariat of 
Food Conference, undated note.
13 HLH, ‘Tolley’, pp. 581–6.
A New Idea Each Morning
276
the first 2 or 3 days there was a feeling of strong optimism and after a week a spirit 
of enthusiasm’. An outstanding feature had been the unreserved cooperation 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. There was ‘a feeling of great 
trust and faith in the future’. McDougall thought that ‘nations are bolder and 
prepared for more far-reaching and constructive suggestions in 1943 than 
they were in 1937’. He welcomed the appointment as delegates of ‘technical 
and expert people who really did know something about the subject they were 
discussing’, and their authority for full discussion without commitment.14 
But British economist Lionel Robbins wrote in his diary: ‘It is very easy to be 
friendly in a luxury hotel with all expenses paid and no binding commitments 
on the agenda. When we did touch on bread and butter questions…opinion was 
by no means so united.’15
Much of the credit for the prevailing optimism must go, nevertheless, to the 
British delegation. Paul Appleby believed that he had influenced British thinking 
about ‘the McDougall plan’ during a visit to London late in 1941. At the request 
of Welles, backed by Winant, Appleby set out to lobby in favour of liberal trade 
policies after Keynes had alarmed Washington by predicting that Britain’s dire 
postwar situation would demand exchange controls, trade quotas and limits on 
consumption in order to maximise exports. Appleby saw a number of ministers 
and found Lord Woolton, the Food Minister, to have ‘a very favourable reaction 
to the McDougall plan’. He believed Woolton’s influence helped ensure the 
British delegation to Hot Springs was a high-level one and that it was briefed 
according to Woolton’s expansive views.16 ‘Extremely gratified’ to find that in 
fact the United States shared their view that the conference should be limited 
to exploration of problems and possible means of resolution, the British made 
every effort to facilitate its success.17 The State Department for its part was 
reassured by circulation of a British paper by J. P. R. Maud of the Ministry of 
Food. Maud argued for expansion of trade and employment, opposed restriction 
of production and advocated education, pooling of information and coordination 
of research.18
A notable omission from the British delegation was John Boyd Orr, still 
considered to be an outspoken and politically dangerous ‘crank’ in Whitehall. 
Bruce had lobbied British ministers for his inclusion in some capacity, but was 
forced to report failure despite American wishes that he should attend: ‘my 
impression is [ministers] are afraid of him even as an adviser.’19 From a diplomatic 
14 Proceedings of the Nutrition Society, 1943, pp. 164, 167, ‘The Hot Springs Conference’, Edinburgh, 2 
October 1943, <http:/journals.cambridge.org> [published online 28 February 2007; accessed 15 May 2011].
15 Skidelsky, Keynes, Fighting for Britain, p. 300.
16 HLH, ‘Paul Appleby’, pp. 267–77.
17 NAA, A2937, Post War Food, FO to Washington Embassy, 20 April 1943.
18 UKNA, FO371/35373, ‘Confession of Faith’, draft by J. P. R. Maud, 10 May 1943; NAC, RG 25, Vol. 2261, 
5050-C-40, ‘Confession of Faith’, sent to Ottawa by Pearson, 12 May.
19 NAA, M100, April 1943, McDougall to Bruce 22 April; Bruce to McDougall, 29 April 1943.
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point of view, the delegation was nevertheless an impressive one. Led by 
Junior Foreign Minister Richard Law, its 10 delegates, accompanied by a team 
of advisers, represented no less than eight Whitehall departments. Several—
among them Law and Lionel Robbins, an academic economist then Director of 
the Economic Section at the War Cabinet Offices—were to attend subsequent 
conferences, including Bretton Woods. P. H. Gore-Booth, of the Washington 
Embassy, wrote of a determination to ‘retain political leadership’ despite being 
surpassed by the United States in ‘material achievement and power’, by means 
of ‘on the spot merit’. The British paid attention to minutiae of procedure and 
protocol, undertaking to entertain every one of the other delegations to dinners 
or cocktail parties, and holding regular delegation meetings in order to identify 
their own internal difficulties and present a united front.20 After the first full 
day, they reported to London: 
...the absence of general discussion seems to indicate that no delegation 
except the Australians and ourselves have as yet a well thought-out 
consistent and positive policy. The Americans certainly have ideas but 
they are not yet decided and in any case are concerned not to throw too 
much weight about…It is noteworthy that neither the Russians nor the 
Chinese spoke at all today. 
J. E. Coulson commented: ‘general apathy and indecision not altogether 
surprising in view of the shortness of time and the general obscurity about 
objects…Although we probably dreaded this conference more than anyone, 
we seem to be the only Delegation which has been able to put forward any 
positive ideas.’21 The effort put into these is evident in cables and records of 
daily delegation meetings.22 Australia’s J. B. Brigden found the British delegation 
‘outstanding’ and ‘uniformly excellent’.23
The Australian delegation played a significant role at Hot Springs. It was led 
by H. C. Coombs, recently appointed Director of Post-War Reconstruction and 
advocate of what was described as ‘the positive approach’ to Article VII of the 
Mutual Aid Agreement. The positive approach shared with the nutrition initiative 
an emphasis on improved standards of living as a goal of public policy, but it 
was more broadly conceived, interpreting the Atlantic Charter and Article VII 
as a commitment to encourage expansion of trade and higher living standards, 
including responsibility to assist underdeveloped countries to raise theirs, and 
national and international commitment to policies of full employment. The 
approach reversed important strands of traditionally protectionist Labor policy 
20 UKNA, FO371/35378, P. H. Gore-Booth, draft memorandum, ‘Food Conference—United Kingdom 
Delegation and its Relation with Other Delegations’, n.d.
21 UKNA, FO371/35373, British Delegation to FO, 5, 19 May; minute by Coulson, 21 May.
22 UKNA, FO371/3572-8, passim.
23 NAA, A989, 43/735/606, Brigden, ‘Some Impressions: UN Conference on Food and Agriculture’, 31 May.
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in its willingness to question imperial preference and to oblige countries to spend 
their credit balances, while continuing to uphold Australia’s right to extend 
its own manufacturing industries. The positive approach was to be formally 
espoused by the Labor Government in 1944; it offered ‘an internationalism of 
[Labor’s] aspiration, to substitute for the predatory internationalism that they 
feared’. It would see Australian delegations at international conferences ‘in 
another kind of Keynesian crusade’ attempting to ‘use Keynesian analysis with 
its emphasis on sustaining demand as the basis of reform of the international 
economic order’. By the time he reached Hot Springs, Coombs had discovered 
an emphasis on employment policy in London. US officials, however, believed it 
would be unacceptable to Congress.24
McDougall was also a member of the Australian delegation. Coombs found him 
‘a very interesting bloke, a bit of a charlatan, but a very appealing one with 
an element of good sense in the line that he was taking…a kind of virtuous 
con-man’.25 Coombs noted that McDougall was working ‘quite closely in 
collaboration with the Americans’. ‘They appear to be seeking his advice and 
criticism on the preparation of material and the working out of the plans for the 
Conference. This is proving quite valuable to us.’26
Dean Acheson led the US delegation at Hot Springs, but attended only 
spasmodically. Delegates remained in constant touch with the State Department 
by telephone tie line. Howard Tolley thought the United States made less 
effort to influence policy at this conference than at later ones.27 They, too, held 
meetings to decide policy, but on occasion there was open division.28
The Hot Springs Resolutions 
The conference divided into four sections: I) Consumption Levels and 
Requirements; II) Expansion of Production and Adaptation to Consumption 
needs; III) Facilitation and Improvement of Distribution; IV) Recommendations 
for Continuing and Carrying forward the Work of the Conference. All sections 
except IV comprised several committees, and all committees prepared resolutions. 
The Final Act of the Hot Springs Conference included 33 resolutions on the 
need for international action to increase and promote agricultural production, 
technical skills and consumption, and on individual governments’ responsibility 
to ensure a sufficient food supply. The text of the resolutions fills nearly 17 long 
24 Tim Rowse, Nugget Coombs, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, pp. 119–25; H. C. Coombs, Trial 
Balance, Macmillan, Australia, 1981, pp. 32–6, 43; Coleman, Cornish and Hagger, Giblin’s Platoon, pp. 222–9.
25 Rowse, Coombs, p. 123, citing Coombs in interview with Sean Turnell; Coombs, Trial Balance, p. 41.
26 NAA, M448, 11, [3], Coombs to J. B. Chifley, 23 April 1943.
27 HLH, ‘Tolley’, pp. 591–3.
28 UKNA, FO371/35378; Gore-Booth, draft memorandum, ‘Food Conference’.
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pages of fine print.29 Section IV prepared the resolution to establish an Interim 
Commission to formulate ‘a specific plan for a permanent organization in the 
field of food and agriculture’. The Commission’s chief task would be to draft 
a constitution. The permanent organisation would come into being once that 
constitution was signed by 20 nations.30
As a result of British determination to oil the wheels, the goodwill of all 
participants and a general aspiration to make use of this unprecedented 
opportunity to build a better world, the Hot Springs Conference had succeeded 
against all expectations. Yet the British encountered one difficulty at its 
conclusion. They had hoped that Section IV would recommend the permanent 
organisation be limited to collection of information and research, but the 
Americans would not agree: ‘The best we could do was to get agreement that it 
should not be mandatory for the Interim Commission to include…functions of 
an executive nature.’31
The conference in fact had issued a clarion call, its formal resolutions beginning 
with a declaration that ‘freedom from want of food, suitable and adequate for 
the health and strength of all peoples, can be achieved’. First, it continued, 
the war must be won, and in the immediately following critical period, urgent 
efforts must be made to economise consumption, increase supplies and distribute 
them to best advantage. Then equal efforts must be made to win and maintain 
freedom from fear and from want: ‘The one cannot be achieved without the 
other.’ Until then there had ‘never been enough food for the health of all people. 
This is justified neither by ignorance nor by the harshness of nature.’ Production 
must be greatly expanded, requiring ‘imagination and firm will on the part of 
each government and people’. ‘The first cause of hunger and malnutrition is 
poverty.’ There must therefore be ‘an expansion of the whole world economy to 
provide the purchasing power sufficient to maintain an adequate diet for all’. 
Primary responsibility lay with each nation, and the committee recommended 
all governments adopt the conference findings and recommendations, urging 
‘early concerted discussion of the related problems falling outside the scope’ of 
Hot Springs. The first steps, nevertheless, should be taken without waiting for 
solution of other problems.32
29 NAA, A989, 43/735/740, copy of Confidential UK Government Print, PCP (43) 4.
30 Sergio Marchisio and Antoinietta Di Blase, The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Martinus 
Nijhoff, The Netherlands, 1991, p. 10; American Journal of International Law, Vol. 38, no. 4, October 1944, 
‘The Interim Commission on Food and Agriculture and the Food and Agriculture Organization’, pp. 708–11.
31 UKNA, FO371/35374, Food Delegation to FO, 25 and 31 May.
32 NAA, A989, 43/735/740, copy of UK Confidential Print, ‘United Nations Conference on Food and 
Agriculture’, Annex B, Resolutions.
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The Interim Commission
McDougall had been rapporteur of Section IV, and the final document probably 
demonstrates his influence. He was dubbed ‘Father of the Conference’, but 
otherwise took no very prominent role at Hot Springs. The Interim Commission, 
on which he again represented Australia, was a body better suited to his 
methods; there he operated as he had on the EMB and IEC: not occupying its 
most prominent position, yet steering its work to a considerable extent by 
virtue of his diligence, knowledge and ideas. He did not lack opposition. The 
nascent organisation was already subject to political manipulation from the 
major powers. British civil servants, and Minister of Agriculture, R. S. Hudson, 
in particular, had a list of persona non grata. They had been able to prevent 
Orr from attending Hot Springs and made it clear he should have nothing to 
do with the Interim Commission. At Hot Springs they had also successfully 
objected to the appointment of the Canadian Secretary of the International 
Wheat Conference, Andrew Cairns, as secretary to Section IV, a move causing 
unease in Washington and Ottawa. After much discussion, British civil servants 
agreed it would be impolitic to make a second objection to Cairns, against whom 
they really had nothing except his ‘enthusiasm and strongly held views’.33 They 
were, however, determined that neither McDougall nor Paul Appleby should 
be appointed Chair of the Interim Commission.34 By suggesting that neither a 
Briton nor an American should occupy the chair, they could avoid the problem 
of Appleby, the precise objection to whom they could not then adequately 
explain, but which related to US agricultural policy. Despite Appleby’s advocacy 
of expansionary policies in London in 1941, he had been known to favour 
international planning of agriculture and restriction of production, along the 
lines of the 1930s US AAA.35
Britain would prefer that the Chairman of the Interim Commission represent 
one of the dominions. Australian participation at Hot Springs had been the 
most impressive, but suggesting an Australian occupy the chair might lead to 
McDougall’s appointment. After Coombs, McDougall had been the member of 
the Australian delegation ‘most in evidence’ and ‘the fact that he had played some 
part in the promotion of the Conference and has certain ambitions connected 
with the outcome…rather complicated matters at times’. Alarm increased as 
the British Embassy in Washington reported that McDougall had circulated a 
memorandum proposing the commission meet quickly to ‘begin work on all 
aspects of the food problem’, and suggesting formation of a series of expert 
committees including, possibly, one on commodity arrangements, which was 
33 UKNA, FO371/35380, minutes by Coulson, 4 and 11 July; Ronald, 5 August; FO to Washington for 
Twentyman, 12 August; notes by Twentyman, ‘IC4’, 26 July.
34 Ibid., FO371/35377, minute by Coulson, 5 July; Coulson to Clutterbuck, 7 July; FO to Washington, 6 July.
35 Ibid., FO371/35373, Sixth meeting of UK Delegation, 12 May.
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‘obviously dangerous’.36 The British were overly fearful: in the event the task of 
chairing the commission went to Canada’s Lester Pearson, for whom McDougall, 
who had never wanted it, had lobbied energetically.
The international organisations formed at the end of World War II are now taken 
for granted as part of the world order. It is difficult to appreciate the magnitude 
and complexity of the task facing their founders. The Interim Commission 
had three main objectives: first to draft a ‘formal declaration or agreement’ 
recognising governments’ obligations to raise standards of living and nutrition, 
to improve agricultural efficiency, to cooperate with other governments on these 
matters and to report on progress; second, to prepare a specific plan for the 
new organisation; and third, to initiate preliminary statistical investigations and 
research into problems likely to face the organisation, so that once established it 
could begin work immediately.37 The commission, comprising representatives of 
the 44 nations at Hot Springs, and occupied Denmark, was formally inaugurated 
on 15 July 1943, only six weeks after the conference concluded, showing, in 
Acheson’s words, a ‘clear indication of the earnestness with which the United 
Nations have undertaken their commitments and the vigor with which they are 
prepared to carry them out’.38
The Interim Commission existed for more than two years, located from October 
1943 in its permanent home: 2841 McGill Terrace, a mansion in a leafy area 
of central Washington. Most rooms became offices, while ‘the commission and 
its committees and advisory panels met in the dining room around a huge oak 
table’.39 The full commission met infrequently, but members were entitled to 
attend any of its committee meetings.40 This meant that an enthusiastic member 
like McDougall could be involved in nearly all of its activities. Most members 
were Washington-based diplomats, with heavy workloads, particularly as the 
pace of planning for postwar organisations increased. McDougall remained on 
Bruce’s staff in London. He spent long periods in Washington, returning to 
London whenever Bruce needed him. When in Washington, he took an interest 
in other areas of postwar planning, and in some leftover business of the League 
of Nations, but he was able to devote most of his time to the commission.
McDougall told Bruce: 
36 Ibid., FO371/35378, draft memorandum, ‘Food Conference’; FO to Washington, 4209, 25 June; telegrams 
2771 and 2772 from Washington, 16 June, and minutes thereon.
37 NAA, A2937, Post War Food, ‘Suggestions on Methods of Work of the Interim Commission’, n.d. 
This document appears to be part of McDougall’s memorandum, discussed in the preceding paragraph and 
summarised in telegram 2772 from Washington to FO, 17 June.
38 NAC, RG 25, Vol. 2261, 5050-B-40C, part i, Address of Welcome by Acheson, 15 July.
39 Hambidge, The Story of FAO, p. 52.
40 NAA, A2937, Post War Food, McDougall to Bruce, 22 July 1943.
A New Idea Each Morning
282
...the Interim Commission does not go well when I am away. There is no 
driving force and not too much knowledge. The staff is hard working 
but not competent and of the Commission only Pearson, Twentyman 
and Appleby are really competent and none of them devote much time 
to the work of the Commission. 
Its committees included ‘a lot of good experts’, but ‘they only see part of the 
picture’. ‘All the hard work [on the commission report] has been done by a 
drafting sub-committee aided by Cairns and a very good American, [Gove] 
Hambidge, both of whom were lent for this purpose.’41 The records show that 
Pearson and McDougall, with the Agent-General for India in Washington, Sir 
Girja Bajpai, the US representative, Appleby for the first year and then Howard 
Tolley, and Edward Twentyman of the United Kingdom, constituted an informal 
inner circle, exchanging and assessing ideas. When they agreed, as they usually 
did, a suggestion was likely to go ahead. McDougall had known and respected 
Bajpai since their days together on the IEC; Tolley found him ‘an especially good 
parliamentarian’, impressive in his chairmanship of committees at Hot Springs.42 
Twentyman, a senior Treasury official, was based at the British Food Mission in 
Washington. He was described as a ‘fearless’ and ‘dynamic’ administrator, of 
somewhat ‘unconventional’ dress and manner; ‘some of his best work was done 
fishing in troubled waters’.43 His death in an air accident while returning to 
Washington in March 1945 is a reminder of the discomforts and dangers faced 
by all who travelled constantly in the cause of the new world order.
Committee C
Decisions of the Interim Commission were taken by three committees; their 
scope was bounded by the Hot Springs resolutions. Committee A drafted the 
formal agreement by all participating nations to raise levels of nutrition, improve 
agricultural efficiency, cooperate with other nations and submit periodical 
reports on progress. Committee A’s work was largely complete by August 1943. 
Committee B devised the structure and constitution of FAO, dealing with some 
contentious issues, particularly concerning financial contributions. Committee 
C provided some assistance to Committee B, but its chief task was to prepare for 
the work of the new organisation, including initiation of preliminary statistical 
investigations and research. It did not commence serious work until late 1943 
when Committee B’s work was nearing completion. On the bones created by 
41 Ibid., M104, 12(4), McDougall to Bruce, 28 June 1943, 16 January 1944.
42 HLH, ‘Tolley’, p. 588.
43 The Times, obituary, 17 April 1945.
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B, C was to develop flesh. McDougall was well placed to influence the shape of 
the new organisation. Formally, he was a member of Committee C, but he also 
participated in the drafting subcommittee of Committee A.44
It seems to have been McDougall’s suggestion that the commission form two 
advisory panels of experts, on science and on economics, to assist with their 
planning. Bajpai subsequently agreed that each of these should be able to 
appoint subcommittees.45 This decision to form panels of technical advisers 
would set the pattern for the work of the commission throughout 1944. There 
was a sense of urgency in discussions by then; Interim Commission members 
expected the 20 acceptances necessary to form the new organisation well 
before the end of the year, after which it must begin work without delay. Late 
in 1943 McDougall had listed possible preparatory tasks to be undertaken by 
Committee C, from which the Commission Secretariat selected the three most 
urgent in January 1944. The first task was to represent the interests of food 
and agriculture at any UN conference: FAO must not be caught unprepared by 
a sudden summons to an international conference. The second was to enable 
the Director-General and the Council of FAO ‘to envisage the tasks confronting 
them and to determine on questions of relative urgency’; this preparation 
should begin with a general survey of the food and agriculture position in 
each country. The third task was to facilitate the work of FAO by measures 
such as establishing links with research and academic institutions, particularly 
with a view to drawing on their personnel. Committee C agreed on 2 February 
1944 that the most urgent of the three was preparation of conference papers. A 
joint committee of Committee C and the Commission Secretariat subsequently 
recommended preparation of memoranda for conferences on agricultural credit, 
commodity control, commercial policy, monetary stablisation, employment 
problems and transport. Committee C also recommended that commencement of 
country-by-country surveys begin immediately, as ‘functioning in vacuo could 
only lead to fumbling and delay, at a moment when delay might be fatal to the 
prospects of the organization’.46 Information, arranged both by countries and 
by subjects, should be prepared forthwith. The recommendation listed one and 
half pages of topics on which data might be collected.47 It was soon realised that 
commission funds and time would limit the studies to samples in a few countries 
to assist FAO in later planning.48
44 A copy of Committee A’s final draft, approved on 11 August 1943, is in NAA, A989, 43/735/740.
45 NAA, A2937, Post War Food, McDougall to Bruce, 2 August.
46 NAC, RG 25, Vol. 2261, File 5050-B-40C, part 2, C Doc 4, 2 February 1944.
47 Ibid., part 3, ‘Draft Report of Committee C to the Interim Commission’, n.d.
48 Ibid., part 4, ‘Ex. Min 26’, 28 April 1944; ‘Subcom. on Agric Prod, Min. 4’, 15 May.
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The Reviewing Panel
McDougall spent much of February and March 1944 in London as part of 
Australia’s delegation to meetings of British Commonwealth officials on 
international economic collaboration. Pearson cabled him that progress of 
deliberations was slower than he had wished, but the program of work adopted 
‘has been more or less as you outlined it’. McDougall’s ‘panel procedure [that 
is, the formation of subcommittees to the main panels] should…be applied at 
once’. By May four such panels—on forestry, fisheries, agricultural production 
and food management—were established. The secretariat ‘would not be in any 
way responsible for the nature or quality of their work’, but there would be 
a ‘Research Reviewing Committee (or some such name) through which these 
panels would report to Committee C. This will be an extremely important group.’ 
What came to be called the ‘Reviewing Panel’ was apparently Pearson’s idea and 
he went on to propose that McDougall chair it, adding ‘it really would be a key 
job on the Interim Commission from now on’.49
Pearson probably ascribed such importance to the Reviewing Panel because 
the experts would not be subjected to bureaucratic interference in making 
their recommendations for the new organisation. The Reviewing Panel, and 
its chair in particular, was to help them to understand what sort of guidance 
would be needed by an organisation unlike any that had existed previously.50 
Minutes of meetings between panels and the Reviewing Panel show how the 
system worked. The latter vetted and amended terms of reference. Should 
wood pulp come within FAO’s ambit? Should there be a statistical study for the 
years 1945 to 1950? Was there a need for panels on statistics and marketing?51 
It was necessary to explain a broader picture to scientists steeped in the 
minutiae of their own fields. McDougall dealt tactfully with the forestry panel’s 
unanimous desire for a separate deputy director-general for forestry.52 He asked 
the fisheries panel to provide ‘a general review of the place of fisheries in the 
world economy’, ranging through nutritive values, contributions of fisheries 
to world food supply, advances in processing and culture, undeveloped fishing 
areas, problems of organised fishery industries and non-commercial fisheries, 
and international collaboration in sustaining resources. The report should show 
how FAO could become ‘the central world organization to promote and foster 
fisheries and fishery industries’.53
49 Ibid., part 3, Pearson to McDougall, 4 March 1944.
50 See summary by Joint Committee Chairman, Haidari, in ibid., Part 5, Ex. Min. 27, 5 May 1944.
51 Ibid., Part 5, Rev. Pan. Min. 3, 12 May 1944.
52 Ibid., Part 7, Subcom. on Forestry, Min. 2, 26–28 June 1944.
53 Ibid., vol. 2263, part 9, Subcom. on Fisheries, Min. 2, 31 July 1944.
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The Reviewing Panel did more than provide guidance for expert committees. 
Its members mapped out the tasks and the philosophy of the organisation as 
a whole. In August 1944, they discussed preparation of their report to FAO’s 
founding conference. Although it was assumed that the final report of the Interim 
Commission would suggest action, McDougall warned against making formal 
recommendations, thereby inviting a charge of attempting to do the work of the 
conference, since the conference was to be the supreme policymaking body of 
the organisation. He approved preparation of a memorandum on the ‘economic 
setting’ since, under Hot Springs Resolution XXIV, the general report to FAO 
‘must be related to the economic setting’. Tolley went further: since purchasing 
power, an expanding economy and international cooperation were all factors 
determining food purchases, perhaps FAO should make recommendations to 
other agencies concerning industrial development, international trade and 
commodity arrangements. McDougall agreed that industrialisation would 
be necessary in some countries to achieve the Hot Springs goals, as was 
international cooperation. ‘Should not the FAO Conference, for example, make 
recommendations to governments concerning this need for industrialization?’ 
There was general agreement that it should.54
The panel discussed FAO’s role in relation to agricultural commodity 
arrangements. Wheeler asked: ‘If FAO is not to organize and activate commodity 
agreements, how is it to get its views expressed and acted upon by another 
body? How is it to see that national plans are properly coordinated?’ Tolley 
argued that Hot Springs resolutions obliged FAO to ensure international action 
either through another organisation or by organising international commodity 
agreements itself. McDougall predicted greater government intervention 
in agricultural production in the future. Without coordination of national 
programs, ‘the trend may become extremely nationalistic’. He proposed a 
statement explaining the need for coordination and recommending a conference 
to develop principles governing all commodity agreements. The panel agreed, 
Tolley emphasising in ensuing discussion the importance of seeing that ‘the right 
kind of agreements are drawn up’, particularly in regard to their contribution to 
agricultural reorientation.55
Constitutional Ambiguity
Some Interim Commission members wanted ‘a strong food and agriculture 
organization which could take positive steps to foster economic expansion 
and help prevent disastrous crises’; others wanted ‘a rather narrowly limited 
54 Ibid., Rev. Pan. Min. 7, 2 August 1944.
55 Ibid., 3 August 1944.
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fact-gathering and advisory agency…carefully insulated from positive action’. 
McDougall took an intermediate view, preferring an advisory body, dependent 
for influence on ‘its own efficiency and competence’, on the seriousness with 
which member nations took the obligation to report, and on arrangements 
for international investment. He wanted the organisation to have a say in 
international discussions on issues within FAO’s ambit, but believed there 
should be a separate international advisory body for commodity agreements. 
He told Twentyman at one point that FAO should not be ‘besmirched’ by having 
‘anything to do with the damned merchants’.56
In the view of one FAO officer, the constitution devised by the Interim 
Commission and approved by member states was a compromise between the 
strong active body and the advisory one. It was ‘more on the advisory than 
the action side but with the way open, constitutionally, to develop in whatever 
direction the member nations might find most useful’.57 The relevant paragraphs 
of Article I listed obligations to ‘collect, analyze, interpret, and disseminate 
information’ and to ‘promote and…recommend national and international 
action’ in relevant fields. But it was also to ‘furnish such technical assistance as 
governments may request’ and to ‘organize…such missions as may be needed 
to assist’ governments to fulfil obligations arising from acceptance of the Hot 
Springs recommendations, and ‘to take all necessary and appropriate action to 
implement the purposes of the Organization’.58
This constitutional ambiguity increased British anxiety. Whitehall was alarmed 
by the committee structures established by Committee C, by its ‘ginger group 
outlook’ and by its extension of activity into new fields. Twentyman was 
instructed to ‘remonstrate against the way Committee C is extending its functions 
to cover postwar economic problems’. Its tendency to tackle ‘outlying subjects’, 
albeit lying within its ambit, such as forestry, would stretch its limited resources 
and ‘wreck FAO’. They hoped the chosen Director-General would ‘develop the 
organisation along the lines we envisage, i.e. a fact-finding, educational and 
advisory body’.59
The Search for a Director-General
Members of the Interim Commission wanted the Director-General to be selected 
before the conference that would formally inaugurate FAO. McDougall’s first 
56 UKNA, FO371/35381, McDougall to Twentyman, 11 August 1943; FO371/35380, Twentyman, ‘IC 1, 
Interim Commission on Food and Agriculture: Commodity Arrangements’, 23 July 1943.
57 Hambidge, The Story of FAO, p. 53.
58 NAA, A989 44/735/743, text of Australian Bill to approve constitution of FAO, read 19 September, 
enacted November 1944.
59 UKNA, BT11/2375, FO to Washington, 7 and 14 May 1944.
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choice as director-general, approved by Lester Pearson, was Henry Wallace. As 
it was not yet clear whether Roosevelt would select Wallace as his fourth-term 
running mate, other options were needed. McDougall thought Bruce would be 
‘splendid’, but preferred him for a bigger job—perhaps chairing the ‘Overall 
Economic and Social Council’. Orr might be possible, although ‘Whitehall would 
be difficult’. Bruce saw that Wallace ‘might be regarded by some as a starry-
eyed dreamer’, an opinion likely to be fostered by ‘the reactionary elements 
in America’. He was dubious about Orr, and agreed that he himself ‘might be 
able to do more useful work in other directions’. McDougall then suggested 
Bruce take the job ‘to give the organisation a flying start’, before moving to ‘the 
more central office’. McDougall tossed in several other names without much 
enthusiasm, but rejected suggestions by some delegates that he be a candidate 
himself: ‘I have warmly repudiated the idea stressing the need for a big man 
with both a name and abilities.’ He would be interested in the deputy job if 
Wallace were chosen, but if it fell to Bruce, the deputy could not be Australian, 
and he would settle for a personal assistant position.60
The British Government opposed Wallace, carefully avoiding naming him in 
messages to the embassy in Washington warning against ‘the appointment of an 
eminent US agrarian mystic’ or ‘a political crusader, especially one connected 
with US agrarian politics’.61 They urged the State Department that a director-
general should be chosen for administrative and scientific abilities rather than 
‘general public eminence’.62 As with the Interim Commission, they preferred 
a dominion candidate, but remained fearful that Australia would nominate 
McDougall. The British Embassy in Washington reported that Pearson, not 
interested himself, suggested McDougall ‘ought to get a senior post in the 
organisation’ and could not suggest anyone else outside Britain and the United 
States.63
In fact McDougall’s views, particularly on the contentious issue of commodity 
control, had proved to be moderate and acceptable to British representatives 
in Washington. Enclosing a letter from McDougall setting out his views on 
the commission, Twentyman acknowledged him as one of the key members of 
the commission, and reported his own view that ‘whatever may be said about 
M’s general proclivities [he was] fairly sensible and sound…my own present 
inclination is to temper my natural caution towards him with a goodly measure of 
appreciation of him as a genuine supporter of our own objectives’.64 Twentyman 
told McDougall frankly of British concerns, and that he had warned Appleby 
60 NAA, M104, 12(4), McDougall to Bruce, 1 and 28 June; Bruce to McDougall, 17 June 1944.
61 UKNA, BT11/92, minute H. J. Habakkuk, 20 May; BT11/2375, FO to Washington, 13 May 1944.
62 Ibid., minute, Habakkuk, 2 May 1944; USNA, 550.AD1, Interim Commission/5, memorandum of 
conversation, Stinebower and Gore-Booth, 19 May 1944.
63 UKNA, BT11/2375, Snelling, DO, to Coulson, FO, 2 June 1944; Holmes to DO, 17 May 1944.
64 Ibid., FO371/35381, Twentyman to W. J. Hasler, 12 August; McDougall to Twentyman, 11 August 1943.
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against making McDougall chair of an important committee, as it ‘might cause 
some U.K. folk to think that the Commission was being dominated by extremists’. 
McDougall replied that he did not wish to chair a committee.65 The British did 
not realise that McDougall was probably as unacceptable to Canberra as he was to 
Whitehall. Just as senior British representatives in Washington found him more 
reasonable than did their masters in London, Australian representatives like 
Coombs formed more favourable views than those at home. J. F. Murphy, then 
Controller-General of Food, believed that ‘for various reasons Mr McDougall 
would have little influence with his Minister or with the Australian Food 
Council’.66
The New Organisation 
Disappointing many expectations, FAO was not established in 1944. A chief 
reason was the US political process in a presidential election year with an 
increasingly obstructive Congress. The United States did not formally accept 
FAO’s Constitution until after the election in November. In the meantime, 
the Bretton Woods Conference in July 1944 had set in train the formation of 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The war in Europe took a little longer than 
expected to end, but then the Pacific war ended abruptly only three months 
later. That ending brought with it devastation previously unimagined. At the 
Quebec conference inaugurating FAO in October 1945, the US delegate spoke 
of two scientific facts that made it ‘impossible for us to go on taking hunger for 
granted’. First, the atomic bomb had shown ‘that we must not have another war. 
And that means we must not permit the pangs of hunger to bring about those 
basic fears and greed which result in war.’ Second, science and technology now 
made hunger unnecessary. Another shadow over the conference warned that 
wartime cooperation was waning. Members of the USSR delegation participated 
fully in the conference, as they had done at Hot Springs, and in the Interim 
Commission. But days passed without their signature to the Constitution; they 
were finally forced to report that they had been instructed not to sign. The 
USSR did not become a member.67 The postwar world was already divided.
Efforts before the conference to find a director-general had failed, though some 
17 names had been canvassed.68 Orr had been persuaded—much against his 
65 NAA, A2937, Post War Food, McDougall to Bruce, 17 July 1943.
66 NAA/CSIR, series 3, PH/McD/54, Richardson to Rivett, 18 February 1944.
67 HLH, ‘Tolley’, pp. 619–24.
68 Amy L. S. Staples, The Birth of Development: How the World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization, 
and World Health Organization Changed the World, 1945–1965, Kent State University Press, Kent, Ohio, 2006, 
p. 80.
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wishes—to go to Quebec as an ‘unofficial’ member of the British delegation. On 
the journey across the Atlantic, he told other members of ‘the futility of the 
kind of organisation it was proposed to set up’; he spent much of his time in 
Quebec as a tourist and renewing scientific friendships. He was persuaded by 
some delegates to address the conference, and in a stirring speech urged them 
to reject the recommended constitution. There was no need for more science to 
show that the world had insufficient food for health. They should seek to give 
the organisation ‘funds and authority to enable [it] to promote the production 
and better distribution of some of the main foodstuffs as the beginning of a 
world policy’. Although the proposed constitution was accepted, Orr, reluctant 
still, agreed to take on the director-generalship: 
I decided to have a shot at putting the organisation on the right lines, 
and if I failed, as seemed to me likely, to retire with honour satisfied. So 
I accepted, but only for two years, which seemed long enough to get the 
organisation established with executive powers if governments could be 
persuaded to agree, and too long if that should prove impossible. 
He began work ‘in a gloomy and grim mood’.69
Figure 18 FAO Director-General, John Boyd Orr (centre), with Special 
Advisers F. L. McDougall (left) and S. L. Louwes (right). 
Source: E. McDougall. 
69 Orr, As I Recall, pp. 161–5.
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Orr immediately appointed two ‘special advisers’: S. L. Louwes, Netherlands 
Director-General of Food, and McDougall. Orr’s first intention had been to 
appoint McDougall as Deputy Director-General, but the executive felt that 
another ‘Anglo-Saxon’ should not be appointed without two more deputies of 
other nationalities. It was not, McDougall later wrote, ‘very satisfactory from a 
personal point of view’. It was at first a temporary secondment, but a year later 
became a five-year appointment as ‘Counselor’—effectively ‘the second person 
in the organisation’ who would act for the Director-General in his absence. As 
an international civil servant, McDougall then resigned from all other positions 
held on behalf of Australia, and even from a personal appointment to the Court 
of Governors of the London School of Economics.70 FAO became his life from 
then on.
FAO had a budget for its first year of US$2.5 million, and $5 million per annum 
thereafter. Orr adopted what McDougall described as a ‘rod and line’ approach 
to staffing, rather than the ‘dragnet’ employed by the new United Nations 
Organisation (UN), which by late 1946 had almost 3000 staff, treble that of the 
League of Nations. FAO, in contrast, had 160 by then, of an expected total of six 
hundred. For some time they occupied the premises of the Interim Commission, 
gradually spreading to several other buildings in Washington. FAO’s permanent 
site was expected to be close to UN Headquarters somewhere in the United 
States.
World Food Crisis
In February 1946 the nucleus organisation faced a crisis. Crops had failed 
in Europe and in Asia; US production was not increasing to meet the need; 
machinery, fertilisers and transport were inadequate and world population 
was rising rapidly. The UN General Assembly, meeting in London, called for 
immediate action to meet a worldwide shortage of food. Orr responded by 
offering to take responsibility ‘for mobilizing world resources’, beginning 
with a conference on ‘Urgent Food Problems’ in May.71 McDougall set out six 
activities needed for effective action. Three fell within FAO’s constitutional 
ambit: continuous review and assessment of trends; calculation of the amount 
of basic foods needed by all countries; and agricultural rehabilitation of 
war-devastated and underdeveloped countries. Constitutional amendments 
would be needed to allow the remaining three: allocation of supplies on an 
equitable basis; centralised purchasing to prevent inflationary purchasing and 
as a reserve; and funding or credit arrangements to allow relief on a business, 
70 NAA, A1067, ER46/4/8, McDougall to Dunk, 8 July; McDougall to V. C. Duffy, 19 November 1946.
71 Staples, Birth of Development, p. 84; NAA, A1067, 46/4/3, UN delegation to EA, 14 February 1946.
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rather than a charitable, basis. McDougall thought these should be given to 
‘an executive body’, established under the general supervision of the Economic 
and Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC), which should itself include 
representatives of relevant agencies.72
There were other multinational bodies with responsibility for food supply. 
The Combined Food Board (CFB) run by the United States, Britain and Canada 
allocated supplies during the war through a series of commodity committees, but 
was due to be dissolved in June 1946. The UN Relief and Rehabilitation Agency 
(UNRRA) and the Food Committee of the Emergency Economic Committee for 
Europe dealt with the aftermath of war and were expected to be short-lived. 
In his invitation to the May conference, Orr predicted a need for ‘international 
action on an agreed plan’ for four or five years.73 He feared supply would be slow 
to return to normal, and that the bogey of unmarketable surplus would hinder 
efforts to increase production. Means must be found to enable the functions 
of the temporary organisations to continue while needed. The Conference on 
Urgent Food Problems agreed that the CFB should remain until December, and 
an International Emergency Food Council (IEFC)—established, staffed and 
financed by FAO—should then have power to recommend production increases 
and direct supplies to areas of most need.
This seemed to solve the problem posed by FAO’s ambiguous constitution. But 
economist J. B. Brigden, then Financial Counsellor at the Australian Legation 
in Washington, had misgivings. The IEFC was more cumbersome than the CFB 
and was unlikely to prove any better; a failure would reflect on FAO: ‘those 
nationals who are concerned for the welfare of FAO have been trying…to protect 
it against such risks, but FAO has chosen to take them.’74 Brigden also criticised 
the conference itself. Preparation had been ‘negligible’ and the conference had 
to be saved by other organisations. ‘I do not expect the FAO Secretariat to cope 
with all the ambitious objectives which Sir John Orr and our Mr McDougall 
feel to be within their scope.’ Difficulties and the slow pace of recruitment were 
understandable, but ‘FAO is too apt to undertake work which it cannot do’. 
There had been sufficient goodwill to excuse its failure to foresee the difficulties, 
but its principals had ‘no very clear ideas about the limits of their functions’. 
He added that FAO was ‘only one of a large number of international bodies now 
trying to get their bearings’, and he hoped that the UN Assembly, through 
ECOSOC, ‘would be able to sort out the appropriate functions for each…[but] 
72 FAO, 3.1, C1, note for Director-General, ‘The World Food Policy’, 13 May 1946.
73 NAA, A1067, ER46/4/14, Text of invitation, 3 May 1946.
74 W. J. Hudson and Wendy Way, eds, Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937–1949. Volume IX: 
January–June 1946, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1991, 277, ‘The International 
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the task of the co-ordinating body is extremely onerous’.75 The IEFC remained 
in being for some three years, allocating exportable surpluses according to need; 
Orr for one believed that it had saved millions of lives.76
The World Food Board
Encouraged by its establishment of the IEFC, FAO sought to gain the executive 
powers it lacked for a long-term attack on hunger. Its own figures suggested a rate 
of population increase in the following 20 years requiring a doubling of world 
food production. This information was circulated to member governments along 
with an invitation to a conference in Copenhagen in September 1946 to consider 
a plan for a World Food Board (WFB). The board would provide long-term credit 
to food-deficient countries to enable purchases of food and industrial products 
to modernise their own agriculture. It would have authority to buy and hold 
stocks of surplus food from exporters, for distribution in time of need and also 
to help stabilise prices, thereby encouraging greater production in advanced 
countries. All this would increase world trade and, as Orr later put it, ‘be an 
important step to the evolution of the United Nations Organisation as a World 
Government without which there is little hope of permanent world peace’.77
The plan alarmed the United States and Britain. The United States disapproved 
in principle of proposals ‘inimical’ to US international trade policy. Will 
Clayton, US Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, tried to persuade Orr 
to withdraw it, arguing that the regime of the International Trade Organization 
(ITO), whose charter and powers were then under discussion at a series of 
multilateral meetings, would foster an increase in trade, in line with the 
Department of State’s longstanding policy.78 Orr refused: the ITO would regard 
trade as an end in itself; food was vital and demanded special treatment.79 
While the Department of Agriculture saw the plan more favourably—it was 
perhaps an ‘ever-normal granary’ on an international scale—the department no 
longer influenced policy and the US delegate, Norris E. Dodd, was instructed 
to acknowledge the problem and to propose that a committee report on an 
alternative.80
The British Government had ‘serious doubts’. The plan was costly and likely to 
increase import prices, worsening Britain’s budget difficulties. As in Washington, 
75 NAA, A1067, ER46/4/14, ‘FAO and IEFC’, J. B. Brigden, 28 May 1946.
76 Orr, As I Recall, p. 170.
77 Ibid., pp. 170–2. See also Staples, Birth of Development, p. 86.
78 NAA, A1067, ER46/4/16, US Legation Canberra to External Affairs, 12 August 1946; Staples, Birth of 
Development, p. 88.
79 Orr, As I Recall, p. 173.
80 NAA, A1067, ER46/4/16, Washington Legation to EA, 9 August; US Legation to EA, 12 August 1946.
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the Ministry of Agriculture found some merit in proposals to stabilise prices, 
but failed to persuade Cabinet.81 There was a danger that the programs of FAO 
would overlap functions of the ITO; the British delegate would be instructed 
that solutions to the problem of world food supply went beyond the scope of 
FAO and should be dealt with by ECOSOC. The problem was serious: Britain had 
been mobilising imperial resources, holding a conference in Singapore earlier 
in the year and urging Commonwealth producers like Australia to increase 
production and withhold domestic consumption. But Britain would support the 
US proposal to seek alternatives to Orr’s plan at Copenhagen.82
Australian economic advisers differed in their views on the WFB proposals. 
Coombs generally favoured its formation. He hoped it would speed up 
international negotiations on commodity arrangements, which were important 
to Australia, but acknowledged that the plan presented ‘the most contentious 
and complex problems that FAO has undertaken to solve’. He identified an 
unstated assumption underlying the plan, that ‘western civilization must 
demonstrate to the world…its capacity for organising in the interests of 
world needs. Failure is to invite political and economic policies which may 
be distasteful to some of the Powers.’ J. G. Crawford was a member of FAO’s 
independent Standing Committee on Economics and Marketing, which had 
endorsed the WFB aims of raising productivity in agriculture, increasing food 
consumption of malnourished peoples and eliminating large price fluctuations 
in agricultural products. Crawford acknowledged the relevance of the plan to 
Australian policy, but worried that possible contributions of foodstuffs from 
‘exporting countries outside commercial markets must be small in relation to the 
total problem’, with a danger that disillusion would follow. He also warned that 
a suggestion of special prices to meet crisis situations ‘raised important issues 
likely to prove thorny in Washington’. Both Crawford and Coombs approved 
of the idea that raising health and nutrition standards involved economic 
policies ‘designed to promote higher levels of income and employment, which 
effectively means industrialization’, neatly fitting the Australian positive 
approach.83 But Australian views counted for little when delegates met in 
Copenhagen in September. All ‘appeared’ to support the WFB, but insisted on 
considering alternatives, preferably in collaboration with other organisations 
such as ECOSOC and the preparatory commission for the ITO.84
81 Staples, Birth of Development, p. 89.
82 NAA, A1067, ER46/4/16, Cable D786, 21 August 1946.
83 Ibid., M448, 72[2], Coombs to McDougall, 21 October; ‘Proposals for a World Food Board’, notes of 
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84 Ibid., A1067, ER46/4/16, Bulcock to Dept of Commerce, 5287, 9 September 1946.
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The WFB Preparatory Commission
A committee duly recommended formation of a WFB Preparatory Commission 
to consider Orr’s proposal ‘and any other relevant proposals’.85 Australia’s 
delegate to the commission, F. W. Bulcock, warned that in the final analysis the 
work would be ‘largely political’.86 The task of guiding that work fell to Bruce. 
As High Commissioner, he had been unable to participate firsthand in the 
events leading to the formation of FAO. When his London appointment ended 
in October 1945, he returned to Australia for the southern summer. He may 
have considered resuming an active part in Australian conservative politics; 
certainly he was not prepared to predict when he would return to London, 
and his refusal of a peerage offered in 1945 may have been to allow for that 
possibility. No such opportunity was presented to him, however, and he was 
back in London by mid 1946. In 1945 Bruce had probably expected to be offered 
a significant international appointment, perhaps heading ECOSOC, but now 
such hopes were fading. Perhaps he was considered too old. He had been in 
the forefront of Australian, imperial and international politics for nearly three 
decades; it could well have seemed that he was older than his sixty-three years. 
Considering possible candidates for UN Secretary-General, Adlai Stevenson 
and Gladwyn Jebb suggested ‘an Australian as good as Bruce but twenty years 
younger’. Bruce was therefore available to continue his work for social justice 
as Chair of the Preparatory Commission. Following Bruce’s appointment, Attlee 
again offered him a peerage, arguing that it would strengthen his hand in any 
international post. This time, Bruce accepted. As Lord Bruce of Melbourne, 
he was to make good use of the House of Lords as a forum for advocating his 
international goals.87
The announcement of Bruce’s appointment to the commission referred to his 
work in 1935 and on other League of Nations inquiries. Now, in a context of 
new consensus on the need for expansion of consumption, the three architects 
of the nutrition initiative were working together in an organisation which they 
hoped would bring that vision into being. Orr’s proposals, argued Bruce, did 
not exceed the primary tasks of FAO, nor did they mean a new superstructure. 
They simply showed the ‘necessity of greater co-operation between existing 
bodies’ and possible creation of ‘some parallel bodies in the future’. Optimism 
was nevertheless tempered by Bruce’s political sense. He feared that it might be 
impossible to realise proposals for stabilisation and made rough notes of answers 
to the argument that a drive for greater production would lead to surplus, 
85 Ibid., FAO Conference, Report of Commission C, 12 September 1946.
86 W. J. Hudson and Wendy Way, eds, Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937–1949. Volume X: July–
December 1946, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1993, 116, Bulcock to Commerce, 13 
September 1946.
87 Cumpston, Lord Bruce, pp. 246, 249.
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thereby renewing the swings from falling prices to reduced production, then 
to rising prices and surplus again. He concluded it would be safer not to give 
stabilisation too much prominence: prevention of starvation in times of famine 
should be at the forefront of arguments in favour of Orr’s plan.88
Figure 19 Lord Bruce and F. L. McDougall at FAO.
Source: E. McDougall.
After five weeks’ work, Bruce stated that his commission was examining three 
proposals to meet the food crisis: British and American suggestions for programs 
centred on individual commodities, and Orr’s WFB. The commission had been 
‘struck most forcibly’ by the need for ‘a co-ordinating authority with respect 
to all commodity agreements’.89 He worked hard himself, chairing committees 
on Development and Food Programs and on Price Stabilization and Commodity 
Policy, as well as chairing some working groups, because ‘he found himself so 
intensely interested in the subject and desired to get a grasp of all its aspects’.90 
In his statement to the commission’s final plenary session, Bruce drew a parallel 
between the world in 1920 and the world in 1947. He predicted that lack of 
88 NAA, M104, 14(1), press statement, 8 October; ‘Opening Remarks of Rt Hon. S. M. Bruce’, 28 October 
1946; handwritten notes, ‘World Food Board’, n.d.
89 Ibid., Address to 60th Annual Meeting of Land-Grant Colleges and Universities, 17 December 1946. Text 
of full WFB proposals is in NAA, M104, 14(2).
90 FAO, 3.1, A3, McDougall to Philip Noel-Baker, 18 December 1946.
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sufficient purchasing power to absorb the output of increased production 
capacity resulting from war would mean mass unemployment, economic 
uncertainty and social unrest. Achievement of that purchasing power required 
international goodwill and cooperation. His commission recommended an 
annual review to ensure that national agricultural programs would fit into a 
global food production plan, and a review of national programs; these measures 
could create in FAO ‘a world parliament of food’. The commission also called 
for development of industry and of the latent resources of less-developed 
countries, and it urged cooperation with other specialised agencies. Bruce spoke 
in similar vein a few months later in his maiden speech in the House of Lords: 
‘Almost every thinking person is now in favour of expansion of production and 
consumption.’91 It was a far cry from the nuts and bolts of Orr’s WFB.
Bruce had made the best of an impossible situation. He was not, argues David 
Lee, ‘compromising his internationalist principles but rather using his skills 
as a facilitator to salvage as much as he could of the original plan’.92 The WFB 
proposals could not withstand the concerted opposition of the two most 
influential members of FAO. Orr stuck to his ideals and left FAO a disappointed 
man in 1948. In the following year, he was created Baron Boyd Orr, made a 
commander of the Légion d’Honneur and awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Like 
Bruce, he used the House of Lords to continue his campaign to feed the hungry.
Orr’s ‘world view, grounded in science and internationalism’, had lost to US and 
British national security policies ‘based on alliances, atomic weapons, unilateral 
international action, large peacetime militaries and a system of managed trade’. 
But it has been argued that the ‘counterhegemonic force’, which FAO with its 
broad membership represented, could not be ignored entirely, and that it was 
able to ‘focus global attention on some of the shortcomings of the emerging 
world system’.93 The Cold War could not quite extinguish the flame lit in Geneva 
in 1935.
FAO after Orr
FAO did change. Its supreme policymaking body was, and remains, its conference, 
reduced from an annual to a biennial event after the organisation moved to Rome 
in 1951. In its first years, the organisation was directed between conferences 
by an independent executive, but in 1948 the conference bowed to pressure 
and accepted that the World Food Council (WFC), the toothless organisation 
91 NAA, M104, 14(1), statement by Bruce at Final Plenary Session, 24 January; summary of speech on WFB 
Proposals, House of Lords, 13 May 1947.
92 Lee, Stanley Melbourne Bruce, p. 177.
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created instead of the WFB, should also replace the executive. Membership 
of the council was elected on a national basis, each member country having 
a power of veto, though its chairman remained independent. Bruce served as 
its first chairman, from 1947 to 1951. He admitted the WFC lacked power, but 
argued that it possessed ‘powerful moral sanctions’: FAO’s independent experts 
would ‘confront the world as well as the governments with facts. Governments 
can’t evade these things any more than they can evade the measures to meet 
these facts.’94 But the independent experts were now subjected to a further layer 
of national control.
Figure 20 F. L. McDougall and John Boyd Orr.
Source: E. McDougall.
As FAO moved to take over the functions of the relief organisation IEFC, 
reports were dire. The Indian harvest had deteriorated and the rice supply was 
precarious. Europe was 9 million tons short of the ‘semi-starvation rations’ 
of grain distributed in the previous winter; the maize crop had failed and 
drought had deprived European farmers of fodder. The WFC considered a need 
for legislative powers. ‘We can’t invent food which doesn’t exist but what we 
can do is to see that the supplies which are available are fairly distributed.’ 
Bruce’s long-term aims—never fully realised—remained the maximising of food 
production by ensuring fair prices all round, and storage of famine reserves.95
FAO itself was attracting criticism. Crawford wrote that ‘FAO badly needs some 
leadership…Orr has launched FAO and his task is done. McDougall is a good 
ideas man but no administrator.’96 The organisation lacked a good administrator 
94 Ibid., p. 94; NAA, M104, 14(1), Bruce in interview with Richie Calder, 19 September 1947.
95 Ibid.
96 NAA, M444 [307], Crawford to Coombs, 2 August 1947.
A New Idea Each Morning
298
at the top, and coordination between its divisions was inadequate. ‘If the new 
DG is not a capable administrator, he must secure a deputy who is.’97 Perhaps 
Orr and McDougall recognised their own failings in this regard. After the 1947 
conference, Orr decided to appoint ‘one first-class Deputy Director-General’, 
with McDougall designated ‘Counselor’ at the same level. In this scheme, 
the Director-General would deal with member governments and large policy 
questions and attempt to bring together all the specialised agencies to collaborate 
effectively under ECOSOC. His deputy would be responsible for machinery, 
personnel and administration, while McDougall would provide advice on policy 
and relations with international organisations.98
Orr undertook to remain at FAO until a successor could be found. The search 
again proved difficult. There were many jobs for able candidates in the growing 
international community and such candidates could not easily be spared by 
nations recovering from war. Many suggestions were made and many feelers put 
out. McDougall thought Coombs would be excellent, but Coombs recognised 
his own lack of appropriate expertise and preferred to remain in Australia.99 
Lester Pearson chose Ottawa, and recommended Bruce.100 Bruce sounded out 
Casey, who also declined. McDougall did not favour his fellow Special Adviser, 
Louwes, and was himself thought to be unacceptable to the British and 
Americans, who might have been prepared to accept Bruce; both would prefer 
someone younger.101 Apparently there were no suitable young candidates. At US 
instigation, a special session of the Conference in April 1948 appointed Norris 
E. Dodd, then US Under Secretary of Agriculture, with a long background in 
the Agricultural Adjustment Administration.102 Dodd, aged sixty-eight, was 
almost four years older than Bruce, and was to occupy the position until early 
1954. W. Noble Clark was seconded from the University of Wisconsin to the 
position of Deputy Director-General for the first half of 1948, bridging the gap 
between Orr’s departure in April and the arrival of the new Director-General 
in June. Dodd’s deputy was Sir Herbert Broadley, a widely experienced British 
civil servant who had been Secretary to the IEC for its first two years. Broadley 
remained at FAO until mid 1958.
Dodd instituted a change of direction, welcomed by the great powers, but 
disappointing at least some of the staff. One of those disappointed was Howard 
Tolley, a former head of the US Bureau of Agricultural Economics, who was FAO’s 
Director of Economics and Marketing and Vice-Chairman of FAO’s Executive 
Committee.103 Tolley respected Dodd as an able administrator, but later recalled 
97 Ibid., A1068, ER47/4/6, Crawford to Bulcock, 14 August 1947.
98 NAC, MG 26 N1, Vol. 62, McDougall to Pearson, 30 June 1947.
99 NAA, M448 [307], McDougall to Coombs, 15 July; Coombs to Crawford, 26 August 1947.
100 NAC, MG 26 N1, Vol. 62, Pearson to McDougall, 30 June 1947.
101 NAA, A1068, ER47/4/6, Washington Embassy to EA, 10 July 1947.
102 HLH, ‘Tolley’, pp. 656–60.
103 FAO, 3.1, A3, McDougall to Bruce, 1 October 1946.
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that old enmities within the Department of Agriculture resurfaced at FAO. Some 
staff, including Tolley, were not retained, others were sidelined while yet others 
abandoned idealism to become ‘petty bureaucrats’. Even ‘McDougall with all of 
his zeal, is hanging on today…though he has been shunted clear aside and isn’t 
in position to make any significant contribution whatever’.104
There is no evidence that McDougall felt this way. His position, as determined 
by Orr, remained unchanged until 1955 when he was forced by ill health to 
retire, and became a part-time ‘consultant’. Until then he continued a busy 
schedule of travel between the United States and Europe, attending meetings 
of ECOSOC and other bodies under the UN umbrella. By the time FAO moved 
to Rome in 1951, the postwar food emergency had passed and the Marshall 
Plan had been implemented in Europe. The focus of FAO’s work under Dodd 
moved to technical assistance to farmers in the undeveloped world, statistical 
intelligence and ‘limited proposals’ for disposal of surpluses. The organisation, 
constrained by a tight budget of $5 million per annum, concentrated on 
‘small practical steps toward increased agricultural production and freedom 
from hunger’. Dodd was creating ‘an international department of agriculture, 
overseeing a global agricultural revolution comparable to that in the United 
States overseen by the US Department of Agriculture’.105 This was not Orr’s 
grand plan, but it accorded with much of McDougall’s thinking. His views on 
the importance of technical assistance and statistical services, formed long ago 
in Renmark, persisted. During 1947, before Orr’s departure, McDougall had 
argued that problems of development and of improving the economic and social 
status of rural populations were ‘peculiarly ours’, even more than those of food 
supply and insurance against surplus; they were also important in providing 
markets for the developed world, as he explained in ‘The Challenge to Western 
Civilization’.106
‘The Challenge to Western Civilization’
McDougall’s last significant memorandum, with the above title, written 
in March 1947, makes an argument similar to those he had made in the late 
1930s, but with a Cold War perspective. ‘The faith of the world in Western 
democracy has been shaken’ by the economic failures and restrictions of the 
1930s. The West has emerged victorious from the war, but with diminished 
prestige. A ‘rival system [is] challenging our whole concept of a civilization 
based upon the liberty of the individual’. The ‘basic dilemma’ is that since 1918 
the Western economy works at full capacity only in war: ‘the economic problem 
104 HLH, ‘Tolley’, pp. 694–5.
105 Staples, Birth of Development, pp. 96–7.
106 FAO, 3.1, C1, McDougall to Director-General, 9 June 1947.
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of the peace is to find a constructive alternative to the total-war economy of 
organized waste.’ Populations suffering poverty, malnutrition and reduced life 
expectancy must be convinced that the system of Western democracy is able 
and willing to help them improve their standards of living. Urgent development 
must extend beyond improvements in agriculture to industry, transport and 
education, and must be undertaken by international action. ‘International 
sponsorship’ of development is essential. Countries with growing national 
consciousness are reluctant to depend upon ‘any one great nation, since this 
causes fears of economic domination’. With modern communications, ‘poverty-
stricken countries know more than ever before about how the well-to-do live…
Misery has never been the basis of a stable civilization, but, because it has 
become so much more conscious, its danger has been increased a hundredfold.’ 
Added to the political argument is an economic one, an international version 
of McDougall’s complementary sheltered markets theory: underdeveloped 
countries need goods of every description; developed economies need markets.
McDougall was disappointed that the WFB Preparatory Commission had given 
insufficient emphasis to ‘the enormous importance of the development aspects’. 
He wanted FAO to bridge the hiatus between a developing country’s receipt of 
technical advice and the securing of a major loan from the IBRD by providing 
small funds to enable preliminary surveys and other preparatory work, but he 
found that major countries could not accept that such funds were needed. He 
also wanted coordinated attacks on problems of food, agriculture, transport, 
health and education. In particular, he stressed the importance of developing 
industry, disputing a view that it should be the responsibility of the ITO, since 
that organisation was likely to be largely concerned with trade and ‘traders are 
the very worst people in the world for the development of industrialisation that 
competes…with existing interests’.107
Throughout the memorandum there is a tone of urgency. Western civilisation 
itself ‘depends on how far in the next five to the outside ten years we succeed 
in convincing the underdeveloped countries that they can obtain the help and 
assistance they require from countries with our type of institutions’.108 That 
sense of urgency was fuelled by the growing political divide. On 12 March 1947, 
US President Harry S. Truman enunciated his ‘Truman Doctrine’, signalling 
the Cold War strategy of containment of Communism. The opportunity for full 
international cooperation had passed. With some prescience, McDougall wrote 
that ‘in the political battle the development of backward countries will play 
an increasingly important part’. He went on to suggest development of ‘new 
centres of economic power’, which could counteract the division of the world 
107 NAA, A1068, ER47/4/18, ‘The Challenge to Western Civilization’, 24 March 1947.
108 FAO, 3.1, A.3, McDougall to Coombs, 28 February 1947.
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into opposing blocs.109 He urged a joint effort from FAO, the IBRD and perhaps 
the United States in development projects. FAO could provide the technical 
backing that the bank would need. A development drive might be based on 
‘individually small but practical projects spread over many underdeveloped 
countries’. Such a scheme could provide ‘a focus for replanning FAO’s work as 
a whole’.110 Here McDougall seems to have been charting the course to be taken 
by FAO under Dodd’s leadership.
Cooperation with International Agencies
‘The one thing which these [international] organisations cannot do is to 
“ensure”.’111 This statement was particularly true of FAO, limited by its small 
budget and constitution, and by the influence of the dominant powers. For all 
the new bodies, demarcation of responsibilities and cooperation with other 
organisations involved tedious and complicated negotiations over legal minutiae, 
as well as political savvy and influence. It was probably McDougall’s most time-
consuming task in the post–Orr era, and it was one for which his aptitude and 
tolerance had been demonstrated in previous decades. Each agency negotiated, 
clause by clause, a formal agreement with the United Nations itself, but practical 
problems of cooperation remained. A belief persisted that specialised agencies 
were subject to problems of overlapping, a view disputed by McDougall, who 
declared that all were ‘so conscious of the limitations of finance and personnel 
as to be strictly on guard against duplication’. Outsiders might confuse common 
fields of interest with common work programs. In rural welfare, for example, 
there were too few people actually at work and there was ‘closest consultation 
in regard to program preparation’.112 FAO was happy to see most of the work in 
many fields undertaken by others, and should concentrate on welfare matters 
within its own province: nutrition, soil conservation and agricultural extension. 
But there must be consultation: ‘I cannot too strongly emphasise that…some 
preliminary discussion should occur with the Specialised Agencies concerned 
before…even an informal commitment’, he wrote after the United Nations had 
organised missions by the specialised agencies to Latin America in which FAO 
could not afford to participate without extra funding.113
A contentious question for FAO in the early years was that of population. 
McDougall used the old phrase ‘intolerable pessimism’ for a view that sufficient 
food could not be produced unless population growth was limited. He objected 
109 CSIR, 379, 22/16, McDougall to Clunies Ross, 31 March 1947.
110 FAO, 3.1, C1, ‘Note for Director General’, 14 November 1947.
111 Ibid., 3.1, B3, Leroy D. Stinebower, State Department, to McDougall, 21 June 1948.
112 Ibid., 3.1, A2, McDougall to Alger Hiss, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 7 June 1948.
113 Ibid., 3.1, A2, McDougall to Mrs Alva Myrdal, UN Department of Social Affairs, 15 November 1949.
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to a proposed UNESCO publication including views of this nature: FAO should 
have been consulted first; an underlying assumption about the amount of land 
required was wrong; and ‘concentration of attention upon population control 
would be dangerous and highly unsuitable for an international organization’. 
And he argued vigorously to ensure that FAO was involved in IBRD consideration 
of questions relating to food and development.114 He could not entirely 
withstand a more general sense of pessimism: ‘the deterioration of the political 
situation [Communists had just seized power in Czechoslovakia, and tensions 
were mounting over Berlin] is proceeding with quite horrible rapidity and it is 
difficult to get forebodings out of one’s mind. Can mankind find a sufficiently 
intelligent way of avoiding his own destruction?’115 But about FAO his optimism 
prevailed. He noted, after FAO’s move to Rome, that while there was still less 
food per capita than in prewar years, there was greater knowledge about ways to 
increase productivity. Small things, such as a change from sickles to scythes in 
Afghanistan, and vaccination of cattle against rinderpest, could achieve much. 
The most urgent task of all international social and economic problems, perhaps, 
was to teach farm families, who represented half the world’s population. That 
action could be taken immediately and could achieve ‘spectacular results’.116
Figure 21 F. L. McDougall, Counselor, FAO. 
Source: E. McDougall. 
114 Ibid., 3.1, A6, McDougall to Dodd, 10 and 18 November 1948.
115 Ibid., 3.1, A1, McDougall to Alan Ritchie, 12 March 1948.
116 Ibid., 3.1, A4, draft article for Pax et Libertas, journal of Women’s International League for Peace and 
Freedom, 22 November 1951.
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Afterword
At an ECOSOC meeting in Geneva in 1955, McDougall suffered a stroke. After 
some months of rehabilitation, his secretary wrote of a ‘miraculous recovery’, 
though his movements were slower, he tired easily and he ‘has lost some of 
his spark’. He retired officially at the end of that year, aged seventy-one.1 
He remained in Rome, living in a set of rooms in the apartment of a younger 
colleague, Karl Olsen. He attended his office in FAO regularly until his death 
from complications of appendicitis early in 1958, at the age of seventy-four. An 
FAO choir sang at his funeral and FAO later initiated the biennial McDougall 
Lecture in his honour.2 Bruce, his senior by one year, remained busy on company 
boards and as first Chancellor of The Australian National University from 1951 
until 1961. He died in London, aged eighty-four, in 1967. Orr retired to his 
farm in Scotland but travelled constantly in the cause of better nutrition and 
was lauded by leaders of many countries for his work. The oldest of the three 
collaborators, he also lived longest; he was ninety when he died in 1971.
Unlike his collaborators, McDougall received little public recognition. The 
New Year Honours list of 1926 had recorded his elevation as a Companion of 
the Order of St Michael and St George (CMG), ‘in recognition of his services 
to the Commonwealth’, doubtless at the request of Bruce. Some Australians, 
in his final years, wanted to recognise his later achievements. Creation of an 
‘Australian’ room at FAO had been suggested a few years before McDougall’s 
death. Rivett’s successor at CSIRO, Ian Clunies Ross, who had known McDougall 
well in London, supported the idea with enthusiasm and also recommended a 
knighthood for McDougall. Others, including Casey, thought Bruce should be 
included in the tribute. Casey opposed the knighthood as McDougall had not 
been serving Australia for many years. Clunies Ross countered that he had been 
at Australia House until 1946 and was ‘still regarded as Australian at FAO’.3 
The knighthood proposal seems not to have been taken further, but the room 
was established, furnished by Australia, and a portrait of McDougall painted 
and installed. Perhaps the political instinct was to avoid giving McDougall the 
publicity that a knighthood would bring, but to allow some recognition safely 
out of the way in Rome.4
1 CSIR, 379/22/16, McDougall to Clunies Ross, 11 November and 7 December; Betty Steedman to Clunies 
Ross, 7 December 1955.
2 Notes by sister Margery McDougall, January 1965; these and other recollections supplied by E. McDougall.
3 CSIR, 541, Clunies Ross to Tange, 25 November 1955; 379/22/16, Casey to McEwen, 12 January; Clunies 
Ross to Tange, 8 February 1956.
4 The Australian Room still exists and was extensively refurbished in 2011. It is considered a prestigious meeting 
room at FAO headquarters. Information from Department of Agriculture, Forests and Fisheries, Canberra.
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Bruce is remembered in Australia chiefly as a prime minister who lost his own 
seat and, unfairly, as one who identified with Britain rather than Australia. One 
possible explanation for the neglect of his international work, which gave him 
high status overseas, is that it took place at times either when Australia lacked 
its own foreign office and diplomatic service or when both were in their infancy. 
International relations were distant in fact and in public consciousness, and 
often seen as the province of Britain, on behalf of the Empire as a whole. The 
nutrition controversy of the 1930s did not stir public interest in Australia as it 
did in Britain; wartime measures to limit food consumption existed, but on a 
far less onerous scale. The activities of the League of Nations were of limited 
interest. Australians knew little of Bruce’s vigorous work in London on their 
behalf. Bruce held no appeal for his former political colleagues, still less for the 
Labor Government in power for most of the 1940s; all were content to let his 
work go unnoticed.
That McDougall’s name is unknown in the country with which he is still 
associated at FAO is understandable. He spent only 10 years of his life in 
Australia, and those chiefly in a rural settlement in the outlying state of South 
Australia, far from centres of influence. Relatively few officials in Melbourne 
and in Canberra knew him firsthand. Those who worked with him overseas were 
generally impressed by his tireless efforts and his abilities, though there were 
exceptions, particularly in the 1920s, when his closeness to Bruce, outside the 
regular establishment, probably caused resentment. In later years, the factors 
that kept Bruce out of public view did so even more effectively for McDougall, 
who had avoided prominent positions. Beyond that, there are clues in some of 
the comments made by Australians in his later years. Coombs’s ‘virtuous con-
man’ phrase suggests a lack of gravitas. Nutritionist and FAO staff member Dr 
W. A. Aykroyd recalled that despite unfailing kindness, particularly to younger 
colleagues, McDougall ‘did not always suffer fools gladly and his comments on 
people and things could at times be withering’.5 Karl Olsen wrote warmly of his 
generosity and friendship, adding:
...his means of shepherding his ideas were wit and hospitality…His 
dinners were well known. There was no stint of food and drink and 
they were certainly never dull. If he could not get a man to go to dinner 
he would buy him a drink. A great deal got done at the bar in between 
quotes from poets, the Scriptures and hilarious and sometimes naughty 
stories about his colleagues…Some of his stories were deadly and this is 
one reason why he had some enemies.6
5 NLA, MS6890/5/3, undated text of recording by Dr Wallace Aykroyd, Director, FAO Nutrition Division.
6 Ibid., Karl Olsen to John McDougall, 23 February 1965.
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In the FAO years, McDougall worked hard to project an Australian image, using 
his congeniality to emphasise it. Dr A. R. Callaghan recalled 
a very happy party in Rome in 1954 at which every Australian known to 
F. L. McDougall had been invited to meet the Australian Delegation. The 
[FAO] 1954 Conference had just finished, the strain was off, and Frank 
McDougall was ready to celebrate. We sang Australian songs with great 
gusto, including Waltzing Matilda, mainly, I am sure, because we all felt 
that Frank McDougall was enjoying his Australian contacts so much.7
Coombs wrote that he gave his capacity to consume beer as evidence of his 
authenticity. ‘When I die’, Mac would say solemnly, ‘I hope they will inscribe 
on my tombstone the tribute, “He never left his beer unfinished”, I have earned 
it.’ Yet Coombs thought that he was not generally considered an Australian and 
asserted his Australian credentials too much.8 
Those who knew McDougall best believed the conviviality masked loneliness 
following the end of his marriage in the late 1920s.9 The loneliness may also 
explain his patience with and even enthusiasm for drafting sessions, committee 
meetings and conferences. Lester Pearson reported to Ottawa from a Wheat 
Advisory Committee meeting that participants favouring a conference included 
Australia ‘because McDougall loves conferences’.10 Paul Hasluck, a young 
diplomat in London when he knew McDougall, later Minister for External 
Affairs and Governor-General, probably captured the essential McDougall 
when he wrote: ‘He loved being busy in and around the corridors of power. 
The Heaven which I hope he now enjoys would be an endless succession of 
conferences, with much plucking of elbows and prompting of delegates and 
sharing of plans with the archangels.’11
McDougall was, of course, far more than an eager ‘committeeman’. His 
contribution to the international world formed in the aftermath of war was the 
result of vision and boundless imagination, driven by the values he had adopted 
as a young man—pragmatism, independence and above all optimism—and 
shaped by all that he had learned on his journey of trade, science, economics 
and of human nature. He had dared to challenge entrenched thinking. Although 
his ideas had not always been accepted and his plans had sometimes come to 
nothing, he maintained a determined optimism. And so he became a driving 
force in the creation of an international organisation aiming to better the lives 
of millions.
7 Ibid., text of broadcast in the ‘Countryman’s Session’, 26 October 1958.
8 Coombs, Trial Balance, pp. 41–2; Interview with W. Way, 7 April 1995.
9 Elspeth Huxley, Letter to W. Way, 15 April 1986.
10 NAC, MG 26-N1, Vol. 14, ‘Skelton O. D.—Canada—External Affairs’, 1939–40.
11 Sir Paul Hasluck to W. J. Hudson, 9 June 1986. Copy in my possession.
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Figure 22 F. L. McDougall.
Source: E. McDougall. 
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Appendix I
F. L. McDougall: Biographical outline
1884 Born 16 April, in Blackheath, London. 
1901 Completes education at Blackheath Proprietary School; passes 
matriculation examination for University of London.
1903–05 Studies German in Godesberg-am-Rhein; prepares to enter 
Technical University in Darmstadt.
1907–08 Travels to St Helena and Natal and investigates possibility of 
wattle-growing on behalf of family.
1909 Arrives in Renmark, South Australia, and is assisted by family to 
purchase fruit block. 
1914 Visits England and investigates markets for dried fruits.
1915 Marries Madeleine Joyce Cutlack.
1915–19 Service in AIF.
1918 Birth of son, John.
1919 ‘Notes on the Dried Fruits Industry in Australia’ read at 
Conference of River Agricultural Bureaux.
1920 Birth of daughter, Elisabeth.
1921–22 Campaign to persuade Australian governments to lobby Britain 
for tariff preference on dried fruits.
1922 Meets Bruce before departure as member of three-man Fruit 
Delegation to Britain. 
1923 Lobbies in London for fruit sales and tariff preference; assists 
Bruce at Imperial Conference.
1924 Returns to Melbourne at request of Bruce to prepare legislation 
for orderly marketing; agreement with Bruce on means of 
continuing work in London.
1925 Publication of Sheltered Markets.
1925–29 Part-time Secretary of the London Agency, Dried Fruits Export 
Control Board.
1925–44 Economic Adviser, Australia House; represents Australia on 
Imperial Economic Committee.
1926–30 London Liaison Officer for Development and Migration 
Commission.
1926–33 Member of Empire Marketing Board.
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1926–30s London Liaison Officer for Council of Scientific and Industrial 
Research. 
1928 Appointed Vice-Chairman, Executive Council of Imperial 
Agricultural Bureaux.
1928–29 Member of League of Nations Economic Consultative Committee 
(ECC).
1929 Joins Agricultural Economics Committee of International 
Institute of Agriculture. 
1929–30 Member of ECC Committee of Agricultural Experts. 
1930 Adviser to Australian delegation, Imperial Conference, London.
1932 Adviser to Australian delegation, Imperial Conference, Ottawa.
1933 Australian representative at International Wheat Conference.
1933–40s Member of Wheat Advisory Committee.
1934 Devises ‘marriage of health and agriculture’.
1935 Works towards Australia’s successful nutrition resolution at 
League of Nations.
1936 Member of League of Nations ‘Mixed Committee’ on nutrition.
1936–39 Applies ideas in nutrition initiative to ‘economic appeasement’ 
of Germany and to reform of the League of Nations. 
1937–39 Member of League Economic Committee
1941–42 Works with US officials to promote the idea of an international 
agency for food and agriculture, and to prepare for its 
establishment.
1943 Represents Australia at Hot Springs Conference; appointed 
member of Interim Commission for Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO).
1945 Formal establishment of FAO; becomes Special Adviser to the 
Director-General.
1946 Permanent appointment to FAO as ‘Counselor’.
1955 Official retirement after suffering stroke.
1958 Dies in Rome.
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Select List of Persons1
Acheson, Dean US Assistant Secretary of State
Amery, L. S. British Colonial Secretary 1924–29; Dominions 
Secretary from July 1925; ‘imperial visionary’
Appleby, Paul H. Executive Secretary to US Agriculture Secretary 
1933–40; Under Secretary of Agriculture 1940–44; 
Member of FAO Interim Commission 1943–44
Ashton-Gwatkin, F. T. 
A.
Head of Economic Relations Section, Western 
Department, British Foreign Office
Astor, Viscount 
(Waldorf)
Owner of the London Observer; Chairman of the 
League of Nations Mixed Committee on Nutrition
Aykroyd, W. R. Nutrition scientist at the League of Nations 1931–35; 
co-author of Nutrition and Public Health (1935); 
head of Nutrition Division, FAO 1946–60
Baldwin, Stanley British Prime Minister 1923–24, 1924–29, 1935–37
Barrington-Ward, R. M. Assistant Editor of The Times (London)
Barwell, H. N. Premier of South Australia 1920–24
Beaverbrook, Lord  
(Max Aitken) 
Canadian-born businessman and owner of the Daily 
Express; President of the Board of Trade 1916; 
Minister of Information 1918; Minister of Aircraft 
Production 1940; then Minister of Supply and Lord 
Privy Seal
Bennett, R. B. Prime Minister of Canada 1930–35
Berle, Adolf US Assistant Secretary of State
Boudreau, Frank G. Deputy Director, League of Nations Health 
Organisation; Executive Director, Milbank Memorial 
Fund, New York, from 1937
Brigden, J. B. Australian economist; member of the committee of 
inquiry into the Australian tariff 1927–29; Financial 
Secretary, Australian Legation in Washington 1941–
46; Chairman of Finance Committee, FAO
1 Positions given are those relevant to this publication.
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Bruce, S. M. Australian Federal Treasurer 1921–23; Prime 
Minister 1923–29; Resident Minister in London 
1932–33; High Commissioner 1933–45; President of 
the Council of the League of Nations 1936; chaired 
committees leading to production of the ‘Bruce 
Report’ 1937–39; Chairman of World Food Board 
Preparatory Commission 1946; Chairman of the 
World Food Council 1947–51; created Lord Bruce of 
Melbourne 1946
Casey, R. G. Australian External Affairs Liaison Officer, London 
1924–31; Federal Minister from 1933; Federal 
Treasurer 1935–39; Minister at Australian Legation 
in Washington 1940–42; British Minister in Cairo 
1942–43; Federal President of the Liberal Party 
1947–49; Australian Minister for External Affairs 
1951–60
Chaffey, W. B. Canadian engineer and irrigation pioneer; 
established irrigation settlements at Renmark and 
Mildura with brother George; remained active 
in grower concerns at Mildura; member of Fruit 
Delegation 1922–23
Chamberlain, Joseph British Colonial Secretary 1895–1903; instituted 
tariff reform campaign 1903
Chamberlain, Neville British Minister of Health 1923, 1924–29, 1931; 
Chairman of the Unionist Party and head of 
Conservative Research Department 1930–31; 
Chancellor of the Exchequer 1923–24, 1931–37; 
Prime Minister 1937–40 
Chadwick, Sir David Secretary of the Imperial Economic Committee from 
1927, and of the Imperial Agricultural Bureaux from 
1928
Churchill, Winston British Colonial Secretary 1921–22; Chancellor of the 
Exchequer 1924–29; Prime Minister 1940–45
Coombs, H. C. Australian economist; Director of Department for 
Post-War Reconstruction 1942; leader of Australian 
delegation at Hot Springs Conference
Cooper, Sir James London accountant and administrator; Chairman of 
the London Agencies of the Australian Dried Fruits, 




Crawford, J. G. Australian economist; founding Director of the 
Bureau of Agricultural Economics; member of FAO 
Standing Committee on Economics and Marketing
Curtin, John Australian Prime Minister 1941–45
Cutlack, F. M. Brother of Joyce McDougall; lawyer, journalist, writer
Davis, Norman Financial and foreign affairs adviser to US President 
Roosevelt; head of American Red Cross
Dawson, Geoffrey Editor of The Times (London)
Deakin, Alfred Australian Prime Minister 1903–04, 1905–08, 
1909–10
Dodd, Norris E. US Under Secretary of Agriculture; delegate to FAO 
Conference, Copenhagen 1946; Director-General of 
FAO 1948–54
Duckham, Sir Arthur Gas engineer and industrialist; leading member of 
industrial organisations and inquiries, including the 
1928 Business Mission to Australia; cousin of F. L. 
McDougall
Elliot, Walter Scottish doctor and Conservative MP; friend of 
Boyd Orr; Parliamentary Under-Secretary of Health 
for Scotland 1923, 1924–25; Parliamentary Under-
Secretary of State for Scotland 1926–29; Chairman 
of the Research Grants Committee of the Empire 
Marketing Board; Minister of Agriculture and 
Fisheries 1932–36; Secretary of State for Scotland 
1936–38; Minister of Health 1938–40
Fadden, A. W. Australian Prime Minister 29 August – 7 October 1941
Fitzpatrick, Dr A. S. Technical Assistant to F. L. McDougall 1926–30
Gepp, H. W. Metallurgist and engineer; Chairman, Australian 
Development and Migration Commission 1926–30
Grady, Henry US economist; member of US Tariff Commission 
from 1937; Assistant Secretary of State for Economic 
Affairs 1939–41; Member of the League of Nations 
Economic Committee
Hall, Professor N. F. 
(Noel)
Head of Department of Political Economy, University 
College London; Director, National Economic Research 
Institute, London from late 1937
Hawkins, Harry Head of Treaties Section, US Department of State
Hopkins, Harry Adviser to US President Roosevelt
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Horne, Sir Robert British Minister of Labour 1919–20; President of 
the Board of Trade 1920–21; Chancellor of the 
Exchequer 1921–22; company director
Hughes, W. M. Australian Prime Minister (Labor) 1915–17, 
(Nationalist) 1917–23
Hull, Cordell US Secretary of State
Huxley, Elspeth, née 
Grant 
Publicity Officer, Empire Marketing Board 1929–32; 
writer 
Jebb, Gladwyn Civil servant in Economic Relations Section, Western 
Department, British Foreign Office from 1935; 
Private Secretary to Sir Robert Vansittart and then to 
Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1937–40 
Julius, George Australian engineer; Chairman of Council for 
Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR)
King, W. L. Mackenzie Prime Minister of Canada 1921–26, 1926–30, 1935–48
Latham, J. G. Australian Attorney-General 1925–29, 1931–34; 
Minister for External Affairs 1931–34 
Law, Andrew Bonar British Prime Minister October 1922 – May 1923
Leith-Ross, Sir 
Frederick
Chief Economic Adviser to the British Government 
and member of the League of Nations Economic 
Committee from 1932; Chairman of the committee 
1936–37
Lloyd, E. M. H. Assistant Secretary, Empire Marketing Board
Louwes S. L. Netherlands Director-General of Food; Special 
Adviser, FAO, from 1945
Loveday, Alexander Director, Financial and Economic Intelligence 
Section, League of Nations
Lyons, J. A. Australian Prime Minister 1932–39
MacDonald, Ramsay British Prime Minister (Labour) 1924, 1929–31; 
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McDougall, Alexander Grandfather of F. L. McDougall; amateur chemist; 
founder of milling and chemical companies
McDougall, Catherine 
(Kit)
Sister of F. L. McDougall 
McDougall, Elisabeth Daughter of F. L. McDougall 
McDougall, John Son of F. L. McDougall 
McDougall, Joyce, née 
Cutlack
Wife of F. L. McDougall from 1915; separated c. 1929
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McDougall, Norman Half-brother of F. L. McDougall; shared Renmark 
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MacLeish, Archibald Librarian of Congress, Washington; Deputy Director, 
Office of War Information
Macmillan, Harold British Conservative MP 1924–29 and from 1931; 
Prime Minister 1957‒63; director of Macmillan & Co. 
publishers; writer
Menzies, R. G. Australian Prime Minister 1939–41
Morgenthau, Henry, jr Head of US Farm Board 1933; Acting Treasury Secretary 
November 1933; Treasury Secretary 1934–45
Norman, Montagu Governor of the Bank of England
Ormsby-Gore, William Under-Secretary at the British Colonial Office 1922–
29, except during Labour Government of 1924; 
member of Empire Marketing Board 
Orr, John Boyd Director, Rowett Institute, Aberdeen; advocate for 
nutrition; Director-General of FAO 1945–48
Parran, Thomas US Surgeon General 
Pearson, Lester Counsellor, Canadian Embassy in Washington 1942–
45; Ambassador 1945–46; Chairman of FAO Interim 
Commission 1943–45
Richardson, A. E. V. Member of Executive Council, CSIR; Director 
of Waite Agricultural Research Institute, South 
Australia
Riefler, Winfield US economist; member of League of Nations Finance 
Committee; Economic Adviser to US Economic 
Defense Board, from 1941; Minister in charge of 
Economic Warfare, US Embassy, London, from 1942
Rivett, A. C. D. (David) Council Member, CSIR, from June 1926; Chief 
Executive from 1927




Runciman, Walter President of the UK Board of Trade 1914–16, 1931–37
Salter, Sir Arthur Head of the Economic and Financial Section of 
the League of Nations Secretariat until 1930; 
writer; Gladstone Professor of Political Theory 
and Institutions at Oxford University from 1934; 
Member of Parliament, from 1937
Scullin, J. H. Prime Minister of Australia October 1929–January 
1932
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Skelton, O. D. Deputy Minister, Canadian Department of External 
Affairs
Smith, A. Stuart Clerical Assistant to F. L. McDougall 1926–30
Snowden, Philip British Chancellor of the Exchequer 1924 and 
1929–31
Stirling, Alfred Australian External Affairs Officer, London 1937–45
Stoppani, Paul Director, Economic Relations Section, League of 
Nations
Tallents, Sir Stephen Secretary, Empire Marketing Board
Taylor, H. S. Editor, Murray Pioneer
Thomas, J. H. Trade unionist; Colonial Secretary 1923; Lord Privy 
Seal 1929–30; Dominions Secretary 1930–35; member of 
Empire Marketing Board from February 1927
Tolley, Howard R. Director, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, 
Washington; member of FAO Interim Commission; 
Director of Economics and Marketing, FAO
Twentyman, Edward British representative on FAO Interim Commission
Van Zeeland, Paul Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Belgium; 
commissioned by Britain and France to study means 
of reducing obstacles to international trade
Welles, Sumner US Under Secretary of State
Wickard, Claude US Secretary of Agriculture 
Wilson, Dr M. L. US Assistant Secretary of Agriculture
Wilson, Senator R. V. Australian Honorary Minister 1923–25; Minister for 
Markets and Migration 1925 – June 1926; defeated 
in November 1925
Winant, John G. Assistant Director, ILO, Geneva 1935 and 1937–39; 
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